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
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
THE HUSSITE WARS



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
BY
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INSCRIBED
TO MY AMERICAN FRIENDS
IN REMEMBRANCE OF MUCH KINDNESS AND
HOSPITALITY RECEIVED DURING A VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE
WINTER OF 1912



R. Smith del. 1794

John Liska of the Chalice.

PREFACE

It is impossible when studying the events connected with the life of Hus not to devote great attention to the lengthy wars in Bohemia and the neighbouring countries that were the inevitable result of his unjust condemnation, and not to realise how great the influence of these wars on the development of Europe was. It is certainly due to the military genius of Žižka and the other Hussite leaders that Hussite teaching and Hussite thought long prevailed in Bohemia and largely influenced the neighbouring countries. Had the Bohemians been defeated in the battles of the Žižkov and the Vyšehrad, their doctrines would have been immediately suppressed, and Hus would have appeared in history as an isolated enthusiast, such as Savonarola.

Yet the history of the Hussite wars is, I think, little known in England. The late Bishop Creighton, in his *History of the Papacy*, gives an admirable outline of the Hussite movement, but he stated that he did not intend to attempt a detailed account of the Hussite wars. In Bohemia itself no reliable account of this great struggle existed before the days of Palacký. For political reasons, into which I do not wish to enter, the Austrian Government which, after the year 1620, obtained absolute control over Bohemia, wished to obliterate in that country all recollections of the time when Bohemia had played a great part in European politics, and successfully repulsed the attacks of countless invading armies. It is from this period that date many of the fables that have long taken the place of historical facts in the records of Bohemia, though it must be admitted that the *Historia Bohemica* of

Æneas Sylvius is responsible for the descriptions of Žižka and Prokop as wizards or magicians, and for foolish tales such as that concerning Žižka's drum.

In this respect Palacký's monumental history of Bohemia produced a complete change. He was the first to collect in the archives of Bohemia and other countries authentic evidence on the period of the Hussite wars. With an amount of courage which English readers can, perhaps, hardly realise, Palacký published an impartial and authentic account of the Hussite wars, regardless of the relentless molestation and persecution which befell him, as having ventured to judge unfavourably the policy of the papal see with regard to Bohemia.¹ Since the time of Palacký, the late Professor Tomek and many others, whom I shall mention presently as authors of works which I have used, have written freely and independently on the great Bohemian civil war.

While this great civil war has thus comparatively attracted but little the attention of historians, and those who have written of it have very frequently misrepresented both the motives and the events of the struggle, the Bohemian people, since it has been allowed to study the annals of its country, has been deeply interested in the Hussite wars. This feeling has been so eloquently described by the Bohemian historian Gindely, that I cannot do better than quote his words. "The Hussite battles," he writes, "were fought for a national cause; poets and painters have chosen them as their subject; the most stirring popular songs date from that time; the names of the leaders of this movement still linger in the memory of the people; the name of no Bohemian king is as familiar to them as that of the blind leader of the Hussite armies. The violent destruction of the national constitution by Ferdinand II, the sufferings which the country endured during

¹ Those interested in this matter will find an account of the annoyances caused to Palacký by the "censure-office" of Vienna in my *History of Bohemian Literature*.

the Austrian war of succession at the hand of Prussians, Bavarians, and Frenchmen, events that occurred but one or two centuries ago are forgotten. On all these occasions the peasant was a mere sufferer; he was deprived of his religious creed, or of his worldly goods, but he never defended himself. In the Hussite wars he had himself been a fighter; he had been a victorious warrior, and his flail and fighting-club had successfully beaten back the enemies of his country and his faith."

It is necessary to refer briefly to the principal sources on which the historian of the Hussite wars has to rely. I will first mention the collections of contemporary chronicles published by Palacký in the third volume of the *Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*. These chronicles, written in the Bohemian language, are the work of various writers. The manuscripts were afterwards collected and first published in the nineteenth century.

Of other contemporary writers Lawrence of Březova, author of a Latin work, *de gestis et variis accidentibus regni Bohemiæ*, is the only one who can be considered as a historian. He writes as a moderate Hussite or "Calixtine," equally opposed to the tyranny of Rome and to the fanaticism of the advanced Táborites. If we make due allowance for the personal sympathies and views of Březova, his chronicle is very valuable, and he may be considered as almost the only genuine contemporary historian of the Hussite wars.¹ I have here largely used the contents of his work. It is deeply to be regretted that Březova's chronicle breaks off suddenly in the middle of his record of the year 1421. Professor Goll has edited, together with Březova's chronicle, two other contemporary chronicles, that of the university of Prague—a not very valuable compilation—and that of Bartošek of Drahonice. Bartošek was a knight in the service of King Sigismund during the Hussite wars. He writes as a soldier, little interested in theological

¹ For a more detailed notice of Lawrence of Březova see my *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia*, pp. 35-47.

discussions; but with regard to the details of warfare—so sadly neglected by the other writers of the time—his work is most valuable. A large collection of mostly contemporary records was published by Professor Höfler under the title of *Geschichtsschreiber der hussitischen Bewegung in Böhmen*. This collection was published under the auspices of the Government of Vienna, and Professor Höfler did not limit himself to the editing of these ancient records, but violently attacked in his commentary the leaders of the Hussite movement.¹ His collection, however, contains some very valuable documents that were previously almost unknown. Of these the Chronicle of Canon Andrew of Regensburg ("Andreas presbyter Ratisponensis"), written from a thoroughly German and anti-Hussite point of view, and the *Chronicon continens causam sacerdotum Taboriensium*, by the Táborite priest, Nicholas of Pelhřimov, one of the few writings by Táborite divines which have been preserved, require special mention. I have, in my notes to this work, referred to other writers contained in Professor Höfler's collection. Another chronicler who, like Andrew of Regensburg, writes with a strong Roman and anti-Hussite bias, was the Professor of Theology at the University of Vienna, Thomas Eschendorfer of Haselbach, who took part in the negotiations at Basel which preceded the agreement known as the "compacts." His chronicle is printed in the second volume of Pez, *Scriptores rerum Austriacarum*. I mention last the work of a contemporary writer which has been more largely quoted by later writers on the Hussite wars than all others, and has up to lately been the foundation of all accounts of the Bohemian religious warfare. I refer to the *Historia Bohemica* of Æneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II. Æneas Sylvius had as a young man been present at the arrival of the Bohemian ambassadors at Basel, and he was on terms of friendship with Cardinal Cesarini.

¹ On the controversy which arose on this subject between Palacký and Höfler, see my *Lectures on Historians of Bohemia*, pp. 102–105.

That the tendency of his work should be strongly hostile to the Calixtine or Utraquist cause was, no doubt, inevitable, but Æneas often attacks his enemies in a distinctly unfair manner. Thus he lays great stress on the appearance of the Adamite fanatics in Bohemia, though they had no connection whatever with the Hussite movement, entered Bohemia as strangers, and were almost immediately extirpated by the Hussite general, Žižka.¹ Žižka himself and the Bohemian nobles are described as savages whom Providence permitted to obtain victories to punish the sins of the Christian world. I have already alluded to the repulsive and untruthful description of Žižka's death. The value of Æneas Sylvius's book is also lessened by the humanistic manner of the author, who is always endeavouring to imitate the historians of Greece and Rome. He always strives to adorn and enliven his narrative by often quite unauthenticated anecdotes, and he follows the classics in introducing imaginary speeches, which the modern student of Bohemian history knows to be quite out of harmony with the character of the supposed speaker.

The period of the German reformation again shows a slight revival of interest in the Hussite movement, which, after the "compacts" and the restoration of King Sigismund, had for a time attracted but little attention. Founding their view on Luther's words, the early German Church reformers glorified the Hussites, whom they considered as their predecessors. The German writers of this time, however, attributed all the success which the Bohemians for a time obtained to the extreme Táborite fanatics, and quite ignored the merits of the conservative Hussite party—consisting mainly of the lords sub-Utraque and the citizens of the old town of Prague—which, under more favourable circumstances, would, perhaps, have established a national church and a national kingdom in Bohemia. We find the same tendency also in the work of Zacharias Theobaldus, entitled *Hussitenkrieg*, which belongs to

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 360-361.

the seventeenth century. After the battle of the White Mountain in 1620, and the suppression of Protestantism and the national constitution of Bohemia, all literary activity in that country ceased, and the Bohemians were prevented from obtaining any information on the history of their country. They were even forbidden to read the *Historia Bohemica* of Pope Pius II. Late in the eighteenth century Pubička's *Chronologische Geschichte von Böhmen* was published. Though the period of the Hussite wars is, as was then necessary, treated with great caution, yet it is not without value, and includes some interesting documents.

In the nineteenth century the monumental historical work of Palacký¹ appeared, to which I have already referred. It threw an entirely new light on the history of the Bohemian revolution. Palacký proved that the Hussites were not, as had been believed, brutal and fanatical savages, but Christians, very zealous for their religion, disgusted by the corruption of the period, and anxious to return to the simplicity and fervour of the primitive church. Besides his great historical work and numerous minor works, Palacký also published two very valuable collections of documents referring to the life of Hus and the period of the Hussite wars. The volume, entitled *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte der Hussitenkriege*, is invaluable for all who wish to study the story of the great Bohemian rising. Of the works on the Hussite wars published after Palacký's history the most valuable are those by the late Professor Tomek. His great work, the *History of the Town of Prague*, becomes, during the period of the Hussite wars, in which the "Praguers" played so great a part, a complete record of all the battles and negotiations that took place in Bohemia at that time. We are also indebted to Professor Tomek for a most interesting biography of Žižka, the first record of the great warrior that has any historical

¹ For an account of Palacký's life and work I refer the reader to my *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia*, pp. 88-105.

value at the present time. Though we, of course, do not find here the grotesque fables concerning Žižka which circulated at the time when independent study of the Hussite wars was prohibited in the Austrian Government, the tendency of the book is obviously adverse to the Bohemian general, and its motive was undoubtedly to lessen the great admiration for Žižka which, as already mentioned, is general among Bohemians. It is unnecessary to enumerate the many recent writings, of greater or lesser value, which have recently appeared in Bohemia—particularly as they are mostly written in the national language, which is almost unknown in England. Much important information is contained in the publications of the Bohemian Museum, of the Bohemian Society of Sciences, the Bohemian Academy, and particularly in the Bohemian *Historical Review* ("Český Časopis Historický"). A Bohemian work dealing specially with the Hussite system of warfare was published recently by Dr. Toman under the name of *Husitské válečnictví* ("Hussite Warfare"). Dr. Toman has made very profound study of the different campaigns of the Hussite wars, and has visited most of the battlefields. The plans and sketches contained in the book have the greatest interest. That Dr. Toman was entirely devoid of all practical knowledge of military matters is evident even to one whose own military experience is founded only on a short period of service in an Austrian regiment of lancers. Some information on the military organisation of the Bohemians during the Hussite wars will be found in General Köhler's very interesting work *Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesen und der Kriegführung in der Ritterzeit bis zu den Hussitenkriegen*. As the title indicates, General Köhler's work ends with the Hussite wars; but incidentally the work contains very interesting remarks on Žižka's system of warfare which I have frequently quoted. It is impossible to refer here to the vast amount of literature on the Hussite wars that has recently appeared. The books of some of these writers are mentioned in my notes to this

work. I must, however, acknowledge my indebtedness to two works by Professor von Bezold; they are entitled *Zur Geschichte des Hussitenthums* and *König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten*.

I have dedicated this work to my American friends, in recognition of the great friendliness and kind hospitality which I met with everywhere during a visit to America in the winter of 1912. I have retained a most pleasant recollection of my countrymen who have settled in the United States, and many of whom I met, particularly in Illinois and Nebraska. Their energy, courage, and self-reliance often recalled to me the Bohemians of old times to a far greater extent than do those of my countrymen who have remained in their old homes.

When writing, in 1895, the preface to the first edition of my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, I wrote the following words: "I must add one remark which is only intended for readers who are my countrymen, in the unlikely case that this little book should come into their hands. In no country has the habit of using the events of the past as examples or arguments applicable to the political dissensions of the present day prevailed so extensively as in Bohemia. Nothing is to my mind more unscientific, and, indeed, more reprehensible. I have exercised special care in avoiding any remark which might have even the appearance of an allusion to the religious or political controversies in Bohemia at the present time."

I find it necessary to repeat this statement, particularly at a moment when the largest Bohemian party, abandoning its former attitude of opposition, endeavours by great subserviency to win the favour of the present Ministry of Vienna.

LÜTZOW

Žampach,
December 1913.

THE HUSSITE WARS

CHAPTER I

ALL writers on the Hussite wars agree that these wars were the result of (three causes), the antagonism of the Bohemians to the Church of Rome, the revival of the Slavic national feeling, and the rise of the democratic spirit which is, to a greater or lesser extent, evident in many European countries at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Where these writers differ widely is in their opinion as to the relative importance which should be attributed to each of these causes. The contemporary chroniclers, who hardly deserve the name of historians, have, both in their Latin and in their Bohemian writings, considered the Hussite movement mainly from the point of view of religious controversy; only occasional remarks indicate how great the racial antagonism was at that period, and how strongly democratic, and for a short time even communistic theories influenced the Bohemian people.

(That the contemporary writers should have laid so great a stress on the religious controversies is natural, if we consider that the immediate cause of the national uprising was the execution of Hus.) The first manifestation of opposition to King Sigismund, the famed "protestatio Bohemorum," which was signed by the principal Bohemian nobles, refers exclusively to the life and the doctrine of Hus.

(The revival of the feeling of solidarity between the different branches of the Slavic race undoubtedly played a considerable part in the determined resistance which the Bohemians offered to the attacks of vastly superior armies of Germans.) As will be noted later, this motive appears on several occasions in the

slight fragments of Žižka's writings that have been preserved. It can be stated generally that the beginning of the fifteenth century is notable as producing a strong reaction on the part of the Slavic race, which, since the time of Charles the Great, had constantly receded before the Teutonic aggression. The first symptom of the Slavic revival was the great victory which the Poles obtained over the Knights of the Teutonic Order at Tannenberg in 1410. According to a well authenticated tradition, Žižka took part in this great battle, and Hus, in a letter which has been preserved,¹ congratulated the King of Poland on his victory. It was in consequence of this feeling of solidarity between the different branches of the Slavic race that Poland generally favoured the Hussite cause. The unswerving fidelity to the Church of Rome, which was frequently disadvantageous to Poland, and contributed considerably to the final downfall of that country, however, prevented the Slavs of Poland from rendering sufficient aid to their Bohemian kinsmen. It should also be mentioned that at this period the revival of the Slavic national spirit extended even to already semi-Germanised lands, such as Mecklenburg and Pomerania.

The third principal motive of the Hussite movement was the awakening of the democratic spirit, which we find in other countries as well as in Bohemia at this time. In consequence of this spirit the Bohemians after their brilliant victories—whose fame soon spread over all Europe—found many friends, even in traditionally hostile Germany and in distant France. It was, no doubt, the fear that this democratic movement might extend to their states which induced the European princes to use their influence on Rome for the purpose of conciliating the Bohemians. In close connection with this democratic feeling we find among the Hussites a strong movement in favour of the emancipation of women. The Czech women of this period not only showed interest in the religious

¹It is printed in my *Master John Hus*, pp. 306-307. >

and political struggles, but they also exercised a considerable influence on the councils of the nation. Some even laid down their lives for the creed of their country.

The faithful friends and adherents of Hus in Prague had, of course, anxiously and feverishly followed the development of the tragedy of Constance, which ended in the condemnation and execution of the Bohemian divine. The letters addressed "to the whole Bohemian nation" and "to the faithful Bohemians,"¹ written by Hus during the last weeks of his life, soon reached Prague, and were read out from the pulpits of the churches. When the fatal news of the death of Hus became known, an ominous silence at first prevailed. Then general lamentation arose and loud indignation was expressed. All saw that a death-struggle was imminent, but the statement of some writers hostile to the Hussite cause that attacks were at this moment made on Roman Catholic priests is unfounded. The people crowded to the churches, and with the musical instinct innate in the Bohemian nation hymns in honour of the new martyr were improvised and sung. Pictures were carried through the market-place representing on one side Christ riding on a mule and followed by the barefooted apostles, on the other the Pope and the cardinals riding richly caparisoned war-horses. The women of Prague, who had from the first shown great interest in the cause of Church reform, and who had always venerated the saintly Hus,² inveighed strongly against the treachery of Rome. The ladies of the court of Queen Sophia—whose confessor Hus had been—were foremost in expressing their grief and indignation.³ Even the Queen's generally apathetic consort, King Venceslas, expressed disapproval. "He (Hus) should not have been executed, as he had a letter of safe conduct," the King is

¹ See my *Life and Times of Master John Hus*, pp. 263-276.

² See my *Master John Hus*, p. 302.

³ Palacký quotes a contemporary strongly anti-Hussite document, which violently attacks the ladies of Queen Sophia's court. One of them, the Lady Anna of Mochov, is described as "*sævissima Jezabel*."

reported to have said. Both Venceslas and his courtiers were greatly irritated by the conduct of the Bohemian clergy, whose complaints and depositions had largely contributed to the condemnation of Hus. The movement caused by the execution of Hus, though it had a somewhat revolutionary character, was, therefore, not at first anti-dynastic, as it was favoured by the Queen and the ladies of her court, and at least not discountenanced by the King.

On the other hand, the secession of the Bohemian people from the Church of Rome became complete. This was mainly due to the general consent to the custom of receiving Communion in the two kinds, Utraquism, as it was generally called. Towards the end of his life Hus had maintained the necessity of Communion in the two kinds. He had at Constance written a tract in defence of this practice as well as a letter¹ in which he warmly upheld it. After the death of Hus, Utraquism became one of the fundamental doctrines of his adherents. I have in other works² attempted to state the reasons why the Bohemians attached such great importance to this tenet. This can to a great extent be explained by the strongly anti-clerical feeling that was at that time almost general among the Czechs. They resented the claim of superiority over all laymen which Bohemian priests—often very unworthy priests—raised, and they resented their attempt to administer Communion in what the Bohemians considered an “incomplete” form. Though recent research has proved that all traces of Communion in the two kinds, as it had been established when Cyrillus and Methodius introduced Christianity into Moravia and Bohemia, had long disappeared in Bohemia, a sentimental recollection of the Eastern Church, to which the “apostles of the Slavs” belonged, may still have influenced the people.

It is at any rate certain that the practice of receiving the

¹ Letter to the priest Havlik, printed in Palacký's *Documenta Mag. Johannis Hus*, p. 128.

² Particularly in my *Master John Hus*, pp. 56–62, 266–267.

Sacrament in the two kinds soon became the characteristic article of faith to which all Bohemian friends of Church reform conformed. The chalice became their emblem, and the whole national party was soon known as that of the Utraquists. The two parties into which the Bohemian nobility divided are by the contemporary chroniclers always described as the lords "sub Utraque" and the lords "sub una." These distinctions, indeed, continued up to the time of the suppression of religious liberty in Bohemia in 1620.

The Bohemians, full of zeal for the doctrine of Utraquism, soon began to expel from their churches those priests—they were not numerous—who refused to administer the Sacrament in the now established fashion, and acts of violence began to take place. The nobles "sub Utraque" also now expelled from their estates those priests who refused to conform to Utraquism. Soon after Hus's death violent letters were sent from Constance to Bohemia, accusing the inhabitants of that country of being heretics. A letter addressed to King Venceslas by Bishop John of Litomyšle,¹ though it was of a somewhat conciliatory character, greatly irritated the Bohemians, who knew that Bishop John had been one of the principal instigators of the trial and execution of Hus. The vast estates of the very wealthy prelate were seized by the neighbouring Utraquist nobles. On July 26, 1417, the Council of Constance addressed to the nobles and knights of Bohemia and to the citizens of the three towns of Prague² a somewhat menacing letter. After having severely censured the deeds of John Hus and Jerome, "those most wicked men, so dangerous to the Church, who had followed Wycliffe in many of his most damnable tenets," the letter ended by stating that should the Bohemians audaciously attempt to oppose in any way the Council's sentence on Hus, which was most pleasing to God and most salutary for the whole Christian people, and should

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, p. 337.

² The city of Prague then comprised three distinct municipalities, the Old Town, the New Town, and the "Small Side" (Malá Strana).

they persist in their damnable heresy, or in any way aid or abet it, then, besides the Divine punishment, which they should certainly expect, the Council would proceed against them in the deserved manner according to the canonical regulations, so that such a punishment should be a useful warning to others.

This letter, which contained no reference whatever to Church reform, the cause which Hus had always had most at heart, and which had at first been considered one of the principal tasks of the Council, caused great indignation among the Bohemians. < It appeared to them that their choice lay between unconditional surrender to Rome or a call to arms. > It was not for a moment doubtful what their decision would be. The powerful Bohemian nobles who at this moment appear as the leaders of the people had, during the reign of the weak King Venceslas, obtained an almost independent position, and they bitterly resented the interference of foreigners in the affairs of their country. Bohemia was at that moment intellectually more advanced than Germany, and many of its nobles, though they were brave warriors, felt a genuine interest in religious questions, and had anxiously hoped for the very necessary reform of the Church. Some of the nobles and knights, particularly those connected with the court, had known Hus personally and had greatly admired his saintly character. The treacherous conduct of King Sigismund—whose letter of safe conduct had guaranteed to Hus the right to be judged in his own country and by his own countrymen—was resented by the whole Bohemian nation. Some of the nobles already opposed the eventual succession to the Bohemian throne of Sigismund, whose brother, King Venceslas, was childless. On the other hand, Sigismund made no attempt to conceal his opinion of the religious views held by the great majority of the Bohemians. In a letter ¹ which he sent to

¹ Printed in German translation by Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber der Hussitischen Bewegung in Böhmen*, Vol. II. pp. 252-254.

his brother Venceslas on December 4, 1417, he wrote: "We cannot consider thee as our beloved brother if thou doest not, as did our ancestors, exterminate all heretics," and further on, "Let every Bohemian, German and Latin, know that we can hardly await the day when I shall drown all Wycliffites and Hussites."

In the last months of his life the weak King Venceslas entirely abandoned the cause of Church reform and endeavoured to stem the Hussite movement. This, as was inevitable, precipitated the course of events. Venceslas issued a decree, declaring that all parish priests whom the Utraquists had expelled from their parishes because they refused to administer Communion in the two kinds should be allowed to return. On the other hand, the Utraquist services were in future to be permitted in three of the Prague churches, and all Utraquist priests not belonging to these churches were to leave Prague. They suffered many indignities at the hand of the Germans of Prague, who had almost all remained faithful to the Church of Rome. Many of these priests fled to the country districts, where they continued to preach and to administer the Sacrament according to the rites of what soon began to be called the Bohemian Church. The priests who had been expelled from Prague mostly sought refuge in the southern districts of Bohemia, where, being deprived of churches, they generally preached, celebrated mass and administered the Sacrament in the open air. The movement spread rapidly, and large crowds flocked to the meeting-places, not only from all parts of Bohemia, but also from the neighbouring districts of Moravia. One of the favourite meeting-places was a hill near the small town of Usti on the Luznice, to which they gave the biblical name of Tábor—a name which they afterwards transferred to the neighbouring hill of Hradiste, where they founded the still existing town of Tábor. Lawrence of Březova thus describes ¹ one of the early meetings of the

¹ Březova's *Chronicle*, pp. 344-345 of Professor Goll's edition.

Hussites : " In the year of the Lord 1419," he writes, " the evangelical priests who favoured Master John Hus and administered the Sacrament to the people in the two kinds, and who were called Wycliffites or Hussites, carried the Sacrament in procession, and assembled a large multitude of people of both sexes from all parts of Bohemia, from towns and villages, on a hill near the castle of Bechyn, to which they gave the name of Tábor. They here administered the Eucharist with great reverence to the people, particularly on feast-days, as their rivals¹ did not permit the people to communicate in this fashion in the neighbouring churches. On the day of St. Mary Magdalene² a large multitude of people of both sexes and many children assembled on this hill from all parts of the kingdom, and more than 40,000 people very reverently communicated in both kinds according to the tradition of Christ and the custom and observance of the primitive Church. On account of this, Venceslas, King of Bohemia, became very uneasy, fearing that he would be driven from his royal throne, and dreading that his place would be taken by Nicholas of Hus,³ whom he had shortly before banished from Prague; for Nicholas had, near [the church of] St. Apollinaris, when surrounded by a large crowd of people, who were, however, unarmed, spoken to the multitude in favour of the right of both adult people and children to receive freely Communion in the two kinds."

It is a proof of the strong Hussite sympathies that prevailed at the court of King Venceslas, that even after their sovereign had abandoned the cause of Church reform many of those who were nearest to him continued to favour the national cause. Nicholas of Hus, who has just been mentioned, had been a member of the royal court, but having been banished from that court because of his Utraquist or Calixtine views, he soon became one of the leaders of the national party. Whether

¹ *i. e.* the priests of the Roman Church.

² July 22.

³ A courtier of King Venceslas. He was not, as has often been wrongly stated, a relation of John Hus.

Březova's statement that Nicholas of Hus aimed at obtaining possession of the Bohemian throne has any foundation cannot, in the absence of sufficient evidence, be ascertained. It is, however, certain that these popular meetings, one of which Březova has described, were not entirely confined to religious practices, but that men such as Nicholas of Hus and Žižka used the opportunity afforded by these vast gatherings for the purpose of giving a certain military training to the numerous peasants, farmers and townsmen who assembled on these occasions. It is more than probable that at the meeting on July 22 the leaders of the people determined soon to march on Prague, should the King continue to be obdurate. It is certain that the nationalists determined that their next meeting should take place at Prague on the day of St. Venceslas (September 28).

Events at Prague, however, before that date brought on the inevitable crisis, and Žižka first appears in the records of the Hussite wars only a few days after the great meeting on the Tábor hill. It has already been mentioned that King Venceslas had limited the Utraquist religious services in Prague to three churches, excluding the Hussites from all the others. This naturally caused great indignation among the citizens, and the Roman Catholic priests and monks who had been expelled from Prague shortly after the death of Hus, but who had now returned, were on several occasions attacked by the people. In consequence of this popular feeling the few Utraquist priests who had remained in Prague soon obtained great influence over the citizens. The most prominent of these priests was John of Zělivo (or Seclau), parish priest at St. Mary-of-the-Snow. On July 30 John preached at his parish church, narrating, as was his custom, his various Apocalyptic visions. He strongly denounced King Sigismund, whom he described as the dragon of the Revelation. The citizens of Prague, who, at that period, following the example of Hus, were deeply imbued with biblical

study, were greatly impressed by Zělivo's fervent and eloquent sermon. After its conclusion the priest led the citizens in procession through the streets, carrying before them the Sacrament in a monstrance, as the Bohemian priests had now begun to do. When the procession passed the town-hall of the New Town¹ they met with a very ungracious reception. Zělivo begged the town-councillors to release some Utraquists who had, because of their faith, been imprisoned in the town-hall. The priest and his followers were, however, received with derision by the town-councillors, who appeared at the windows, and stones were thrown at the procession. One of the stones struck Priest John, who was carrying the monstrance, and the infuriated people immediately attempted to storm the town-hall. They found a leader in John Žižka of Trocnov, who, like Nicholas of Hus, had formerly been a member of the royal court.² Directed by him the citizens forced open the gates of the building, which had been hurriedly barred. Then, entering the council-chamber, they threw the councillors from the windows. Those who survived the fall were killed by the crowd which had assembled below.

The name of Žižka, the hero of the Hussite wars, will, of course, recur constantly in these pages, but though his fame really dates from a somewhat later occurrence, it may be well to refer here already to the early history of the great warrior. The family of the Žižka's of Trocnov, who belonged to the lower nobility or rather gentry of Southern Bohemia, owned a farm and some land at Trocnov near Budějovice.³ Even the recent careful researches concerning Žižka's ancestry have met with little success. The name of Žižka first occurs in an official document of the year 1378; it is, however, doubtful whether the person referred to is John. It seems, indeed,

¹ In the present Karlovo náměstí. See my *Prague* ("Mediæval Towns" series).

² Lawrence, of Březova, in whose work he is first mentioned on this occasion calls him "regis Bohemiæ familiarem."

³ In German, "Budweis."

probable that John Žižka of Trocnov was not born much before the year 1378, as he died in 1424, when still in the full strength of manhood. Of his relations also little is known, though we find a casual mention of his brother and his nephew in the chronicles of the Hussite wars. The many strange tales told of the birth and early youth of Žižka¹ must be considered as purely legendary. It is certain that John Žižka played a considerable part in the guerilla warfare between King Venceslas and the great Bohemian nobles, which continued almost without interruption during the early part of the King's reign. Žižka took the side of the King in these struggles, which were mainly caused by the dislike the nobles felt for the democratic tendency of their sovereign. Among these powerful antagonists of Venceslas were the nobles of the Rosenberg family, some of whose estates were situated near Trocnov. It is probable that it was during a skirmish between the King's soldiers and those of the Rosenberg faction which took place during these wars that Žižka lost the use of one eye. Though very probable, it is not certain that Žižka, fighting on the side of the Poles, took part in the great battle of Tannenberg. Polish as well as Bohemian chroniclers mention his presence, and it was natural that tradition should connect the great Slavic warrior with this first manifestation of the Slavic reaction of the fifteenth century. It is at any rate certain that Žižka was, at the beginning of the Hussite troubles, a member of the royal household—no doubt in recognition of the services which he had rendered to King Venceslas during the civil wars at the beginning of his reign. It is evident that Žižka was from the first

¹ Thus it was said that Žižka was born in a forest during a great storm, and that at the beginning of the Hussite wars he swore, standing under the oak tree under which he was born, to revenge the death of Hus. This legend has been chosen by the German poet Lenau as the subject of one of his finest poems. A recently deceased friend who was interested in Bohemia translated this poem into English. Though the translation by no means does justice to the beauty of the original, I have thought it worth while to publish it as an Appendix to this work.

a firm defender of the national or Utraquist cause, and he was one of those who took part in the popular meetings, at which armed resistance against the adherents of the Church of Rome was first planned. It is certain that Žižka was from the first a fervent believer in the tenets of the Hussite Church, as they were afterwards formulated in the so-called "articles of Prague," and later in the "compacts." As one of the royal courtiers he accompanied Queen Sophia when she attended the sermons of Hus, her confessor, in the Bethlehem Chapel.¹ According to a very ancient and not improbable tradition, Žižka was personally acquainted with Hus. It is certain that he felt the death of the Bohemian divine more deeply than most of the other members of the royal court. It is stated that King Venceslas, noticing one day at court that Žižka appeared melancholy and absorbed in thought, inquired what was the cause of his depression. Žižka answered, "How can I be gay, when our trusted leaders and the faithful preachers of the law of the Lord are, by order of infidel priests, undeservedly and unjustly condemned to the flames?" The King answered, "What can we do? If you know any way to do so, righten it yourself; we shall be pleased." Žižka now considered himself authorised to defend his country against its enemies.

The defenestration at the town-hall of the new city of Prague first gave the Hussite movement a revolutionary and, indeed, anti-dynastic character. It is almost certain that the attack on the town-hall had been planned by John of Zěljivo, who had acquired almost unlimited influence over the people, to force the hand of the more moderate Calixtines, who still hoped that, through the influence of the good Queen Sophia, Venceslas would again become favourable to the Utraquist cause. The anti-dynastic character of the Hussite movement became more pronounced after the death of King Venceslas, which followed the riots at Prague at a very short interval. The

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 74-76, 161, 300.

King was then residing at his castle of Kunratic near Prague. On receiving the news of the events in that city he was immediately seized by an apoplectic fit. Infuriated against the Bohemians, he, after having slightly recovered, wrote to his brother Sigismund, begging him to march to his aid with an army to exterminate all heretics. Only a few days later a second apoplectic fit, on August 16, ended his life. Though the democratic tendencies of King Venceslas and the favour he showed to his Slavic and, for a time also, to his Hussite subjects have caused him often to be judged more severely than he deserves, he was certainly quite unfit to rule a turbulent country, such as Bohemia then was, at one of the most critical moments of its history.

As Venceslas had died childless, his brother Sigismund was now the rightful heir to the Bohemian throne. The state of public opinion in the country, however, rendered it impossible for him to be recognised by the people as their sovereign. When Sigismund permitted—and, indeed, abetted—the execution of Hus at Constance, he practically abdicated the Bohemian throne, though, after twenty-four years of sanguinary civil war, he finally reigned as King of Bohemia for one brief year. The vindictiveness of the Bohemians was proportionate to the strength of their devotion to Hus. Even the more moderate Hussites, such as Žižka, who was by no means on principle opposed to monarchy, abandoned their usual moderation when it was even suggested that the Bohemians should enter into negotiations with Sigismund. To the more advanced Hussites, whose leader was then John of Zělivo, Sigismund was the dragon of the Apocalypse, the murderer of the saint. Sigismund, on his part, as already stated, did not attempt to conceal his detestation of the Hussites, and, indeed, of all Bohemians.

It is not, under these circumstances, surprising that the immediate consequence of Venceslas's death was renewed and more serious rioting in Prague and other Bohemian cities.

The counsels of the extreme party for a time prevailed, and the movement assumed an iconoclastic character. Several churches in Prague were destroyed, as well as the monastery of the Carthusian monks. These monks had incurred the special displeasure of the people, as they had spoken disparagingly of Communion in the two kinds, and had loudly expressed their approval of the execution of Hus. The Carthusians had been informed of the intended attack and had removed most of their treasures, but their monastery was destroyed, and many statues and pictures perished. The Roman Catholic priests and monks, who had returned to Prague during the last months of the reign of Venceslas, were again obliged to leave the city. It is a proof of the strongly puritanic character of the Hussite movement that the people, together with the churches and monasteries, destroyed also all the houses of ill-fame in the city.

Quiet returned to Prague for a short time when the widowed Queen Sophia assumed the regency. Her great sympathy for the Hussite cause was well known, and she had even risked the penalty of excommunication by the ardour with which she protested against the execution of Hus. King Sigismund at the moment raised no objection to the establishment of a regency. He was then in Hungary preparing for war against the Turks, and well knew that it was impossible for him to proceed to Bohemia. Very shortly after the death of Venceslas, probably before the end of August, the leading Utraquist knights and nobles, and some of the prominent citizens belonging to the national party, met at Prague. A message was sent to King Sigismund at Buda in Hungary inviting him to Bohemia, but at the same time formulating certain demands, which mainly referred to matters of religion. They claimed the right to maintain freely the law and word of God according to the teaching of Hus, and also the right to receive the Sacrament in the two kinds. They further demanded that it should be forbidden to call Hus and Jerome heretics.

The designation of heretic always deeply offended the Bohemians, who maintained that they were members of the universal Church. The Bohemians further asked Sigismund to use his influence with the Pope to induce him to permit Communion in the two kinds in Bohemia, and finally demanded that very severe measures should be taken to check the simony and evil living that were then very prevalent among the Bohemian clergy. The citizens of Prague added several other demands. They begged the King to condone the recent riots and to grant his sanction to the election of the new town-councillors, whom they had, during the disturbances, chosen illegally, that is, without requesting the approval of their sovereign. They lastly begged that the houses of ill-fame that had been destroyed should not be rebuilt. The King's answer was a short and evasive one. He promised to maintain the ancient privileges of Bohemia, and stated that he could give no decisive answer with regard to Communion in the two kinds till he had returned to Bohemia and consulted the nobles and the clergy of the country. The conciliatory attempt of the Utraquist nobles, who had limited their demands to the right of communicating in the two kinds and to the King's consent to regulations which would have checked simony and the immorality of the clergy, had thus failed, as attempts at mediation on the part of moderate men in a time of revolution generally do. Both the Romanists and the Utraquists very soon resumed hostilities.

The more advanced Hussites—who soon became known as the Táborites—had from the first placed no faith in the attempted mediation. Their meetings, therefore, continued. On September 30 a large meeting took place at a spot known as "at the crossways" ("U Křižku") near Benešov, and not far from Prague; it had evidently been chosen for the purpose of facilitating the attendance of the Praguers, many of whom were, no doubt, expected. The meeting was a very orderly one. Several sermons were preached, one by Venceslas

Koranda, parish priest of Plzeň, afterwards one of the most famous Hussite divines, and many received the Sacrament in the two kinds. No one was allowed to carry arms, and private property was rigidly respected. When a poor peasant complained that his field had been injured by the crowd which had crossed it, one of the leaders immediately collected sufficient money to repair the damage done. The numerous priests who were present engaged in theological discussions, and it is probable that the theological affirmations afterwards known as the "articles of Prague" were drawn up on this occasion,¹ though negotiations on these points had taken place previously, and the articles were only officially published in 1420. There is no doubt that the military leaders, who were well acquainted with King Sigismund's intentions, also met in council. They probably thought that, in view of the inevitable war, it would be well to obtain possession of the capital as soon as possible. Prague was then, as it is now, the only large city in Bohemia, and it holds in that country a predominant position, which can be compared only to that of Paris in France. It was therefore decided that the next meeting of the nationalists should be held at Prague on November 10.

Even before that day great excitement prevailed in the capital. It was known that several of the nobles who sided with King Sigismund were determined to attack the Utraquists on their march. The preacher, Koranda, entreated the people not to desist from their intent; in the then customary language he declared that the vineyard of the Lord was beginning to blossom, but that the goats wished to gnaw at it; therefore should the faithful carry with them for its defence not sticks but arms.² Several skirmishes, in which the Hussites

¹ This now appears to me most probable, though Dr. Dvorský places the date of the "articles" as far back as 1417. See my *Master John Hus*, p. 343, n. 1, also my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 128, n. 1.

² As already noted, the Hussites at their earlier meetings assembled unarmed, carrying only cudgels.

were victorious, took place before they arrived at Prague. News of these skirmishes, or at least of the intention of the Romanist nobles to attack the Hussites on their march, reached Prague already, on November 4, and street-fighting immediately began. The priest Ambrose, formerly parish priest of Králové Hradec (Königgrätz), exhorted the people to attack the royal castle on the Hradčany hill. The bells of all the church steeples of Prague were rung, and large masses of Utraquists, led by Nicholas of Hus and Žižka of Trocnov, crossing the bridge of Prague, attacked the royal troops, which occupied the Malá Strana at the foot of the Hradčany. After a prolonged and very sanguinary contest the Hussites remained victorious, and the royalists were obliged to evacuate the Malá Strana—part of which was burnt down—and retire to the strongly fortified Hradčany castle. The victory was principally due to Žižka, and it was here that his brilliant career as leader of the Bohemian people may be considered to have begun.¹

Almost at the same time as the Utraquists had resumed hostilities the Roman party began to attack them in various parts of Bohemia. Troubles first broke out at Kutna Hora (Kuttenberg), then the great mining city of Bohemia. They are thus described by Lawrence of Březova, almost our only contemporary authority. "At this time," he writes, "the faithful Bohemians, both priests and laymen, who favoured Communion in the two kinds and reverently partook of it, and who deeply deplored the unjust death of John Hus, of sacred memory—who had perished by a terrible death because the perverse clergy of the kingdom of Bohemia and the margraviate of Moravia, principally the bishops, canons, abbots and parish priests, who had not been able to suffer his sermons, in which he denounced their pride, simony and avarice . . . had,

¹ We read in the "*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*" (Vol. III. p. 32), "The Bohemians occupied the end of the bridge on the side of the Malá Strana, and here Žižka became famous among the people, for here he first began to fight. The *Chronica Universitatis Pragensis* (p. 581 of Professor Goll's edition) states: "Item Pragenses spoliaverunt civitatem minorem Pragensem, et ibi Žižka cepit capitaneatum."

by the aid of gifts of money, procured false witnesses against him, and had been abetted by the Hungarian King Sigismund—these faithful Bohemians, I say, suffered many troubles, tribulations, annoyances and vexations from the enemies of truth and the blasphemers who robbed them, and tortured them by cruel imprisonment, hunger, thirst and death.¹ For the enemies of the truth pursued the clerics and laymen who were zealous for the chalice, through various parts of the kingdom, and delivered them over to the miners [of Kutna Hora], and sold some men to them; these miners, who were Germans, and cruel persecutors of the Bohemians, and particularly of those who loved the teaching of Christ, with much blasphemy tortured them, and inhumanly threw them, particularly at time of night, into the deepest pits and shafts—some still alive, and others after they had decapitated them; and they did this principally at the shaft near the church of St. Martin, beyond the Kouřim gate, calling this shaft Tábor;² and so great was the vast cruelty of the miners against the faithful Christians who were zealous for God's law, that during a brief time more than 1,600 men who were in favour of sacred Communion with the chalice were miserably murdered by them and thrown into the shaft, when the executioners had become weary of murdering. But assuredly this inhuman raging against the faithful of Christ was followed by Divine vengeance; for after two years this mining city was, in punishment of the murder of many faithful there, thoroughly destroyed and consumed by fire." When we read this page and many similar ones we understand why the Hussites—though their antagonists far surpassed them in cruelty—sometimes acted with great ferocity during the Hussite wars.

The severe fighting which took place at Prague, during which the entire Malá Strana and numerous buildings in other parts of the city were burnt down, caused many Utraquists—

¹ In spite of its formidable length, I have translated this period literally, as it gives a good idea of Březova's style.

² Of course an allusion to the meeting-place of the Hussites.

and particularly the nobles who adhered to that party, who, from dynastic, or rather feudal motives, were reluctant to oppose the legitimate sovereign—to again attempt the hopeless task of reconciling King Sigismund with the Bohemian nation. Through the intervention of Lord Čenek of Wartenberg, acting for Queen Sophia, who, though she had left Prague, was still considered as regent, an armistice was concluded on November 13, which was to continue up to the end of April 1420. The Queen and the lords who sided with her promised to maintain, as far as it was in their power, the right of preaching freely and of receiving Communion in the two kinds. The Pragueres, on the other hand, agreed to surrender to the royal troops the castle of the Vyšehrad, of which they had obtained possession during the recent fights, and they also promised to prevent all further destruction of churches and monuments.

Sigismund did not sanction this agreement, and the Táborite party, rightly distrusting his future intentions, refused to accept the armistice. Žižka, now the recognised leader of the Táborites, determined to leave Prague with his men, and to march into South-Western Bohemia. As for a short time no events of importance occurred in Prague, it is more interesting to follow Žižka and his Táborites. They first marched to Plzeň (Pilsen), on the advice of Koranda, a priest of that city, whose name has already been mentioned.¹ Koranda—wrongly, as afterwards became obvious—believed that the inhabitants of Plzeň were almost entirely favourable to the Hussite cause. Žižka was, no doubt, more influenced by the fact that Plzeň was at that time strongly fortified. The fortified places and castles in Bohemia were then still almost all in the possession of the royalists, and Žižka sought at Plzeň what he afterwards found at Tábor—a fortified centre

¹ Before the appearance of Palacký's work, when the only records of Bohemia consisted in myths and legends, we were told that Žižka marched to Plzeň because it was one of the five "cities of refuge" or "holy cities," and because it was called "the City of the Sun." Those interested in such matters will find these visionary ideas expounded in George Sand's quaint biography, or rather historical romance, entitled *Jean Zyska*, pp. 78-79.

for the military community of which he had become the head. It is one of history's ironies that Plzeň, first chosen as the centre of the Hussite party, should, in the later period of the war, have become the stronghold of the Roman party, and that the unsuccessful siege of Plzeň should have been the immediate cause of the downfall of the Táborites.

Žižka and his followers arrived safely at Plzeň, and he, by a successful sortie, dispersed the royal troops, who were preparing to besiege the city. Yet Žižka's stay at Plzeň did not last long. Some of the most enthusiastic Táborites had—as will be mentioned presently—founded a new city, or rather military camp on a hill, to which they gave the name of Tábor, situated close to Ústi, where the early meetings of the Hussites had been held. Žižka, who had found that the inhabitants of Plzeň were not as largely favourable to his cause as he had been led to believe, sent part of his troops to the help of the new settlers at Tábor, which his military genius had, perhaps, already selected as his future stronghold. After the departure of part of his army Žižka's position at Tábor became a difficult one. The partisans of Sigismund and the Roman Church were numerous in the city, and street-fights between them and Žižka's soldiers constantly occurred. About this time Lord Venceslas of Duba, chamberlain of King Sigismund, issued a proclamation¹ in which he, in the name of his sovereign, called on all nobles, knights and citizens to pay a special tax for the purpose of equipping an army which was to extirpate all heretics. It was well understood that this army was to attack, at Plzeň, Žižka, whom the royalists rightly considered their most dangerous enemy. Under the circumstances Žižka decided to conclude a truce with his enemies. Through the medium of envoys of the city of Prague, who visited Žižka at Plzeň, an agreement was made, according to which Žižka was to evacuate Plzeň, on condition

¹ Printed in Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte der Hussitenkriege*, Vol. I. pp. 21–22.

that the citizens who wished to communicate in the two kinds should be allowed to do so—a promise that was not kept—and that Žižka and his forces should be allowed to march unhindered to Tábor. He then surrendered the city to Venceslas of Duba and started on his march. He had only four hundred warriors, twelve equipped wagons and nine horsemen, but was accompanied by several priests, among them Koranda, who no longer considered himself safe at Plzeň, and many women and children. The Hussite women were, however, by no means to be considered as mere encumbrances. The women who accompanied the Hussite armies were very fervent Utraquists, who sometimes fought in the battles “for the law of God,” to use the then general designation. On the occasion of Žižka’s march to Tábor they appear to have acted only as nurses. Žižka was not fated to march unopposed to Tábor. Several lords of the Roman party, of whom the most important were Lord Peter Konopišt of Sternberg, and Lord Nicholas Divucek, mintmaster of Kutna Hora—that great centre of the royalist party—had, by order of King Sigismund, marched to Plzeň to reinforce the besiegers of the city. On hearing of the truce they rightly or wrongly¹ declared that they were not bound by it. They determined to intercept Žižka’s army on the march. The danger was indeed great. The royalist nobles were at the last moment joined by Lord Hanuš of Kolowrat and by the grandmaster of the order of the Knights of Strakonic. The accounts as to the number of their soldiers vary from 2,000 to 8,000;² they were all mounted, and, wearing full armour, were known as the “iron knights,” and greatly feared by the Bohemians. They had just obtained possession of the Utraquist town of Pisek, where Žižka had intended to halt to obtain supplies and perhaps reinforcements. He certainly did not—at least at

¹ This matter has led to much controversy.

² Accounts concerning the number of the royalist forces vary greatly; it is certain that the Hussite chroniclers often exaggerated the numbers of the hostile armies.

this early period of the war—wish to encounter a force so greatly superior to his own. He therefore attempted to move his men as quickly as was possible and to avoid a battle. The large number of women and children who accompanied his army, however, rendered this very difficult. As soon as Žižka saw that an encounter with the enemy was inevitable, he began, with his customary energy and resourcefulness, to prepare his defence. He took up his position on a steep hill inaccessible to mounted men, and protected on one side by a steep dike. In this position, close to a mill in the neighbourhood of the village of Sudoměř he hurriedly formed his armed wagons in “lager,” to use the modern South African expression, placing the priests, women and children in the centre, while the warriors manned the “iron-clad” wagons. The royalists had previously declared that they would not be obliged to fight, as they would merely have to ride down the Hussites and crush them under the hoofs of their horses. When, contrary to their expectation, they were obliged to dismount, they none the less bravely advanced, and their attack began about midday on March 25, 1420. The Hussites defended themselves with heroic bravery, and considering the smallness of the forces engaged, the engagement was a very bloody one. Lord Břenek of Skála, one of the Hussite leaders, was killed, and one of the leaders of the partisans of Sigismund died of the wounds received on this occasion. At nightfall the royalists retired, and Žižka’s band encamped on the battlefield that night; this was at that period the traditional fashion of claiming the victory. The impression produced by the victory of Sudoměř—which may be called Žižka’s first considerable deed of arms—was very great in Bohemia, and many legends connected with it afterwards sprung up. The sun, it was said, set that evening earlier than is usual in Bohemia in March. The pious Hussites attributed this to the intervention of Providence. A contemporary chronicler writes:¹

¹ “*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*,” Vol. III. p. 34.

"Many among the people said that God had been with him [Žižka], and that this miracle had occurred: when it was still early, it appeared as if it were eventide; the sun vanished behind a hill, as if it wished to separate [the combatants], and immediately deep darkness descended on the battlefield, so that no man knew how to strike at another. When the enemies saw this, many voices among them said: 'My lance does not stab them, my sword does not strike them, my gun does not reach them;' and then they retreated in various directions with much shame and great losses." In consequence of his victory at Sudoměř the fame of Žižka, who here first proved his military genius and his talent as a tactician, spread widely in Bohemia. The contemporary chroniclers, therefore, devote more attention to Žižka's first successful skirmish in the Malá Strana at Prague and his victory at Sudoměř than the importance of these engagements, if we consider the number of the combatants, would warrant.¹ We have, indeed, more information concerning these events than we have about more considerable battles at a later period of the war. Among the many writers who have described the skirmish at Sudoměř, Æneas Sylvius deserves mention, as his florid and picturesque, though absolutely unreliable, work did duty as the standard work on the Hussite wars for centuries. He tells us that Žižka ordered the Hussite women to spread out their long veils on the ground, so that the spurs of the attacking dismounted horsemen should be caught in them.²

Žižka, though his popularity among the Bohemians had previously already been very great, here for the first time appears as a military leader, in fact as one of the not very numerous great generals known to history. The new system of warfare, which rendered the Hussites invincible for a con-

¹ Toman, *Husitske Válečnictví (Hussite Warfare)*, pp. 9-10.

² [Žižka] "ut ergo desilire ab equis adversarii, mulieres quæ de more exercitum sequebantur projicere pepla in terram jussit, quibus implicati per calcaria eques prius extincti sunt, quam pedes expedire valerent" (Æneas Sylvius, *De Bohemorum origine*, chap. xl).

siderable time, was so entirely his work that Dr. Toman—to whose book I must here acknowledge my indebtedness—rightly states that the terms Hussite system of warfare or Žižka's system of warfare are identical. It may, therefore, on the occasion of his first considerable victory, be well to refer briefly to this system. The subject is by no means easy, as the contemporary chroniclers—principally interested in religious controversies—devote comparatively little attention to warlike events, and are also often inaccurate. They frequently exaggerated the forces of the enemy, while stating that the small armies of the Bohemians were even less numerous than was actually the case; they thus wished to render yet more miraculous those victories which they always attributed to the direct intervention of Providence. Among the earliest leaders of the Hussites were several priests, such as John of Zělivo, Koranda of Plzeň, Ambrose of Králové Hradec, and others. As learning was in those days confined almost entirely to the priesthood, it has been conjectured that these priests instructed the people to fight according to the system of the ancients, a conjecture which is confirmed by the words of a contemporary chronicler.¹ Dr. Toman has even ventured a further conjecture. He suggests that some of the Hussite leaders, perhaps Žižka himself, were acquainted with the work of Vegetius, *Epitome rei militaris*.²

¹ Nicholas of Pelhřimov writes (Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber der Hussitenkriege*): "bellum [of the Hussites] cum magna fuit erectum diligentia et exemplo ac regulis antiquorum bonorum bellatorum roboratum atque circumstantio natum per præfatos Pragenses magistros ac sacerdotes regni Bohemiæ qui tunc et ab initio dicto cum populo laborarunt. Quamvis heic sub tempore hoc bellum per multos, qui se ipsis fraudulenter cum aliis applicarunt intentionibus in magnas versum erat deordinationes semper contra propositum atque intentionem fidelium qui pro illo dicto bono se fideliter et catholice opposuerunt." Nicholas of Pelhřimov (see my *Master John Hus*, pp. 359–363) was bishop of the Táborites, but belonged to the moderate fraction of that party, as appears from the last words I have quoted.

² The military maxims contained in this work were considered the foundation of military learning from the time of William of Orange to that of Frederick the Great, and even earlier, if we accept Dr. Toman's conjecture. Dr. Toman has with great industry selected a considerable number of passages from the book of Vegetius, and attributed the tactics of Žižka on certain occasions to their influence. I must refer those interested in this matter to Dr. Toman's work.

The beginning of the Hussite wars coincides with the time when fire-arms had attained such a degree of development that their judicious use had begun to have tactical importance. The use of fire-arms is first mentioned on the occasion of a skirmish between the soldiers of Archbishop Jenštejn of Prague and those of Lord John Čuch of Zasada in 1384.¹ During the street-fighting in Prague after the death of King Venceslas hand-guns or muskets were already used. It was, however, to Žižka that the development of the Bohemian artillery at this period is entirely due.² The war-wagons or carts, which will be mentioned presently, were armed with small field-pieces, which could be transported with great rapidity, and which were immediately in position when the enemies attacked the Hussite camps. Closely connected with Žižka's improvements in the use of artillery was his system of forming his troops within the *hradba vozova* or lager-fort, which was defended in every direction by armed wagons. The wagons or carts were not, indeed, entirely Žižka's invention, but he first used them as an important feature in warfare. They were generally covered with steel or iron (ironclad, to use a modern expression), and carried a few small field-pieces. On the march not only the warriors, but also the women, children and priests, found room in these movable forts. Through the genius of Žižka these wagons played so great a part in the Hussite war that towards the end of that war the German enemies, though not very successfully, began to adopt the system. At the beginning of the battles the Hussites used their well-served artillery against the enemies, till they were weakened and discouraged; they then issued from their wagons and attacked them. In case of a defeat the rows of wagons formed a strong and secure place of refuge. Žižka's battles were almost always fought against an overwhelmingly

¹ See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 86, n. 2.

² Captain C. F. Atkinson writes very truly in the *National Encyclopædia* under "Artillery": "The introduction of field artillery may be attributed to John Žižka."

superior enemy, and his tactics were, therefore, generally defensive. It has often been stated, on the always doubtful authority of Æneas Sylvius, that Žižka's columns of wagons were sometimes used to attack the enemy.¹ This would have been practically impossible, and the statement may be considered as untrue. Žižka's wagon-drivers soon became very experienced in this manner of warfare, which was favoured by the topographical condition of Bohemia, whose vast plains then, as now, were little intersected by fences and ditches. The "lager," in more recent times a feature in South African warfare, was adopted under similar topographical conditions.

One of the strongest proofs of Žižka's military talents consists in the manner in which he succeeded in forming an almost invincible army out of the peasants and townsmen, almost all unused to warfare, who flocked to his standards. A flail mounted with iron, a club or a short spear, were the only arms with which Žižka's men were acquainted, and these rough arms, under Žižka's skilful guidance, and carried away by their religious and national enthusiasm, they used most valiantly. It was for Žižka, perhaps, an even more difficult task to train his men to use skilfully the hand-guns and field-guns, whose superiority to the fire-arms of the enemies so greatly contributed to his victories. It is at the present moment a somewhat unfashionable theory that a people can, under the influence of extreme national or religious enthusiasm, defeat skilled soldiers after having received only a brief training. Yet this proved true during the Hussite wars, as it did during the wars of the French Revolution three and a half centuries later. There is also another analogy between the two cases. Žižka—differing herein from Julius Cæsar and Oliver Cromwell—had been a warrior from his earliest youth; according to some accounts he is stated to have been present at skirmishes which took place when he was only sixteen years old. Similarly,

¹ This statement is contained also in the earlier editions of my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*.

Nicholas of Hus, Krušina of Lichtenburg, Kolda of Žampach, and other knights whose names will appear in these pages, had received the usual knightly military training. Their part at the opening of the Hussite wars was, therefore, not dissimilar from that of the former French officers of the regular army who did so much to train and discipline the revolutionary forces. The thorough knowledge of the knightly system of warfare possessed by Žižka and his comrades no doubt greatly helped them in devising the best manner in which lightly equipped infantry could meet the attack of horsemen in heavy armour, who—as at Sudoměř—generally formed a large part of the Romanist forces.

It should here be mentioned that in the last years of the fourteenth century a movement antagonistic to the extreme preponderance of the nobility and knighthood had already begun to arise. This movement had already tended to democratise the system of warfare. In 1386 Swiss peasants had defeated the chivalry led by an Austrian archduke, and during the reign of Venceslas the townsmen of Southern Germany had formed confederacies which had sometimes successfully resisted the forces of the German nobles.

A circumstance which greatly contributed to the victories of the Hussites was the almost incredible rapidity with which Žižka and his successors were able to move their armies. Thus, when in 1420 the Táborites hurriedly marched to Prague to aid the citizens of that town, the whole force of 9,000 soldiers, with the women, children and priests, arrived at the capital on the evening of the second day of their march. They marched, indeed, along level roads through the central plain of Bohemia; yet, if we consider the slowness of mediæval armies—the German armies during the Hussite wars are an instance—this exploit appears truly admirable. This extraordinary rapidity greatly surprised the Germans and often caused them anxiety. A contemporary German chronicler ¹

¹ *G. Fabricii Ordo stirpis Saxonicae* (quoted by Dr. Toman).

writes: "Whatever military enterprises the Bohemians undertake they carry out with great rapidity."

Very characteristic of the Hussite armies, at least while they were commanded by Žižka, is the very severe—puritanic, as we may call it—discipline which he maintained in his camps at a period when almost every licence was granted to soldiers. Žižka's regulations of war¹ bear witness to his severity, and also to the somewhat democratic manner in which he enforced the same discipline on all, irrespective of all differences of social rank. He allowed no idle or disreputable people in his camps. The women who followed his armies—where alone they were safe from the cruelty and violence of the royal soldiers—were employed as nurses or cooks, and sometimes even took part in the battles. Even the boys who accompanied their parents on the marches were taught to hurl stones from a sling, and soon became very skilful in the use of these arms. Lawrence of Březova calls them "*garciones quos fundibularios seu praczatas*"² *vulgari bohemico nuncupant*."

I have, in several previous works, referred to the utterly unjust manner in which Žižka has been judged by most historians. Even Protestant writers, though approving of the cause for which he fought, have described him as a ferocious, cruel and savage fanatic, whilst to Roman Catholic writers he has appeared as a bloodthirsty murderer and robber, a mediæval communist and anarchist. The Hussite wars were certainly waged with terrible cruelty on both sides, but now that we have more extensive knowledge of those times than was formerly the case, no unprejudiced person can deny that the atrocities committed by the Hungarian and German so-called "crusaders" were far more heinous than any act of cruelty ever committed by a Hussite. The crusaders undoubtedly aimed at the complete extermination of the Czech population of Bohemia, whom they wrongly believed to be all Utraquists.

¹ I have printed this interesting document as an Appendix to this work

² "*Prak*" signifies a "sling" in Bohemian.

They therefore murdered all, without distinction of age or sex. "They were determined to let no heretic live," as a contemporary chronicler writes. The Hussites almost always spared children and women, and those who suffered most from their cruelty were priests and monks, whom they considered responsible for the murder of Hus, as they termed it. It is, of course, impossible to deny that Žižka was cruel; no Hussite general could be otherwise; but he at least on one occasion severely blamed his men for unnecessary cruelty, and he sometimes, on the advice of others, withdrew cruel orders which he had given. Thus the learned Jesuit Balbinus, whom no one will accuse of partiality for Žižka, states¹ that when Žižka occupied the abbey of Sezemic, near Chrudim, he ordered twelve nuns who had been found there to be drowned in the Elbe; but on some of the soldiers of the Praguers—the moderate Utraquists, whose centre was Prague—pleading for them they were spared, and conducted to a convent of their order at Králové Hradec.

The true character of Žižka appears very clearly from his few letters which have fortunately reached us. One of these letters, though written only in September 1422, may well be quoted here already. The citizens of Domázlíce (Taus) had joined the national party, and greatly feared to be attacked by the Germans. The situation of the city, very near the Bavarian frontier and in a district partly inhabited by Germans, exposed them to such attacks, and they applied to Žižka for help. Žižka sent the following reply :

"To the brave captains and citizens of the town of Domázlíce,
my dear brethren.

"May God grant you to return to your fervour, as at first,² that you may first do brave deeds. Dear brethren in God, I beg you, for the sake of the Lord God, to remain in the fear of

¹ Balbinus, S. J., *Miscellanea historica regni Bohemici*, Lib. IV. p. 144.

² i. e. when they first joined the national party.

God, as His most beloved sons, and not to complain if He chastises you. Remembering the Founder of our faith, our Lord Jesus Christ, you will defend yourselves bravely against the wrongs which these Germans endeavour to inflict on you. You will thus follow the example of the ancient Bohemians, who valiantly using their lances, defended both God's cause and their own. And we, dear brethren, seeking the law of God and the good of the commonwealth, will strive that every one of our men who is able to wield a club or even to hurl a stone should march to your aid.

"And therefore, dear brethren, be it known to you that we are collecting our men from all parts of the country against these enemies and devastators of the Bohemian land. Therefore instruct your priests that they may, when preaching, call the people to arms against Antichrist. Let it also be proclaimed in the market-place that all, both young and old, must keep watch and ward at all hours.

"And we, God willing, shall be shortly with you; have bread, beer, fodder for the horses ready, and all weapons of war; for, indeed, it is time (to march), not only against the internal enemies, but also against the foreigners. Remember your first campaign, when you fought bravely, humble men against the great, few against many, unclothed ¹ against men in armour. For the arm of God has not been shortened. Therefore trust in God and be ready. May the Lord God grant you strength.

"JOHN ŽIŽKA of the Chalice,

"In the hope of God leader of the men of Tábor." ²

We meet with ideas similar to those contained in this and other letters of Žižka, as well as in his regulations of war, in a famous Hussite war-song, "All ye Warriors of God," ³

¹ *i. e.* without armour.

² I have borrowed this translation from my *History of Bohemian Literature*.

³ I have translated part of this song in my *History of Bohemian Literature*.

often called the Bohemian Marseillaise, and it has been suggested that Žižka was its author; this is, however, doubtful.

Before ending this brief note on Žižka, I must lay stress on the absolute purity of his life; he strictly conformed to the severe rules which he enforced on others. Equally notable is his entire integrity. A poor man at the beginning of the Hussite wars, he died a poor man in 1424. Even if we reject the high-coloured accounts of Æneas Sylvius concerning the offers made to Žižka by King Sigismund, very large bribes were certainly offered to him, and it would also have been easy to him to enrich himself at a moment when so many estates of Romanist nobles and houses of German citizens of Prague became ownerless. The only token of gratitude which Žižka accepted from his countrymen was a small castle, or rather fort, to which he gave the name of Chalice. This designation, which was sacred to him as a fervent Calixtine, he always added to his signature during the last years of his life.

It has already been mentioned that Žižka encamped on the battlefield on the evening of his victory at Sudoměř. On the following morning he crossed the river Vltava (Moldau), and then established his lager near the castle of Ujezd. Some of the men of Tábor met him here, and on March 27 or 28 Žižka and his victorious warriors were received with great rejoicing when they entered the newly-founded stronghold. The foundation of the new Tábor had taken place some time before Žižka's arrival there. The small town of Ústi was near the castle of Kozi Hradek, where Hus had stayed during his exile from Prague,¹ and the first meetings of the Hussites, as already mentioned, had taken place in this neighbourhood. The town of Ústi had gradually become a centre of the more advanced Church reformers. These men, whose enthusiasm had from the first led them to judge King Sigismund more severely but also more correctly than others did, foresaw that Bohemia

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 167-176.

would soon be attacked by vast hostile armies, and they therefore did not consider the position of Ústi sufficiently strong. They determined to obtain possession of the neighbouring hill called "Hradište," strongly situated on what may almost be called a peninsula surrounded by a small lake, to which the Hussite gave the biblical name of Jordan, and the small Košin stream which connects the Jordan lake with the Lužnice river, which flows through the valley at the foot of the steep hill "Hradište," which was to become the new Tábor.¹ The priest Vaněk and another ecclesiastic in minor orders named Hromadka,² led some of their adherents to Hradište, of which they obtained possession after very slight resistance, and the whole religious community of Ústi was soon gathered together in this new and stronger place of refuge. Hromadka, who for a time appears to have acted as leader, informed Žižka of the foundation of this new settlement and asked for aid, which—as already mentioned—was given to him.

On arriving at Tábor, Žižka immediately assumed supreme command, and it was here also that he first had the opportunity of organising an armed force, whose religious enthusiasm rendered them capable of the most brilliant deeds of arms, and who, certain that they were fighting for the law of God, did not know fear. This religious enthusiasm gave them the strength not only to fight courageously, but also—perhaps a more difficult task—to submit to the military training on which Žižka insisted. This was, indeed, particularly necessary at a moment when numerous peasants from all parts of Bohemia flocked to Žižka's standards. These men had not even that slight experience of warfare which Žižka's earliest companions had acquired during the street-fighting in Prague, the defence

¹ For a good description of Tábor, see Professor Karel Thir, *Hradiště hory Tábor*.

² Březova calls him "campanator." He was an acolyte ordained to the fourth of minor orders. These men were at that time often employed as bell-ringers in churches.

of Plzeň and the skirmish of Sudoměř. Žižka had not to wait long for an opportunity to try the mettle of his new soldiers. Nicholas Divuček, one of his antagonists at Sudoměř, on his return to Kutna Hora, marched through the small town of Ožic, situated about two German miles from Tábor. Žižka attacked and defeated him on April 5, 1420, and made a considerable number of prisoners. It was agreed to exchange these for the few Táborites who had been made prisoners at Sudoměř. Žižka thus saved them from the terrible death that awaited them at Kutna Hora. Only a few days later Žižka led his troops to the attack of the castle of Sedlec, the owner of which, Lord Ulrick of Ústi, was one of the nobles opposed to the national cause; he had cruelly persecuted some of the Hussites who had settled on his estates. The castle was stormed, and Ulrick and all his followers were killed. The Hussites, with strange cruelty, spared the six bravest warriors, and offered his life to the one of them who would consent to decapitate his five comrades.¹ A man named Pinta agreed to do this, and henceforth joined the Hussite armies.

An important task which Žižka undertook shortly after his arrival at Tábor was the fortification of his new stronghold. By his order the whole circumference of the city was surrounded by two strong walls, and a fosse was dug, which could be crossed only by drawbridges in the one direction in which the city is easily accessible from the surrounding plain. The city had at first been a mere encampment, but houses rapidly sprang up. The centre of the town was the market-place, which played the part of a forum or agora. The narrow streets leading to it were built in a winding and irregular fashion, thus rendering the access to the centre of the city very difficult; this was a matter of considerable importance at a time when street-fighting was very frequent. It was also necessary to establish at Tábor what may be called a provisional government. Four captains of the people were therefore chosen.

¹ Readers of Balzac will be reminded of his tale entitled *El Verdugo*.

Though their authority appears to have been equal, we find Nicholas of Hus mentioned as first of them. Žižka, who well knew the necessity of concord, in view of powerful enemies, wished to conciliate a very ambitious man, who had organised the first meetings of the people, and who had thrown down his gauntlet to the Roman party before any other Bohemian knight had done so. The second captain was Žižka, and the others were Zbyněk of Buchov and Chval of Machovic. The Táborites were thus thoroughly prepared for the bloody struggle which they considered inevitable.

CHAPTER II

THE armistice concluded in Prague on November 13, 1419, proved, as was perhaps inevitable, to be of short duration. It became every day more evident that King Sigismund, who, in spite of his somewhat scandalous private life, was a firm adherent of the Church of Rome, had no intention of making any concessions whatever to those whom he considered as heretics; this ill will extended even to matters such as Communion in the two kinds, which the Roman Church has itself on some occasions sanctioned.¹ No man was, indeed, less likely to favour a system of compromise than Sigismund, who was devoid of all learning and consumed by puerile vanity, and who possessed neither statesmanship nor military talent nor even personal courage. Sigismund, on hearing of the disturbances in Prague, and of the armistice which was afterwards concluded, determined to abandon the war against Turkey in which he had been engaged and to proceed to his new dominions. He arrived on December 15, 1419, at Brno (in German, Brünn), the capital of Moravia, one of the lands of the Bohemian crown.² He was met here by the Dowager Queen Sophia—whose brief and stormy term of government now ended—by the principal nobles of Bohemia, and by the representatives of many towns in the country. The King maintained his evasive attitude with regard to all religious questions, but the nobles and some of the town representatives, in whom the dynastic feeling was very strong, did homage to their hereditary sovereign. Somewhat later than the other deputations, the representatives of the towns of Prague arrived at Brno. To the great displeasure of the King and his courtiers they entered the city pre-

¹ For instance in the case of the Uniates in Poland.

² See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 1, and note 1 on the same page.

ceded by trumpeters, and though the town had been declared to be under interdict, because of the presence of heretics, they insisted on celebrating mass according to their rites in the part of the town which had been assigned to them. When they were admitted to the royal presence Sigismund received them very ungraciously. He allowed them to kneel before him for a longer time than was customary, and blamed them severely for having barricaded their streets and besieged the royal castles of Hradčany and Vyšehrad. He ordered the citizens to remove immediately all street fortifications, and no longer to molest the monks and nuns at Prague. The envoys of that city, who belonged to the most moderate Hussite party, were intimidated by the threatening language of the King, and on their return to Prague caused the royal commands to be immediately obeyed. When the barricades and street fortifications were removed the Germans of Prague greatly rejoiced, saying: "Now there will be an end of these Hussites and Wycliffites." ¹

As Queen Sophia had gladly cast off the burden of regency, Sigismund appointed as regent one of the high officials of the land, Lord Čeněk of Wartenberg; not, however, thoroughly trusting Wartenberg, he chose two other Bohemian noblemen, who were to act as co-regents. The career of Wartenberg has often been judged by historians more severely than it deserves. He was a firm believer in the teaching of Hus, and he attached to Communion in the two kinds the same importance as—for reasons which I have endeavoured to explain elsewhere—most Bohemians of his time did. He also, like most of his countrymen, believed that it was only by enforcing poverty on the clergy that a true moral reformation of the then very corrupt Bohemian churchmen could be brought about. At the same time Wartenberg shared with many other Bohemian nobles

¹ "Jam heretici ille Hussite et Wikleffiste peribunt et finem habebunt" (Březova, p. 354, Professor Goll's edition). When quoting Březova I have always preserved his somewhat eccentric system of spelling.

a feudal devotion to the princes of the house of Luxemburg, the legitimate and hereditary rulers of the lands of the Bohemian crown. The position of Wartenberg was, therefore, a very difficult one, and even a more talented and more conscientious man would probably have failed in attempting to conciliate two entirely antagonistic points of view. Many of the other Bohemian nobles were in the same difficult position, though there were also among the nobility, and yet more among the knighthood, many who unreservedly upheld the cause of Church reform.

After a short stay in Brno King Sigismund proceeded to Breslau, the capital of Silesia, then also one of the lands of the Bohemian crown. Æneas Sylvius, whose opinion was afterwards repeated by many writers, severely blamed Sigismund for having proceeded to Silesia instead of marching from Brno directly on Prague.¹ The citizens of that town appeared to be momentarily cowed, and many of the nobles and town delegates had done homage to Sigismund. Yet the King's decision proves that he understood the feelings of the Bohemian people better than did the brilliant Italian humanist. Sigismund knew that he was indebted for the limited amount of popularity he then possessed entirely to the fact that he had been able hitherto to avoid expressing his views on the all-important subject of Communion in the two kinds. Many Bohemians, believing probable that which they hoped, thought that Sigismund would finally sanction the use of the revered chalice at the Communion of laymen. Sigismund, however, knew that it would be impossible to continue long his policy of silence. The Roman see had, on March 1, 1420, proclaimed a crusade against the Hussites, and the King, who required the aid of the crusaders to conquer Bohemia, knew that this would not be granted to him should he make even the slightest

¹ "Nec dubium videbatur quin tota Bohemia labes Hussitarum excessisset, si ex Bruna Sigismundus recta via se Pragam contulisset. Sed divertit ille, ut fortasse fati sui erat, Vratislaviamque Silesiæ caput accessit" (*Historia Bohemiæ*, cap. xxxix).

concession to heretics. The few but somewhat powerful Romanist nobles in Bohemia would also in this case have withdrawn their support. Sigismund's own sympathies were also entirely in favour of an intransigent policy. He was, however, aware of the bitter and implacable hatred which his treacherous behaviour towards Hus had aroused in Bohemia. Life was not valued very highly at that period of incessant internal and foreign warfare, and the execution of a heretic was not an exceptional event; but the Bohemians rightly believed that Sigismund's letter of safe conduct had stated that even if Hus were found guilty he should be allowed to leave Constance freely, and should be judged by the ecclesiastical authorities of his own country.¹

Sigismund was, therefore, thoroughly justified in believing that he would meet with desperate resistance in Bohemia, where both national and religious enthusiasm were much stronger than in the sister-lands Moravia and Silesia. He therefore decided to remain at Breslau till the vast forces who were sure to assemble for the crusade proclaimed by the Pope had had time to meet. Other duties also awaited Sigismund at Breslau. He had summoned an imperial diet to that city, and on his arrival there, on January 5, 1420, was met by many German princes, the Dukes of Saxony, Silesia and Bavaria, the papal legate Ferdinand Bishop of Lucca, the margraves of Meissen and Brandenburg and many others. The margravate of Brandenburg had recently been conferred on Frederick Burgrave of Nürnberg by Sigismund at Constance. The new margrave was at that moment an intimate friend of Sigismund, and certainly one of his wisest councillors,² but for reasons that will be mentioned presently he took no part in

¹ I cannot enter into this subject here. The question is fully treated in my *Master John Hus*, pp. 290-292.

² Droysen in the first volume of his brilliant *Geschichte der preussischen Politik* lays great stress on this point. Droysen's work is undoubtedly a panegyric on the house of Hohenzollern, but he has shown more clearly than any other writer to how large an extent the Hussite wars form part of the great struggle between Slav and Teuton.

the first crusade. There is no doubt that Frederick strongly advised Sigismund to pursue a conciliatory policy in the Bohemian question. Of the many other matters of state that were discussed at the diet of Breslau only one requires mention here, because of the very important part—overlooked by many historians—which Poland played in the Hussite wars. After their great victory at Tannenberg the Poles had overrun a large part of the territory of the Teutonic order. Their successes had not, however, been maintained, and they, as well as their antagonists, accepted the mediation of Sigismund on condition that he should terminate his arbitration not later than on January 6, 1420. The Polish envoys who appeared at Breslau were greatly displeased when Sigismund delayed giving his decision on the questions that had been submitted to him, and yet more when he finally pronounced judgment. Without entering into details, it is sufficient to state that on all moot points Sigismund's decision was favourable to the Teutonic order. This influenced future events to a considerable extent, for in consequence of the bitter hate they felt for Sigismund, the Poles received the offer of the Bohemian crown to a Polish prince more favourably than they would have otherwise done.

Another unwise action of Sigismund greatly increased the hatred and animosity against the King which already prevailed in Bohemia. John Krasa, a greatly respected merchant of Prague, who had arrived at Breslau for the annual fair, had imprudently blamed the execution of Hus, and spoken in favour of Communion in the two kinds. He was arrested by the executioners of Sigismund, drawn by wild horses and then flayed; his body was then burnt.¹ This public spectacle caused

¹ In a letter addressed to the Venetians—published by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, Vol. I. pp. 39–42—the citizens of Prague wrote: “Novissime in Wratislavia famosum virum Johannem Krasa integrum fide et virtute constantissimum inclytæ urbis Prag. civem in notam et maculam regni nostri perpetuam nonnisi occasione communionis prædictæ [*i. e.* in the two kinds] jussit [Sigismund] inhumaniter equis trahi et absiliente carne ad nuda corpora laniari et tandem constantem virum damnari et comburi.” The letter, too long to

general horror and deep indignation among the Utraquist nobles who had followed King Sigismund's court. Some of them, such as Čeněk of Wartenberg, now became his bitter enemies.

On March 1 Pope Martin V published a bull decreeing a crusade "against the Hussites, Wycliffites and their friends."¹ This was done with the full approval of Sigismund, who believed that the enthusiastic Bohemians could only be subdued if their country were invaded by vastly superior hostile forces. Experience had shown that whenever a crusade was proclaimed vast numbers of men from all parts of Europe, some inspired by religious enthusiasm, others by the hope of plunder, flocked to the papal standards. On the Tuesday following Easter—April 9—Sigismund and his army left Breslau and marched to Schweidnitz, and then, crossing the Bohemian frontier at Nachod, arrived before the important city of Králové Hradec (Königgrätz).²

It was a bad omen for the campaign that Sigismund now undertook that one of his former great friends at this moment became estranged from him and took no part in the crusade. The Elector Frederick of Brandenburg left Breslau even before the end of the deliberations of the imperial diet. He strongly disapproved of the intransigent policy of Sigismund, which had imperilled his rule in his newly acquired dominions. In the then only partially Germanised lands of Pomerania and Mecklenburg the Slavic reaction was very strong at that moment, and the Pomeranian Prince of Stolpe treated the papal bull of excommunication with contempt. There was also the danger that the Poles, irritated by the hostile attitude

quote in its entirety—throws a terrible light on the unspeakable cruelty of Sigismund. It is well to insist on this, as most writers lay great stress on the cruelties committed by the Hussites, while almost ignoring the far greater cruelty of their antagonists.

¹ "Wycliffistarum Hussitarum ceterorumque hæreticorum, fautorum receptatorum et defensorum." (The bull is printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, Vol. I. pp. 17–20).

² Grünhagen, *Die Hussitenkämpfe der Schlesier*, p. 31.

of Sigismund, might aid their Slavic brethren, and Polish troops had already begun to attack the marches of Brandenburg. The Slavic dynasty of the Obotrites in Mecklenburg also rose in arms against the new margrave. By a rapid and victorious campaign against these numerous enemies Frederick isolated the Bohemians from their possible allies in Germany. He believed—wrongly, as events proved—that Sigismund had sufficient forces to crush all resistance in Bohemia.¹ Sigismund had, indeed, invaded Bohemia with a large army, and his forces were greatly increased when, somewhat later, numerous crusaders joined him before Prague. The beginning of the campaign was successful. Králové Hradec, one of the Hussite strongholds, was occupied after very slight resistance, and the royalist army then marched to Kutna Hora, a mining city whose inhabitants were almost all Germans and fervent adherents of the Church of Rome. Sigismund was, therefore, enthusiastically received at Kutna Hora and, sanguine as he sometimes was, he no doubt concluded from this friendly reception that the feeling of the Bohemian people was not as hostile to him as he had previously imagined.

Yet it was just at this moment that the Bohemian movement acquired a distinctly revolutionary character. Čeněk of Wartenberg had left Breslau deeply embittered, and his dynastic tendency disappeared, or at least became obscured for a time. He formally renounced his allegiance to Sigismund, dismissed

¹ "Schon hatte in Pommern die hussitische Lehre Eingang gefunden, die fürstliche Familie im Stolper Lande neigte ihr zu und ertrug mit hussitischem Gleichmuth den Bann, den der Papst über sie verhängte. . . . Und wieder um den Kampf gegen die Marken desto entscheidender zu machen kam ein polnischer Streithaufen von 5000 Mann nach Pommern. . . . Während sich in Böhmen alles zum Kampfe auf Leben und Tod gegen den König und die Deutschen rüstete und die Freunde Böhmens, Skandinavien und Polen über Pommern und Mecklenburg sich die Hände reichten, brach Markgraf Friedrich mit raschem Entschlusse gegen den Bund los. . . . Ihn [Margrave Frederick] fesselten dringendere Sorgen an die Marken; nur erst der Anfang war gemacht Böhmen zu isolieren. . . . Es steht urkundlich fest dass er während des ganzen Feldzuges 1420 in den Marken blieb; er hatte dort vollauf zu schaffen! Und das Kreuzheer das sich vor Prag versammelte war gross genug um den Kampf zu stehen." (Droysen, *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, Vol. I. pp. 293 and ff.)

the former Romanist commanders of the castles of Hradčany and Vyšehrad and appointed Hussites in their stead. A few days later—on April 20—he published a manifesto couched in very strong language, in which he, together with Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, many knights and nobles, and “all who upheld the freedom of God’s law and the commonwealth of the Bohemian nation,” declared that Sigismund, King of Hungary, could not be accepted as King of Bohemia. Then followed a detailed enumeration of the grievances against Sigismund—far too lengthy to be reproduced here. It was stated that he had induced the papal legate to proclaim a crusade against the Bohemians because they maintained the custom of communicating in the two kinds, according to the traditions of the primitive Church. The execution of Hus—a subject on which the Bohemians were always implacable—was then mentioned, as well as the ruthless torture inflicted on John Krasa. Complaints concerning Sigismund’s political attitude towards the lands of the Bohemian crown were also raised. In opposition to the policy of his father, Charles IV, who had been a friend to Bohemia, Sigismund had on several occasions favoured Germany at the expense of Bohemia. Probably contrary to Wartenberg’s expectation, only part of the Bohemia nobility joined him in declaring that Sigismund had absolutely forfeited the Bohemian crown. The citizens of Prague, on the other hand, warmly approved of Wartenberg’s act. They had, a few days before the appearance of Wartenberg’s manifesto, published a proclamation which is interesting as proving how largely the racial feeling influenced that great uprising which we call the Hussite war. Religious questions play a secondary part in this proclamation, and Sigismund is not even mentioned by name. All the evils from which Bohemia had suffered are ascribed to the Germans, and they are accused of intending to exterminate the Slavic race in Bohemia, as they had already done in Saxony and Prussia. It is noteworthy that the memory of those then already ancient events still lingered among the

Bohemian people. After the publication of the manifesto of the Praguers and of that of Wartenberg the few Germans who still remained in Prague were driven out of their houses, of which the Bohemians took possession. In view of the probability of a siege of the city the presence of Germans there was impossible.

At this moment the extreme party among the Hussites for a time completely obtained the upper hand. The citizens of Prague, led by the fanatical monk, John of Želivo, committed many cruelties against Roman Catholic monks and nuns. Aided by the members of the new religious community, who were known as the Orebites—who derived their name from a hill near Králové Hradec, to which they had given the biblical name of Oreb—they plundered all the property of the adherents of the Roman Church, and destroyed most of the beautiful ancient cathedrals and churches that had been one of the glories of the land. This greatly aroused the indignation of Wartenberg, who upheld Communion in the two kinds and demanded severer regulations for the Roman clergy, but abhorred religious anarchism. The destruction of the ancient churches of his country appeared to him—if I may use an anachronism—as it would to an English High-Churchman. He was also probably impressed by the reluctance of many of the Bohemian nobles to join him, and by the first successes of Sigismund's army.

Whatever his motives may have been it is certain that Wartenberg abandoned the national party after a few weeks, and—not for the last time—changed sides. He concluded a truce with Sigismund, according to which a full amnesty was granted to him and his family, and they, as well as the tenants on his estates, were to retain the right of communicating in the two kinds. Under these conditions Wartenberg consented to abandon the national cause, and on May 7 he opened the gates of the Hradčany and Vyšehrad castle to the soldiers of Sigismund. The Praguers attempted to regain possession of these

strongholds. They were aided by members of the Orebite community, led by Lord Krušina of Lichtenburg and the monk Ambrose, one of the numerous warrior-priests of this period. Their repeated attacks were, however, repulsed, and the citizens were even obliged to evacuate part of the Malá Strana.

A great feeling of discouragement now prevailed among the citizens of Prague. They concluded a truce with the royalist commanders of the Hradčany and Vyšehrad castles and determined to enter into negotiations with Sigismund in view of peace. They elected six envoys—two city councillors, two doctors of the university and two townsmen—who were to proceed to Kutna Hora for this purpose. Their reception was most ungracious. Sigismund again subjected the envoys to the indignity of kneeling before him for a longer time than was customary. He then informed them that he was bound by oath to extirpate all heresies by fire and sword, and that he would not perjure himself even if he were obliged to destroy the whole Bohemian kingdom, reduce it to ashes and re-people it with foreigners. Then, brutally violent as he often was when dealing with those whom he believed to be weak, he “became as hard as steel and moved his limbs as one demented.”¹ The King finally again ordered the Praguers to remove all fortifications and barricades within their city and to deliver up all arms to the commanders of the royal garrisons of the Hradčany and Vyšehrad; on his arrival at Prague only would he be prepared to tell them what amount of mercy he would grant them. This, as Palacký has well said, meant war to the knife. When the envoys, on their return to Prague, informed the citizens of the result of their mission all, men and women, rich and poor, began to work incessantly at the fortifications

¹ “Contra quas crudeles insolentias nobis ipsum [Sigismund] pie alloquentibus et omni subjecta humilitate deprecantibus ut saltem aliis obmissis ante justiciam ministraret ac præstaret regnicolis audientiam expeditam; sed ipse cum sic a nobis humiliter et modeste peteretur factus adamante durior velut si aculeis stringeretur cœpit ad furiosi similitudinem membra agitare.” (From the letter of the citizens of Prague to the Venetians, which has already been quoted.)

of the town. The works were further strengthened after the Táborites, as will be mentioned presently, had arrived in Prague. About Whitsuntide, Březova writes,¹ the Táborite women, joined by the women of Žatec and Loun and a large number of women of Prague, dug a deep fosse from the Slavic—now called Emaus—monastery to the Karlov and the church of St. Apollinaris, thus guarding that part of the town that was most menaced by the neighbouring fortress of the Vyšehrad.² We have, as is so often the case in the annals of the Hussite wars, very insufficient information concerning the fortifications of Prague at that period, but subsequent events prove that they had been erected with some skill. While strengthening the defences of their town as much as the shortness of time permitted, the citizens also attempted to summon to their aid all Bohemian nobles and townships who had not submitted to Sigismund. The most important step was to appeal to the rising community of Tábor; this resolution was not made without some reluctance. The puritan severity and rigour of the Táborites was displeasing to many citizens, as indeed became obvious when the men of Tábor arrived at Prague. The teaching of the university of Prague, to which the Praguers conformed, was opposed to the rules and rites of Tábor, as the university rejected all innovations which could not be traced back to Hus himself. The common danger for a time silenced these differences. Immediately after the return of the envoys from Kutna Hora the citizens of Prague sent messengers to Tábor begging the Táborites, "if they wished verily to obey God's law, to march to their aid without delay, and with as many men as they could muster."

Žižka's military genius had enabled him during his short stay at Tábor to organise his troops so thoroughly that they were ready to confront immediately the troops of Sigismund, a conflict with whom he had long considered inevitable. On

¹ *Lawrence of Březova*, p. 373 of Professor Goll's edition. I may here mention that I always quote that edition.

² See my *Prague* ("Mediæval Towns" series).

the very day on which the messenger arrived the men of Tábor set out on their march to Prague; they numbered 9,000 warriors, and were, as had become customary, accompanied by many priests, women and children. The four captains of the people led the expedition, but supreme command was here already tacitly granted to Žižka. A considerable garrison was left at Tábor, which afterwards successfully repulsed an attack by Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, who had now abandoned the national party, and who was aided in his attack by some Austrian troops sent by the Archduke Albert, son-in-law of Sigismund. The Táborites did not reach Prague unmolested. When crossing the Sazava river near Poříč they were attacked by a large royalist force led by Lord Peter Konopišt of Sternberg—their old enemy—and by the Italian condottiere Pipa of Ozora, who somewhat later played a considerable part in the Hussite wars. The royalist forces were, however, routed by Žižka after a short skirmish. The Táborites now reached Prague on May 20 without any further hindrance. When the Táborite columns, preceded by the priests who—as was now customary—carried the Sacrament in a monstrance before the soldiers, entered the city gates they were enthusiastically greeted and welcomed by the townsmen. Sigismund, whose forces were approaching Prague in the direction of the Sazava, retired on Stara Boleslav (Alt Bunzlau), evidently not wishing to encounter the Hussites in a pitched battle before the arrival of the numerous crusaders, who were expected from Germany.

Shortly after the arrival of the Táborites the citizens of Prague received another considerable reinforcement. The citizens of Žatec (Saaz), Loun and Slané sent to Prague an army consisting of several thousand men. As the Bohemian peasants and even the townsmen were then little accustomed to warfare, they, particularly at the beginning of the Hussite war, generally chose knights or nobles as their leaders. Thus this small army of townsmen was led by the Utraquist knights Bradatý and Obrovec, who brought with them a small force of cavalry,

which, according to the chroniclers, who probably exaggerated, consisted of about 1,000 men.

After retiring from the neighbourhood of Prague Sigismund proceeded to raid the country districts of Bohemia, hoping thus to intimidate the population. He then, accompanied by his Queen Barbara and the Dowager Queen Sophia, proceeded from Stara Boleslav to Mělník, and then to Slané, which had already been captured by some of his adherents. He remained some time at Slané, and summoned to that city representatives of the town of Loun. The citizens of Loun made their submission to Sigismund and consented to receive a royalist garrison. It has already been mentioned that the more warlike citizens of Žatec and Loun had already marched to Prague to take part in the defence of the menaced capital. The passage of Sigismund's army was everywhere marked by deeds of horrible cruelty. At Slané the papal legate, Bishop Ferdinand of Lucca, who accompanied Sigismund, caused a priest and a layman, who claimed the right to receive Communion in the two kinds, to be burnt alive. At Litoměřice, to which city the royal army marched from Slané, Sigismund himself ordered seventeen town-councillors, who had been imprisoned as being suspected of Utraquism, to be drowned in the Elbe. These evils deeds, when they became known in Prague, caused, as was inevitable, terrible reprisals.

The vast armies of the crusaders had meanwhile begun to arrive in Bohemia. As had been settled at the imperial diet of Breslau, the city of Prague was to be the rallying point for the varied host that was now intent on destroying the ancient liberty and nationality of the Bohemians. Sigismund, therefore, decided again to draw nearer to Prague; his access to the capital was always assured by the possession of the castles of Hradčany and Vyšehrad. On his march Sigismund halted at the town of Zbraslav (Königsaal) on the Vltava, where evil tidings awaited him. Lord Krušina of Lichtenburg, leader of the Orebites, had left Prague with the monk Ambrose, and

passing safely through a country occupied by Sigismund's troops, they arrived near Králové Hradec. They called to arms the fervently Utraquist inhabitants of that district and, aided by them, recaptured the Hussite stronghold of Králové Hradec. This was a matter of considerable importance, as it cut off Sigismund's communications with Silesia. To the King of Hungary—who had none of the talents of a military leader—this appeared unimportant. He limited himself to sending to North-Eastern Bohemia an army of 10,000 men, which made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain possession of Králové Hradec. At Zbraslav Sigismund had been joined by several German princes, who were at the head of considerable forces, and it probably appeared to him unimportant that he was obliged to detach 10,000 men from so vast an army. Even a more talented leader than Sigismund might at that moment have felt sanguine. He had marched from Kutna Hora to Mělník, Litoměřice, Slaně, Loun, Zbraslav, and other places, and met with little or no resistance. Could he but possess himself of Prague—which holds in Bohemia the position that in France belongs to Paris—the conquest of the Hussite land was certain. Even of the redoubtable Táborite warriors, the great part were shut up in the capital, and the town itself appeared incapable of resistance. The Hradčany and Vyšehrad castles were in the hands of the royalists. The Malá Strana had been almost totally destroyed during the fighting at the foot of the Hradčany hill. It remained only to subdue the Old and the New Town.¹ The whole army of the crusaders encamped before Prague on June 29, and on the following day the King proceeded to St. Vitus's cathedral on the Hradčany hill,² where high mass was just being celebrated.

The citizens of Prague—though they had long been reluctant to break off the negotiations—showed indomitable courage now that the decisive struggle had begun. They elected new magistrates, who all belonged to the party which had long

¹ See note 2, p. 5.

² I must here again refer my readers to my *Prague*.

considered war inevitable. There were occasional dissensions among the defenders. Thus the Táborite women took possession of a nunnery and expelled the nuns who had remained there, and some of the citizens complained that they and their wives and daughters had been insulted by Táborites whose puritanic feeling was offended by the richness of their garb. These occurrences had at the time little importance; all were at that moment busy in strengthening the fortifications. Žižka practically assumed sole command of the defending army. His colleague, Nicholas of Hus, had returned to Tábor and successfully repulsed an attack which the royalists made on that city. Though I find in the scanty contemporary records little proof of the antagonism between Nicholas and Žižka which has been assumed by most modern writers, it is certain that the departure of Nicholas of Hus was favourable to the unity of the commandship.

It was during the defence of Prague that Žižka first gave evidence of his military genius. With that intuition which only born leaders of armies possess, he had found that the key of his position was the Vitkov hill, and he immediately ordered that hill to be fortified, and he placed his scanty artillery behind the earthworks which had been hurriedly thrown up. The Vitkov hill consists of a narrow ridge parallel to the Vltava river, which is very steep, both in the direction of the river, and in that of the open country around Prague; from the city only the hill is easily accessible. Its possession secured to the defenders the possibility of communicating with the country districts of Bohemia, where some cities were still in the hands of the Hussites.¹

By the end of June all the vast army of the crusaders had assembled around Prague. The strength of the forces

¹ See General Köhler, *Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesen in der Ritterzeit*. Vol. V. pp. 389–390. Though General Köhler was, like all writers on this campaign, obliged to rely mainly on Březova—who is here somewhat carried away by national enthusiasm—Köhler's account of the attack on the Žižkov is far more lucid than that of any other modern writer.

cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. Dr. Grünhagen states that at the lowest valuation the army must have consisted of 80,000 men. This figure is probably too low. Lawrence of Březova states that the troops of Sigismund, including all the German and other crusaders, amounted to 150,000 men, and Æneas Sylvius writes—undoubtedly exaggerating—that the cavalry alone numbered 70,000 men. Among the crusaders, according to the account of Březova, who writes with justifiable national pride, were Bohemians (of the Roman party), Moravians, Hungarians and Croats, Dalmatians and Bulgarians, Wallachians and Szeklers, Cini (sic) and Jasi (sic), Slavonians, Servians and Ruthenians, Styrians, men of Meissen, Bavarians, Saxons, Austrians, Franconians, Frenchmen, Englishmen, men of Brabant and Westphalia, Dutchmen, Switzers, Lusatians, Suabians, Carinthians, men of Aragon, Spaniards, Poles, Germans from the Rhine-lands and many others.¹ The princes and Church dignitaries who had now joined Sigismund were also very numerous; among the names which the chroniclers record we find Albert, Duke of Saxony, Frederick and William, margraves of Meissen, Albert, Archduke of Austria, many of the Silesian princes, Louis, patriarch of Aquileia, many archbishops, and numerous princes and counts of the empire. The army was one of the largest which ever at that period assembled for battle. Palacký, with his usual sagacity, greatly deplores that we find very little mention of the siege of Prague in the writings of the contemporary German chroniclers, who perhaps did not care to give a detailed account of events in which their countrymen had not played a very glorious part. We are, therefore, reduced to conjectures, even as regards many important events.² Of the

¹ *Lawrence of Březova*, p. 384.

² The German contemporary chroniclers are almost entirely silent as regards the events of the first crusade. Monstrelet gives a brief account of the siege, which is interesting also as evidence of the fanatical hatred of the Bohemians that had already sprung up in all parts of Europe. It is this hatred which induced the people to give credence to any, even the most absurd, accusations against the Bohemian nation. Monstrelet writes (Vol. IV. chap. cclix),

Bohemian chroniclers only Lawrence of Březova gives a somewhat detailed account of the siege; it is true that at this moment, when Bohemia braved the world in arms against her, Březova's national feeling and patriotism strongly asserts itself.

The vast armies which had assembled around Prague did not attempt an immediate attack on the city; perhaps the first symptoms of discord among these men who had entered on this campaign from very varied motives already appeared. Some were enthusiastic followers of Rome, eager to extirpate all heretics¹; others were glad to continue, under the auspices of Rome, their habitual warfare against the Slavic race; others had followed their princes according to the duties of feudal allegiance; others, mere mercenaries, gave their services to that prince in whose pay they happened to be at that moment. The army was established in three large camps, which, as the chroniclers write, had the appearance of three vast cities. One of the armies of the crusaders was encamped in that part of the then almost desolate Malá Strana that is immediately opposite the Vltava river. The crusaders encamped there frequently insulted the Hussite outposts on the right bank of the river, by crying, "Ha! Ha! Hus! Hus! Ketzer! Ketzer!"²

"En cest an le roy des Rommains, empereur des Alemaignes, fist une moult grande assemblée de gens d'armes de plusieurs pays de la chrestienté pour combattre et résister aux entreprises des faux puans hérétiques, qui se tenoient en la cité de Prague et au pays d'environ deux ou trois journées. Auquel mandement alèrent grand quantité de princes, prélas, chevaliers et communes tant de pié que de cheval, des pays d'Alemaigne, de Liège, de Holande et de Sélande, Haynnau et autres lieux. Et y arriva tant de gens que a peine se povoient ils nombrer. Mais les hérétiques tindrent si fort la cité de Prague, qu'on ne les povoient guères dommager, si non en aucuns rencontres, où il y en eu plusieurs mis à mort. Et estoient en si grand nombre et si fort que par faulte de vivres convient lesdiz Chrestiens retourner. Et pour vray iceulx maudis hérétiques estoient si obstinez en leurs erreurs qu'ils ne craignoient nulz martires dont es les feist mourir. Et mesmement se desguisoient, armoient les femmes ainsi que dyables pleines de toutes cruaultez et en furent trouvées plusieurs mortes et occises es dessusdiz rencontres." I have of course preserved Monstrelet's spelling.

¹ Of these men Březova writes: "*Gentes multe et varie . . . confluebant pro expugnanda inclita et magnifica Pragensi civitate ac sic calicis communione annullanda et cassanda per hoc indulgencias a pena et a culpa obtinere se sperantes quod spirituales ipsis licet false promittebant ad destruendum fideles Boemos utriusque sexus multipliciter animando.*" ² *i. e.* "heretic."

The bridge of Prague had remained in the hands of the national party, and the Hussite warriors, who had strongly fortified the tête de pont on the left bank, often sallied out to attack the crusaders. Skirmishes took place almost daily, and the crusaders were guilty of great cruelties; they burnt alive all the prisoners whom they could seize; only occasionally a Bohemian noble of Sigismund's party was able to interfere and to save the life of his countryman. The soldiers in the other camps, whom the strong fortifications separated from the Bohemians, ravaged the neighbouring country districts and burnt alive all Bohemians whom they met in the villages. As they murdered quite indiscriminately, there were among their victims many fervent Roman Catholics, who had never received Communion in the two kinds.

It is difficult to understand why the crusading army so long delayed its attack on the capital. The delay was, of course, very advantageous to the patriots, who continued to strengthen the fortifications. It is true that the crusaders continued to receive reinforcements. Thus the Archduke of Austria, who had on his march unsuccessfully attacked Tábor, only joined the army of the crusaders early in July. It was now finally decided that a general attack on Prague should take place on July 14. Three simultaneous attacks were planned. The army which occupied the Hradčany hill and the neighbouring part of the Malá Strana was to drive back whatever Hussites might still be on the left bank of the Vltava, and then, forcing its passage across the bridge, to enter the old town. At the same time another army of crusaders was to descend from the Vyšehrad hill and attack the new town, whose formerly weak defences had recently been strengthened in consequence of the foresight of Žižka and by means of the constant and unsparing labour of the men and women of Prague. The third attack was to be made on the Vitkov hill, which assured the communications of the city with the country districts, in which the peasantry, infuriated by the unspeakable cruelties of Sigismund's mer-

cenaries, was everywhere rising in arms against the invaders. There is little doubt that the attack on the Vitkov was the one to which the besiegers attached most importance. Had it succeeded, it was certainly possible to subdue the city by starving it out.¹ An unconditional surrender would have delivered Sigismund from all his enemies, while, in the event of the city being stormed, it was not impossible that some of the undaunted Táborites and the other bravest men of the garrison might escape and continue the war. The troops from Meissen were chosen for the attack on the Vitkov. They numbered about 7,000 or 8,000 men, the majority of whom appear to have been horsemen. The contemporary records hardly enable us to obtain an exact idea of the fortifications on the Vitkov, which had been hurriedly erected under Žižka's direction. The pious Březova is too intent on expounding the direct Divine aid which the Bohemians obtained on this memorable day to vouchsafe us much information. It is certain that by Žižka's orders several blockhouses had been erected and provided with some of the rough field-guns of that period. These improvised forts were defended by Táborite men and women, whom national and religious enthusiasm rendered for a time almost invincible. One blockhouse, defended only by twenty-six men and two women and one girl, was only taken after desperate resistance; one of the women, though unarmed, surpassed the men in bravery, and refused to forsake her post, saying "A true Christian must never retire before Antichrist, and thus fighting bravely she was killed and gave up the ghost."² Seeing the peril of his men, Žižka, who had previously remained on the part of the Vitkov nearest to the city,³ now attacked in the flank the German soldiers who were ascending the hill.

¹ This method was frequently employed in Bohemian warfare; thus Sigismund's father, Charles IV, subdued the castle of Žampach by starvation—to quote but one of many examples.

² *Lawrence of Březova*.

³ General Köhler states that Žižka remained within the city walls during the beginning of the fight; this appears very improbable to one who is acquainted with the topography of Prague.

A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued, and Žižka, who, as was his custom, fought in the front rank, was for a time in great danger, till the flails and fighting-clubs of his Táborites drove back the Germans. Meanwhile a new troop of Táborites arrived, led by priests carrying the Sacrament, as was customary, particularly in moments of great peril; many citizens of Prague, summoned by the ringing of the church bells in the numerous churches of the city, hurried to the aid of the defenders of the Vitkov. The defeat of the Germans was soon complete, and many of them, rushing down the slopes of the Vitkov—then much steeper than at present—perished in the Vltava. As soon as victory appeared certain the Táborites and Praguers knelt down and intoned the *Te Deum Laudamus*, while the whole city was filled with unspeakable joy. About the same time as the attack on the Vitkov took place, the crusaders in or near the Vyšehrad and Hradčany castles attacked the parts of the city which were near those strongholds; they were, however, easily repulsed, principally, as it appears, in consequence of the superiority of the Bohemian artillery.

The battle of the Vitkov—or rather of the Žižkov, as the hill since that memorable day bore, and still bears, the name of the victorious general—may be considered as the turning point, as the Valmy or Turnham Green, of the great Bohemian civil war. The Hussites had not, indeed, obtained a decisive victory; many of the crusaders had not even been engaged. Yet the Bohemians had stemmed the tide of hostile victories. The large number of men who, even in times of great political and religious enthusiasm, think mainly of their personal advantage, began to consider the Hussite as the winning side. The nobility in Bohemia, though not in Moravia, began to desert Sigismund. The conduct of the “Hungarian King,” as the Bohemians always called Sigismund, had not been heroic; contrary to the custom of princes in that warlike period he had taken no part in the fighting. A contemporary chronicler, who, being a fervent Catholic and a canon of St. Stephen’s cathedral in Vienna,

cannot be considered hostile to the Roman and royalist cause, writes that, when Sigismund viewed the defeat of the crusaders, he returned to his camp " smiling at the defeat of the faithful Christians who had succumbed to the heretics." ¹

The battle of the Žižkov was immediately followed by an attempt at reconciliation. The doctors of the university of Prague, who were the leading theologians of the moderate Utraquist party, took the initiative. They had previously drawn up a paper which enumerated the demands of the Utraquists; should these be granted by Sigismund, the theologians advised their countrymen to recognise him as their sovereign. These articles, as they were called, were shown to some of the knights and nobles of the national party, who strongly approved of them. The articles of Prague fully responded to the wishes of these men, whose demands in regard to ecclesiastical matters were limited to the right of communicating in the two kinds, and of freely preaching according to the teaching of Hus, and also to the establishment of a more rigorous discipline among the clergy. The possibility of an agreement with Sigismund also appeared most desirable to men who were always reluctant to take up arms against the descendant of their ancient kings. The citizens of Prague, however, declined to take part in any negotiations from which the men of Tábor were excluded. This matter, however, was settled amicably, and both parties decided that a conference should take place between the Utraquist and the Roman Catholic divines. In consequence of the intense mutual distrust and the ever-present recollection of the treachery committed against Hus, the Bohemians refused to meet their opponents within the walls of the royal Hradčany castle. It was finally settled that the deliberations should take place in

¹ " Quod [the defeat on the Vitkov] cum Sigismundus rex cerneret ad castra revertit subridens (ut fertur) casum fortium Christianorum succumbentium in hæreticos qui contra eos triumpharunt " (*Thomæ Ebendorferi de Haselbach Chronicon Austriacum* ; in Pez, " *Scriptores Rerum Austriacarum*," Vol. II. p. 849).

the open air, on what may be called neutral ground, among the ruins of the Malá Strana, in view of both the contending armies. The principal papal representatives were Louis, Patriarch of Aquileia and Simon of Ragusa, Bishop of Trau in Dalmatia. They were accompanied by numerous theologians and some of the Bohemian nobles of the papal party. They were met by the principal theologians of the university of Prague, some of the Utraquist nobles, and representatives of the cities of Prague and of the community of Tábor. The famed articles of Prague were laid before the Roman churchmen, and it may be well to give their contents here. They declared :

I. The Word of God shall in the kingdom of Bohemia be freely and without impediment proclaimed and preached by Christian priests.

II. The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of God shall in the two kinds, that is in bread and wine, be freely administered to all faithful Christians, according to the order and teaching of our Saviour.

III. The priests and monks, according to secular law, possess great worldly wealth, contrarily to the teaching of Christ. Of this wealth they shall be deprived.

IV. All mortal sins, particularly those that are public, as well as all disorders which are opposed to God's law, shall in all classes be suppressed by those whose office it is to do so. All evil and untruthful rumours ¹ shall be suppressed for the good of the commonwealth, the kingdom and the nation.

It cannot be said that these demands were very extreme, and the contents of the articles are very similar to those of the compacts which ended the Hussite wars. Yet sixteen years of almost incessant warfare were to pass before this compromise

¹ This mainly refers to the statement frequently made by the Germans that the Bohemians were heretics; this was considered a mortal insult. The version of the articles given above is the one read before the conference. There is a more extensive version containing further statements and many biblical quotations. It is of interest rather to theologians than to students of history.

was finally accepted. Though both the Romanist and the nationalist nobles approved of the articles, it was necessary that a disputation between the theologians should now take place. Dr. Peter Paul de Vergeriis, one of the theologians attached to the papal legate, acted as spokesman for the Roman Catholics, and Master John of Přebor, one of the foremost Utraquist divines, defended the cause of the Church reformers. It is characteristic of the customs of the period that the chroniclers find it necessary to state that the proceedings were carried on in a courteous and orderly fashion. While the three first articles were being discussed it did not seem impossible that the contending parties would arrive at an agreement. The representatives of the town of Prague loudly exclaimed: "God be praised." They were doomed to disappointment. When the Utraquists suggested that—as was indeed natural—each party should make some concessions in regard to the questions still in dispute, the representatives of Rome absolutely rejected the proposal. "We cannot discuss these matters with you," they said, "because they have already been decided by the council; even if in our own minds we were convinced by your arguments we could not agree with you on matters which are opposed to the teaching of the Church."¹ The conference then immediately broke up.

Almost immediately afterward the vast armies of the crusaders began to disperse. All writers on the Hussite wars have attempted to discover the causes of this unexpected event, and it can be affirmed—though this may appear paradoxical—that all their various explanations contain a certain amount of truth. It is certain that immediately after the unsuccessful attack on the Vitkov very strong mutual distrust between the German crusaders and the Bohemian Catholic nobles who upheld Sigismund began to arise. It is equally certain that both his German and his Bohemian soldiers distrusted Sigis-

¹ Tomek. *Dějepis města Prahy* (*History of the Town of Prague*), Vol. IV. p. 85.

mund. The Germans maintained that the King had not on July 14 allowed the artillery to fire on the town of Prague, for fear of destroying a city which he considered his own property. Ebendorffer of Haselbach, who has already been quoted, lays great stress on this point.¹ He was imbued with that dislike of the Austrian for the Bohemian which has endured for centuries, and is by no means extinct at the present day. He and other writers have even, quite unjustly, accused Sigismund of having caused the disaster of the Vitkov by withholding reinforcements. The Bohemian nobles of the party of Sigismund were also incensed against him. They thought—and as subsequent events proved, rightly—that the King's influence, if effectively used, could have induced the papal see to make the not very far-reaching concessions which then appeared to be sufficient. They also believed that the horrible cruelties committed by German soldiers against Bohemians, quite irrespectively of their religious creed, had exasperated the people, whom it would be easier to pacify if the foreigners departed. Other causes contributed to the dispersion of the crusaders; in the absence of all sanitary regulations various epidemics—collectively described by the contemporary chroniclers as “the plague”—broke out among the vast agglomeration of men which surrounded the walls of Prague. Great fires broke out, which destroyed numerous tents in the camps. Their origin was never known, but the Germans strongly suspected their Bohemian allies. It is more probable that the incendiaries were Taborite women, who managed to pass secretly into the enemy's lines. Other difficulties also arose. Many of the crusaders, at the moment when Pope Martin's bull had caused great enthusiasm, had enlisted for a limited time. These men—as did the American volunteers at the beginning of the civil war—now began to declare that their term of service had elapsed, and begged

¹ Ebendorffer of Haselbach has placed in Sigismund's mouth a very eloquent harangue in which he protests against the destruction of his capital (Pez, “*Scriptores rerum Austriacarum*,” Vol. II. p. 850).

permission to return to their homes. When this was refused many, none the less, left the camps. Other men, professed mercenaries, were indeed prepared to stay, but demanded that their pay should be given them regularly.¹ To Sigismund, who was always in financial trouble, this was a matter of great difficulty, even after he had, following the example of his opponents, begun to sell the monstresances and other sacred vessels in the churches that were in his power.

As soon as it appeared certain that the camps of the crusaders would break up, Sigismund determined also to leave the neighbourhood of Prague. He would, indeed, still retain a large following, as the Roman Catholic nobles of Bohemia and Moravia remained with him, and he had also a strong force from Silesia, which was ready to continue the war. He was in that country supported, not only by the Catholic nobles, but also by the townsmen, who were mostly Germans and ardent Roman Catholics; these terms were indeed synonymous in the lands of the Bohemian crown at that period. These considerations did not affect Sigismund's decision, though he afterwards again appeared near Prague. Great doubt has been thrown on the personal courage of Sigismund, who certainly differed widely from his grandfather King John, "the crown of chivalry."² The annals constantly refer to the brave deeds of Žižka, Krušina of Lichtenburg, Bořek of Mileteček, and on the Catholic side of Ulrich of Rosenberg—to mention but a few names—but Sigismund never appears in these often very picturesque battle-pieces except occasionally as a spectator. Before retreating from Prague Sigismund was, on the advice of the Bohemian Catholic nobles, crowned as King of Bohemia in St. Vitus's cathedral on the Hradčany hill. It is not my intention to refer here—I have done so elsewhere—to

¹ How greatly financial difficulties contributed to the dispersion of the crusaders is proved by a very laconic statement of a contemporary Bohemian chronicler. He writes: "Afterwards [*i. e.* after the defeat of the Vitkov] the King dismissed the Germans, for he had nothing more to give them" (*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*, Vol. III. p. 38).

² See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, pp. 68–69.

the great importance which the Bohemians attach to the coronation of their kings. The ceremony took place on July 28. Sigismund was crowned by the archbishop of Prague, Conrad of Vechta, in the presence of numerous German princes, among whom was his son-in-law, Albert, archduke of Austria. Some Bohemian nobles of the Catholic party were also present. Two days later Sigismund and his forces retired to Kutna Hora, where they remained for a considerable time.

In Prague the citizens, who now enjoyed temporary quiet, began to take counsel as to the future government of their country. They now already decided to send an embassy to Ladislav, King of Poland, which was to offer him the Bohemian crown. Žižka, who, though an implacable hater of Sigismund, was not opposed to the monarchical system of government, gave his support to this scheme. The proposal was, however, rejected by King Ladislav, who, a heathen by birth, had only recently been received into the Roman Church, and was strongly averse to any conflict with the head of the Church which he had just joined. As appeared later, the Bohemians would probably have been received more favourably had they offered the crown to Prince Vitold of Lithuania, a relation of King Ladislav.¹ Vitold, also born a heathen, had afterwards joined the Greek Church, but was now a Roman Catholic. His intense ambition was, however, little troubled by religious scruples. Though it has been necessary to mention here already these plans of the restoration of monarchy under a Slavic prince, it will be better to refer again to these negotiations later, when they had become more fully developed.

The short period of respite which the citizens of the capital had secured was, unfortunately, also marked by the beginning of discord between the Táborites and the moderate Utraquists or Praguers, as they began to be called, that city being the centre of moderate Hussitism. The presence of Táborite priests in Prague had greatly influenced many of the citizens whose

¹ They were both grandsons of Gedymin, Prince of Lithuania.

religious views had hitherto conformed to the teaching of the masters of the university, particularly of those who, like John of Píbram, Jacobellus of Stříbro, Christian of Prachatice, had been intimate friends of Hus.¹ The teaching of the Tábórites went far beyond anything ever contemplated by the master. They founded their doctrine entirely on the Bible, and rejected all later dogmas as human inventions. They rejected private confession as a sacrament, and admitted only a general public confession of sins. They entirely refused to admit the existence of purgatory, and demanded an extreme simplicity in the religious services; the churches were to have no altars; only a plain table was to be used for Communion; they also strongly objected to the use of vestments and of costly vessels at the religious services. The situation became very serious. The demand of these innovations, which were abhorred by most of the Praguers, was made by an armed peasantry who, after defeating the chivalry of Europe, were not likely to prove conciliatory towards the citizens of Prague. Intestine warfare then already appeared probable. That it was for a time averted is due to the statesmanship of Žižka. He was no friend of religious anarchism, and we will shortly find him severely punishing crazy fanatics. The extreme veneration which he cherished for the memory of Hus rendered him very reluctant to oppose the old friends of the master. His link with the advanced party consisted mainly in their common abhorrence of Sigismund, whose candidature to the Bohemian throne some of the Utraquist nobles and a few conservative citizens still considered as admissible, should he frankly accept the articles of Prague. Žižka announced to his followers that the possibility of an attack on Tábor by Sigismund's partisans necessitated their presence in Southern Bohemia, and on August 22 the Tábórites left Prague.

Though, in consequence of the very short range of the primitive artillery of that day, the citizens of Prague were in a

¹ See my *Master John Huss*, passim.

state of comparative security, the royal garrisons in the fortresses of the Hradčany and Vyšehrad were yet a permanent menace to the city. The Praguers therefore determined to lay siege to the Vyšehrad, from which stronghold the neighbouring parts of the new town were always open to an attack. On Sunday, September 15, some of the troops of the Praguers and their allies left the city and occupied the village of Pankrác and the church of that name, which lie on the high road that then as now runs from Southern Bohemia to Prague by way of the Vyšehrad. This new position was immediately fortified by earthworks. Somewhat later the Praguers also succeeded in occupying positions to the left and the right of the fortress, thus joining the fortifications at Pankrác to those of the city, and surrounding the Vyšehrad in every direction.

Before continuing the account of the siege it is, however, necessary to mention a new attempt at mediation. The nobles of the district of Králové Hradec, whose leader was probably Čeněk of Wartenberg, attempted to persuade Sigismund to accept the articles of Prague and conclude a truce in view of a possible pacification. An envoy from Králové Hradec undertook the mission of informing Sigismund of this proposal. The King, as usual, evading a direct answer, but raising counter-demands, declared that it was necessary that the citizens of Prague should previously abandon the siege of the Vyšehrad. When the envoy arrived at Prague he found the citizens determinately opposed to this demand. They, however, put forth another proposal, which cannot be considered unfair; both besiegers and defenders were for a time to evacuate the Vyšehrad and its neighbourhood, which, during the peace negotiations, were provisionally to be occupied by the nobles of Králové Hradec, who attempted to mediate between the contending parties. When the envoy returned to Beroun bearing this message, Sigismund was seized by one of those attacks of fury verging on madness to which, like his brother Venceslas,

he was subject. Using the most filthy language,¹ he declared that he felt far more inclined grossly to insult the citizens of Prague than to surrender the Vyšehrad; "rather," he continued, "let these peasants² surrender the city of Králově Hradec to me." He then drove the envoy from his presence, after having grossly insulted him.

It was again obvious that Sigismund would only accept the unconditional surrender of the Bohemian nation, and the Praguers continued the investment of the Vyšehrad with increased energy. They again appealed to their allies for aid, and this was readily granted them, as the Bohemians now felt certain that the result of the great civil war depended on the possession of Prague—as proved true at the end of the war. The citizens received immediate aid from the men of the Orebite community, who, led by their gallant commander, Krušina of Lichtenburg, marched to Prague with a force of 7,000 soldiers. The faithful citizens of Žatec and Loun sent a contingent to Prague, again commanded by Bradatý, who had previously taken part in the defence of the city. Victorin of Poděbrad, one of the greatest territorial nobles of Bohemia (father of George of Poděbrad, who became King of Bohemia), now renounced the allegiance of Sigismund, and with a large force marched to the aid of the capital. The Táborites also promised to send troops, but did not do so immediately, as they were then engaged in warfare with the Catholic Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, who was raiding the country near Tábor and murdering mercilessly all whom he suspected of having received Communion in the two kinds. It was only somewhat later that Nicholas of Hus arrived at Prague with forty Táborite horsemen.

The Praguers and their allies now encircled the Vyšehrad in every direction, intending—in the fashion so frequent in the

¹ I do not dare to repeat Sigismund's words, through even the learned Professor Tomek has not hesitated to repeat (in the original Latin) the King's words as recorded by Březova.

² The persons referred to being mostly knights and nobles, calling them "peasants" was, of course, at that feudal period a gross insult.

Bohemian warfare of that period—to enforce by starvation the surrender of the garrison. The encampment of the Praguers was near the village of Pankrác; next to them were placed the troops of Lord Victorin of Poděbrad and the men of the Orebite community under Lord Krušina of Lichtenburg, who was chosen as commander-in-chief of the whole national army. Close to this encampment the men of Žatec and Loun under Bradatý took up their position on the declivity below the Karlov church. The three camps were protected by a deep fosse that extended from the lines of Pankrác to the position of Bradatý and the city walls. The Vyšehrad was thus surrounded in every direction, except where almost perpendicular cliffs descend from the hill to the Vltava. It was attempted to bring provisions to the castle from the river, but this attempt failed, as Sigismund's ill-conceived plans generally did. The last events connected with the siege of the Vyšehrad and its capitulation are best told in the words of Lawrence of Březova, the contemporary chronicler, whose narrative is here at its best. He shares with most mediæval chroniclers the defect of great prolixity, and it is often necessary to abridge his narration. He writes¹: "By this time John of Sembera and the other captains of the castle of Vyšehrad, having observed that the King still deferred supplying them with provisions, and that many, tormented by hunger and not having even horse-flesh, appeared pale as the dead, while others died of hunger, on the day of St. Simon and St. Jude (October 28) held a conference with Lord Krušina and the other barons and commanders of the army of Prague, meeting in an amicable fashion at a spot midway between the Vyšehrad and the church of St. Pancrace; now while this conference was proceeding a wondrous rainbow appeared in the skies. While some masters of the liberal arts and bachelors were sitting on the summit of a hill named Kavec, overlooking the Vltava river, and were waiting for a good result of the happy conference,

¹ pp. 435 and ff. of Březova's chronicle.

and were talking on various subjects, there appeared in the air a rainbow such as we ¹ had never seen before. Its arc arose almost at our feet in the Vltava river and it extended over the city as far as a spot near St. Pancrace's church, where soldiers were standing, awaiting the result of the conference. Thus only in the space between that church and the hill on which we were sitting the circle was incomplete, and this space was not greater than a fourth of the whole circle. And while many were giving various opinions as to the significance of this rainbow, we joyfully sat down again, for this miraculous rainbow was [*i. e.* signified] that the Praguers would soon take possession of the Vyšehrad; and indeed it befell thus, as will be told later. For by the will of God a treaty was concluded between the parties according to which, if the King did not send sufficient provisions before the fifteenth hour ² on the 1st of November, which was the day of All Saints, then the possessors of the castle were on their faith and honour to surrender the Vyšehrad to the citizens of Prague." Březova then gives the document containing the details of this conditional surrender, as it may be called, as well as the names and titles of all the warriors and chiefs of both parties who signed the agreement.

It is interesting to quote again Březova's account of the last events of the campaign of the Vyšehrad. He continues: "On the vigil of the day of All Saints, the King, who had arrived at Nový Hrad early in the morning, was afraid of attacking the men of Prague early on that day, hoping to receive further reinforcements from the Moravian barons. These arrived at Nový Hrad towards evening, and remained in the woods in full armour during the night, that they might be prepared in the morning to repulse from their camp the men of Prague and all their allies. During the night the King also sent a message to his mercenaries in the (Hradčany) castle of Prague, ordering them to be under arms early next morning,

¹ Březova was one of the party and therefore writes as an eye-witness.

² That is, 9 A.M. according to our present system of counting time.

and, descending from their fortress, to attack the bridge-tower ¹ or the house of the Duke of Saxony ² and burn them down if possible; he himself would, with a large force of soldiers who had joined him on that evening, drive the Praguers from the field at the same time. But God, who opposes the proud and favours the humble, delivered the messenger with his letter into the hands of the Praguers, who, informed by the letter, fully understood the plans of the King. The captains of the men of Prague, therefore, carefully disposed their soldiers, showing each of them which place he would with his men occupy on the morrow and bravely defend against the attacks of the enemy.³

“Thus it happened that the King, with 15,000 or 20,000 well-armed men, descending from Nový Hrad, approached the spot where his army stood. Then, standing on the summit of a hill from which the road descends in the direction of St. Pancrace’s church, he drew his sword and brandished it in the air, thus signalling to the men on the Vyšehrad that they should make a sortie from their castle and attack the enemies, because he, with a large army, which they could see from the Vyšehrad, was preparing to attack the Praguers. But as the King by the will of God had neglected to arrive at the hour fixed by the agreement, the captains of the Vyšehrad closed the gates of the castle and allowed no one from the Vyšehrad to attack the Praguers, though many, principally those who were Germans, wished to do so. When the nobles of the King’s army saw that the troops on the Vyšehrad did not stir, and that the Praguers were well entrenched, they advised the King not to attack them if he wished to avoid serious losses to his army. Then the King said, ‘Far be this from me! It is altogether necessary that I should fight with these peasants to-day.’ Then Lord

¹ On the left bank of the Vltava.

² This house, the former Prague residence of the Dukes of Saxony, was situated in the Malá Strana close to the bridge-tower.

³ Březova obviously refers to orders given by the commanding general to his officers.

Henry of Plumlov,¹ courteously addressing the King, said : ' Be it known to you, lord King, that you will incur great losses to-day and retreat in disorder ; for I,—he said—' dread the fighting-clubs of these peasants. Then the King : ' I know,' he said, ' that you Moravians are cowards, and not loyal to me.' Then the said Lord Henry, with the other barons of Moravia, speedily dismounted, and said : ' Behold, we are ready to go where thou sendest us, and we shall be there, O King, where thou shalt not be.'² Then the King assigned to them the most dangerous post, ordering them to advance through low-lying ground, passing along marshes and fishponds, and then bravely attack the Praguers. He ordered the Hungarians to march over higher ground along the high road and attack the men of Prague. And when the troops had formed in this order and attacked bravely the Praguers in their entrenchments, these [the Praguers] were terrified, and at first began to fly, and crowded round the church of St. Pancrace. Seeing this Lord Krušina said with a loud voice : ' O good brethren, turn back and be to-day brave soldiers in Christ's battle ; for it is not our war, but God's that we are waging ; for you see that the Lord God to-day delivers all our enemies and His own into our hands.' Before he had finished his speech some one exclaimed : ' The enemies fly ! they fly ! ' On hearing this they all rushed forward, drove the enemies back from the entrenchments and turned them to flight. Then the Praguers with their nobles,³ pursuing them cruelly, killed some in the marshes and fish-ponds, as well as those who were flying in every direction, through the vineyards and the fields. The peasants struck them [the enemies] down with their fighting-clubs, sparing none, though some surrendered and promised to observe God's law⁴ up to their death. The nobles⁵ in armour, who had fought bravely during the battle, made

¹ The leader of the Moravian nobles.

² This taunt was, of course, an allusion to the widespread rumour that Sigismund was deficient in personal courage.

³ *i. e.* the nobles who fought on their side.

⁴ *i. e.* the articles of Prague.

⁵ Of the Hussite party.

many prisoners and, even at their own peril, saved many from the fighting-clubs of the brethren. Thus Lord Henry of Plumlov, who had been mortally wounded and made a prisoner, was carried to the churchyard of St. Pancrace, made confession, and died while asking to receive Communion in the two kinds. Similarly Lord Henry of Leř¹ died lying in his tent after having confessed and received Communion in the two kinds. Thus few of the barons of Moravia who opposed Communion in the two kinds remained alive. Here Lord Henry of Plumlov, supreme captain of Moravia, who, according to his promise, joined the King with 2,000 men, Jaroslav of Veseli, Vok of Holštýn . . . with many barons and knights of Bohemia and Moravia, were cruelly killed like pigs, and deprived of their armour and all their clothing except their shirts. What man who was not a pagan could pass through those fields and vineyards and view the brave bodies of the dead without compassion? What Bohemian, unless he were a madman, could see these dainty and robust warriors, these youths so curly-haired and so comely, without deeply bewailing their fate²; particularly as many, by order of the [Táborite] priests, remained in the vineyards and fields, and thus became the food of wolves, dogs, and the birds of the air, and the terror of those who beheld them? Some of them were, however, buried by faithful and pious men at night-time. The number of those killed was counted as being about 400 men in armour, besides those who were wounded and died at Brod and on the way; so that it was said that about 500 men of the King's army had perished, while it was also said that scarcely thirty men of the army of Prague had been killed. Of these the most important was Ješek, son of Ješek the goldsmith, who, with Krušina,

¹ Leř had been a friend of Hus, who mentions him in his last letter. (See my *Master John Hus*, p. 275.)

² This passage has been greatly admired by all readers of Březova. The humanity and compassion expressed in it form a very welcome respite in the midst of an almost uninterrupted record of ferocity and cruelty. Professor Denis, in his brilliant *Hus et la guerre des Hussites*, expresses particular admiration for this passage.

Bocko, and Nicholas of Hus, fighting knightly, deserved the sword-belt of knighthood. Now there was on this day a strong and very cold wind, which was more harmful to the knights in armour than to the lightly-clad footmen. There appeared, also in the air, a column in the fashion of a rainbow, and the many who gazed at it wondered what it signified.

“ At the time of the battle the mercenaries also descended from the [Hradčany] castle of Prague and attacked the Saxon house, but when they saw that their attack was useless they burnt down a few houses in the Mala Strana and then returned to the castle from which they had descended.

“ The King, as has been said, during the battle stood on the summit of a hill, and when he saw the pitiable destruction of his men, struck by terror, and feeling with his followers, he retired with tears. And, after having placed the wounded on carts, he evacuated Nový Hrad and marched by the shortest road to Brod. After having here buried a Hungarian nobleman he returned to Kutna Hora greatly lamenting. Wishing, however, to conceal the death of so many of his men, he declared that more Praguers than soldiers of his own army had been killed. There, on this day and on the following one, he and his queen placed green wreaths on their heads, pretending to show joy which in their hearts they did not feel.”

I have devoted a considerable amount of space to the transcription of this, the finest of Březova battle-pieces; he writes, of course, on some occasions as an eye-witness. Březova's own views, which were those of the Utraquist nobles and the university of Prague—what Dr. V. Bezold has very strikingly called the “ Hussite High Church ”—appear very clearly from the passages which I have quoted. Březova firmly believed in the justice of the Hussite cause, and was certain that men such as Lord Krušina of Lichtenburg were fighting God's battle. On the other hand, he severely blames the cruelty of fanatical peasants instigated by visionary priests. The abnormal condition of Bohemia at this period appears very

clearly when we read of knights and nobles who march to Bohemia to extirpate all Utraquists, and yet piously receive Communion in the two kinds before dying. Březova's narrative also seems to predict the future divisions among the Hussites which afterwards led to bloodshed, and finally to the downfall of the Hussite cause.

The fortress of the Vyšehrad capitulated to the victorious army of Prague immediately after the retreat of Sigismund; on this occasion also the zeal of fanatical peasants caused the destruction of many ancient churches and monuments. It is not, however, true that, as has been often stated, all buildings on the Vyšehrad hill were destroyed, and that it then already began to acquire that appearance of solitude and decay which it now wears. The last warlike events of the year 1420 took place in Southern Bohemia. Žižka had, as previously mentioned, returned to that district as soon as the safety of Prague had been at least momentarily assured. He first marched to Pisek, a city that had already joined the brotherhood of Tábor. From this centre he invaded the extensive domains of Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, and on October 12 he defeated the forces of Rosenberg and other Roman Catholic nobles. Before the end of the year he had also obtained possession of the important city of Prachaticze.

CHAPTER III

It is necessary to turn for a moment from the records of incessant warfare to the study of the internal condition of Bohemia during the early part of the Hussite wars. These wars have that analogy to the great English civil war in that minor struggles, simultaneously with the warfare of the main armies, but almost independently of it, took place in several parts of the country. Thus Žižka's brilliant campaign in Southern Bohemia in the autumn of 1420 had little connection with the war waged against Sigismund by the Praguers and the Utraquist nobles almost at the same moment. Up to the end of the war there was constant border-warfare on the frontier of Bohemia and Silesia, and incessant combats between the citizens and the neighbouring Utraquist nobles also took place around Plzeň—the town which, first occupied by Žižka, became the principal stronghold of the Roman party during the later period of the war.

As the religious dissensions were—whatever other motives may have influenced the actors—the principal cause of the Hussite wars, it is well to consider here the position of the different parties. It is a mistake to believe, as many writers have done, that a fundamental difference existed among the Hussites from the beginning of the movement and as soon as they attempted to obtain religious freedom. All Hussites equally revered the great name of Hus, and agreed generally on many important points, such as Communion in the two kinds and the necessity of a thorough reformation of the clergy. How urgent that necessity was can only be understood by those who take the trouble to study contemporary records, even those written by faithful adherents of the Roman Catholic

Church¹; no similar condition fortunately exists in any country at the present time. Had the Utraquist or moderate Hussite Church been allowed peacefully to pursue its development, it is not impossible that a Bohemian national Church, conforming to Rome in most matters, might have been established under the auspices of the very influential university of Prague, and of the Bohemian nobility, then one of the most enlightened in Europe. Had Venceslas, who undoubtedly sympathised with the Hussite movement—as far as his very limited intelligence permitted him to do so—been a man of firm will and determination, such an occurrence was, perhaps, not an impossibility. From the moment that the foreign invasion began the extreme party gained the upper hand, as was the case in the French Revolution and on so many other occasions.² The terrible misfortunes that befell Bohemia inevitably raised to the highest pitch of excitement a race in which mysticism is innate. The example of relentless warfare which the Bohemians derived from their study of the Old Testament and the Apocalyptic preaching of fanatical priests, such as John of Zěľivo and Ambrose of Králové Hradec, undoubtedly contributed largely to the brilliant victories of the Hussites. There is also no doubt that these priests, as the preachers of the Scotch Puritans, were fully convinced of the justice of their cause. The priests John and Ambrose differed in no respect from the Táborite woman who, when

¹ I do not care to enter here into this matter, and must refer the reader to my *Master John Hus*, pp. 14–16.

² Even the Táborites at first hoped that the revolution could be carried out peacefully. Nicholas of Pelhřimov writes in his *Chronicon Taboritarum*: “Illos articulos [the articles of Prague] ac illas sanctas veritates parati erant rite scripturis legis Dei fundare et munire sine omnibus bellicis difficultatibus. Dum et quando fuisset eis data debita pacifica et catholica publica audientia quam multis annis minime habere potuerunt. Quia autem inimicus veritatis ac humanæ salutis diabolus, nolens ut hoc bonum augeatur, suscitavit membra sua quatenus hoc bonum per potentiam, violentiam ceterasque crudelitates tam per sæculares quam per spirituales impediatur ut puta per papam et alios prælatos per Sigismundum regem tunc Hungariæ, Teutonicos et cæteras exterarum nationes et domesticos indigenas eorum in hoc adjutores qui conabantur qualiter hoc bonum inceptum et cum *Bohemicæ nationis lingua* condemnent, *deleant ac extirminent*” (Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. II. p. 481).

urged to take part in a temporary retreat during the battle of the Vitkov, said: "A true Christian must never retire before Antichrist." The ferocity with which the Germans carried on the war, of course, continuously strengthened the advanced party among the Hussites. To the Germans the national hatred of the Bohemian Slav proved an even stronger incentive to cruelty than the fanaticism which urged them to exterminate heretics. It is certain that among the countless Bohemian peasants, men and women, who, in the neighbourhood of Prague, were ruthlessly slaughtered by the so-called crusaders, there were many who had always been faithful to the Catholic Church and had never even heard of the Hussite doctrine. The unfortunately well-founded conviction that the Germans intended to destroy their race and extirpate their language excited the Bohemians to greater fury, and their revenge was sometimes terrible, though it must never be forgotten that the cruelty of the Hussites was never as great nor as general as that of their antagonists.

The first symptoms of discord among the Hussites were not of great importance, and were founded on differences of social rank, which at a feudal period necessarily separated the nationalist nobles from the peasantry, and even from the Utraquist townsmen. There were certainly among the advanced Taborites levellers, to whom the distinction conferred by learning, as represented by the university of Prague, was as distasteful as were the privileges of knighthood and nobility. More serious, however, were the theological dissensions which, almost immediately after the victory of the Vitkov had secured temporary safety, broke out between Utraquist and Taborite priests on certain questions of ritual and doctrine.

The prominent leaders of the two Hussite parties attempted to mediate in these disputes, which, within a nation then almost entirely absorbed in theological controversies, were bound to lead to a rupture, and eventually to civil war; this apprehension somewhat later became fully justified.

After concluding a truce with Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg Žižka marched to Rícan, a city that was still in the hands of Sigismund's partisans. Some of the men of Prague joined in this expedition, and Rícan capitulated on December 4. When the allies returned victoriously to Prague, the leaders began to consider the possibility of organising a disputation in which the Utraquist priests of both parties could expound their doctrine. It was hoped that such an exchange of views might lead to a compromise. The real originator of this plan appears to have been Peter Zmrzlik of Svojšín, an intimate friend of Hus,¹ who had been mint-master during the reign of King Venceslas, but had been dismissed by Sigismund because of his Hussite sympathies. Of the other nobles who took part in this attempt at reconciliation the most important was Ulrich, Lord of Hradec Jindřichův (Neuhaus). These men succeeded in persuading the citizens of the Old and New Towns of Prague, as well as the Táborites, to send delegates to a conference which was to meet at the church of St. Ambrose on the Příklad² on December 8. To further the peaceful development of the negotiations the citizens had taken a step which is very characteristic of the period; they had forbidden access to the church to all priests and women. The proceedings were orderly, and it was agreed that the deliberations should be continued two days later at the Carolinum college of the university. On the 10th the aldermen of the old town invited the disputants to partake of a banquet at the town-hall before they proceeded to the neighbouring Carolinum. Žižka, always favourable to concord among the Hussite parties, readily accepted the invitation, as did several other Táborite captains. Nicholas of Hus, however, under the pretext that he would not be safe in the midst of his enemies, declined to proceed either to the banquet or to the subsequent conference. When after

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, p. 275, n. 1.

² See my *Prague* ("Mediæval Town" series).

the banquet the Tábórite leaders and the Utraquist nobles arrived at the Carolinum, they found there Master Prokop of Plzeň, rector of the university, and many theologians who belonged to it. The priests of the Tábórite community failed to appear. Lord Ulrich of Hradec and Žižka, however, did not even then despair of obtaining an agreement, and they proposed that the disputants should meet at the house of Peter of Svojšín in the old town. All present proceeded to that house, and the Tábórite divines also consented to appear there. Among those present were besides Zrmzlik of Svojšín many Utraquist nobles, including Lord John of Lacembok, son of Lord Henry, who had accompanied Hus to Constance,¹ the Hussite captains Žižka, Chval of Machovic, Lord Roháč of Duba, one of the few nobles who remained faithful to the cause of Tábor up to the end of the civil war, and many others. Among the theologians present were Prokop of Plzeň, rector of the university, and the most learned divines of Prague, as well as the most prominent priests of the community of Tábor. Their leader and spokesman was Nicholas of Pelhřimov, whom the Tábórite clergy had elected bishop, thus openly seceding from the Roman Church, while the moderate Utraquists always endeavoured to obtain Catholic ordination for their priests. Among the Tábórite divines present was also Martin Loquis, celebrated as an eloquent preacher. It had previously been agreed that the discussion should turn mainly on the question of vestments, which then, as at some other periods of the development of the Catholic Church, caused much controversy. Prokop of Plzeň, rector of the university, however, thought it advisable to extend the discussion, and instructed Master Peter Mladenovic² to read out a lengthy paper, which formulated in seventy-two articles the theses of the Tábórites to which the Utraquist

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, p. 208.

² The companion of Hus at Constance and his biographer, one of the principal moderate Utraquist theologians. See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 240-243, 357, etc.

university of Prague objected. The accusation was undoubtedly an unfair one. Some of the articles recorded the Chiliastic teaching of certain Taborite preachers, their statement that at that period all goods should be common to all the faithful, who were justified in devastating the estates of those opposed to the teaching of Tabor, and also of depriving them of all worldly goods. The Taborites were further accused of saying that at that moment all temporal authority had ceased to exist, and that women were now justified in leaving their husbands, if they felt inclined to do so.¹ This terrible indictment of the whole Taborite party cannot be sufficiently blamed. The Taborites were here practically accused of socialism, polygamy, and anarchism. Such views had undoubtedly been expressed by fanatical and semi-crazy priests who claimed to belong to the Taborite community. Other articles dealt with more serious matters, and referred to views that were really held by many Taborites. Prokop of Plzeň declared in his articles that the Taborites rejected auricular confession, that they celebrated mass in the open air and under tents, that they had maintained that those who, contrary to the custom of the primitive Church, celebrated mass clothed in vestments were not priests but hypocrites, that their prayers were, therefore, vain, and that none should attend their religious services. It is, of course, impossible to enumerate here the entire contents of the seventy-two articles. These general accusations caused great indignation among the Taborites. Bishop Nicholas of Pelhřimov declared that he accepted the teaching contained in the articles, but rejected the venomous insinuations which had been read out together with them. He added that the Taborites had only taken part in the con-

¹ Březova, almost as malicious when writing of the Taborites as he is when referring to the Church of Rome, enumerates all the accusations made against them. He writes that Prokop of Plzeň stated that they believed in a "*regnum ecclesiæ militantis quod est domus novissima ante resurrectionem.*" In this "*regnum reparatum*" "*mulieres ecclesiæ vianis parient filios et filias sine corporali perturbacione et dolore.*" "*Est hæresis,*" the pious Prokop of Plzeň adds. The whole document has great psychological interest.

ference to discuss the question what vestments should be worn by the priests when celebrating mass. It was finally decided that Nicholas of Pelhřimov as representative of Tábor and Master Jacobellus of Střibro in the name of the university should both forward to Lord Ulrich of Hradec Jindřichův, who presided at the conference, and to the burgomaster of Prague, a detailed written statement formulating their religious opinions. The conference then separated with only the negative result that a formal rupture between the Hussite parties had been avoided. On the following day Žižka and his soldiers returned to Tábor.

Politics and religious controversy were at that moment so closely connected in Bohemia that it is an easy transition to refer now to the political situation in Bohemia during the early part of the Hussite wars. Public opinion was greatly divided. Of the powerful Bohemian nobility, that part which was opposed to Church reform was, of course, entirely devoted to the cause of Sigismund, the champion of the Roman Catholic Church; they formed, however, but a small minority. Most Bohemian knights and nobles fervently revered the memory of Hus, whom many of them had known personally, and they were unanimous in demanding a thorough reformation of the discipline of the clergy and the right of receiving Communion in the two kinds. Many of these men, however, hesitated before formally renouncing their allegiance to Sigismund, and continued hopeless attempts to persuade their sovereign to make certain religious concessions to the Bohemian nation. It seems almost certain that these nobles had some ground for thinking that the compromise which they desired was not impossible. The treachery and duplicity of Sigismund render all conjectures admissible, even if we remember the virulent abuse of all heretics in which the King of Hungary frequently indulged. It is not improbable that in private conversations with some of the nobles Sigismund may have insinuated that he was prepared to make certain concessions

to the Bohemian people, should they recognise him as their sovereign. This is rendered all the more probable by the fact that in his speeches Sigismund often referred to the example of his father, Charles IV, who, though a very fervent Catholic, severely blamed the morals of the clergy of his time.¹ The enforcement of rigid discipline of the clergy was one of the points on which the Hussites laid great stress. During the siege of Prague Sigismund's conduct had on several occasions appeared suspicious to his German allies. It has already been mentioned that he was accused of having prevented the artillery of the crusaders from firing at the city, and when the German crusaders left the neighbourhood of Prague, after the raising of the siege, they loudly declared that Sigismund was secretly himself a heretic.

While thus the Roman Catholic nobility remained faithful to Sigismund, and a certain number of Utraquists long hesitated to throw off entirely their allegiance to him, a large party in Bohemia soon began to consider the subject of electing a new king. Among those who principally favoured this plan were the majority of the Utraquist nobility, the cities and university of Prague, and the moderate Tábórites with Žižka at their head. Only a few extreme fanatics dreamt of a republican, or rather anarchical, form of government. Nicholas of Hus immediately protested against the choice of a foreign prince. He may be considered as having thus raised his own claim to the Bohemian throne. That he entertained such a plan is stated by the contemporary chroniclers even when writing of the period that preceded the outbreak of the war. In consequence of the great increase of the racial hatred between Slav and Teuton, which was one of the consequences of the outbreak of the Hussite wars, the election of a German prince was out of the question. Many soon began to consider the possibility of raising a Polish prince to the Bohemian throne. The negotiations that

¹ See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 77.

followed are shrouded in great mystery, as, in consequence of the opposition of the Roman see, to which the Poles have always been greatly attached, they were resultless. The Bohemians had no wish to record an attempt that had proved a failure, and the Poles were glad to leave in obscurity the fact that they had, even for a moment, swerved from their allegiance to Rome. The Bohemian chroniclers, therefore, give but little information on this subject, and Dlugosze's *Historia Polonica*, which deals more fully with these matters, is written with so strong a bias that it must be used with great caution.

It is stated that as early as in April 1420 some of the Hussite leaders determined to offer the Bohemian crown to King Ladislav of Poland. During the following warlike events these negotiations for a time came to a standstill, but they were—as already mentioned—resumed after the victory of the Žižkov. The principal Utraquist nobles, as well as the citizens of Prague and Žižka—who signed the parchment which accredited the Bohemian envoys—entrusted Lord Hynek of Kolštýn with the mission to proceed to Poland and offer the Bohemian crown to King Ladislav, and, in the case of his refusal, to his relation, Prince Vitold of Lithuania. It may, indeed, be conjectured that it was Prince Vitold on whom the Bohemians really wished to confer their crown. Prince Vitold, whose name is now undeservedly forgotten, was then at the height of his fame, which had spread over all the Slavic north-east of Europe. Like King Ladislav of Poland, he belonged to the Lithuanian dynasty of Gedymín, which had only recently accepted Christianity, and he himself was born a pagan. After his conversion to Christianity he joined the Greek Church, and in consequence of the vicissitudes of Polish politics, to which it is unnecessary to refer here, he had recently conformed to the Church of Rome. The Lithuanian people, however, mostly continued faithful to the Eastern Church, and were therefore Utraquists. There was thus a natural link between them and the Calixtines

of Bohemia. Vitold himself was known as a man whose religious views were by no means fanatical. Even after he had joined the Church of Rome he had built a church for his subjects who conformed to the Greek rite. It was also known that Vitold had allowed one of his courtiers to declare publicly at his table that Hus had been unjustly condemned and burnt. Vitold, an exceptionally gifted statesman,¹ might thus have played a considerable part in the history of Bohemia, and, indeed, of the Slavic world, had he not been occupied with continual warfare on his eastern frontiers, where Poland and Lithuania were then constantly extending their territory at the expense of Russia, and had not advancing age—he was born in 1350—then already somewhat weakened his formerly indomitable energy.

It is a proof of the great secrecy which surrounded the mission of Hynek of Kolštýn that King Sigismund was long quite unaware of the departure of the Bohemian envoy for Poland. It was only later that he was informed of it by the citizens of Breslau, whom he thanked in a letter,² requesting them at the same time to arrest the "Wycliffite" envoy. We have, for reasons already mentioned, very scanty information concerning this first embassy to Poland. The Bohemians were received by King Ladislas, who was at that moment badly disposed to Sigismund, because of his intervention in the dissensions between Poland and the Teutonic order. The King was, however, in view of the great influence of the clergy in Poland, obliged to act with great caution. He therefore limited himself to general assurances of good will,

¹ Dr. Caro writes of him: "Die slavische Welt hat kaum je wider einen Mann von gleichem Gepräge hervorgebracht. Zwei Motive insbesondere machen den Character unter psychologischem Gesichtspunkte bemerkenswerth; erstlich die allmähliche Entwicklung desselben, das geschichtliche Werden und Aufsteigen, und dann die ungeheure Ausdehnung und Ausweitung der Persönlichkeit. In diesem letzteren Sinne ist er ganz besonders einer der schärfsten Typen der slavischen Begabung" (*Geschichte Polens*, Vol. III. p. 624).

² Letter dated from Kutna Hora, August 11, 1420 (published by Grünhagen, *Geschichtsquellen der Hussitenkriege*, p. 1).

and declared that he must confer with his councillors. The Bohemian envoy also visited the Prince or, as he is often called, Grand Duke Vitold, but we have scarcely any information concerning the result of the visit. Judging by subsequent events it is not improbable that he proved more favourable to the Bohemian cause; yet he also probably refused to bind himself. Though the battle of the Žižkov had been fought the castles of Hradčany and Vyšehrad were still held by Sigismund's troops, and it appeared venturesome to side openly with the Bohemian "heretics." The not very successful result of this attempt to obtain allies among their fellow-Slavs did not deter the Bohemians from continuing their negotiations with Poland. The Utraquist nobles, the Praguers and that part of the Táborites who were entirely devoted to Žižka, determined to send another embassy to Poland. It was finally decided that the new embassy should start at the end of the year 1420. An unexpected event facilitated the mission of the envoys. On December 24 Nicholas of Hus, the principal opponent of the establishment of a Polish dynasty in Bohemia, died from the consequences of a fall from his horse. Hynek of Kolštýn was again the head of the embassy, which started for Poland on December 26, but he was now accompanied by several other prominent nobles, aldermen of the cities of Prague, and several Utraquist divines, among whom was John of Reinstein, nicknamed "Kardinal."¹ The envoys were, to use Březova's words,² "to visit the King of Poland on behalf of all who defended God's law, and to ask him to defend the law of God and accept the Bohemian crown." This signified, in the Hussite terminology of the period, that the election of the Polish King was made conditional on his accepting the articles of Prague. The result was such as the delegates probably expected it to be. Ladislas

¹ He had been an intimate friend of Hus, whom he accompanied to Constance. See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 101, 208.

² p. 465 of Březova's chronicle.

declined the "crown of a kingdom with articles condemned by the Catholic Church." The envoys then proceeded to Lithuania and entered into prolonged negotiations with the Grand Duke Vitold. These negotiations were rendered very difficult by the interference of King Ladislas, who disapproved of Vitold's plans, either from jealousy or because he was influenced by the very powerful Polish clergy.¹ The influence of the Bohemian envoys, however, finally prevailed, and Vitold formally declared that he was ready to accept the Bohemian crown. In June 1421 Hynek of Kolštýn returned to Prague, accompanied by the envoy of Vitold, Wyszek Raczynski, who was authorised to inform the Bohemians of his master's decision. The news was received with great joy by the Bohemians, who modestly attributed this happy event not to their own merit, but to the special beneficence of Providence.²

The negotiations between Poland, Lithuania, and Bohemia continued for a considerable period, and finally led to the result that a Lithuanian prince became for a short time ruler of Bohemia. It is now, however, necessary to refer briefly to the numerous warlike events of the year 1421. It has already been mentioned that warfare—sometimes on a large scale, sometimes consisting of mere skirmishes between guerillas—continued in Bohemia almost without interruption from 1420 to 1434. It will, of course, only be possible to refer here to the more prominent events which considerably influenced the course of the war. During the winter of 1420 to 1421 warfare never entirely ceased. On New Year's Eve the citizens of Prague laid siege to Nový Hrad, the stronghold from which Sigismund had recently attempted to relieve the Vyšehrad fortress. On January 25, 1421, the commander, Herbort of Fulštýn, capitulated, on condition that he and his troops should be allowed to leave

¹ It is, of course, only possible to deal here summarily with the complicated political situation of Poland and Lithuania at that period.

² "Ut firmiter creditur, divinæ benignitatis instinctu" (letter quoted by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, Vol. I. p. 121).

the fortress freely and take with them all their own property, but not that of King Sigismund. When Fulštýn left the castle it was discovered that he had concealed in the carts which conveyed his goods many books¹ and other property belonging to Sigismund. The people seized these objects and, irritated by this deceit, plundered everything they found in the fortress. The Praguers then engaged workmen, who entirely destroyed the stronghold, to prevent its ever again affording support to those mighty attempts to attack the city.

Žižka also during these periods continued his ever-victorious campaigns. Leaving Tábor early in January, he first marched to the town of Střibro (in German, Miess). Hearing, however, that Bohuslav of Švamberk, the principal leader of the Roman party in the district of Plzeň, which always continued to be a stronghold of Sigismund's party, had retired to the castle of Krasikov, Žižka laid siege to this fortress. Švamberk was finally obliged to capitulate, and became a prisoner of the Táborites. It is one of many instances of the strange vicissitudes through which the Bohemian nobility passed during the great civil war that Švamberk, in the following year, joined his former antagonists, and became, during the later part, one of the foremost leaders of the Táborites. After this important success Žižka marched to Tachov (in German, Tachau), and approached the frontiers of Bavaria. The name of the Táborites had already become so formidable that German cities such as Nürnberg and Ulm became alarmed, appealed to Sigismund for aid, and exchanged letters inquiring where the King of Hungary was.² Sigismund, when informed of the great successes of Žižka in the district of Plzeň, feared that his scanty adherents in Bohemia would now be entirely discouraged, and marched to Plzeň with a considerable army. On hearing of his arrival Žižka abandoned the siege of Tachov

¹ Březova writes of "libri." It seems probable that State papers, estate deeds, or patents of nobility are meant.

² Some of these letters are printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I.

and proceeded to Tábor to seek reinforcements for his army. His bravery and enthusiasm, indeed, never diminished his prudence, and he was determined to meet the King of Hungary at the head of as large a force as possible. This was the more advisable as Sigismund had received considerable help from several German princes, principally from the Duke of Bavaria and the Margrave of Meissen. Žižka had during his temporary absence left considerable garrisons in the recently conquered towns. The most important of these cities, Kladruby, was during his absence besieged by Sigismund and his German allies, but, bravely defended by Chval of Machovic, one of Žižka's most brilliant lieutenants, it successfully resisted all attacks. Before rejoining his troops Žižka also succeeded in renewing the alliance with Prague. The Praguers joined Žižka at Dobříš with a large force of infantry and cavalry and 320 armed wagons on February 6, and the united Utraquist armies then marched by way of Zěbrák and Horovic to Rokycany, a town that was then under the rule of the Archbishop of Prague. The Hussites were received within the walls without any resistance. The decisive step taken by the archbishop a few months later afterwards explained an attitude which, at the time, undoubtedly caused great surprise. The national army then marched in the direction of Kladruby, where the Táborite garrison under Chval of Machovic was still besieged by Sigismund and his allies. Žižka evidently now wished to offer battle to the royalist army, but when he arrived near Kladruby he was informed that the King of Hungary had already retired and disbanded his troops. Sigismund retired to Litoměřice and then to Kutna Hora, but early in March he left Bohemia and proceeded to Moravia.

Žižka was now more than ever intent on subduing the city of Plzeň and the surrounding country. The great importance of that stronghold could not but be obvious to a man of his brilliant talent, and it was undoubtedly a great fault that he did not insist on an unconditional capitulation. Some years

after Žižka's death the fact that Plzeň refused to accept the articles of Prague proved one of the great difficulties which the Bohemians encountered at the Council of Basel, and the events that occurred during the later siege of Plzeň largely contributed to the downfall of Tábor. At that moment, however, the citizens of Plzeň by no means felt disposed to encounter the victorious Bohemian hero, though some of the neighbouring towns where the Roman Catholics had the upper hand and some knights of Sigismund's party had joined them. A treaty was, therefore, concluded, according to which the citizens of Plzeň and their allies promised not to molest those inhabitants of Plzeň and the neighbouring country who professed the articles of Prague, and also to allow Utraquist divines to preach and celebrate mass freely in the territory which was in their power.

After having thus secured, at least for a time, a peaceful understanding with the citizens of Plzeň and their confederates, Žižka marched to Chomoutov (in German, Komotau), probably called there by the citizens of the neighbouring town of Žatec, who had always been strong upholders of the Hussite cause. As in Plzeň, in Chomoutov also several knights and nobles of Sigismund's party had joined the citizens in their attacks on the neighbouring Utraquists. On March 15 Žižka's forces made a first attempt to storm Chomoutov, but they were repulsed with great slaughter. On the following day—it was Palm-Sunday—Žižka was more successful. The Praguers attacking on one, and the Táborites on the other side, both forces succeeded in escalating the city walls. The defence continued even then, and each street was only occupied after prolonged fighting. This is one of the few occasions on which Žižka cannot be acquitted of cruelty. By his order all the male adult inhabitants of Chomoutov were killed. Only thirty men were left alive to bury the others. If, as has so often been done, we compare the great Bohemian warrior to Cromwell, Chomoutov was certainly Žižka's Drogheda. If, as is

probable, the Utraquists wished to spare the women, their intention was frustrated by the fanatical Táborite women. Under pretence of saving the lives of the wives and children of the citizens, they enticed them out of the city, deprived them of their clothing and jewels, and drove them into a farm building, where they were burnt alive.¹

Though the last-named atrocity was possibly, and indeed probably, committed contrarily to Žižka's wish—for the Hussites generally spared the lives of women and children—no one can acquit Žižka of great cruelty on this occasion. His conduct can only be defended in the fashion in which all reprisals have been defended; it has been said that the courage of the adherents of a party is strengthened by the belief that cruelties committed against them will become fewer if the enemies know that they are liable to suffer similarly, that acts of cruelty committed in common will bind the adherents of a party more closely together, finally that fear will attract waverers to the party of those who have been guilty of deeds of cruelty.

It is certain that the massacre of Chomoutov brought many new recruits to the Hussite ranks, and that many hitherto wavering cities either recognised the supremacy of Prague or joined the confederacy of Tábor or at least concluded treaties, similar to the agreement made with Plzeň, by which they granted immunity and even a certain amount of liberty to the Utraquists. The most important accession to the Hussite party, which cannot, however, be directly ascribed to the events at Chomoutov, was the acceptance of the articles of Prague by Conrad of Vechta, Archbishop of Prague. The archbishop has, by his defection from the Church of Rome,

¹ Březova thus describes this horrible scene: "*Thaboritarum vero iniquæ mulieres horrendum ibidem scelus commiserunt, mulieres enim et virgines, viros suos et parentes deflentes extra civitatem deduxerunt promittentes eis salvas abire, quæ cum extra civitatem devenirent, eas vestibus spoliant et pecuniis aliisque rebus ablatis in quodam tugurio vineæ includentes ignis voragine consumunt, nec pregnantibus parcunt ut livorem suæ iniquitatis augmentent*" (p. 477).

incurred much uncalled-for, or at least greatly exaggerated, obloquy. The great modern historian of Prague, Professor Tomek, himself a fervent Roman Catholic, wrote of Conrad that he was neither better nor worse than the majority of the great dignitaries of the Church in Bohemia at that time. Sigismund, who appears to have had a personal dislike to the archbishop, in a letter sent in 1416 to the Council of Constance in answer to its complaints with regard to the progress of heresy in Bohemia, and to the attitude of King Venceslas, wrote that his brother was guided by the archbishop, who in consideration of the authority of the Council declined all responsibility, desiring to be "not a martyr, but a confessor."¹ It is certain that Vechta sympathised with King Venceslas, as long as that prince was favourable to the cause of Hus and of Church reform. In the absence of all unfavourable evidence, very remarkable at a time when theological controversy consisted largely in the grossest personal invective, we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the archbishop. It is probable, though as on so many matters connected with the Hussite wars our information is here scanty, that the archbishop had incurred the enmity of both Sigismund and the papal legate Ferdinand, Bishop of Lucca. Though Archbishop Conrad was a Westphalian by birth, he had become friendly to the Bohemian people, and he may have expressed disapproval of the indiscriminate slaughter of the peasantry in the country around Prague. It was, however, an act of hostility on the part of one of Sigismund's partisans that was the immediate cause of the secession of Vechta. Lord Hanuš of Kolowrat, one of the King of Hungary's most enthusiastic followers, stormed and plundered the small town of Přebíram, situated on the archbishop's estates. On April 21 Conrad addressed a letter to the citizens of Prague, stating that he

¹ "Archiepiscopus se excusat propter præsentiam hujus sacri concilii ad cuius examen et iudicium hujusmodi negotium pertinere dicit, cupiens esse non martyr sed confessor" (Palacký, *Documenta Mag. Joannis Hus*, p. 652).

accepted the four articles and had renounced the allegiance of King Sigismund. The Praguers immediately answered, promising him their aid should he be attacked by the enemies of Utraquism. More interesting than these communications is a letter which the archbishop, also on April 21, forwarded to the King of Hungary.¹ He stated that he had hitherto always endeavoured to serve and please him, but that the King had listened to false accusations, such as that he (the archbishop) was leagued with the Praguers, which was not true. He further stated that the King, together with "Ferdinand, the so-called papal legate," had forwarded false and untrue accusations against him to the papal see. He then bitterly complained that Sigismund had, in contempt of Almighty God and of the saints, harassed the Church of God in his diocese by intolerable rapines, affronts, and calumnies, deeds which God's vengeance would not leave unpunished.² The archbishop further declared that he and all his followers henceforth entirely renounced their allegiance to King Sigismund, and accepted the true and Catholic four articles (of Prague) to which the famed community of Prague and the barons of the kingdom of Bohemia and of the margravate of Moravia had conformed.

The acceptance of the four articles by the Archbishop of Prague naturally greatly strengthened the moderate Utraquists, the Hussite High Church, as we may call it. The adherence of an archbishop, of course, ended the difficulty with regard to the apostolic succession of the priests, on which the conservative party among the patriots laid great stress. It also, though we are here limited to conjectures, probably facilitated the enterprise of Prince Korybut, who shortly

¹ Printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, Vol. I. pp. 83-84; the two letters to which I previously refer also form part of this collection.

² It may be interesting to give the passage in full in the original: "Insuper etiam quia Ser. V. in contemptum omnipotentis Dei sanctorumque ejus gravem injuriam et offensam ecclesiæque Dei et universo clero diocesis meæ intolerabiles rapinas et injurias et calumpnias, quas Dei vindicta finaliter non patietur inultas, intulit et arrogavit."

afterwards arrived in Bohemia. The extreme fanatics of the Táborite party alone showed displeasure. They declared that, as a German, Conrad was by birth an enemy of the (Bohemian) nation, and reproached him for having crowned Sigismund as king.¹

While the great victories of Žižka and of the men of Prague had almost silenced all hostility in southern and western Bohemia, the country, never destined to enjoy a respite even of a few months, was now obliged to assure the safety of its eastern and northern frontiers. Bohemia here marches with Silesia and the county of Glatz, which was then still considered as forming part of the Bohemian kingdom. Silesia itself, with Moravia and Lusatia, then formed the lands of the Bohemian crown, as they were called. This theoretically and at some periods actually involved a supremacy of Bohemia over these lands. The population of Silesia at that time consisted mainly of Germans, who were very zealous Catholics, and therefore hated their Bohemian neighbours both as Slavs and as heretics. Incessant border-warfare, therefore, took place on the frontiers during the great civil war.² It did not on the whole have much influence on the main current of the war, and therefore requires but slight notice here. In consequence of the great victories of Žižka in the spring of 1421 some of the Catholic frontier towns of Bohemia appealed to their Silesian neighbours for aid. In May 1421 a Silesian army, consisting of the levies of the towns of Breslau and Schweidnitz and numerous knights with their followers, invaded Bohemia. According to Březova the army consisted of about 20,000 men. Crossing the frontier at Trautenau—now known as one of the battlefields of 1866—they burnt down the small town of Police, and a few days later stormed the fortified hill of Ostaš, where the inhabitants

¹ Nicholas of Pelhřimov, cap. 25, iii. (in Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. I. p. 647).

² This warfare has found a brilliant historian in Dr. Grünhagen, author of *Hussitenkämpfe der Schlesier*. He writes, however, with a strong German bias, and his statements concerning the cruelties committed by the belligerent parties must be received with great caution.

of Police and other neighbouring Utraquists had taken refuge. The Germans here committed acts of horrible cruelty. They murdered all whom they found on the hill, including the unarmed men and the women, and cut off the noses, arms, and legs of about forty boys. The Silesian army did not, however, remain long on Bohemian territory. When the citizens of Králové Hradec, commanded by Krušina of Lichtenburg and Bořek of Miletinek, marched to the Silesian frontier, together with the men of the Orebite community under the priest Ambrose, the Silesians retired without giving battle. They attempted another incursion later in the year, but retired on hearing that Žižka was approaching. The chroniclers record during the first part of the year 1421 a long list of cities, castles, and fortified monasteries which surrendered to Žižka. The capitulation of Kutna Hora, whose inhabitants had committed great cruelties against the Utraquists, is of particular interest. When the citizens of Prague on April 23 marched from Kolin on Kutna Hora, the citizens of that town also marched out to meet them in the field, led by Žižka's old antagonist, the mintmaster Divůček. When they, however, came in sight of the Hussite army, they immediately retired, impressed by the strength of the forces of the enemy. On the following day they sent envoys to Kolin offering their submission, and begging only that those who would not conform to the Utraquist creed should be allowed freely to leave their city. The Hussites consented, but made it a condition that all the population, men, women, maidens, and children, should, leaving the town, go in procession to ask forgiveness for the cruelty they had committed by beheading guiltless men and throwing them down the shafts of their mines. On April 25 the citizens of Kutna Hora proceeded to the monastery of Sedlec, where the army of the Praguers was drawn up. The people of Kutna Hora then all fell on their knees, and a prominent citizen in the name of all begged "the pardon of God and of the Praguers." The priest John of Zělivo then addressed them

and, reminding them of their crimes, exhorted them not to sin any more. He then declared that "God and the Praguers" granted them peace and mercy. Then all those of both parties cried bitterly, and all intoned the *Te Deum*, the miners of Kutna Hora and the Praguers alternately singing one verse. The citizens then joyfully returned to their town, accompanied by some of the Praguers, who were to take possession of it and establish the new order (*i. e.* Utraquist government) in it.¹

The submission of Kutna Hora also brought many nobles back to the Utraquist ranks. The most important of them was the ever-fickle Lord Čeněk of Wartenberg, whom the Hussites obliged to do penance in a manner similar to that to which the citizens of Kutna Hora had had to submit. Negotiations in view of the capitulation of the Hradčany castle began in May, and the garrison, isolated in the midst of a vast country, now entirely occupied by their enemies, wisely consented to evacuate the stronghold. The nuns of the abbey on the Hradčany mostly consented to accept the articles of Prague; those who refused to do so were safely conducted outside of the Hussite lines. Immediately after the departure of Sigismund's garrison 160 soldiers of the Old and 100 of the New Town occupied the deserted citadel to maintain order there. This unfortunately proved very necessary, for immediately after the departure of the enemy the rabble of Prague, led by the priest John of Zělivo, attempted to plunder and destroy the churches and monasteries on the Hradčany. It is impossible not to agree with Březova's censure of this priestly anarchist. John himself may, in consequence of his iconoclastic views, have believed himself justified in destroying images and decorations which he believed to be hurtful to true Christianity; but the rabble whom he led on saw in his conduct only a pretext for robbing and stealing.

¹ I have abridged this account, which is very characteristic of the Hussite period, from Březova's narrative, which well deserves to be read in its entirety.

By the middle of the year 1421 by far the largest part of Bohemia was in the hands of the Utraquists, that is to say of all those who, though differing on some matters, had accepted the articles of Prague. A few isolated castles in various parts of the country remained in the hands of Sigismund's partisans, and a few cities such as Plzeň, though they had unwillingly granted the Utraquists permission to celebrate religious services according to their rites, had not accepted the teaching of Hus. Yet the country was sufficiently pacified to make it advisable to deliberate on the subject of its future government. The cities of Prague had, since the great victory of the Vyšehrad, possessed a hegemonic position in Bohemia. It was, therefore, befitting that they should take the initiative in this matter. In their own name and in that of the archbishop and of the barons of Bohemia they invited the estates of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as those of Silesia and Lusatia, without distinction of religious creed, to meet at a conference or diet at Časlav. It was suggested that this assembly should begin its sittings on June 1. It was at the same time formally declared that letters of safe conduct would be granted to all adherents of the Church of Rome who wished to take part in this Council of the nation. Considering the frequent cases of treachery during this struggle between the Roman and the national Church, it deserves mention that this promise was scrupulously kept.

This step of the Utraquists was undoubtedly statesmanlike, and their well-intentioned attempt deserved the success which it did not obtain. Compromise has almost always proved a failure in Slavic countries. Many of the delegates arrived at Časlav on the June 1, and even earlier, but the sittings of the Congress only began on the 3rd. On that day masses were said in all the churches of Časlav, and the hymn "Veni sancte spiritus" was sung. The debates of the first day were limited to attempts to adjust feuds between various cities and nobles, which it was very desirable to terminate

at a moment when a general pacification of the country did not appear impossible. Somewhat later a considerable number of Moravian nobles appeared at Časlav, as well as some Bohemians, who were adherents of Rome and of Sigismund. The King of Hungary had requested some of the nobles of his party to uphold his claims at Časlav, thus putting his trust in the faith of those to whom he had himself broken his word.

The assembly at Časlav was a thoroughly representative one. Among those present were the Archbishop of Prague, Conrad of Vechta, representatives of Prague and the allied cities, Žižka and the other Táborite captains, among whom Rohač of Duba had taken the place of Nicholas of Hus, Krušina of Lichtenburg, Henry of Poděbrad, John of Chlum, who had accompanied Hus to Constance, Ulrich of Rosenberg, leader of the papal nobles, as well as the Lords Holicky of Sternberg and Puta of Častolovice, who by desire of Sigismund were present as his unofficial representatives.

It is greatly to be regretted that we are very insufficiently informed as to the deliberations of the assembly of Časlav. It is certain, however, that it was declared, though not without opposition on the part of some of those present, that all bound themselves to accept and defend the articles of Prague. The assembly further declared that it would never recognise Sigismund as King and rightful possessor of the Bohemian crown, unless God should will it otherwise, or the glorious cities of Prague, the Bohemian lords, the Táborite community, the knights, nobles and cities and all other communities who acknowledged the four articles subsequently decide otherwise; for the King had been a blasphemer against the holy truth, and a mortal enemy of the honour and of the persons of the Bohemian nation. A further resolution decreed that the assembly should elect twenty men, who were provisionally to act as regents and maintain order in the land. Their period of office was to end on the day of St. Venceslas (September 28) unless the country should recognise a king

before that time. Of the twenty regents five were to be chosen among the nobles, four from the citizens of Prague, two among the members of the Táborite community, five among the knights, and four among the representatives of the towns—except Prague—and the other communities. In all cases where the regents might be unable to decide as to God's will—this undoubtedly refers to theological controversies—they were to consult two priests, John of Přeborn, one of the most prominent theologians of the university of Prague, and John of Želivo, who had great influence over the people of that city. It was further decided that an assembly of the Bohemian priests of all denominations should shortly take place to settle all theological dissensions. It was lastly declared that all those who would not accept the decrees of the assembly of Časlav should be considered as enemies of the commonwealth, and should by force of arms be obliged to conform to these decrees.

The proceedings of the assembly of Časlav, as far as they are known to us, are among the most interesting records of the Hussite wars. The project of establishing a provisional government on a wide basis is not devoid of greatness. Its failure has caused it to have fallen into almost complete oblivion. Among the twenty regents were Ulrich of Rosenberg, Čeněk of Wartenberg, Krušina of Lichtenburg, John Žižka of Trocnov, and other representatives of all the political and ecclesiastical parties in Bohemia. The manifesto, as we may call it, published by the assembly, also bears the trace of being the result of a compromise. Thus after violently denouncing Sigismund and declaring him to be excluded from the throne, the document refers to possible, though certainly not probable, contingencies which might render his recognition as King of Bohemia admissible. We know that the nobles of Moravia—over which country Sigismund never as completely lost his hold as over Bohemia—and even some Bohemian nobles had at first refused to sign the manifesto. Similarly the negotia-

tions with Poland were not mentioned directly in the proceedings at Časlav, though these negotiations, as will be mentioned presently, were being energetically pursued at that moment. The injunction concerning the period during which the regents were to hold office, of course, indirectly referred to the arrival of a Polish or Lithuanian prince. An undoubtable mistake was, however, committed when it was agreed that in certain cases an appeal should be made to two priests, of whom one belonged to the Calixtine, the other to the extreme Taborite party. John of Příbram,¹ a very learned theologian, entertained that intense animosity against the Taborites which we meet with also in Březova's great work. He considered the Taborites more dangerous opponents of his lifelong plan of founding a national Church in Bohemia—conforming mainly to the Roman Church, but faithfully maintaining the articles of Prague—than even the Roman Catholics. This leader of the Hussite High Church was expected to deliberate jointly with an iconoclastic fanatic, such as was John of Zélivo. The assembly of Časlav, while maintaining a conciliatory policy with regard to all Bohemians, firmly and decidedly rebuked the hostile attitude which perhaps racial, rather than religious, motives had induced the estates of Silesia and Lusatia to assume. The letter to the estates of Silesia, dated from Časlav June 1, 1421, complained bitterly of the cruelties committed by the Silesians during their incursions into Bohemia² and reminded them of their allegiance to the Bohemian crown. A similar letter³ was on the same day sent to the estates of Lusatia. The question of electing a Polish prince to the Bohemian throne was undoubtedly one of the matters dis-

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 361-362.

² "Quod Vos et vestri exercitus injurias atroces innumerosas, calumnias, vastationes et exustiones villarum et oppidorum, inhumanas et crudeles occisiones virorum indifferenter, mulierum et puerorum parvulorum, quas nefas est gentibus effecisse contra honorem vestrum in detrimentum coronæ Bohemiæ continue inferatis." (Letter printed by Grünhagen, *Geschichtsquellen der Hussitenkriege*, p. 41.)

³ Printed in the *Codex diplomaticus Lusatiae superioris*, Vol. I. pp. 49-50.

cussed at the assembly of Časlav, but as far as the very insufficient records inform us, no decisive step was then taken. The regents invited the representatives of all the parties to meet again at Kutna Hora in August. The menace of a new so-called crusade had then just arisen, and it was decided that the forces of all the Bohemian cities and nobles should assemble at Český Brod (in German, Deutsch Brod) to repulse a new invasion, should it be necessary. The assembly then arrived at a very momentous decision. On September 4 Vitold (or, according to the name he received at baptism, Alexander), Grand Duke of Lithuania, was proclaimed King of Bohemia, and it was decreed that a new embassy should be sent to Poland. Vitold and his councillors had given no definite answer to the former envoys, though their words had been encouraging. The new embassy, consisting of some of the most important nobles, among whom were Lord William Kostka of Postupic and Lord Venceslas of Jenštejn, immediately started for Poland. On their journey they were arrested at Ratibor by order of Duke Hanuš of Troppau, one of the numerous princelings who then ruled over parts of Silesia. He probably acted by order of Sigismund, who had in the previous years already attempted to intercept Bohemian envoys on their way to Poland. This outrage was considered a breach of international law, even at that lawless period, as the Bohemian envoys had Polish passports and letters of safe conduct. The indignation in Poland and Lithuania was very great. Grand Duke Vitold sent envoys to Prague requesting the Hussites to attack the Duke of Troppau and promising to send troops under his nephew, Prince Sigismund Korybut,¹ who were simultaneously to attack the Silesian princeling. Korybut himself, the leader of the Bohemian party in Poland, addressed a letter of protest to the Duke of Troppau, informing him that his action had caused great indignation at the Polish Court, and requesting him to liberate

¹ Or Korybutovič, *i. e.* son of Korybut.

the envoys immediately. He writes somewhat as a future claimant to the Bohemian throne; for though his uncle Vitold was the candidate, it was, in consequence of his age, certain that Korybut would soon become King of Bohemia should a Polish or rather Lithuanian dynasty be established. Prince Korybut lays great stress on the racial affinity between the two peoples.¹ King Ladislas, probably in view of the general indignation, also wrote to the Silesian prince, informing him that he was sending an ambassador to him to demand the release of the Bohemian envoys. He appears, however, to have avoided taking any further steps. We already find in Ladislas traces of that fanatical hatred of all opinions antagonistic to Rome which later contributed so largely to the downfall of Poland. The Duke of Troppau found it safest to hand over his prisoners to King Sigismund, who basely ordered the servants and followers to be beheaded, while he retained the envoys as prisoners—no doubt in hope of their being ransomed. The negotiations between Poland and Bohemia continued, nevertheless, but it was only after the great victories of the Bohemians, which I shall mention presently, that Grand Duke Vitold came to a decision.

The ignominious result of the first crusade did not deter the Germans from making further attempts to extirpate the "heretics." The papal legate, Cardinal Branda, used every effort to encourage the German princes who met at an imperial diet at Nürnberg on April 13, 1421. Though Sigismund, whom war with Turkey detained, was absent, the assembly was numerously attended. Among those present were four German electors, and many other German princes, the papal legate, and even envoys from Brabant, Holland, and Savoy. All present expressed a strong, though, as events proved, momentary, determination to suppress all heresy in Bohemia. The

¹ "Prædicti domini [King Ladislas and Grand Duke Vitold] in nullum eventum volunt Boemos deserere sed ipsis tanquam linguaio proprio et suis subditis volunt quomodolibet cooperari." (The whole letter is printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, Vol. I. p. 148.)

German princes have been frequently blamed for their supposed apathy with regard to the Hussite movement. It is, however, generally forgotten that most of these princes were, in consequence of Sigismund's ineptitude and indifference, engaged in constant feuds with their nearest neighbours. It was undoubtedly meritorious to exterminate heretics, into whose real tenets nobody troubled to inquire, but it was far more important to defend villages, situated but a few miles from a nobleman's own castle, which a neighbouring enemy might attack at any moment. About the beginning of May the members of the diet, now certain that Sigismund would not appear, left Nürnberg; but further meetings of the German princes took place at Wesel, and afterwards at Maintz and Boppard, and it was now settled that the German crusaders should assemble at Cheb (in German, Eger) on the day of St. Bartholomew (August 24).

Local warfare continued uninterrupted during the whole summer of the year 1421. In spring the Silesians crossed the Bohemian frontier from the county of Glatz and, entering the Orlice valley, destroyed the castles of Žampach and Litice. They, however, again soon returned to their country. On the Saxon frontier the Bohemians obtained possession of Bilin and several other cities. They, however, met with a reverse when attempting to storm the castle of Most (in German, Brüx). The defenders had received considerable aid from the Margrave of Meissen. Žižka was not present on this occasion. When besieging the castle of Rabi some time previously he was wounded in the eye by an arrow. He hurriedly repaired to Prague to consult the doctors. Though they were able to heal his wound, he now became totally blind, but he continued to command the Hussite armies.

In consequence of the eloquence and energy of Cardinal Branda, the German princes had meanwhile raised a vast army. If Březova, who is, however, somewhat inclined to exaggerate the strength of the hostile armies that invaded

his country, can be trusted, the army of the crusaders consisted of about 200,000 men. They were accompanied by the Archbishops of Mainz, Cöln, and Trier, the Elector Palatine, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and over a hundred princes and counts of the empire. This mighty muster of reigning potentates no doubt rendered the progress of the army very imposing, but it also caused it to become almost impossible to maintain discipline. It was not even attempted to appoint a commander-in-chief, as none of the princelets were prepared to surrender their rights to the others. The German crusading armies during the Hussite wars were, indeed, the prototype of that "army of the imperial circles" which, during the Seven Years' War, became the object of Frederick the Great's Aristophanic wit,¹ and of the army of the Germanic confederacy, whose inglorious exploits in 1866 have already fallen into deserved oblivion. It had been agreed that the crusaders should enter Bohemia from the west, where the country marches with Bavaria and Saxony. Sigismund and the Archduke Albert of Austria, who about this time became his son-in-law, were simultaneously to attack Bohemia from the east. Sigismund was, however, still occupied with the defence of Hungary against the Turks, and the crusaders, after having waited for him some time, crossed the Bohemian frontier on September 10. On reaching the frontier the electors and other nobles reverently dismounted, knelt down² and fervently prayed that God might grant success to their enterprise. The crusaders immediately occupied the city of Cheb (in German, Eger) without meeting with any resistance. Another smaller crusading force, consisting mainly of Saxons, had entered Bohemia some time previously, and had obtained some successes. The Hussites in the neighbouring small towns and castles had all retired to Žatec (in German, Saaz), which appears then to have been

¹ See his "*Congé de l'armée des cercles et des tonneliers*" (*Supplément aux Œuvres de Frédéric II.*, Tome I, pp. 277-280. Cologne, 1789).

² Březova, maliciously adds, "*humilitatem coram aliis, licet simulate, ostendentes.*"

strongly fortified. The main army of the crusaders marched on Žatec to join their allies, committing horrible atrocities on its march. As Březova tells us, the crusaders burnt down all villages, castles, and forts, and, acting more cruelly than heathens, they either murdered or burnt alive all those whom they met, young or old, men or women. There is little doubt that the Germans believed they could best suppress Hussitism by exterminating the whole indigenous population of Bohemia. After the crusading armies had joined before Žatec, they immediately attempted to storm this important stronghold. On Friday, September 19, no fewer than six determined attacks on the city were made, but they were all repulsed by the heroic Hussites who, knowing the fate of their comrades, fought with the energy of despair. After this failure the German princes seem already to have thought of abandoning the campaign, particularly as they received no communications from Sigismund, of whom it was expected that he would cause a diversion by attacking Bohemia from the east. The communications were, however, difficult, as the intervening country was almost entirely in the hands of the Bohemians.

The Bohemian main army had during this time remained at Slane, not far from Prague. The national leaders were thoroughly aware of the great importance of assuring the immunity of the capital from all attacks. The city, or rather cities, of Prague had established an autonomous municipal government, somewhat similar to that of certain towns in Italy and the Netherlands. Many smaller cities and some nobles and knights had recognised the hegemony of Prague. No less great was the importance of Prague as the centre of the ecclesiastical administration of the country. As early as in 1415 the estates of Bohemia had pledged themselves to recognise provisionally the university of Prague as the supreme authority in all matters of religion.¹ The Hussites,

¹ See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 110.

who enjoyed the sympathy of almost the whole Bohemian people, were naturally well informed as to the movements of their enemies. As soon as they had ascertained that no hostile forces were, at least for the present, menacing their Eastern frontiers, they resolved to march immediately to the relief of Žatec. On the approach of the Hussites a panic seized the crusaders, who were also exasperated by the attitude of Sigismund, which they attributed to cowardice. They burnt the tents of their besieging army¹ and hurriedly and in great disorder retired to the German frontier. Though the Hussites did not pursue their enemies as they did when they acquired more experience during the later campaigns, they made a large number of prisoners and captured a great part of the arms of the enemies. On their return to Germany the crusaders cast all blame on Sigismund, forgetting, as Palacký rightly states, that their forces had been vastly superior to those of the Bohemians.

Fortune—or God's special grace, as the pious Bohemians would have worded it—here again favoured Bohemia. Almost at the moment when the retreating crusaders left Bohemia the troops of Sigismund appeared on the eastern frontier of the country. The King of Hungary had succeeded in assembling a vast army, consisting principally of his Hungarian, Transylvanian, and Croatian subjects. With these forces he crossed from Hungary into Moravia at the beginning of November. In Moravia Sigismund was joined by an Austrian army of 12,000 men, which his son-in-law, Archduke Albert of Austria, brought to his aid. Frequent defeats had taught Sigismund to distrust his military talent. He had, therefore, engaged as leader for his new enterprise an Italian soldier of

¹ Březova, whose mysticism renders his book so fascinating, here also sees the direct intervention of Providence. He writes: "*Nam miro modo tam inhumanam gentem [the crusaders] nullo homine impugnante Deus omnipotens in fugam convertiti. Die namque II Octobris divina providentia ordinante incensa sunt in multis locis exercitui tentoria, apparuit namque una velut flavea columpna super tentoria transferens se de uno ad alterum et, ubi stabat columpna, ibi ignis vorabat tentoria*" (p. 513).

fortune, Pipa of Ozora. Pipa, with the ruthlessness of an Italian condottiere, resolved to intimidate his adversaries by wholesale massacres. His instructions were but too energetically carried out.¹ It is certain that Pipa's policy obtained a certain amount of success. Many nobles of Moravia renounced the articles of Prague and again recognised Sigismund as their legitimate sovereign. Their example was afterwards followed by a considerable number of Bohemian nobles, whom the murder of Sadlo and other internal troubles at Prague, which will be mentioned at the beginning of the next chapter, had for a time alienated from the national cause. Sigismund marched to Brno, the capital of Moravia, almost without meeting with any opposition. He summoned the estates of the country to a diet, which was to have begun its deliberations on November 1, but which, in consequence of delays, only met on the 10th of that month. Sigismund had taken the precaution of filling the council-chamber, where the estates met, with his Hungarian soldiery. It was no more attempted to keep up the appearance that the assembly deliberated freely than when, in the present year,² the Hungarian Parliament voted in a house that was crowded with police. Sigismund expressed his wishes very clearly. He told the estates that it was their duty to renounce the four articles which were erroneous and heretical; then, having done penance, they would receive absolution from the papal legate. The Moravians hesitated, but seeing the anger of the King, whose fits of fury sometimes verged on madness, and knowing that the Hungarian soldiers were prepared to attack them, they obeyed the King's command.³

¹ Březova writes: "Et factum est quod nulli parcentes villas et oppida combusserunt, virgines violarunt et inhumane hominesque utriusque sexus parvulis non parcentes, quos ceperunt, combusserunt aut ferro perimerunt" (p. 513).

² 1912.

³ Březova writes: "Videntes ultimate quod rex cum furia super proposita materia ab eis optat adstatim responsum, videntes etiam Ungaros cum armis se invadendos paratos, timore perculsi se regis submitunt facere voluntatem" (p. 52⁷).

The easy submission of Moravia determined Sigismund to march immediately to Bohemia. He first proceeded to Jihlava (in German, Iglau), close to the Bohemian frontier, and here received several Bohemian nobles who had abandoned the national cause. The vanguard of Sigismund's army immediately occupied the small towns of Humpolec and Ledec, and the whole army then proceeded in the direction of Kutna Hora. Never was Bohemia in greater peril. Žižka and his Táborites were engaged in warfare with the royalist nobles in the distant southern districts of Bohemia. The troops of Prague had recently been quartered in the country near Časlav, but on receiving the news of Sigismund's approach they retired on Prague, though not without leaving garrisons at Kutna Hora, Králové Hradec, and other important cities. On hearing of this new invasion the citizens of Prague immediately sent messengers to Žižka begging him to march to their aid. Žižka immediately consented to do so. Though the preparations for a new campaign necessarily caused some delay, the Táborite troops, marching with that rapidity which contributed so largely to the Hussite victories, arrived at Prague on December 1. Žižka's entry into the city was a triumphal one. When the Táborite forces, preceded as usual by priests carrying the Holy Sacrament, and accompanied by numerous Táborite "sisters," arrived at the city gates, the whole population hastened to welcome and greet them. Subsequent events render it probable that the Táborite army was a very considerable one. Besides a large force of infantry, the Táborites on this occasion had also a considerable number of horsemen and numerous battle-wagons, so important a feature in the Bohemian warfare of that period. When the blind general entered the city gates, the great bells of the town-hall and of all the numerous church steeples were rung, and he was received with all the honours that were usually only rendered to the sovereign of the land. Žižka spent a week at Prague, conferring with the municipal authorities and also attempting to raise

more troops; for he was far too good a soldier to under-rate the difficulty of the task that now confronted him. It is also probable that some agreement was made at this moment between Žižka and the citizens of Prague, according to which he obtained supreme command of all the national forces. At this time Žižka began to sign his commands as "leader of the communities of the Bohemian land who are devoted to God's law and obey it."¹ On December 8 Žižka and his Táborites left Prague, and on the following day the Praguers also marched out to encounter the enemies of the Utraquist Creed.

The centre of the new campaign was Kutna Hora. The King of Hungary naturally attached great importance to the occupation of that city. It has been previously mentioned that when that town had accepted the supremacy of Prague, those inhabitants who refused to conform to the teachings of the Utraquist Church had been allowed freely to leave Kutna Hora. The Utraquists, whose leniency always contrasts favourably with the ferocity of Sigismund's partisans, had not insisted on this stipulation being carried out very strictly. Many adherents of Rome, and particularly many miners whose work caused them to wish to continue near the silver-mines, had thus remained at Kutna Hora. The partisans of Sigismund rightly, as the subsequent events proved, believed that these men would by no means feel grateful to a conqueror who had treated them with a leniency quite exceptional at that period, but that they would prove their vindictiveness as soon as it was possible to do so with comparative safety. The campaign of Kutna Hora is one of the most interesting episodes of the Hussite wars. We have unfortunately even less information concerning this campaign than we have with regard to other far less important events.² Kutna Hora, the

¹ Professor Tomek, *Dějepis města Prag (History of the Town of Prague)*, Vol. IV. p. 220.

² Březova's work ends quite suddenly in the middle of his narrative. This is usually attributed to the sudden death of the author (see my *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia*, pp. 35-47). I have there incorrectly called the historian "Březov."

centre of the new campaign, has not naturally a very strong position, and Žižka, on his arrival there, was confronted by difficulties that must have appeared serious even to his indomitable mind. A considerable part of the population of Kutna Hora was undoubtedly hostile to the national cause, and it was probable that the forces whom the patriots would have to encounter would be greatly inferior to Sigismund's army. After remaining only a few days at Kutna Hora Žižka repaired to Časlav, where some of his troops had hurriedly thrown up earthworks. He was here joined by the forces of the Moravian nobles, Hašek of Valdštýn and Venceslas of Kravář, as well as by the Lord Boček of Kunštatt Poděbrad, who had, from his castle of Litice, brought a considerable force to aid the national cause. After leaving a considerable garrison at Časlav, Žižka returned to Kutna Hora.

Sigismund, King of Hungary, had meanwhile, avoiding the direct road by way of Časlav, arrived before Kutna Hora on December 19. His troops again committed unspeakable cruelties on the march.¹ Žižka had returned to Kutna Hora, accompanied by his Moravian allies, who were burning to revenge the cruelties committed against their countrymen by an Italian condottiere and semi-savage Hungarians. It was Žižka's plan to give battle to the adherents of Sigismund outside the walls of Kutna Hora. On December 21—a Sunday—it was, in the name of the Bohemian nobles, Žižka and the citizens of Prague announced in the churches and afterwards by heralds in the streets that all should be ready to encounter King Sigismund, and should keep their faith and, as they had promised, defend the evangelical truth; they should also not give way to fear because the royal army was approaching. The troops immediately marched out of

¹ Březova thus addresses the King "O princeps insensate cur domesticos tuos quos defensare deberes gentili more persequeris, cur nidum proprium stercoriando defedare non cessas? cur innocentium sanguinem fundere non desinis? cur delere cupis qui pro lege Dei sui certando se tibi opponunt?" (p. 532).

the town by the Kouřim gate and after proceeding but a short distance¹ came in sight of the army of Sigismund. In view of the vast numerical superiority of the enemy, Žižka's army immediately formed a square, which was defended in every direction by the iron-clad wagons. After the priests had briefly addressed the soldiers and all had knelt down for a short prayer, the guns on the wagons immediately opened fire on the enemies in every direction. The position which Žižka had chosen was a very strong one and had a free outlook almost in every direction.² It seems probable that Žižka decided to give battle outside of the town, which, as he rightly believed, contained many secret enemies. The infantry and cavalry of Sigismund immediately attacked the Bohemians, but were repulsed with great slaughter, and at even-tide the King of Hungary had obtained no advantage, though some of his soldiers had succeeded in occupying the space between the Kouřim gate and Žižka's lager. Treachery within the city walls now, however, entirely changed the situation. Numerous Roman Catholics, particularly miners who had been expelled from the city after its capture by the national party, had returned with Sigismund's army and had entered into communication with their comrades who had remained in Kutna Hora. The latter, while the fighting between Žižka and the troops of Sigismund was at its height, treacherously opened the Kolin gate, through which the exiled miners, closely followed by the royal troops, entered the city. A massacre immediately ensued, in which the brutal, fanatical miners surpassed in cruelty even the semi-savage Hungarians. As Palacký writes, only the day of St. Bartholomew in Paris surpassed in horror this evening at Kutna Hora. Žižka's position now became an almost desperate one. He was

¹ The contemporary chroniclers write "two hons." The "hon," an old Bohemian measure of distance, consisted of about 125 steps.

² The position is well described by Dr. Toman in his *Husitské Válečnictví* (*Hussite Warfare*). He also remarks that the advantage of the wagon-fort under a leader such as Žižka appears particularly clearly here.

surrounded by the enemy in every direction, and the loss of Kutna Hora rendered it impossible to provision his troops. He therefore determined to abandon his position and take up another nearer to the country, whence he could hope to obtain food and reinforcements. At daybreak on December 22 Žižka attacked the enemies and, principally in consequence of his superior artillery, drove them from their positions. He then marched to the Kašik hill on the opposite side of the city, and his troops again formed in a square, ready to repulse a new attack. No such attack, however, took place, as Sigismund appears to have hoped to force the Hussites to capitulate. They were, indeed, in a sorry plight, almost without provisions and suffering bitterly from the cold, as the warm clothing had remained at Kutna Hora. The magnetic influence which Žižka exercised over his soldiers enabled him to induce them to remain under arms and face the enemy the whole day. At midnight, however, his artillery again opened fire on the enemies and Žižka succeeded in forcing his way through their lines. On December 23 the whole army had safely reached Kolin.¹ Žižka here granted his warriors a few days of well-deserved rest. With the true intuition of a born general he saw that his army was not then sufficiently numerous to oppose the advance of Sigismund. He therefore immediately sent messengers to the neighbouring districts of

¹ We have unfortunately scarcely any contemporary information concerning this brilliant deed of arms. We can now no longer use Březova's history, and the chroniclers devote but a few words to the event. The account given by the learned Jesuit Balbinus is very interesting, as he seems to have used sources that are not now at our disposal. He writes: "Žižka . . . in monte Taurgang [Kaňk] ad Cuttnam [Kutna Hora] castra fixit. Cæsar Cuttnam 20 [rect. 21] Decembris obtinuit. Žižkam in monte stantem ita cinxit ut evasurus non crederetur; hic cæci Ducis et animus et magis etiam scientia rei militaris apparuit; ita enim et currus ordinavit et aciem instruxit nocte 23 Decembris ut omnes suos, salvis omnibus impedimentis, per media Sigismundi castra traduceret, pugna semper abstinens et sola fronte dimicans qua viam sibi, rejectis in latera hostibus, faciebat; ita frustra de die jam assilientibus et latera fodientibus cæsareis (quos currus armatis instructi simul progredientes satis arcebant) Colinum salvus et illæsus servatis ordinibus evasit; quod opus militiæ periti majus quam acie vincere existimaverunt." (*Epitome rerum Bohemicarum*, Lib. IV, cap. viii.)

Jičín and Turnov calling the people to arms. A large number of peasants, many of them, indeed, armed only with flails and fighting-clubs, flocked to Žižka's standards.

Sigismund, always a prudent warrior, only entered the gates of Kutna Hora on December 24. Christmas was celebrated there very festively, and the King believed that the heretics had at last been definitely vanquished. Events soon proved that his hope was not justified. On January 6, 1422, the national army again advanced, and Žižka established his headquarters at Nebovid, a village halfway between Kolin and Kutna Hora. The Hussite soldiers were never so determined as at this moment. Zealous readers of the Old Testament, they considered merciless revenge their duty. Their fury became yet intenser when they found in a shed at Nebovid the corpse of a young girl, who had succumbed to the outrages inflicted on her by some of Sigismund's Hungarian mercenaries. "It is our duty," the warriors said, "to avenge this, even at the risk of our lives."¹ On the other hand, the unexpected advance of Žižka caused a panic among Sigismund's soldiers. Even so experienced a general as Pipa of Ozora advised the evacuation of Kutna Hora and an immediate retreat to the frontier. It is here particularly regretted that we have very little contemporary evidence.² The King decided to leave the town, but suggested that some of the Bohemian nobles who had joined his party should remain at Kutna Hora and defend the city. They declined this task as being too dangerous. Men who had so frequently changed sides can hardly have felt great enthusiasm for either cause. Not wishing

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 48.

² Professor Tomek in his *Life of John Zizka*, to which I wish here to acknowledge my indebtedness, quotes on this occasion an important passage from the German chronicler Windecke. Windecke's German is so rugged and difficult that I will transcribe his words in English. He writes: "Now the King had on this evening [when Žižka's advance became known] many cowards [Windecke writes 'Hollanders,' but the word had that signification at this period] from Bohemia and Moravia in his camp, though they had sworn to be faithful to him; so the King had to retreat. Yet Pipo was accused of having caused the flight both from the town and from the open country."

that Kutna Hora should fall into the hands of the rapidly advancing enemies, Sigismund gave the order that the city should be set on fire at various places. The Hussite troops, however, entering the town almost at the moment the King left it, succeeded in soon extinguishing the flames. Sigismund's departure was a flight rather than a retreat. The terrible cold—the first half of January is in Bohemia proverbially the coldest time of the year—demoralised his soldiers, who frequently refused to face the enemies. The army was followed by large bands of miners who, after their recent treachery, could not hope for mercy on the part of the Hussites. They had brought their wives and children with them, many of whom perished from cold and exhaustion. The King ordered some of the town-councillors of Kutna Hora, whom he, probably rightly, suspected of intending to rejoin the national party, to be arrested and tied to some of the wagons which followed the army. On January 8 Pipa drew up his forces on a line of hills near the village of Habry. He hardly appears to have hoped to be successful, but to have wished to delay the rapid pursuit of Žižka's army. This was certainly particularly necessary in view of the safety of the King, whose fate, had he fallen into the hands of the patriots, was certain.¹ When the sound of trumpets announced the approach of Žižka the Hungarian cavalry refused to fight, and galloped away at the full speed of their horses. The infantry thus deserted also fled, and the rout of the army was complete. There seems at first to have been the intention of halting at Nêmecký Brod, a small town favourable to the royalists, but the King now refused to enter the town, and continued his flight in the direction of the Moravian frontier. He crossed the River Sazava on a bridge, but this bridge was insufficient to give passage to the panic-stricken crowd. Many were cut down

¹ Palacký mentions the fate of a Moravian knight, John of Lhotský, who, with a few followers, made a hopeless attack on the advancing Bohemians, hoping that his death would facilitate the flight of Sigismund (*Geschichte von Böhmen*, Vol. III. Part 2, p. 273, n.).

by the pursuing Hussites. The Hungarian horsemen attempted to cross the frozen Sazava, but after a certain number had crossed safely the ice gave way and a considerable number were drowned.¹ The whole luggage of the King, as well as the rich plunder which the Hungarians were carrying away, fell into the hands of the Hussites on the occasion of this miniature Beresina. The remaining part of Sigismund's army sought refuge within the walls of Německý Brod, where they found some sympathisers. The respite was, however, short. On January 9, "immediately after hearing mass," the Hussites attacked the city from all directions. At nightfall the defenders still resisted, but their cause was already hopeless, and they began to negotiate in view of a capitulation. Meanwhile, some of Žižka's soldiers entered the gates, and all resistance soon ceased. A general massacre of the citizens and of Sigismund's soldiers then began, though here also the women and children were spared. Žižka himself was on this occasion unable to control the fury of his men, but he strongly expressed his disapproval.² Thus ended the campaign of Kutna Hora. The rapidity with which Žižka moved from Kutna Hora to Německý Brod, in the middle of winter and through an almost roadless country, twice at Habry and before Německý Brod forming his troops in battle order on the way, is a wonderful proof of Žižka's energy, and of the will-power and enthusiasm of his men. On the 11th Žižka was dubbed a knight, probably by one of the Utraquist knights or nobles in his army. His conforming to the custom of mediæval chivalry proves that he was by no means an anarchist or "leveller," as has often been stated. On the retreat from Kutna Hora to Německý Brod Sigismund lost about 12,000 men, not including the 458 Hungarian horsemen who had been drowned. Numerous men of rank in his army had

¹ According to the "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," "458 men in armour."

² See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 136, n. 2.

also been made prisoners; he was obliged to exchange them, and it may be mentioned that among those who were now enabled to recover their liberty and return to their country were the Bohemian envoys who, contrary to international law, had been arrested at Ratibor.

CHAPTER IV

THE Bohemian historians, who wrote of the great civil war as contemporaries, all, not excepting Březova, adopted a strictly chronological method which makes the study of their works somewhat fatiguing. After reading an account of the beginning of the siege of some castle we find ourselves suddenly transferred to the "*áγορά*" or market-place of Prague, or to the university colleges, and read the account of a disputation on some abstruse question of theological dogma or ritual. A page or two further we return to accounts of warlike events. The patience of a modern reader would hardly tolerate such a system. I wish, therefore, to give here a brief account of the theological controversies which caused great discord and internal troubles, both in Prague and at Tábor, during the years 1421 and 1422. As noted in the last chapter it had been settled at the conference in the house of Zmrzlík that both the contending parties should send a written statement of their religious views within a month to Lord Ulrich of Jindřichův Hradec, who had presided at the conference, and to the burgomaster of the old town of Prague. The Táborite priests immediately drew up a lengthy document expounding their doctrine, and entrusted one of the most extreme members of their community, the priest Venceslas Koranda, whose name has already been mentioned, with the duty of presenting this paper to the Praguers. The danger of a new foreign invasion then again confronted the Bohemians, and it was certainly the duty of the Táborites to further concord among the Hussite parties. If they really had this duty at heart their choice of an envoy could not have been more unfortunate. Koranda expressed the wish to deliver his message at a general meeting of the citizens. In consequence

of the feverish state of excitement that prevailed in the city, this would inevitably have led to riots and to bloodshed. The town-council, therefore, wisely prohibited the meeting. Koranda then declared that he would preach in the church of St. Mary-of-the-Snow, and there expound the teaching of the brethren of Tábor. When he arrived there unexpectedly the pulpit was occupied by Martin of Volyn, who had been a disciple of Hus. When Martin had ended his sermon, Koranda immediately addressed the congregation. He began by complaining of the conduct of the magistrates of Prague, who, he said, had attempted to prevent him from obtaining a hearing. He then discussed the question of vestments, which greatly interested a population then entirely absorbed by ecclesiastical controversies. He invoked the example of Jesus Christ to condemn the use of any but ordinary clothing during religious services and, speaking in a very menacing tone, added that the brethren would treat those men of high rank—who obviously referred to the Utraquist nobles—who attempted to defend the use of vestments by falsified Scriptural texts in the same fashion as other infidels who falsified Scripture.¹ These threats were unfortunately carried into execution afterwards. Koranda then left Prague, after having transmitted to the town-council an extensive paper expounding the religious views of the Táborites. The document was an amplification of the statements which Koranda had made in his sermon. Great stress was laid on the use of vestments, and Jesus was quoted as witness to prove that they were not only useless, but opposed to the teaching of the Gospel.² Koranda further

¹ "Proposuit quod fratres Thaboritæ contra homines altos pro ornatis scripturas impertinenter adducentes et fratrum scripturas adulterantes quod contra illos vellent agere sicut contra quoscunque alios infideles scripturas adulterantes, sicut antea pro imaginibus et consecracione acquarum fecerunt" (Březova, p. 467).

² "Primum quod Dom. Jesus, Deus et homo, cujus perfecta sunt opera, sine vestibus exterioribus jam ad hoc consuetis et consuetudine et adinventione hominum deputatis et sine ritu a modo sacerdotibus usitato sufficientissime et saluterrime cœnam suam perigit." ("Chronicon Taboritarum," in Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. II. p. 489.)

affirmed, in the name of the community of Tábor, that it considered the ritual of the Catholic Church as founded, not on the traditions and decrees of Christ, but on the authority of popes and others belonging to a far later period.¹ The university of Prague, representing the Utraquist Church, replied in a very prolix document. This paper energetically defended the ritual of the Roman Church, which decreed the use of vestments, and it declared that he who despised his mother, the primitive Church, to whom the Saviour granted power upon earth inferior only to His own, was not only a publican and sinner, but was Satan himself. The lengthy document contained very numerous quotations; those from the Old Testament refer principally to the ritual of the Jews; even the distinct dress of the ancient Egyptian priests is adduced as an argument in favour of vestments. The principal statement is that all regulations of God, and those of the Holy Church which are not opposed to God's law, and in particular the use of vestments, must be observed by the faithful.² These statements of the views of the two parties clearly show how great the distance between them had already become.

The community of Tábor and their allies in Prague, such as the priest John of Zělivo, were at that time carried away by an ultra-revolutionary current, and had it not been for Žižka both cities might have fallen into a state of complete anarchy.³

¹ "Supponimus quod ritum humanum in proposito nolumus vocare traditiones sed decreta paparum et hominum jam longe a vita Christi et apostolorum declinantium, in quibus jam caritas refriguerat iniquitate superabundante" (Höfler, as above, p. 490).

² "Omnis institutio Dei aut sanctæ matris ecclesiæ legem Dei non destruens sed adjuvans, quam exequi non est de se peccatum est a fidelibus observanda; sed institutio de vestibus ad sacrificandum specialiter deputatis est Dei institutio et sanctæ matris ecclesiæ primitivæ legem Dei non destruens sed adjuvans, quæ non est de se peccatum; igitur talis institutio est a fidelibus observanda" (Höfler, as above, p. 504).

³ Dr. Krummel in his interesting work entitled *Utraquisten und Taboriten*, in which he generally upholds the Taborite point of view, yet writes: "Die Taboriten kamen damals in Gefahr . . . durch einen übertriebenen Purismus und die chiliastischen Ideen, welche unter ihnen aufgekommen waren, auf eine abschüssige Bahn zu gerathen, die gefährliche Bahn auf welche im 16ten Jahrhundert die Wiedertäufer gerathen und verdienter Maszen untergegangen sind" (p. 53).

It is but fair to note that this movement did not influence the entire Tábórite clergy. There were many men among them who, holding extreme puritanical views, abhorred church ornaments and vestments, and differed from the Church of Rome in their doctrine concerning the Sacraments more widely than did the moderate Utraquists, but who were by no means visionaries, and ardently wished to maintain public order. The leader of these men was Nicholas of Pelhřimov, whom the Tábórites had, in the autumn of the year 1420, chosen as bishop. For a time, however, the fanatics seemed to prevail, and as was natural in a country where religious controversies had become the predominant interest, the crimes and follies of these men were by their opponents imputed to the whole Tábórite community. Almost immediately after Koranda's sermon in Prague, the people of Tábor and of the neighbouring districts began to attack all those who publicly approved of the wearing of vestments by priests when celebrating mass. Some of these men were declared heretics and burnt alive by the populace. Among the Tábórite priests whose fanaticism endangered public order was one Martin Houška, surnamed Loquis who, in, a more enlightened age, would deservedly have been confined in a lunatic asylum. He professed an insane and fanatical hatred of the Sacrament of Communion, and expressed his views in a repulsively blasphemous fashion. Probably by request of Žižka he was arrested by Lord Ulrich of Jindřichuv Hradec, one of the Utraquist nobles. From his prison in Lord Ulrich's castle he wrote to his friends at Tábor, begging to be allowed to expound his views there. Lord Ulrich granted him his liberty, probably thinking that he would there be punished by the members of his own community. At Tábor he recanted the opinions opposed to the teaching of that community which he had previously professed, but not believing himself to be safe there he attempted to fly to Moravia, which appears to have been his home. On his way he was arrested at Chrudim by the commander of the district, Bořek of Mile-

tinek, one of the Utraquist generals. It is a curious proof of the universal interest in theological controversy at that period that the general himself examined Loquis on his views about Communion. They appeared to Miletinek so blasphemous that he struck Loquis on the face and ordered him to be burnt. The priest Ambrose of Králové Hradec, leader of the Orebite community, however, begged that the enthusiast should be entrusted to him, asserting that he would convert him from his erroneous views. After a few weeks the priest Ambrose declared "that he could do nothing with him." He then had the wretched man, who well deserved the quiet of a cell in a lunatic asylum, conveyed to the castle of Roudnice, where the Archbishop of Prague, Conrad of Vechta, then resided. The archbishop consulted the citizens of Prague, and they appealed to Žižka, who was then practically the ruler of Bohemia. The great general was at that moment very much impressed by the internal troubles caused by religious fanatics, which appeared to endanger the future of the Hussite movement. He therefore declared that an example should be made, and suggested that Loquis should be burnt publicly on the market-place of Prague. The magistrates, knowing that the fanatic had many adherents in their city, declined to do this, fearing the outbreak of riots. They sent, however, an executioner to Roudnice, who, after having cruelly tortured Loquis and a companion who had followed him, burnt them alive in a barrel into which they had been thrust. It is a proof of the terrible ferocity which at that time was general, even among men of moderate views, such as Lawrence of Březova, that he should refer to the death of Loquis in the following words: "Let praise be given to God, who seized the wolves who attempted to invade His flock, and in a wondrous fashion repelled and destroyed them before they could taint the others."¹ In consequence of the chiliastic prophecies which, since the year 1420, had been widely spread at Tábor, a feeling of recklessness prevailed among the

¹ Březova, p. 495.

people, and even the most absurd and anti-social theories found believers. The best known occurrence in connection with these religious excesses is the rise and fall of the so-called Adamites. The excesses of these obscene fanatics have very unfairly been used to discredit the whole Hussite movement, and even Pope Martin V did not hesitate to do so. As I have previously written¹ recent research has proved that the so-called Adamites had no connection whatever with Hussitism. The first mention of Adamites in Bohemia is contained in a letter² addressed to the Archbishop of Prague in the year 1409—before the death of Hus and long before the beginning of the Hussite movement—by the priest John of Chvojnov, in which he complains of the orgies which took place at night-time among his parishioners. He relates misdeeds very similar to those of which Březova, Æneas Sylvius, and their many copiers afterwards accused the Adamites. This letter undoubtedly contains the first mention of Adamites in Bohemia. That sect cannot in any way be connected with Hus, or even with extreme fanatics such as Loquis. It is probable that though religious insanity has, under various forms, existed at all periods, the direct forerunners of the Adamites were the so-called Turlupins in France. From France their doctrines penetrated to Austria early in the fourteenth century,³ and they undoubtedly reached Bohemia from there in the first years of the fifteenth century. The attempt to connect the deeds of these fanatics with the actions of the brothers of Tábor was undoubtedly inspired by the writings of Březova, whose hatred of the Táborites was even intenser than his hatred of the adherents of the Church of Rome. It is sufficient to state that the doctrine of the

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 360–361.

² Published by Dr. Nedoma in an interesting article in the *Věstník Kral. c. společnosti nauk* (*Journal of the Roy. Bohemian Society of Science*) in 1891. I must here acknowledge my indebtedness to this valuable article, which throws much new light on the question.

³ This is proved by the *Anonymi auctoris brevis narratio de nefanda hæresi adamitica in variis Austriæ locis sæculo XIV grassante* (printed by Pez. "Scriptores rerum Austriacarum," Vol. II. pp. 534–536).

Adamites did not originate in Bohemia, that it existed there before the time of Hus, and that it endured after the fall of Tábör. It is more correct to state, as does Dr. Nedoma, that the Adamite movement in that troubled period rose to the surface in consequence of the universal political and religious anarchy. According to Březova, who is almost our sole authority, but cannot be considered an impartial one, those who dwelt in Tábör divided into two parties, that of the Picards¹ and that of the Tábörites; the more faithful (*i. e.* moderate) Tábörite party expelled more than 200 people of both sexes from Tábör, and these, wandering through the hills and forests, reached such a degree of insanity that all, both men and women, walked in a state of complete nudity, saying that they were in a state of innocence, and that clothing had first been assumed because of the transgression of our first progenitors. Březova then proceeds to accuse the Picards or Adamites of incest and other horrible crimes, and declares that it is impossible to relate some of them. Žižka was inexorable in his treatment of these enemies of God's law. On his return from Beroun to Tábör after one of his military raids he ordered fifty of these fanatics, belonging to both sexes, to be burnt in the neighbouring village of Klokot. Some of these fanatics had escaped from Tábör before Žižka arrived there, and had formed a settlement on an island in the River Nežárka near Časlav. Æneas Sylvius has given us a very unedifying account of their life there. They were attacked by Žižka in October 1421 and mercilessly exterminated.

Other less insane, but perhaps even more dangerous, fanatics also imperilled the Utraquist Church in the year 1421. Prominent among them was the priest John of Želivo, who has already been mentioned. He was the leader of the advanced party

¹ The origin of the Bohemian word "pikhart" is very difficult to trace. It was applied to all extreme fanatics, but particularly to the Adamites. It has often been used connected with the province of Picardy, as the origin of the Adamites is believed to have been in France. Others have connected the pikharts with the Beguins, who were often accused of professing heretical opinions.

among the citizens of Prague. In his sermons he constantly referred to the approaching Kingdom of Heaven, and opposed all temporal laws and regulations. Though he may himself have been a well-meaning man, his following consisted mainly of the most turbulent and violent citizens of the lowest class. These men caused constant riots in the city. Inflamed by the sermons of Priest John they expelled the Utraquist priests from their parish churches and established Taborite preachers in their places. Thus the rabble, headed by two Taborite preachers named Prokop¹ and Philipp, "fugitive monks and men of evil repute," occupied the church of St. Peter on the Poříč, drove away the Utraquist preachers and established their two leaders in their stead. Similar events occurred in other churches in Prague.

When in July John of Želivo accompanied the army and left Prague a temporary reaction took place. It is very characteristic of the social condition of Bohemia at the period of the Hussite wars that women took the lead in this movement. Several widows and other zealous women called many of their friends together, and walking in procession to the town-hall requested a hearing of the town-councillors. When they had been admitted, one of the women read out a letter, signed by all, which complained of the injustice with which the faithful priests of the churches of St. Michael, St. Nicholas, and St. Peter on the Poříč had been treated. They then reminded the councillors of the ordinance which the city had passed in March forbidding the propagation of heresies in Prague, and accused them of partiality in their administration of the town, and specially of summoning only their partisans to the meetings of the citizens and of the aldermen. They ended by demanding that all these grievances should be remedied. The councillors, who all belonged to Želivo's party, were greatly displeased

¹ This Prokop is, of course, not to be confounded with Prokop the Great, nor with Prokop the Less, leader of the "Orphans" during the last part of the war.

by this demonstration. They caused the women to be arrested, and ordered them to separate. Those who were married were to stand apart, and the other ones also. All were shown where to stand. The women refused to obey this order and declined to separate. The town-councillors then ordered the women to deliver to them the letter which had been read out, but this also they refused to do. The councillors then became angry. Leaving the town-hall, they gave the order that the crowd of women should be locked up in the council-chamber. They were, however, after two hours allowed to leave the council-chamber unharmed.¹

The courageous initiative of the Bohemian women proved successful. The priests of the Utraquist Church were reinstated in their parishes, while the agitators either retired to Tábor or continued, led by their ringleader, the priest John, to cause disturbances in Prague. This conduct was all the more reprehensible because the country was—as already stated—at that moment again attacked on all its frontiers by ferocious and fanatical foreign enemies. One of the principal objects of Zělivo and his partisans was to impede and, if possible, to break off the alliance of the Praguers with the Utraquist nobility. When the assembly of the Bohemian estates took place at Kutna Hora in August, it was found that the envoys of Prague had no credentials. The assembly therefore declined to admit them to its deliberations, but sent two of its members, Vávak of Hradec and John Sadlo of Kostelec, who had formerly been private secretary to King Venceslas, to Prague to complain of this omission. On their arrival in Prague the two Bohemian lords earnestly exhorted the citizens not to hinder the proceedings of the national assembly by their opposition, and they very strongly rebuked the priest John of Zělivo, telling him that it was not becoming for a priest to interfere in worldly matters. In spite of the influence of the party of priest John, the magistrates of Prague finally decided to forward to their

¹ Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. pp. 191-192.

envoys the required credentials. As Professor Tomek conjectures with his usual sagacity, the fact that Žižka, known as a bitter opponent of all extreme fanatics, was then in Prague contributed largely to this decision. The well-deserved rebuke which he had received undoubtedly rankled in the mind of priest John, and he was able, as will be mentioned presently, to wreak terrible vengeance on John of Sadlo. The disturbances in Prague meanwhile continued almost uninterruptedly. On October 19, John of Zělivo, as had now become his custom, had the large bells of the church of St. Mary-of-the-Snow rung, and called on the citizens to assemble in the church of St. Stephen. He there addressed the people and called on them to choose "one man as their capable and faithful captain." After he had inveighed against the barons of the kingdom some of his followers declared that John Hvězda of Vicemilic¹ had always proved faithful, and deserved well of the commonwealth, and that they wished him to be their captain. This somewhat irregular vote was sanctioned by the whole assembly, and very far-reaching powers were granted to the new captain of the people. Four town-councillors, of whom two belonged to the old and two to the new city, were then chosen to assist Vicemilic in the performance of his new duties. Immediately after this *coup d'état*—for it cannot be otherwise described—the town council, in which Zělivo's adherents had the majority, committed other illegal acts, which were severely blamed by the moderate Utraquist members of the council. These men had not dared to protest on the spot against the illegal election of Vicemilic, but they afterwards met at the Bethlehem chapel, famous as the scene of Hus's sermons,² and from here forwarded a protest to the town council, which was, however, practically ignored. Priest John meanwhile continued in his sermons to attack the Utraquist nobility with increasing violence. He particularly affirmed that many of the nobles

¹ He was after Žižka's death for a short time leader of the Tábórites.

² See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 75-77.

had not obeyed orders when the Utraquist forces had recently been summoned to assemble at Slané. Either the priest John or one of his adherents—the accounts differ—stated that John Sadlo of Kostelec had been one of those who had failed to lead their men to Slané. Sadlo was greatly disliked by Zělivo's rabble, as he had sternly rebuked their leader and requested him not to interfere in secular matters. When informed of these accusations, which appear to have been entirely unfounded, Sadlo was naturally very indignant. He decided to return immediately to Prague, and to justify his conduct before the magistrates of a city which then exercised a hegemony over the greatest part of Bohemia. Sadlo, however, well knew how untrustworthy the ochlocracy that then ruled Prague was. He therefore sent a messenger to Prague demanding a letter of safe conduct. The town-councillors in their reply stated that they by no means believed in the accusations that had been made against him, and that he could safely proceed on his journey. On October 20 Sadlo, accompanied by a few friends and some followers, proceeded to the town-hall of Prague. On his entry he was immediately arrested, and his companions were told to leave the town-hall. The councillors waited till two o'clock in the night, and then decreed that Sadlo should be decapitated. Sadlo, who was a fervent Utraquist, begged to be allowed to receive Communion in the two kinds before his death. This was refused, and he was buried secretly in the neighbouring church of St. Nicholas without any religious ceremonies. The fully justified indignation which this perfidious act naturally caused among the sensible and reasonable Utraquists is well expressed in Březova's words. He writes : ¹

“ Now this John [Sadlo], who had been a great favourite of King Venceslas and his principal councillor, and had often protected the priests, scholars, and citizens against the fury of the King, had faithfully upheld Communion in the two

¹ p. 515 of his Chronicle.

kinds, and had, as far as it was in his power, opposed all innovations that were contrary to God's law. He thus incurred the enmity of many who were then powerful in the city. The greater part of the Praguers, however, deeply deplored Sadlo's sudden death, and the preachers faithful to the Lord both privately and publicly blamed the town-councillors, and declared that by causing his sudden death they had sinned grievously." Březova's grave but truthful words indicate one of the causes of the failure of the Hussite movement, and, it may be added, of some of the subsequent attempts of the Bohemians to act as a united nation. There exists among the baser-minded Bohemians a tendency to behave in a somewhat servile fashion to those who are their acknowledged enemies, and at the same time to cast suspicion, distrust, and even obloquy on those who, like John of Sadlo, though they belong to a superior class, attempt to befriend the people; for it must be remembered that the differences of class, which are now almost extinct in Western Europe, in Bohemia long continued, and to a certain extent still continue to be almost as strict as in the fifteenth century.

The success of John of Zělivo and his followers in destroying one of their most powerful antagonists naturally encouraged them to continue their turbulent movement. Utterly oblivious of the constant external peril which menaced their country, they had reduced Prague to an almost anarchical condition. As was inevitable, their fanatical madness led to a reaction among the more sensible townsmen. In January 1422 the victorious Hussite armies, led by Žižka, returned to the capital from Německý Brod, and their arrival certainly strengthened the minds of those who were opposed to anarchy. Speaking generally, it may be said that the inhabitants of the new town favoured Zělivo's views, while the party of order had its principal supporters among the citizens of the old town. We have, however, unfortunately little information concerning

these civic disturbances. The leader of the party opposed to Želivo was then Master Jacobellus of Střibro,¹ Hus's associate and the originator of Utraquism. He was now Hus's successor as preacher at the Bethlehem chapel. In consequence of the presence there of the national army, many Utraquist nobles and Táborite captains, including Žižka, were now in Prague. These men considered the possibility of re-establishing order in Prague. They decided that nineteen men chosen from all the national parties should act as mediators. Among those selected for this arduous task were two nobles of the house of Poděbrad, Hašek of Valdštýn, a Moravian noble whom King Sigismund had deprived of his estates, Žižka, with two other Táborite captains, and Hvězda of Vice-milic, whom the Praguers had recently chosen as captain of the people. The mediators began by appointing what may be called a provisional government, but in view of the resistance of the advanced party soon decided to appeal to the people and to order the election of new town-councillors. The elections were to take place separately in each of the towns, and a certain number of representatives allotted to each of the different divisions of the city. These regulations were evidently necessary, because during the mob-rule of Želivo and his adherents no orderly elections had been possible. The elections which were then held resulted in a victory of the moderate party. The mediators then decreed that the new town-councillors should under all circumstances retain their positions for the term of one year, and enjoined on them to admit no priest to the deliberations of the council unless it should prove necessary to consult him on matters of ritual or doctrine. They further consented to allow four ecclesiastics, Jacobellus, Peter Payne (surnamed Engliš), John Kardinal, and John of Želivo, to continue to direct ecclesiastical matters; they were, however, to act on the advice of a certain number of laymen,

¹ For Jacobellus see my *Master John Hus*, passim, particularly pp. 71, 232.

who were to be appointed by the town council. After this agreement had been concluded the allies of Prague almost immediately left the city. Žižka gladly returned to his task of repulsing the foreign enemies of his country, hoping that the new regulations, which were probably partly his own work, would ensure a certain amount of tranquillity to the Bohemian capital.

One of the first steps taken by the new authorities in Prague was the destitution of the captain of the town, Hvězda of Vicemilic. They then appointed as his successor Lord Hašek of Valdštýn; and in view of the base, incessant attacks upon the Utraquist nobles which proceeded from Zělivo's partisans, they could hardly have made a better choice. Valdštýn, a very fervent Utraquist, had, during Sigismund's invasion of Moravia, sacrificed his large estates in that country for the sake of his cause, and had afterwards taken a considerable part in Žižka's brilliant campaign of Kutna Hora. There is no doubt that the inconstancy and ambiguous attitude of Čeněk of Wartenberg and some other Bohemian nobles caused them to be often suspected by the Bohemian people, but of the countless writers on the Hussite wars Palacký alone has pointed out the great difficulties which then confronted the Bohemian nobles. The choice of Valdštýn was an intentional and justified rebuke of the anarchical tendencies of Zělivo and his associates. The theological controversies in Prague meanwhile continued uninterruptedly. Very violent discussions took place among the priests who were still entrusted with the direction of ecclesiastical affairs. John of Zělivo invariably opposed all the views of his colleagues. At last Jacobellus in the presence of Zělivo openly declared that priest John was the cause of all the riots and bloodshed in Prague, and that he had wilfully led astray the Bohemian and Moravian nation. The new conservative town-councillors of Prague then came to the conclusion that it was necessary to end the influence of Zělivo over the turbulent

citizens of Prague, even if this result could only be obtained by his execution.¹ Even if we admit that in a land menaced in every direction by ferocious and implacable enemies it may be necessary to remove a man who sows discord among the defenders of his country, we must blame the treacherous fashion in which the execution of Zělivo was carried out. On March 7 Jacobellus proceeded to the town-hall and here formally complained of the conduct of Zělivo and his adherents, who, he said, were from their pulpits openly inciting the people to sedition. He at the same time blamed the magistrates, accusing them of undue leniency. The magistrates then decided to act without further delay. On March 8 they sent two of their members, one representing the old, the other the new town, to the dwelling of priest John near the church of St. Mary-of-the-Snow. They intended to invite him to the town-hall, probably under the pretext of consulting him with regard to the coming campaign; for Zělivo, like many Bohemian priests of his time, often accompanied the armies on their marches, and was even consulted by the generals. The priest was not, however, at home, and a message was sent to him from the town-hall towards evening saying that it was now too late, but begging him to come to the town-hall early on the following day. When he arrived there he was cordially received by the burgomaster and the aldermen, and they began to discuss the plan of the campaign which the joint forces of the Praguers and the Táborites were shortly to undertake. The burgomaster then called in a messenger, and ordered him to request Lord Hašek of Valdštýn to come to the town-hall, as his presence there was very necessary. When Hašek had arrived the burgomaster said to Zělivo, "Dear priest John, let us all be reconciled before we start on our campaign."

¹ The best contemporary account of the execution of Zělivo is that by a priest who accompanied him to the town-hall. It has been printed from the original MS. in the *Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum*, Vol. III. pp. 480-485, and translated into German by Palacký. The document of course is greatly biased.

The priest, always intransigent, did not receive this suggestion in a conciliatory manner. He complained of the treatment of Vicemilic, who had been deprived of his captainship, and of other men of his party who, he said, had suffered injustice. A somewhat stormy discussion arose, in the course of which Hašek left the hall. Shortly afterwards a magistrate appeared in the hall accompanied by the executioner and his aids. He exclaimed in a loud voice, "Surrender, you are prisoners!" By command of the executioner his aids seized Zělivo's partisans and bound them with cords. Two of them rushed at Zělivo himself and attempted to lift him from the bench on which he was sitting. He, however, showed them by a sign that he was prepared for death, and knelt down for some time in prayer. He then approached the burgomaster and, speaking in a low voice, reminded him of the troubles which would be the consequence of his execution. The burgomaster only answered, "It cannot be otherwise, priest John." Contrarily to what had been done in the case of Sadlo, Zělivo and his companions were allowed to confess to a priest who had accompanied John to the town-hall, and to receive Communion from his hands. This priest, who was himself allowed to leave the town-hall unharmed, is the author of the most extensive account of this event which has been preserved to us. Zělivo and his followers were then conducted to the courtyard within the town-hall. Zělivo was then bound with cords and decapitated. Immediately afterwards the same penalty was inflicted on twelve¹ of his followers.

Waldstein undoubtedly foresaw that this execution, and particularly the treachery connected with it, would cause riots in the city. He had drawn up in the market-place close to the town-hall a considerable force of mercenaries in the pay of the city, and he had also secured the assistance of some soldiers who were in the service of the Utraquist nobles. The best

¹ Accounts differ with regard to the number of adherents of Zělivo who were decapitated with him.

account of the riots which immediately followed the execution of Zělivo is that given by one of the contemporary chroniclers.¹ He writes: "In that year [1422], on the Monday following the Reminiscere Sunday during Lent-time, the priest John, a monk of the Premonstratensian monastery, preacher at the Church of St. Mary-of-the-Snow, was beheaded in the town-hall, and with him twelve other men, and the hall was well closed. Then the priest Gaudentius carried his [priest John's] head through the streets on a dish, inciting the citizens to avenge him. Then also the armed citizens of the new town sounded the bells of all their churches, scaled the walls of the old town² demanding that [the body of] priest John should be delivered up to them. Lord Hašek was then captain of the old town, and he had ordered all young nobles from the neighbouring country to be in Prague on this day. This Lord Hašek with his men placed himself at the corner of the Železná Ulice (Iron street)³ nearest to the market-place; but when he understood that he was not safe there he hid himself in Prague,⁴ so that many houses were afterwards plundered by those who searched for him. Then the men of the new town, seeing that no resistance was offered them, rushed into the market-place, forced open the gates of the town-hall and found there the bodies of the decapitated. They then began with loud and menacing voices to rail against the murderers. They also searched for the aldermen of the old town, and plundered and destroyed their houses, wherever they found one of them they murdered him. They then attacked the Jews and robbed or destroyed all their possessions. When there was nothing more to steal there, they attacked the [university] colleges, forced open the gates and took away the books of the masters and other scholars,

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. pp. 50-51.

² The old town was then divided from the new by fortifications. See my *Prague* ("Mediæval Towns" series), p. 7.

³ The street still bears that name. See my *Prague*, p. 178.

⁴ The entire career of Valdštýn proves that this accusation of cowardice levelled against him is a calumny. The whole account shows, indeed, great animosity against him.

and the books of the public library they either carried away or spoilt them and tore them up. They then attacked the houses of the priests and destroyed them, and those masters who had not fled they arrested and brought to the town-hall. Then Master Rokycan also fled from Prague. On this day Prague suffered more damage than when King Sigismund encamped around the city with more than 100,000 men." Some of the town magistrates who were suspected of having approved of the execution of Želivo were immediately decapitated. On numerous other prisoners the people decided to pass judgment later. "Thus," as Professor Tomek writes,¹ "the prominent companions and followers of Hus in his endeavour to reform the Church, the most zealous and most learned leaders of the whole Utraquist Church, were to be judged by an uneducated rabble." The reign of terror in Prague, however, lasted only a few days, and we find no explanation of this fact in the scanty contemporary records. It does not seem improbable that Žižka, whom his campaign of Kutna Hora had naturally rendered very popular, interfered. A man of sure judgment such as he was could not fail to see that the continuation of anarchy in the capital would soon be followed by the complete downfall of the Hussite movement. New town-councillors, mostly belonging to Želivo's party, were, however, elected; and, probably by a compromise, it was decided that the priests and masters of the university should be sent to Králové Hradec "to do penance there."

It has already been noted that the protracted negotiations with Poland at last led to a favourable result, when the news of the victories near Kutna Hora reached Poland. The political situation in that country was also at that moment favourable to the plan of founding a Polish dynasty in Bohemia. Though already of the age of seventy-four, King Ladislav had recently, mainly through the influence of the Grand Duke Vitold, married again. His youthful bride Sonka, grand-daughter of Ivan

¹ *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 242.

Olgimuntovič, Prince of Kiev, had been brought up according to the teaching of the Greek Church, and though she joined the Roman Church on her marriage it is certain that she used her great influence over the old King in favour of the Bohemians who were Utraquists, as were her own people. She certainly acted entirely under the influence of the Grand Duke Vitold. This enigmatical prince, one of the most interesting figures in early Slavic history, seems to have contemplated the foundation of a Slavic Utraquist Church which would have become the basis of a vast state, of which he would have been the ruler. His intense ambition, which had not as yet been diminished by increasing age, is one of his characteristics on which both Bohemian and Polish contemporary chroniclers lay great stress. Vitold now declared himself ready to accept the Bohemian crown, and charged his nephew, Prince Sigismund Korybutovič, who was also a nephew of King Ladislas, to proceed to Bohemia as his representative. Pursuing the usual tortuous policy of the Lithuanian princes, Vitold wrote to Pope Martin V informing him that he had accepted the Bohemian throne, as he thought it easier to obtain the return of the Bohemians to the fold of the Church by peaceful means than by warfare.¹ The Pope's answer,² couched not unnaturally in somewhat menacing language, severely blamed Vitold, and declared that unconditional surrender on the part of the heretics was the only solution of the Bohemian question which the Church of Rome could accept. This letter, which Vitold only received after a considerable lapse of time, would probably in no case have influenced his decision or that of Prince Sigismund

¹ Vitold wrote: ". . . quod dicti Bohemi multis et variis comminationibus atque guerris et exercitibus ad observantiam fidei sanctæ Rom. ecclesiæ et obedientiam sedis sanctæ *Vitræ* usque hoc reduci nequiverunt, quin imo post tot triumphos totiens reportatos ad majorem pertinaciam deducerentur; quos nec gladius nec persecutio terrere poterant, sed ex crebra victoria et aspersione Christi fidelium qui, proh dolor, unanimiter ex utraque parte funditur eo magis animantur." (Letter of March 5, 1422, printed by Palacký, *Urkunden*, etc., Vol. I. pp. 186-187.)

² Printed by Palacký, *Urkunden*, etc., Vol. I. p. 206. The letter is dated May 21, 1422.

Korybutovič. In the spring of the year 1422 he raised at Cracow a small army, which he entrusted to his nephew, Prince Korybutovič. The little army, consisting probably of about 5,000 men, left Cracow about Easter and entered Moravia by way of Osvěti (in German, Auschwitz) and Těšin (Teschen). King Sigismund, who after his great defeats near Kutna Hora had retired to Moravia, now left that country, thinking himself safer in his own Hungarian kingdom. The nobles of Moravia, disregarding the oath that Sigismund had recently forced them to take, rejoined the Utraquist party and again accepted the articles of Prague. Korybutovič first attempted to storm Olomouc (Olmütz), then already a strongly fortified city, but was repulsed with very considerable losses. He then marched to Uničov (Mährisch Neustadt), and obtained possession of the town after some slight resistance. He here, fulfilling the promise he had made before leaving Poland, received Communion in the two kinds, thus formally accepting the four articles of Prague. He remained some time at Uničov, and from there sent several letters to prominent Utraquists both in Bohemia and in Moravia, informing them that he had arrived in their country as representative of his uncle, Grand Duke Vitold, the "postulated" or "demanded" ¹ King of Bohemia. He also summoned the nobles and cities not to continue their feuds, and to meet him at a diet that was to take place at Časlav. We have scarcely any information with regard to the proceedings of this assembly. It is, however, certain that Korybutovič swore to obey God's law and to defend the articles of Prague. He was recognised as regent by all present, and proceeded to Prague, where he was joyfully received by the people, ²

¹ In Bohemian "požádaný," in German "postulirter." According to the ancient constitution only the coronation conferred the full dignity of King of Bohemia.

² Even Dluhoš, whose strong Roman Catholic feeling naturally did not dispose him to judge Korybutovič favourably, writes: "Sigismundus Korybut . . . Pragam advenit et a plerisque Baronibus et Nobilibus Bohemiæ ab universis vero Pragensibus civibus de adventu suo lætantibus et claves civitatis Pragensis et castri utriusque sibi possessionem consignantibus summo studio

though of course the extreme fanatics, whose leader John of Želivo had been, did not share the general joy. Equally displeased were the scanty adherents of the King of Hungary. Many of the great Bohemian nobles, though they fully sympathised with the Utraquist movement, had hitherto hesitated entirely to discard King Sigismund, whom they considered the representative of the monarchical principle; for it must be remembered that the conception of a republic as a form of government possible in an extensive country was quite foreign to that period. Only in a separate city or a small village community was the republican form of government then considered possible. The great Bohemian nobles, with a few exceptions, therefore rallied round Korybutovič. The same can be said of the university of Prague and the Hussite High Church generally. These elements were not, however, in themselves sufficient to form a firm foundation for the rule of Korybutovič. Much depended on the attitude of Žižka and his Táborites. Žižka, as will be remembered, had signed the first letter offering the Bohemian crown to the King of Poland. Subsequently he seems to have conceived a not unjustifiable distrust of the Polish princes. He knew that King Ladislas was entirely subservient to the Pope, though at moments when he was on bad terms with Sigismund he sometimes appeared to encourage the Bohemian national movement for the purpose of embarrassing the King of Hungary. Grand Duke Vitold was undoubtedly more genuinely favourable to the Hussite cause, but the mere fact that he had written to the Pope informing him of the expedition of Korybutovič naturally roused the suspicion of Žižka, whom the treachery once committed against Hus—which he always bore in mind—rendered distrustful. There had also been personal dissensions. According to a

et favore summaque gratulatione exceptus est, et magni illi honores tam de Baronibus quam a civibus Pragensibus habiti, summaque rerum tradita. Qui civitatem brevi ad justiorem formam redegit. Nobilibus et qui quiete vivere vellent blandus et amicus. In seditiosos et facinoros asperimus vindex." (Dlugossi, *Historia Polonica*, Vol. I. Lib. xi. p. 452).

not very reliable contemporary chronicler¹ Korybutovič had from Uničov written to Žižka in a somewhat imperative manner summoning him to recognise the new King Vitold, and begging him to desist from plundering the country. Žižka returned a sharp answer, alluding to Prince Korybutovič in a very disparaging manner. The Prince wisely did not continue the controversy when, to quote the same chronicler, he heard "that Žižka was a great victor and an invincible warrior in all battles." It is to the credit of both Žižka and Korybutovič to add that when they afterwards met, a sincere friendship sprang up between the two generals. We are even told that Korybutovič was in the habit of addressing Žižka as "father," while the latter addressed the Lithuanian Prince as "son." Before, however, any personal meeting had taken place, Žižka and his followers had already in a letter addressed to the citizens of Prague recognised Korybutovič as leader. The interesting document² which announces this decision well deserves quotation. Žižka wrote: "With God's help! Amen. Be it known to you, my Lord and brethren, that we, with the brethren of Tábor, Domážlice, Klatovy, Sušice, Pisek, as well as the lords, knights, nobles, and the communities of Prachatice and Horaždovice who have voluntarily recognised as rulers me, Chval and Buchovec³ and entrusted themselves to our guidance, have accepted his Highness the Prince⁴ as helper and supreme administrator of the land. We will gladly obey his Highness, and with God's help aid him by word and deed in all rightful things; and we also beg you all from this day forth to discard all quarrels, dissensions, and bitterness which you have had either during your whole life, or during these last years, that you may honestly say the Lord's prayer and pray: Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III, p. 52.

² Printed in the Bohemian original in Čermák, *Listy [documents] Jana Žižky z Trocnova*.

³ The two other captains of the Táborites.

⁴ i. e. Korybutovič.

But if you do not act thus, and, banding together in your communities, continue to nourish disorder, lies, and disputes, then by God's help we, together with his Highness the Prince, the magistrates, the lords, knights, nobles, and faithful commons; will strive to wreak vengeance, whoever the culprit may be, without regard of person. Do you promise to assist us in this task? And should a man have a dispute with another, be it on matters of religion or on others, then he is without riot or disturbances to appear before the burgomasters, the town-councillors, or judges in an orderly fashion and state his case. The elders of the communities, as well as the burgomasters, town-councillors and judges you must hold in honour, and you must love one another. Then God and His holy grace will be with us and grant us His blessing for all good purposes."

This manly letter, whose Cromwellian flavour will not escape the reader, is one of the most striking and characteristic documents of the Hussite period that have been preserved. It throws a very clear light on Žižka's true character. The true Žižka had nothing in common with the brutal, cruel, and blasphemous ruffian whom the descendants of those whom he so often defeated conceived and somewhat meanly called Žižka. It is one of the principal merits of the great historian Palacký that he was the first to point out that the fables concerning Žižka, first imagined by Æneas Sylvius and by some fanatical monks and then uncritically repeated by countless writers, are absolutely untrue. It will have been noted that Žižka in his letter to the Praguers laid great stress on the necessity of concord. This admonition was very timely. The Praguers had, after the riots that followed the execution of John of Želivo, chosen new town-councillors belonging to the party of the decapitated priest. It was practically impossible that Korybutovič should act in unison with men who, as Professor Tomek writes, were the intimate friends of the lowest rabble of Prague. The Lithuanian Prince showed great tact and sagacity in this

difficult position. He at first maintained amicable relations with the municipal authorities. He, however, suggested a change in the municipal government, probably—there is scarcely any contemporary evidence on this matter—proposing that members of all Utraquist parties should be included in the town council. The fanaticism of some priests and other former adherents of Zělivo, however, rendered all negotiations fruitless; but the good sense of the moderate Utraquists had at last determined them to end the incessant civic strife. On Sunday, May 24, a week after his arrival in Prague, when Korybutovič left his dwelling in the New Town, a large crowd assembled around him and, seizing the bridle of his horse, led him amidst great enthusiasm through the Old Town to the gates of the town-hall. When the town-councillors saw that the city was greatly excited they immediately surrendered the seals and keys (thus signifying their resignation of their offices), that new councillors might be appointed; and this was done. On the following day the whole community met in the town-hall and elected new councillors. They took the oath of allegiance to the Prince, and recalled from Králové Kradec the masters who had been exiled there.¹

As soon as order had, at least momentarily, been re-established in Prague, Korybutovič attempted to obtain possession of the Karlštýn castle,² situated not far from the capital. This decision has often, and not unnaturally, caused surprise. The castle of the Karlštýn was one of those strongholds which the partisans of King Sigismund still occupied in various parts of Bohemia. Isolated and invested as it was, it could hardly in any case influence the result of the war. It is therefore difficult to understand the importance which Korybutovič attached to its possession, particularly as the ever-present menace of a German invasion was then

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 55.

² See my *Prague, etc.*, pp. 199–200.

very great. The Karlštýn castle had been built by Charles IV as a refuge for the royal family in time of war, and also as a stronghold where the Bohemian crown and other royal jewels could be safely deposited. Some writers have therefore conjectured that Korybutovič believed that the Bohemian crown jewels were still in the Karlštýn castle, and that he wished to obtain possession of them. This is exceedingly improbable. Korybutovič's Bohemian advisers certainly well knew how great an importance the Bohemians, like the Hungarians, attach to the possession of the royal insignia and to the coronation of their kings, but they must have known equally well that King Sigismund had immediately after his coronation in 1420 caused the crown of Bohemia and the other crown jewels to be sent to Moravia and afterwards to Hungary. The siege of the Karlštýn is, at any rate, the principal military event connected with the first short stay of Korybutovič in Bohemia. It is here to be particularly regretted that we have but few and short contemporary accounts of the siege, and these have rather the character of romance than of history. The attempts of modern writers to reconstruct the siege have been but moderately successful. It is probable that Korybutovič's Bohemian and Polish soldiers began a regular siege of the Karlštýn on May 20, but Korybutovič himself only took over the command of the besieging army on June 4. The castle of Karlštýn, built by the Emperor Charles IV, King of Bohemia, about the year 1350, had a position which could not be considered strong, even if we consider the very primitive condition of artillery at the beginning of the fifteenth century, being situated on an isolated hillock surrounded somewhat closely by higher hills. General Köhler in his interesting work, which I have already quoted, expresses surprise that Charles IV, who had been present at the battle of Crécy, where fire-arms had been used, should yet, when building the Karlštýn a few years later, not have taken the use of artillery into account. It is certain that men began only very gradually

to realise the complete change in the methods of warfare which was a necessary consequence of the use of fire-arms. The Bohemian and Polish army, which appears to have been very considerable, occupied all the hills which surrounded the Karlštýn, and as was then the custom, erected block-houses or small forts, surrounded by ditches, which were to secure the besiegers against sorties. The Hussite army brought a considerable amount of artillery, according to the ideas of the time, and among them four large pieces of ordnance. The names of three of these, the "Pražska," "Jaroměřská," and "Rychlice" (the "rapid"), have been preserved. The Praguers had also brought a considerable number of catapults, or large slings, which appear to have done more damage than the guns. A large ravine separated the Karlštýn from the surrounding hills, which were occupied by the national forces, and the whole attack had the character of a bombardment rather than of a regular siege. The artillery fire, in consequence of the clumsy and unwieldy make of the guns, was very slack. The "Pražska" and "Jaroměřská" could be fired seven times a day, and even the "Rychlice," famed for its rapidity, only thirty times. The garrison of the Karlštýn which, contrary to the statement of some chroniclers, must certainly have consisted of more than 500 men, defended itself with great bravery. The besieging army, irritated by this obstinate defence, resorted to some of those strange devices which were customary in mediæval warfare. The commanders caused large stink-pots and baskets containing ordure to be thrown by slings into the fortress, hoping thus to cause contagious diseases within the citadel. They were to a certain extent successful. The chroniclers tell us that the defenders of the Karlštýn were attacked by a mysterious malady which caused all their teeth to fall out. This method of forcing the garrison to surrender, however, also failed. According to the report of a contemporary chronicler, to whom I must leave the full responsibility for a somewhat improbable tale, some of King Sigismund's adherents

at Prague succeeded in conveying to the Karlštýn certain medicaments which cured this mysterious disease.

The attempt to obtain possession of the Karlštýn failed. Several circumstances contributed to Korybutovič's decision to raise the siege. At the end of September the remaining adherents of priest John again caused troubles in Prague. They were supported by the former captain of the town, Hvězda of Vicemilic, who had joined the Táborites, and later became one of their captains. Prince Korybutovič hurriedly returned to Prague and succeeded in re-establishing order in the capital. The fact that the Táborites had here for the first time intervened in the internal troubles at Prague as allies of the anarchical party greatly influenced the course of the Hussite war. Though the two parties continued for a time to act together both in warfare and in diplomatic negotiations, the former cordial friendship disappeared, and mutual distrust took its place. Other circumstances also contributed to the decision of the Hussites to abandon the siege. The north-eastern frontier of Bohemia, where the country marches with Silesia, was now again, as so constantly during the war, menaced by the German population of Silesia, whose hatred of the Bohemians was founded as much on racial as on religious motives. In the year 1422 the Silesians again entered Bohemia, but very soon again retired. Another danger, which appeared to the Bohemians far more serious than it actually was, consisted in the decision of the German diet then assembled at Regensburg to attempt another invasion of Bohemia on a large scale. The Bohemians concluded an armistice with the defenders of the Karlštýn which was to last for one year. All hostilities were to be suspended, and it was agreed that should the Hungarian King Sigismund return to Bohemia during the period mentioned the defenders of the Karlštýn should be free to admit him into their castle, but should grant him no armed aid if he attacked Prince Korybutovič or the Praguers. The partisans of King Sigismund greatly rejoiced

over the preservation of their stronghold and over the cessation of the siege which, had it continued, would inevitably have led to the capitulation of the Karlštýn; for the defenders were already running short of provisions, and epidemics were raging within the citadel. It is a proof of the intense religious fanaticism which was common to all parties in Bohemia at that time that some ardent Roman Catholics expressed strong disapproval of this agreement, though it was obviously favourable to their party.¹

As early as the beginning of the year 1422 some of the German princes had suggested a new invasion of Bohemia. On March 8 King Sigismund addressed a letter to all the electors, princes, and free towns of Germany summoning them to a diet which was to assemble at Regensburg on May 31. He, however, afterwards adjourned the meeting to July 1, but on his arrival at Regensburg found that the German princes had already left the town and had proceeded to Nürnberg. They had, however, left their representatives at Regensburg, who in the name of their sovereigns invited Sigismund to that city. Sigismund was finally obliged to accept this invitation, though he was greatly irritated by this proposal to change his plans, and declared that he as King and Emperor—though as yet uncrowned—was alone entitled to determine the spot where the imperial diets should meet. Very lengthy deliberations, leading to very slight results, took place at Nürnberg, where Sigismund spent two months. The German States, both great and small, were at that moment almost exclusively occupied

¹ Thus Andreas Ratisbonensis writes in his *Cronica de expeditionibus in Bohemiam contra Husitas hæreticos*: "Sicque facta pace ad annum inter eos [the Hussites] et Christi fideles de Carelstein tandem ipsi hæretici ab obsidione recesserunt. O bonum pacis, bonorum omnium excellentissimum, tu suavis desiderabilis hominibus bonæ voluntatis, quomodo nunc et dolosa advenisti. Tu enim gloria jocunditatis nostræ necessitate tua modo legem fregisti quem dedit dominus Moysi dicens: 'Non inibis fœdus cum habitatoribus terræ.'" "The Chronicles of priest John Andrew of Regensburg"—printed by Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber, etc.*, Vol. II. pp. 406-457—contains much interesting information concerning the siege of the Karlštýn, mainly derived from the narrative of another priest, who was with the garrison, probably as chaplain.

with their internal dissensions and feuds. The overbearing manner and unreliable character of Sigismund had won him few friends in Germany. He was at that moment still on bad terms with the influential Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick of Hohenzollern. The only persons who spoke strongly in favour of a new invasion of Bohemia were the ecclesiastical electors and princes whose zeal was stimulated by frequent bulls of Pope Martin V. It was finally decided that an armed force should be equipped to relieve the Karlštýn fortress,¹ and that in the whole empire a tax should be levied for the purpose of carrying on continuous warfare against Bohemia. Disputes into which it is unnecessary to enter here immediately arose with regard to the apportionment of this tax. Cardinal Branda, who had remained in Germany, employed all his eloquence to induce the Germans to retrieve the disgraceful campaign of the previous year by a new and successful one. He presented to Sigismund in the church of St. Sebaldus a battle-flag blessed by the Pope, which the King made over to the Elector of Brandenburg, who was to take command of the crusade.² It was generally supposed that the campaign of the previous year had failed because of the want of unity in the command, and Sigismund somewhat reluctantly consented to the Elector of Brandenburg's being commander-in-chief. The Hohenzollern prince on the other hand appears to have shown little enthusiasm for the cause which he was to uphold. He was at that moment greatly absorbed by negotiations with Poland and the Teutonic Order. He, however, led his troops, which do not seem to have been numerous, as far as Tirschen-

¹ The idea of the great importance of the Karlštýn prevailed equally among the Catholics and the Utraquists. Thus Andreas Ratisbonensis, who has just been quoted, states that the partisans of Sigismund, when they learnt by a secret messenger that the Elector of Brandenburg had—as will be mentioned presently—abandoned the intention of relieving the Karlštýn, hurriedly concluded a truce with the Hussites before the latter knew that the garrison could not hope for any aid from Germany.

² As the Germans did not in this year enter Bohemia, this expedition can hardly be called a crusade. Modern writers generally call the invasion of Bohemia in 1421 the second, and that in 1427 the third crusade.

reuth in the Upper Palatinate, not far from the Bohemian frontier. He here expected to be joined by large reinforcements, but hardly any German troops appeared. The Margrave of Meissen, who was to attack Bohemia from Saxony and thus create a diversion, did not move. The annual Silesian raid was too distant and too insignificant to affect the events at the principal theatre of war. When even the Bishop of Würzburg, who had joined the army, declared that it was better not to enter Bohemia at all than to suffer another defeat there, Frederick disbanded his forces.

While Sigismund's hope of subduing Bohemia by the help of Germany was thus again disappointed—as indeed it continued to be up to the end of the war—he about this time obtained an important diplomatic success. Ever since the arrival of Prince Korybutovič in Bohemia the Holy See had constantly appealed to the Grand Duke Vitold of Lithuania and his cousin, the King of Poland, attempting to induce them, both by promises and menaces, to recall Korybutovič. It must be admitted that Vitold, and to a far greater extent Ladislas, acted disloyally towards the Bohemian people. During the short first rule of Korybutovič in Bohemia the Polish clergy, led by Simon Olesnicky, who had just become Bishop of Cracow, fully used its vast influence against the Bohemians.¹ The implacable hatred of Utraquism which has always been a characteristic of the Roman Church was in Poland intensified by the vicinity of Lithuania and Russia, where the Greek Church has always maintained the right of laymen to receive Communion in the two kinds.² Vitold had in a letter which I have already quoted attempted to describe the

¹ It is impossible to enter here more fully into the politics of Poland, though their influence on Bohemia was far greater than is usually supposed.

² As I have written elsewhere, the connection between politics and religious controversy is in Eastern Europe nearly as close as it was in the Middle Ages, and the intense animosity between the Eastern and the Western Churches still continues. During a recent debate in the Austrian parliament (October 1912) the priest Bauchinger declared that he "saw no difference between Islam and schism," meaning of course Mahomedanism and the Eastern Church.

mission of Korybutovič as inspired by the wish to reconcile the Bohemians with the universal Church, an expression that obviously may have conveyed a different meaning to the Grand Duke Vitold and to Pope Martin V. We have no information with regard to Korybutovič's correspondence with his Polish and Lithuanian relatives, which undoubtedly preceded his departure from Bohemia. It is certain that the Prince left his new country very reluctantly, and that after leaving Prague he remained in Bohemia up to Christmas Eve, 1422, and then only returned to Poland.

The official policy of Poland now became, and for a considerable time continued to be, very hostile to the Utraquist cause. It appears that when leaving their country Prince Korybutovič had promised the Bohemians that he would return and obtain aid from his uncle, the Grand Duke Vitold. The Bohemians, trusting this promise, which was probably made in good faith, wrote to the Lithuanian Grand Duke, inviting him to come to Bohemia as he had promised, and to assume the government of the country. Vitold sent an answer ¹ whose untruthfulness, falsehood, and misrepresentation is almost unrivalled even in the records of diplomatic dispatches. He began by stating that he had only permitted the mission of Korybutovič because the Bohemians had promised that, as soon as the Prince arrived, unity and obedience to the Church of Rome would be re-established in the kingdom. The Prince had, however, after his arrival in Bohemia, not been able by his kind and affable mediation to unite the people, lead them away from the erroneous articles (of Prague), and reconcile them with the Holy Roman Church. When we consider the fact that Prince Sigismund Korybutovič had both at Uničov and at Časlav received Communion in the two kinds, that he had in the latter place sworn to defend the articles of Prague, and that, during his stay in the capital, priests of the national Utraquist Church had been among his principal councillors, we cannot

¹ Printed in Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, Vol. I. pp. 268-288.

help being astounded at these outrageous misstatements. The Grand Duke then declared that he had concluded an alliance with King Sigismund, and now intended to aid him and all the other princes in combating the Bohemians, and that he had therefore recalled Prince Korybutovič from their country.¹

This letter of the Grand-Duke, probably as insincere as had been his former profession of friendliness for the Utraquists, can only be explained by reference to the general political situation at that moment. In the year 1422 there had been bitter enmity between King Sigismund and the rulers of Poland and Lithuania, and Sigismund had even suggested a plan for partitioning Poland. This menace, of which they were immediately informed, appears to have greatly impressed both Ladislas and Vitold, who fully realised that the fanatical and powerful Roman Catholic clergy in their dominions could scarcely be trusted, should King Sigismund, acting as champion of the Pope, attack Poland. These considerations determined the two princes to agree to what may be called an unconditional surrender. In the month of March 1423 Ladislas, Vitold, and King Sigismund met at Käsmark in Hungary. It was here decided that the joint forces of the new allies should attack Bohemia. King Ladislas, who had never felt any sympathy for the Utraquist movement, though for political motives and also from personal animosity to King Sigismund he had occasionally appeared to favour it, greatly rejoiced at having regained the favour of the papal see. In a letter² addressed to the electors of Germany on April 10, 1423, the King of Poland, replying to a letter of the electors accusing him of favouring heretics, declared that he and the Grand Duke Vitold had been

¹ Nos igitur gratulanter cum ser. principe D. Rom. Ungariæ, Boemiæ rege fratre et amico nostro carissimo concordiam inivimus et pacem perpetuam fecimus inter nos inviolabiliter duraturam. Nolentes in eo S. Matre Rom. ecclesiæ et totius Christianitatis universitati contraire, sed potius cum ipsa S. Matre eccl. Rom. D. Rege et cæteris catholicis principibus totaque Christianitate contra vos velle stare et juvare, ipsum ducem Sigismundum [Korybutovič] de terris regni Boemiæ exire mandavimus."

² Printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I. pp. 286-288, and by Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. II. pp. 433-435.

falsely accused. It was true that after the heretics had solemnly promised to renounce their errors and return to the Holy Mother, the universal Church, Vitold had sent some of his followers to Bohemia who, he hoped, would give the people good advice and lead them on the right path. When, however, Ladislav found that the heretics obstinately maintained their errors, he and the Grand Duke Vitold had determined, together with Sigismund, King of the Romans and of Hungary, to equip an army which was to be commanded by King Sigismund, and which was to exterminate those whom their wickedness blinded. Finally King Ladislav begged the German electors not to believe the accusations of heresy which had been brought against him and the Grand Duke Vitold.

The Lithuanian Grand Duke hardly viewed this complete change of policy with the same pleasure as did King Ladislav. To Vitold it meant the wreck of all his ambitious projects. His recently established relations with some of the Moscovite princes, based on the common desire to defend Utraquism, naturally ceased after this surrender.¹ He does not appear to have discarded his former sympathies as completely as did King Ladislav. It is almost certain that he gave secret approval and support to the new expedition of Prince Korybutovič, whom we shall shortly again find in Bohemia. The cause of Vitold's submission was undoubtedly the fact that Lithuania was without Poland both too weak and too distant to play a part in the politics of Central Europe. After the triumph of the Roman party in Poland, Vitold could not hope for any help from that country; its hostility, indeed, was certain. Immediately after the meeting at Kāsmark armaments began both in Poland and in Lithuania in view of a campaign against Bohemia. Their result was not successful. It was found almost impossible to find soldiers who were ready to take part in this war. If the enthusiasm when Korybutovič started on his expedition was, perhaps, not quite

¹ This is well shown by Caro in his *Geschichte Polens*, Vol. III.

so great as some Slavophil writers have stated, it was certainly entirely absent on the present occasion. The attempt to attack Bohemia in 1423 entirely failed. The fact that the Poles showed great reluctance to take up arms against Bohemia revived the former distrust of the Germans against their Polish allies. About this time the municipality of the city of Breslau received a letter ¹ from its representative in Poland stating that "Polish envoys were then at Ofen [in Hungary] because of the Hussites, but that he had heard that the Hussites intended to remain on the side of the Poles against our King [Sigismund], and that it appears that the affairs will never be brought to an end." This proof of intense distrust shows how impossible a common war of Poland and Germany against Bohemia would have been. Pope Martin V had, in this year, planned a vast invasion of Bohemia by armies collected from various parts of Europe, somewhat similar to the great crusade of 1420. He had hoped that not only the Poles and Lithuanians, but also Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians would join in this sacred war. It was, however, on the attitude of the Germans that the success of the new crusade principally depended. It is unnecessary to repeat what has already been written on the complete failure of the attempted German invasion. Of the distant northern sovereigns whose aid was expected only the King of Denmark landed in Germany with a small force. On hearing that no serious attempt to invade Bohemia would be made he very soon returned to his own country.

The Bohemians were thus, during the years 1423 and 1424, almost entirely free from foreign invasion, though warfare with King Sigismund and his son-in-law, Albert of Austria, never entirely ceased. This respite was not, unfortunately, altogether favourable to the national cause. The religious controversies between the Utraquist parties, which, since the time of Hus, had occasionally caused discord, now became far

¹ Grünhagen, *Geschichtsquellen der Hussitenkriege*, pp. 38-39.

more envenomed, and for the first time led to civil war. During the later months of the year 1422 Žižka did not play so prominent a part in Bohemian affairs as before and after that date. He does not, for instance, appear to have taken part in the siege of the Karlštýn, and its failure was probably partly due to his absence. He had, as we have seen, freely and generously accepted Prince Korybutovič as his leader, but appears afterwards to have become somewhat suspicious of the Lithuanian prince. Though the negotiations at this period are shrouded in great obscurity, it appears certain that Korybutovič, during his stays in Bohemia, entered into negotiations with the nobles of the Roman party. It is very probable that he hoped that the Pope would sanction the articles of Prague, or, at least, Communion in the two kinds. This idea was in itself by no means incongruous, and a similar compromise at the Council of Basel finally closed the Hussite wars. Korybutovič probably hoped that in consequence of his merits as a peacemaker he or his uncle Vitold would be accepted as sovereign by the whole Bohemian nobility, by the Hussite High Church, as well as by the powerful city of Prague, which was then under the influence of that Church. He also probably hoped that the influence of the Roman Catholic nobles would help him to obtain the recognition of Pope Martin V, who was not always on good terms with King Sigismund. It is, I think, certain that Korybutovič's acceptance of the articles of Prague and of Utraquism was a genuine one, and that his negotiations with the enemies of Utraquism, both during his first and his second stay in Bohemia, had the purpose outlined above. During his whole adventurous life the Lithuanian prince always remained faithful to Utraquism, even when, as occurred on several occasions, it would have been more favourable to his ambitious plans if he had surrendered unconditionally to Rome. The matter was not viewed in this light by the extreme Táborites—levellers who could believe nothing but evil of all princes and nobles. These

men affirmed that Korybutovič intended to force the Bohemians to abandon their national Church, and hoped as a reward to obtain the Pope's support for his plan of obtaining the Bohemian crown. Žižka, perhaps uncertain as to the fashion in which he should judge the attitude of Korybutovič, remained for a time almost inactive, but after the departure of the Lithuanian prince internal troubles broke out, in which Žižka played the most prominent part. It is certain that after the departure of Korybutovič the monarchical party, consisting of the Romanist and some Utraquist nobles, who placed the upholding of the legitimist principle before all other considerations, again entered into negotiations with King Sigismund. This was the one point on which Žižka tolerated no compromise. I have, following the recent independent Bohemian historians, endeavoured to prove that many unjust accusations have been brought against Žižka, and that in true history he appears totally different from the murderer and robber who is the Žižka of tradition.¹ It would, however, be absurd to assert that, even judged from the standpoint of his own age, the great Bohemian warrior was faultless. A relentless and implacable hatred of King Sigismund, the murderer of Hus, sometimes obscured his generally brilliant intelligence and caused him to deviate from his usual moderation. In March 1423 hostilities began in the district of Králové Hradec between the forces of the Orebite community and Lord Čeněk of Wartenberg, who, after having been for some time a Utraquist, had now again conformed to the Church of Rome, and was momentarily an enthusiastic adherent of the Hungarian King. There had for some time been a feud between Čeněk and the brothers Bartoš and Bernard of Valečov, who belonged to the Orebite community and were on terms of friendship with Žižka. Borěk of Miletinek, then captain of

¹ I refer here principally to German writers. I have seen English books of the eighteenth century which judge Žižka quite fairly, and as correctly as the limited information then available permitted.

the Orebites, took up the cause of the brothers Valečov, probably, as Professor Tomek has conjectured, on the advice of Prince Korybutovič, who, on his way to Silesia and Poland, passed through the district of Králové Hradec about this time. Čeněk, now a strong partisan of the Luxemburg dynasty, was naturally particularly obnoxious to the Lithuanian prince. Žižka also took part in this campaign, as an ally of the brothers Valečov, and what had originally been but a local feud became civil war. Žižka summoned his adherents to meet him at Německý Brod on April 8, and then marched into the district of Králové Hradec, devastating the vast estates which Čeněk owned in that part of Bohemia. Some of the Utraquist nobles joined the forces of Čeněk, and the first battle of the Hussite wars, when Hussites were opposed to other Hussites, took place at Hořice on April 20. This battle is interesting, as it throws considerable light on Žižka's tactics. He was here, as on almost all other occasions, confronted by a force vastly superior to his own. At the beginning of his battles Žižka invariably succeeded in occupying a strong defensive position, in which he awaited the enemy's attack. When, after a time, the enemy was fatigued and his heart began to fail him, and particularly when Žižka's always skilfully used artillery had weakened him and slackened his advance, then Žižka considered that the decisive moment had arrived. He then flourished his fighting-club; his standard-bearer waved his flag as signal for a general attack; then the gates of the battle-wagons were opened and with war-cries troupes of men armed with fighting-clubs rushed forth.¹ It was Žižka's practice to choose a position on a range of sloping heights to which the wagons could be easily conveyed, and he often chose a small church as the centre of his position. The church tower gave him a good outlook on the movements of the enemy, and the wall which surrounded the churchyard was useful as obstructing the attack of the enemy's cavalry. On

¹ Toman, *Husitské Valečnictví* (*Hussite Warfare*).

this occasion Žižka chose the small church of St. Gothard, near Hořice, as the centre of his position. A contemporary chronicler¹ thus describes the battle which ensued. "In the year 1423, when Žižka was marching through the district of Králové Hradec subduing the people to his rule, the lords determined to attack him; and he, hearing of this, marched before them to Hořice, having but two columns of wagons. He took up his position with his men near the church of St. Gothard, to be able to place his soldiers and his artillery on a height, and also for the reason that, as horsemen were to attack him, they should be obliged to dismount, and should find nothing to which they could tie their horses. When they [the enemies] then approached, and, having dismounted, advanced to attack the position, they were more burdened by their heavy armour than Žižka's infantry, who were accustomed to fight on foot. When they were near the summit and attempted to attack the wagons he [Žižka] received them with fire from his guns and constant attacks by his infantry; and before they could capture his wagons he beat them back as he pleased; and after he had driven them away from the wagons he sent fresh soldiers against them. And here the Lord God helped him, so that Lord Čeněk [of Wartenberg] and Lord Ernest [of Pardubice] and the other lords and their men were defeated by him on the field of battle and lost their wagons and guns. Lord Čeněk himself fled from the field with only a small number of followers."

About the same time civil war also broke out in another part of Bohemia. The citizens of Prague, in alliance with some of the nobles of King Sigismund's party, began to besiege the Taborite stronghold of Křiženeč. When, however, Bohuslav of Schwamberg, once a strong Romanist, but now one of the most strenuous Taborites, arrived to relieve the besieged fortress all parties agreed to conclude an armistice. It was decided to hold previously one of the many disputations on

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 56.

dogma and ritual which were so frequent during the Hussite wars, and which generally led to but slight and temporary results. This disputation took place at Konopišt in June and lasted for several days.¹ The representatives of the Hussite High Church were the theologians of the university, John of Přeboram, Jacobellus of Stříbro, John Kardinal, and the young priest, John of Rokycan, who afterwards became famous as Utraquist Archbishop of Prague. The representatives of the Táborites were Nicholas of Pelhřimov and the English Lollard, Peter Payne, who had fled from his country and sought refuge among the Táborites.² Each party also chose two umpires, probably for the purpose of maintaining order during the proceedings; for it can hardly be thought that nobles or citizens would be competent to formulate a decision, should learned and subtle theologians disagree. The question discussed on the first day was that of Communion. The Táborite representatives immediately read out a statement declaring that the sole basis on which they intended to found their arguments were the Holy Scriptures and the teaching of Jesus Christ Himself, the prophets, and the apostles; the teaching of other holy men they could accept if it was in conformity with Christ's words or obviously founded on the Holy Scriptures. They added that they would die rather

¹ A full account of the proceedings at Konopišt is given by Nicholas of Pelhřimov in his *Chronicon Táboritarum* (printed in Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber, etc.*, Vol. II, p. 574 f.). Dr. Krummel in his *Utraquisten und Taboriten* gives an excellent outline of the arguments of both parties written from the standpoint of a German Lutheran divine. He does not, however, appear to me to do justice to the views of the Bohemian Utraquists. They insisted on Communion in the two kinds, believing this to be the law of God, and also desired that the use of the national language in the religious services should be extended, and that stricter regulations regarding the conduct of the priesthood should be established. They never desired or contemplated a separation from the universal Church.

² It appears probable that Payne's unyielding temper and bitterness impeded the proceedings here as they did afterwards at Basel when, as John of Ragusa writes: "Ipse Anglicus tanquam anguis lubricus quanto strictius teneri videbatur et concludi, tanto citius, ad impertinentes dilabebatur." ("Tractatus quomodo reducti sunt ad unitatem ecclesiæ," in *Monumenta conciliorum generalium XV Secul.*, Vol. I. p. 260.

than maintain or accept anything that was opposed to the wish of Christ and of His primitive Church. The divines of the university of Prague in their reply declared that they also accepted the Holy Scriptures, and that the Bible of the Christians which was in common use must be accepted by all the faithful under penalty of eternal damnation. They added that they considered the Latin translation of St. Jerome as correct with regard to all matters of faith, and that they also accepted as true and authentic the books of Dionysius, Clement, and Origen, as well as those of the four fathers of the Church Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, and Gregory. They finally declared that when these four fathers expressed a unanimous opinion on any question of faith it was safer, more useful, and easier to agree to it than to some modern conception.¹ The Taborites immediately answered, stating that they rejoiced in learning that their opponents had the same veneration for Holy Scripture which they themselves felt; they wished, however, to mention that the divines of the university had not made the necessary distinction between the canonical and apocryphal books of the Bible. They further stated that many writings had been falsely attributed to Origen and to other ecclesiastical writers, and they suggested that even when the four fathers of the Church had agreed on some point they might have all four erred. The Taborites finally replied to the allusion to the "conceptions of modern persons." There is little doubt that the persons meant were Martin Houška, John of Zělivo, and other zealots who had claimed Divine inspiration for their teaching. The Taborites maintained that if God at the present time revealed to some man a new meaning of the Scriptures, this man should be believed rather

¹ "Supponimus quod prædictis doctoribus quatuor in quacunque fidei materia idem unanimiter sentientibus, sed in quacunque alia sententia non expresse posita secundum formam propriam catholicæ saltem fidei non dissona nec in aliquo destructiva amplius, securius et utilius et expeditius credendum sit et a Christi fidelibus tenendum et observandum quam novis conceptibus modernorum" ("Chronicon Taboritarum").

than the fathers of the Church.¹ The proceedings of the first day then terminated. On the second day the representatives of Tábor raised the question of the celebration of mass. They demanded that the ceremonies connected with it should be shortened and simplified, as their long duration prevented the people from listening to the preaching of the Word of God which was so necessary. They strongly blamed the custom of reciting or singing before the people words in a foreign language which they could not understand. They then formulated other grievances, and demanded the suppression of the masses for the dead (the "requiems"), which, they said, had only been established by the Pope Pelagius in 568. They finally denied the existence of purgatory, and stated that it had been unknown in the primitive Church. In their reply the divines of Prague stated that under the penalty of eternal damnation all were obliged to obey, not only the laws and regulations of the apostles and fathers of the Church, but also those of the Church, even if they were evil and depraved, as long as they were reasonable and not obviously opposed to God's law. It is evident that the moderate party, which wished above all things to maintain its connection with the universal Church, here laid down a principle which it would be very difficult to define. The Táborites then declared that the ritual of the Church of Prague was in many points contrary to Scripture, and that it required to be amended. They further stated that the masters of the university had quoted in defence of their ritual the words of theologians with whom they did not agree on other points, and they (the Táborites) would in future dispense with vestments, as the Praguers had failed to prove that it was obligatory or even lawful to use them. The next subject discussed was the Lord's Supper.

¹ "Distinguendum etiam videtur de novis conceptibus hominum modernorum, si enim ex revelatione aut apertione scripturarum Deus hodie sensum potiozem alicui tribueret magis sibi credendum esset quam doctoribus antedictis; multa enim usque ad tempus statutum sunt signata et clausa, ut dicitur Danielis 12" ("Chronicon Taboritarum").

Here at least both parties agreed on certain points. As this was the only positive result of the very lengthy debates, it will be well to enumerate these points here :

I. All faithful Christians admit that both in the species of bread and of wine the whole Lord Jesus Christ, true God and true man, is with us in true presence, both with His own blood and His own body.

II. In the visible Sacrament Christ is contained in His corporal-natural substance, which was transmitted to Him by the Holy Virgin Mary.

III. In the Eucharist and in the visibly sanctified host the full Godship dwells bodily.

IV. The substance of the body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, as regards body and substance, but not dimension.¹

V. The substance of the body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist only as such.²

VI. It (the substance) is, however, though without material extension present in substance and in body.

VII. Christ, true God and man, is, as regards His true natural and substantial body, which lives in heaven, simultaneously and at the same time present in one and many places and with all the communicants, though not in a measurable extension.

VIII. Therefore this same Christ, true God and man, in whom we believe, should, in this venerable Sacrament, be worshipped with genuflections and all honours due to Christ.

This compromise with regard to one of the most burning questions of Bohemian theological controversy secured at least a temporary respite. Though most of the theological problems remained unsolved, an armistice was concluded immediately after the disputation had ended. Though it

¹ "Substantia Corporis Christi est in sacramento eucharistiæ in quantum corpus et in quantum substantia, non tamen est ibi dimensive."

² "Substantia Corporis Christi est in sacramento eucharistiæ, in quantum substantia sit in se."

had no permanent result I have thought it well briefly to outline the theological discussions that took place on this occasion. They show very clearly how great the differences between the moderate Utraquists and the Tábórites already were. It appears surprising rather that the men of the two parties should have joined together in opposing foreign invaders and even in sending envoys to the Council of Basel than that they should so frequently have fallen out. We have but little information on the agreement which followed the disputation of Konopišt. It seems, however, certain that the Utraquist lords, the Praguers, and the Tábórites determined to act in common against the common enemy, and at least for a time to desist from internal strife. The nobles of the Roman Catholic party were not included in the agreement, and we find Žižka almost immediately after the truce engaged in warfare against the inconstant Čeněk of Wartenberg, who continued to oppose Utraquism. It is probable that on the occasion of the meeting at Konopišt the military leaders deliberated on the future joint plan of campaign and decided to invade Moravia. We are insufficiently informed as to the condition of Moravia during the Hussite wars. The country was always more closely connected with Bohemia than the other lands of the Bohemian crown. During the Hussite wars a religious war similar to that in Bohemia, but on a smaller scale, continued uninterruptedly. The Moravian nobility, closely connected with that of Bohemia, on the whole favoured Utraquism. Yet the Church of Rome never lost its hold on Moravia as completely as it did on the sister-land. In the powerful and energetic John, the "iron" Bishop of Olomouc (Olmütz), who had so greatly contributed to the execution of Hus,¹ the Moravian Catholics found a strong leader. The country bordering on Austria was also exposed to the constant attacks of King Sigismund's son-in-law, the Archduke Albert. It was therefore

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, particularly pp. 217 and 234.

decided that Žižka with his Táborites was first to attack Čeněk of Wartenberg and march to Litoměřice, where the German part of the citizens had declared for Rome; he was then to join in Moravia the army of the Utraquist nobles under Bořek of Miletinek, which was immediately to march into that country. The invasion of Moravia appears at first to have been successful. The Utraquists took possession of the town of Přerov, and after a victorious battle besieged and took the town of Kroměříž, which belonged to their arch-enemy, the Bishop of Olomouc. They did not, however, continue their campaign long. One of those strange sudden civic upheavals took place with which we sometimes meet in Bohemia as in mediæval Italy. Korybutovič had, during his short rule, appointed Bořek of Miletinek captain of the city of Králové Hradec. When Bořek started on his expedition to Moravia he appointed his brother Dětrich his provisional representative. For reasons which are not clear to us, the citizens rose in revolt against Dětrich and expelled him from their town. On hearing this Bořek evacuated Moravia and marched on Králové Hradec. He also wrote to the citizens of Prague asking for aid, and they immediately sent troops to join him. On the other hand the men of Králové Hradec sent messengers to Litoměřice entreating Žižka to come to their help. Žižka immediately complied with their wish and marched on Králové Hradec. This step is very difficult to account for. Bořek of Miletinek had but a few months previously fought bravely at Žižka's side at the battle of Hořice. It has been suggested that during his Moravian campaign Bořek had entered into secret negotiations with the citizens of Prague. This would not, however, sufficiently explain Žižka's conduct, for he himself always wished to be on good terms with the people of the capital. It is probable that Žižka had already received some information of the secret negotiations with King Sigismund into which the Praguers and Utraquist nobles were just entering and which were more fully developed in the

following year. This would also account for the exceptional ferocity which Žižka is stated to have shown on this occasion. The encounter between Žižka and perhaps the best of his generals is well described by a contemporary chronicler, though he is somewhat incorrect as regards the succession of the events. He writes :¹ " Diviš [Bořek of Miletínek] ruled over Králové Hradec and placed there his brother, the Lord Dětrich. The citizens informed Žižka of this, and he marched from Litoměřice to Králové Hradec. The citizens admitted him into the town and drove away Lord Dětrich and destroyed the castle. Then Diviš left Moravia, taking with him the Praguers, and sought revenge on the citizens of Králové Hradec because they had driven away his brother; and with the Praguers he drew near to Králové Hradec; and brother Žižka with the citizens marched out to encounter them; and a battle took place between the two parties near the Strachov farm and here ark was ranged against ark;² and the Praguers fled, defeated by Žižka on this field; and here many people were killed and 200 taken prisoners; and Diviš fled to Kutná Hora with his men; and the priest who carried the ark for the party of the Praguers Žižka killed with his fighting-club." From Králové Hradec Žižka marched to Jaroměř and Králové Dvůr and easily subdued these cities, which had been allied with Prague. He immediately afterwards besieged the important town of Časlav. Soon afterwards, however, a new armistice was concluded, and it appears that all Utraquist parties wished that the great general should resume the Moravian campaign. Before starting on this new enterprise, Žižka published his famed regulations of war.³ Their purpose was to establish strict and rigorous order in the Táborite

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 57.

² The Utraquist priests of all parties carried the Holy Sacrament in a monstrance before the warriors when battle began. It became customary to call the monstrance "the ark." See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 140, n. 2.

³ They are printed as an Appendix to this volume; see n. 1, p. 28.

camps and to bind all his warriors to the four articles of Prague. To give more weight to these regulations, they were issued not only on the authority of Žižka, the commander-in-chief, but also—to quote but a few names—on that of the Lords John Roháč of Duba, Alěš of Riesenburger, John Potštýn of Žampach, as well as of the burgomasters of the three towns, who, as mentioned above, had joined the confederacy of Tábor, and many knights and nobles. It appears that many of the older Táborites, among whom anarchical and visionary views still lingered, disapproved of Žižka's attempt to enforce military discipline. They continued, indeed, to obey his orders when engaged on a campaign against the common enemy, but the mutual distrust and dislike between the Táborites and Žižka's more intimate friends constantly increased. Žižka at the end of his life incurred the hatred of at least some of the Táborites.¹

Žižka immediately started on his new campaign in Moravia. He first occupied Jihlava (Iglau) in that country, and then decided to invade Hungary. King Sigismund was then residing at Buda. Žižka, whose statesmanship has often been underrated by those who saw in him only a brilliant general, rightly thought that it was only by invading his Hungarian kingdom that Sigismund could be forced definitively to renounce his claim to the Bohemian throne. To Žižka, a mortal enemy of the house of Luxemburg, but no enemy of the monarchical principle, this naturally appeared the only way by which the pacification of Bohemia could be effected.

Žižka's Hungarian campaign was unsuccessful; yet this campaign, and particularly his retreat from Hungary, have always been considered one of the greatest proofs of his military

¹ "Then the old Táborites truly already hated Žižka, principally because Žižka's priests said mass in an orderly fashion, in vestments, tonsured, and wearing a cope, and carried the body of the Lord in a monstrance." ("Kronyka o Janovi Žižkovi," quoted by Professor Tomek in his *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV, p. 287, n.) This was, of course, by no means their only grievance against Žižka.

genius.¹ It is here particularly to be regretted that contemporary evidence is very scanty. We can only conjecture that the Hungarians everywhere retreated when Žižka advanced, and that not being able to give battle he determined to retreat when he could not find sufficient supplies for his soldiers in a country which the Hungarians themselves had ravaged. I will quote the account of a contemporary chronicler² which, though often vague as regards topography and chronology, is interesting as giving a good insight into Žižka's methods of warfare. The chronicler writes: "When the brethren had remained some time in Moravia they persuaded him [Žižka] to undertake a more distant expedition.³ Then he fitted out four columns of wagons, and with as many guns as he could collect crossed the hills and marched into Hungary. The Hungarians did not oppose his advance, nor interfere with him. They wished to ascertain if some of his men would leave the ranks, hoping then to defeat him. For they had assembled against him a large force of horsemen, and when they had all joined they marched against him, and they had a large number of guns. And he [Žižka], seeing that he could do no good, turned back his wagons in the direction of the land of Moravia and thus disposed them: first he assembled all the men near the wagons, and then continued his march with closed wagons.⁴ And thus did he dispose the wagons at the flanks, that he placed between the wagons⁵ two shields, and behind each shield two or three shooters; and he did this for this purpose that, should they [the Hungarians] on the march attempt to jump into the wagons, these men should prevent it. On that day the

¹ All contemporary writers, even those hostile to Žižka, write with great praise of this campaign. Recently Professor Léger has compared it with Xenophon's *Anabasis*.

² "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 77, ff.

³ This is certainly incorrect. Žižka undoubtedly acted on his own initiative.

⁴ The meaning is that the troops were shut up in the wagons.

⁵ That is, in the space between two wagons which followed each other.

retreat was very difficult; for, whenever he attempted to halt even for a moment, they fired heavily at his troops. He was unable to oppose them, and so marched on till nightfall; he did this that they might not observe where he encamped and fire at his troops; and he allowed no fires to be lit in his army. They [the Hungarians] rode round his army, but having nothing to which to tie their horses they had to go to the neighbouring villages, and that at some distance, to be safe from him [Žižka]. Then, having rested as he thought fit, he marched on the next day to a lake near a hill. He here took up a position so that one flank of his army touched the lake, and the other was placed under the hill for the reason that they should overshoot themselves, if they wanted to shoot at his troops. He himself acted thus: he took the fodder-carts, and had them driven up to this height, and he made out of them at the front gate a bastion and another one at the back;¹ and he threw up entrenchments here, and having done this placed his guns on the bastions; and he never allowed them [the Hungarians] to remain on these heights.² Thus he remained safely encamped here on that day and the following night. Then on the third day he marched from the lake to another stream which flows in the direction of Narhid,³ and encamped near this river; and here he greatly feared an attack while his men were crossing the river. During the whole night he ordered the wagons from one bank of the river to the other to be secured by trenches,⁴ surrounded them with ditches to enable his soldiers to resist and on the other side of the stream he placed fodder-carts and a sudden attack of cavalry. He gave orders that the ground

¹ That is to say, at the two gates of his camp, at the two extremities of the slopes of the hill.

² Žižka's fortifications commanded the ridge and the slopes of the hill. The enemies, therefore, could not establish themselves there and disturb him. They could not with any result fire at the hill, as Žižka's camp was on the opposite side, and they would, therefore, have overshoot themselves.

³ According to Professor Tomek's *Jan Žižka* this was the river Nitra.

⁴ As Dr. Toman suggests, this necessarily means that Žižka had ditches dug from the bank of the river at the left end of his lager to the right end.

on both banks should be dug up, so that he could cross with four columns of wagons. When they [the enemies] saw him occupied in crossing the river with his wagons, they attempted to attack the wagons that were in the rear; then he drove them back from the entrenchments, and when many foot-soldiers and horsemen attacked him, then he wounded and killed many of them, and having beaten them off he crossed to the other bank with his wagons and his men. Then he thanked the Lord God, because the Lord God had deigned to grant him His help when he crossed the river. From here he marched through wide woods where there are marshes and meadows, and encamped in an outlying spot, that they might not fire at him, and here he remained overnight. On the fourth day ¹ he marched to the fish-ponds which are near Tyrnau. And here he repaired his wagons, removing some from the places which they had previously occupied in the columns; and this was done because they [the Hungarians] had damaged the wagons at the flanks and killed many horses; and here they left him undisturbed; and having encamped near the fish-ponds and repaired his wagons, on the fifth day he marched to a sloping hill. Then they again attacked him with horsemen and guns. But he marched close to the slope, so that he was secure on one flank; for it was easier for him to defend himself on one flank than on both. Then they, seeing that they could not harm him, retired from the proximity of his army; then he encamped on the hill. Then, as the people tell, there was great misery and distress in the camp, so that for one green cabbage-stump they would gladly have given much money. The reason of this was that they [the Hussites] never ventured out of their wagons, for the enemies were strong in cavalry and they dared not attack them on foot. Whenever the enemy prepared to attack him [Žižka] or fought with him, he always defeated them, and they were beaten back by him;

¹ It was really the fifth day of the retreat.

for differently are horsemen equipped and differently foot-soldiers, to whom it is an unaccustomed thing [to fight on horseback]; for if you wish to learn something, before you get used to it some time is required and a certain leisure.¹ On the sixth ² day of the march he moved away from the slope, as he [Žižka] had to reach the hills;³ and he had on this day to form his wagons in but one column, for he could not advance in any other way. Then the Hungarians, seeing this, pursued him with large forces, hoping that neither his [military] organisation nor his order-of-battle would any longer avail him, and that his men would be obliged to leave the wagons, and he thus prepared his defence: he took up a position close to some forests under a hill, and this was done that, should they fire at him from their guns, they should overshoot themselves. He himself with his artillery took up a position on the summit of this height. Then he ordered the horses from the wagons to be unharnessed and told his men to mount the horses, and he armed them with hatchets, shovels, and spades, that they might explore the road, whether it was in any way obstructed; this was done that the [Hungarian] horsemen should not attack his wagons from the flanks, and he ordered the road to be carefully repaired. Then when he had to march his men out of the forest he ordered a new road to be built at a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ 'hons'⁴ from the old one on one side and also on the other, and this was done for the reason that if the enemies should overtake him, he could direct his guns and foot-soldiers to the old road, and if the enemies wanted to dispute his passage through the fields, through which he intended to leave the forests, he could in this way fire at

¹ The meaning of this passage is that the distress in Žižka's camp was caused by the fact that his soldiers were unable to leave their wagon-forts because of the superiority of the enemy's cavalry. The passage also conveys the impression that Žižka may have thought of establishing some sort of mounted infantry.

² Really the seventh.

³ *i. e.* the mountains which divide Hungary from Moravia.

⁴ An old Bohemian measure. See p. 106, n. 1.

them and slay them; and thus did it afterwards befall; and while at this side of the forest he thus disposed his wagons, out of the four columns in which he had marched, he now formed two. He then had forage-carts broken up, and made out of them four rows like a palisade or a bastion from one end of the forest to the other, and he ordered [the planks] to be attached together by cords, so that they could not easily tear them or break them down. And he did this that, should they attempt to jump into his wagons or seize his cannon, his men could defend themselves behind these planks as behind a wall; and thus did it afterwards befall. And then he sent into the forest first the guns, then some foot-soldiers, then fifty wagons from his right flank. And when these fifty wagons had entered the forest, he again ordered some infantry to follow them, as appeared advisable to him, and he sent on fifty more wagons from his left flank, and then again infantry. Thus he again sent on each time fifty wagons, and between each column foot-soldiers, as many as was necessary. And this was done for the reason that if they [the enemies] attempted to kill the wagoners, or seize the wagons, these foot-soldiers marching between the columns of wagons should prevent this. Then, when the last passed, the Hungarians attacked the rear, wishing to seize his cannon. They then, descending from the heights, attacked the fodder-carts which he had placed there, but they [Žižka's men] remained sheltered by them till the artillery had entered the wood and the infantry also; then they also retreated. And they so little feared the Hungarians that while they [the Hungarians] took possession of the carts they partly destroyed the road, so that the horsemen could not follow them. When the Hungarians saw this, that they could in no way harm him, some rode on in advance, wishing to oppose him [Žižka] when he debouched out of the forest, others rode home saying that this was not a man, but that the devil gave him this cunning, and that nothing availed

against him. And thus did he lead his army out of the forest again through some fields that were between slopes. When he had arrived at the new roads which he had made, he first ordered these fifty wagons to move along the new road which he built to the right [of the old one]; and when they marched through the fields they drove close to the slope so that the foot-soldiers had on one side the wagons and on the other the slope, so that they did not fear the horsemen; and he ordered the other columns also to advance along the other [the new] road; and he sent the artillery out of the wood by the old road and then occupied the fields. And so gradually all the wagons were driven out of the wood, and he disposed them so that they were all in one line and wound themselves together like a wreath. And he did this to unite the two columns in one and drive them [the Hungarians] from the field with a powerful hand. And thus the number of wagons which left the forest ever increased, till they had all got into the open. And thus did the Lord God help him to retreat from Hungary. But from the time that Žižka had begun to war this had been his heaviest task."

This contemporary account of Žižka's Hungarian campaign—which I have thought best to translate literally from the rugged fifteenth-century Bohemian of the original—was probably written by one who took part in the campaign. It contains many inaccuracies and obscurities and, as I have mentioned, leaves us in doubt with regard to matters both chronological and topographical. Recently Professor Tomek and Dr. Toman, who have thoroughly studied this curious document, have tried to elucidate some doubtful points. The account gives but few names of localities—these generally spelt in a manner that renders them almost unintelligible—and the question arises: What part of Hungary did Žižka invade? It seems most probable that he entered Hungary from Moravia at Holíč, and that he marched by Tyrnau and Neutra to the

neighbourhood of Gran, where he reached the Danube.¹ He was there not very far from King Sigismund, who was then residing at Buda. The King of Hungary, though he immediately left that city, organised a large force to oppose Žižka, who had hitherto advanced without meeting with any resistance. It was probably in the plains between Gran and Komorn that Žižka was first attacked by vast forces of Hungarian horsemen, and nearly surrounded by them. He then immediately determined to retire to Moravia. On his retreat he probably took the same route as on entering Hungary, but in the absence of all information we are reduced to conjectures. It appears certain that Žižka reached Moravia about October 20, and we read of him as being in Bohemia shortly afterwards.

Very serious events had taken place in that country during Žižka's absence. It appears probable that soon after the armistice of Konopišt the Praguers and some of the Utraquist nobles entered into negotiations with King Ladislav of Poland. It is even stated that they entrusted him with the mission of tending their, probably not unconditional, submission to the Roman see. Ladislav, with a *perfidia plus quam Polonica*, did not hesitate to communicate these strictly confidential negotiations to King Sigismund. Polish envoys were sent to the Hungarian court and were received there with great favour. Somewhat later two of the principal nobles of the Roman party in Bohemia also proceeded to Hungary. Doubtless realising that a complete submission of their Utraquist countrymen, after an almost uninterrupted series of victories, was an impossibility, they suggested another conference. A meeting of the Utraquists of Bohemia took place at Kolin shortly afterwards. They decided to enter into negotiations with the Roman Catholics, and it was agreed that representatives of all Bohemian parties should meet at Prague "on the

¹ Æneas Sylvius places one of Žižka's semi-mythical exploits "near the Danube in Austria." This probably refers to his Hungarian expedition, when he reached the Danube near Gran.

day of St. Gallus"—October 16. At this meeting members of all Bohemian parties except the Táborites were present. Among those who took part in this assembly were Archbishop Conrad, who occupied the first place, the Romanist nobles Aleš of Šternberg and Frederick of Kolowrat, as well as John of Opočno and Puta of Častolovice, who had just returned from visiting King Sigismund in Hungary. Among the Utraquist nobles present were Lord Hašek of Valdštýn and Lord Krušina of Lichtenburg. The rank next to them was assigned to the representatives of the cities of Prague. After them came the knights among whom was Bořek of Miletínek, and the representatives of the other Bohemian towns.¹ The conference sat till November 1. The only information which we have concerning its deliberations is contained in a document that was drawn up before the members separated. It began by stating that all those present agreed to the continuation of the negotiations with the Roman party which the meeting at Kolin had first suggested, and that all desired that a new conference should shortly take place at Brno in Moravia. The document then declared that the members of the conference had decided to elect a provisional government. They thus followed the precedent of the assembly at Časlav in 1421. Twelve "captains of the people" were chosen, and the list included most of the prominent Roman and Utraquist noblemen, whose names have frequently occurred in this work, as well as Bořek of Miletínek, who now commanded the troops of the Praguers. One of the duties of these captains of the land was "to help and defend the country against all who wished to ruin it and to cause troubles and riots." If we consider the strongly conservative, not to say reactionary, tendency of the assembly at Prague we can hardly doubt that the persons alluded to were the Táborites. The latter were naturally indignant at being described as robbers and rioters.

¹ The members of the assembly were seated at the meetings in the order of precedence, quoted above from the contemporary records.

The official document containing the results of the deliberations at Prague avoided to mention King Sigismund, yet immediately after the meeting John of Opočno and Puta of Častolovice again proceeded to Buda, where King Sigismund had now returned. The ostensible purpose of their journey was to obtain letters of safe conduct for the Utraquist envoys who were to proceed to Brno, which was then in the hands of the Archduke Albert, Sigismund's son-in-law. Enough has been written of Žižka to make it unnecessary to state that these renewed negotiations with Sigismund, as well as the insulting references to the Táborites—whose military leader he was, though he disapproved of many of their tenets—infuriated him to the highest degree.

The year 1424 which now begins is known in Bohemian history as Žižka's last and bloodiest year. A personal motive, which may to a certain extent have influenced even an absolutely fearless man such as was Žižka, perhaps contributed to his not unjustifiable indignation. While Lord John of Opočno was in Hungary, the town council of Králové Hradec and Ambrose, parish priest of that city, wrote to Žižka informing him that their soldiers had made prisoner "one of the party of Opočno,"¹ a man of rank, who stated that some one had received a large sum for the purpose of entering Žižka's camp and assassinating him. It is impossible to ascertain the truth of this report, but it is certain that on his return from Hungary and Moravia Žižka immediately entered the district of Králové Hradec and attacked the estates of Puta of Častolovice and John of Opočno, who hurriedly returned from Hungary. A battle took place at Skalice² on January 6, 1424, in which Sigismund's partisans were signally defeated. Žižka, indefatigable in this, the last year of his life,

¹ John of Opočno, who resided in the castle of that name, was the leader of Sigismund's party in North-Eastern Bohemia, and a bitter enemy of the neighbouring town of Králové Hradec.

² Some of my readers may remember that Skalice was the scene of one of the first engagements in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

continued, almost always successfully, his campaign in the district of Králové Hradec. He then marched to the neighbourhood of Plzeň, which ever since its evacuation by Žižka at the beginning of the war had continued to be the principal stronghold of the Royalist or Roman party in Bohemia. Žižka's expedition appears to have been unsuccessful. Plzeň, to the end of the Hussite wars, remained the weak spot in the position of the nationalists. From Plzeň Žižka returned to central Bohemia. The Praguers, who had sanctioned the new negotiations with Sigismund and even taken part in them, had incurred his bitter hatred. Žižka who, as must always be remembered, was everywhere confronted by far more numerous hostile forces, entered the town of Kostelec on the Elbe, and was here besieged by a large army consisting of Praguers and of nobles both of the Utraquist and the Roman party. He is said to have been in great danger, and it is even stated on doubtful authority that King Sigismund greatly rejoiced, believing that Žižka would shortly be his prisoner. Žižka, however, with the aid of Lord Hynek of Poděbrad, succeeded in crossing the Elbe by a ford at night-time. On the other bank he was joined by the forces of the Lord of Poděbrad and by fresh Táborite troops. The army of Žižka and his allies then marched along the right bank of the Elbe till they reached Poděbrady, the principal castle of the lords of that name, who were among Žižka's staunchest allies in the Bohemian nobility. The Praguers and their allies continued to march along the left bank of the Elbe, only the river separating the opposing armies. On arriving at Poděbrady Žižka with his usual rapidity suddenly decided to recross the river and to march in the direction of Kutna Hora, a country which he thoroughly knew from the time of his winter campaign in 1421. It is not very clear what his ulterior plans were. It has been suggested by some writers that he intended to retreat on Tábor and there to gather reinforcements. If this was for a moment his intention, he immediately changed his mind

when he thought that his forces were sufficiently strong to engage the enemies. One of the Táborite leaders, Lord Roháč of Duba, resided in the neighbourhood of Kutna Hora in a castle to which, according to the Hussite custom, he had given the biblical name of Sion. Lord Roháč immediately joined Žižka with a considerable force; some other reinforcements also reached him. He, however, continued his seeming retreat, determined as usual only to give battle on a site where he believed his chances to be favourable. On June 7 he halted near the fort¹ of Malešov, situated on the summit of a hill. Here he immediately formed his columns of wagons and his soldiers in line of battle. As was invariably the case Žižka's position was a very strong one. The enemies could advance by one road only; the slopes of the hill were then undoubtedly thickly wooded, and a marshy stream crossed the road at the beginning of the ascent. The Praguers, still vastly superior in number, immediately advanced to attack, anxious only that Žižka should not, as at Kostelec on the Elbe, again escape them. Žižka waited till about half the forces of the Praguers had crossed the valley through which the stream flowed and had begun to ascend the hill. He then ordered his horsemen to attack the flanks of the enemies, but soon to retire. Shortly afterwards he gave the order that his battle-wagons, laden with heavy stones, should be driven down the slope into the midst of the advancing Praguers. Their appearance immediately caused a panic, which was, no doubt, all the greater because Žižka's exploits had already become legendary. The flight of the first columns prevented the advance of the others, and many soldiers—among them the troops of the nobles allied with Prague—never came into action. The flight soon became general, and 1,200 Praguers were killed; among them were the knight Peter Turkovec, who had carried the standard of Prague, and many prominent citizens.

It is probably at this period that an incident occurred which,

¹ The Bohemian word "tvrz" signifies a fortified house or small castle.

though we have only Æneas Sylvius's very unreliable authority for it, yet should, perhaps, not remain unrecorded. Æneas Sylvius states¹ that King Sigismund, seeing that Žižka was everywhere successful, and that he was the one man on whom the fate of Bohemia depended, secretly attempted a reconciliation with him. He promised to appoint him Governor of Bohemia and commander of the troops in that country, and to grant him a large sum of money.² There is every probability that this tale is entirely untrue. Had Žižka become a traitor to his country and his creed he would have found his only supporters in Bohemia among the not very numerous Romanist nobles, from whom the intense hatred caused by four years of incessant warfare widely separated him. King Sigismund was probably well acquainted with the dispositions of the Hussites, and cannot have been ignorant of Žižka's extreme suspiciousness, which would certainly have prevented him from trusting the word of Sigismund. Only one quite ignorant of Žižka's true character can have imagined this tale. The certainly spurious anecdote has only been mentioned here because many writers have even recently repeated Æneas Sylvius's tale.

The victory of Malešov was followed by a series of successes for Žižka. Immediately after the battle he again obtained possession of Kutna Hora, and the cities of Český Brod, Kouřim, and Nymburk, formerly allies of Prague, voluntarily accepted his rule. In this his last year we find Žižka constantly moving with feverish activity from one part of the country to another. It has already been mentioned that the Hussite war, like the great English civil war, comprised numerous local struggles, which were dispersed over all parts of the country. Žižka, as if aware of his imminent fate, now wished to give his aid and advice to his comrades in the different districts. After receiving the submission of the cities on the

¹ *Historia Bohemica*, cap. xlv.

² Æneas Sylvius writes: "ingens auri pondus quotannis."

Elbe, which have just been mentioned, Žižka hurried once more to the district of Plzeň and then proceeded to Žatec. He here received important news. The negotiations of the Bohemians with Poland, to which I have frequently referred, had lately been broken off. There is little doubt that King Ladislav used the Bohemians only as a pawn in the difficult political game which he was playing with King Sigismund, the Teutonic order and the Elector of Brandenburg.¹ The King of Poland, at this moment on good terms with Sigismund, endeavoured to ingratiate himself with him by inducing the Bohemians—by means of promises which would not be kept—to at last recognise Sigismund as their king. The negotiations, as was inevitable, failed. In direct contrast with the attitude of Ladislav was that of his nephew, Prince Korybutovič. He again declared himself openly a friend of Bohemia, and travelling rapidly through Silesia suddenly arrived at Prague on June 29 accompanied by 1,500 Polish horsemen. The citizens, greatly weakened by their defeat at Malešov, gladly welcomed him, and conferred on him wider powers than he had possessed during his first stay in Bohemia. They did not, however, grant him the title of king, though he claimed that rank.²

Meanwhile Žižka was at Žatec equipping a large army, determined to march on Prague and entirely to suppress the freedom of the city. Besides his own Táborites the men of Loun, Žatec, and Klatovy marched with him. They started at the end of August and arrived on September 1 at Libochovice, where Žižka, with his usual rigid puritanism, caused four monks who had committed outrages on women and maidens to be burnt. From there Žižka's army—according to Professor Tomek's conjecture, for the contemporary

¹ It is of course beyond my purpose to enter into these matters here; but these negotiations alone explain the fluctuating attitude of Poland towards the Bohemians.

² The contemporary chronicler Bartošek of Drahonice writes: "Eodem anno circa festum sancti Procopii revenit dux Sigismundus [Korybutovič] Pragae et Pragenses ipsum *pro domino susceperunt de facto sed non jure*" (p. 593 of Professor Goll's edition).

chronicles are, as usual, hopeless with regard to topography—crossed the Elbe at Veltrus and marching rapidly, as was Žižka's custom, arrived early in September at Libeň, then a village near Prague; now a part of that city. In the camp at Libeň he received further reinforcements; among others the men of Králové Hradec, always faithful to the national cause, flocked to Žižka's standards. The city of Prague was not, however, regularly invested, though the Táborite soldiers often closely approached the walls of the new town and taunted the citizens. The latter sometimes attempted sorties, but were invariably repulsed with great loss.

The Utraquists, both within the city walls and in Žižka's camp, now began seriously to consider the far-reaching consequences which the capture and perhaps the destruction of the capital would have. Žižka's irritation, though regrettable, is not inexplicable. He had saved Prague in 1420 when it was menaced by the enormous forces of the crusaders, and he had only met with ingratitude. Acute statesman as he was, he well knew that only the incredible apathy of the German princes and the failure of King Ladislas to induce his subjects to take part in a crusade against the kindred Bohemian nation had, both in 1423 and 1424, prevented the complete subjection of Bohemia. It is certain that at the time of the battles of Králové Hradec, Hořice, and Malešov Bohemia would not have been able to resist a determined invasion. Žižka undoubtedly thought that he could defeat the foreign enemies more easily alone than in the company of unreliable allies.

Even among Žižka's most intimate friends, his intention to attack and, as it was said, to destroy Prague met with grave opposition. They reminded him of the reverence that all, even the most uncultured, Bohemians felt for their time-honoured capital, and of the terrible loss of life which such an assault would inevitably involve. They also alluded to the increasing peril of Moravia. Within the city Prince Kory-

butovič also exercised a moderating influence. As a friend of Žižka he warmly appealed to the citizens, begging them not to offend the great warrior, but to make all possible concessions. A deputation of the citizens of Prague arrived at Žižka's camp at Libeň on September 14. Its leader was the priest John of Rokycan, afterwards Utraquist Archbishop of Prague. The citizens could not have made a better choice. Rokycan was a determined Utraquist, who insisted on the right to receive Communion in the two kinds and on the necessity to enforce discipline and poverty among the clergy. He detested, however, the attempts of the extreme Táborites to introduce innovations in respect of doctrine and ritual which had never had the sanction of Hus. These views coincided entirely with those of Žižka, who was always irritated by the endeavours of his enemies to render him responsible for the acts and views of some of his more unruly adherents. The chroniclers tell us that Žižka was greatly impressed by the eloquence of Rokycan, who afterwards became known as one of the greatest of Bohemian preachers. We possess, however, no authentic contemporary account of his speech. It is at any rate certain that the contending parties came to an agreement, and that it was decided that the Táborites under Žižka, the Praguers with Prince Korybutovič, and the Utraquist nobles should henceforth act in common, and should immediately march to Moravia, which had been almost entirely subdued by the Austrian Archduke Albert. Žižka almost alone did not view the future hopefully. "This agreement will not last longer than that at Konopišt," he is reported to have said. The great warrior's scepticism was no doubt caused by the fact that it had also been settled at Libeň to enter again into negotiations with the lords "sub una," that is to say, those who belonged to the Roman party. These men were entirely under the influence of King Sigismund, who had long before declared that he could grant no concessions in ecclesiastical matters, as such matters appertained exclusively to

the jurisdiction of the Pope. Some years had to pass and much blood to be shed before the Council of Basel accepted a different standpoint. The negotiations with the nobles of Sigismund's party led to no very definite result, but an armistice was concluded, and the nobles "sub una" pledged themselves to grant to their peasants the freedom to receive Communion in the two kinds during the suspension of hostilities.

The principal reason why Žižka gave his consent to the treaty of Libeň was the wish to terminate civic warfare and prepare for the defence of his country, menaced by constant raids and attacks. King Ladislav's intended invasion of Bohemia had entirely failed; many of the Polish soldiers, who were to have taken part in it had even joined the forces of Prince Korybutovič. On the other hand, the Germans were again planning a new crusade. The most pressing danger at that moment was, however, on the Moravian border. It had been agreed at Libeň that the reunited forces of the Utraquists should immediately march to Moravia; and at the end of September the whole force started on its new campaign. Žižka was, of course; commander-in-chief, and Hvezda of Vicemilic, who had just brought reinforcements from Tábor, Prince Sigismund Korybutovič, Bořek of Miletinek, the Lords Kuneš of Bělovic and Victorin of Poděbrad commanded divisions. It was the largest and most united army which any Utraquist general ever led to battle. Its commanders were all experienced soldiers, and Žižka's men were prepared to follow him anywhere. Fate, never favourable to Bohemia, here also proved hostile. The army marched along the usual road to Moravia by Kutna Hora, Časlav, and Německý Brod, and while the vanguard, under Bořek of Miletinek, immediately crossed the frontier, the rest of the army laid siege to the castle of Příbyslav, which occupied a somewhat important position. While encamped here Žižka was seized by a violent attack of the plague, which then raged in Bohemia, and died on October 11. A contemporary chronicler, who probably

took part in Žižka's campaigns, thus describes his death.¹ "After concluding peace with the Prince (Korybutovič) and the Praguers Žižka and the brethren marched into Moravia, and while encamped before the castle of Přebyslav brother Žižka was seized by a deadly attack of the plague. Then he gave his last charge to his dear faithful brethren and fellow-Bohemians, Lord Victorin of Poděbrad, Lords Kuneš of Bělovic and Hvězda of Vicemilic, saying that, fearing their beloved God, they should firmly and faithfully uphold God's law in view of His reward in eternity. And then brother Žižka recommended his soul to God and died on the Wednesday before the day of St. Gallus." This tranquil and hopeful death was very befitting for the great Bohemian warrior, who had, according to his views—on which the historian cannot pass judgment—devoted his life to the defence of God's law. He who had so often fought what he firmly believed to be God's battle assuredly did not dread entering into God's peace.

It is only reluctantly that I refer to the odious and absolutely unhistorical anecdotes concerning Žižka's death which, circulated by Æneas Sylvius,² have since been repeated by countless writers, and no doubt greatly diverted the Voltairean scepticism of Frederick the Great,³ to whom Žižka must have seemed a very inexplicable personage. "Žižka's drum" has fortunately at last been relegated from the domain of serious historical study. I have in the course of this work referred so frequently to Žižka that little now remains to be added. He was a very fervent Utraquist, to whom it appeared certain that the Sacrament of Holy Communion according to Christ's

¹ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 64.

² Æneas Sylvius writes: "Žižka . . . divinitus ut par est credere, peste tactus expiravit monstrum detestabile, crudele, horrendum inopportunum quod postquam manus humana conficere non valuit digitus Dei extinxit. Ferunt illum quum ægrotaret interrogatum quo nam loco mortuus sepeliri vellet, jussisse cadaveri suo pellem adimi, carnes volucris ac feris objectari ex pelle timpanum fieri, eoque duce bella geri, arrepturam fugam hostes quam primum ejus timpani sonitus audierint" (*Historia Bohemica*, cap. xlv.).

³ In one of his letters Frederick the Great announces that he has captured "Žižka's drum" and that he has had it removed to Glatz.

ordinance was only valid when administered in the two kinds. He believed the reform of Church discipline as demanded by Hus to be a necessity. He certainly entertained an undying hatred of King Sigismund, believing—in accordance with his views, derived from the Old Testament—that it was his duty to avenge the treacherous murder of Hus. The opinions expressed by foolish ultramontanes and equally foolish socialists, who describe Žižka as a communist or leveller, are absolutely unhistorical. Žižka belonged to the estate of the “zemans,” the gentry of Bohemia, and had in most respects the same views as other men of his rank. Only his unrivalled military genius and his great gift of statesmanship placed him above them. Thus it gave him much pleasure to receive the order of knighthood after his brilliant victories near Kutna Hora, and—absolutely disinterested as he was—he yet did not hesitate to accept the gift of a small castle near Litoměřice, which the Bohemian estates offered him in recognition of his services to the nation. He gave his new castle the name of Kalice (chalice) as token of his religious views. From this time he always called himself “John Žižka of the chalice,” according to the Bohemian custom, as the knights and nobles then refused titles and took their name from their castles.

According to the contemporary chroniclers Žižka's body was conveyed to Králové Hradec, where he had many friends, by Ambrose, parish priest of that town, and the priest Prokupek, afterwards famous as a leader of the “Orphans.” It is stated that his remains were afterwards transferred to Časlav, and according to Theobaldus,¹ who writes as one who had seen the tomb, they were interred near an altar on which were placed portraits of Hus and Žižka. Under the portrait of Hus were written the following lines :

“Husse, tuus vindex jacet hic dux Žižka Johannes,
Supplex Sigmundus cui quoque Cæsar erat,
Et quoniam bustis clarent loca multa, sepulchrum
Žižka Caslaviæ fama perennis erit.”

¹ Zacharias Theobaldus, *Hussitenkrieg*, 1623, pp. 228–289.

Under Žižka's portrait the following lines were inscribed :

*"Strenuus in bellis hoc dormit Žižka sepulchro,
Žižka, suæ gentis gloria, Martis honos.
Ille duces scelerum monachos pestemque nefandam
Ad Stygias justo fulmine trusit aquas.
Surget adhuc rursus, quadratæ cornua cristæ,
Supplicii ut pœnas, quas meruere luant."*

All traces of Žižka's grave undoubtedly disappeared during the period of reaction which followed the battle of the White Mountain, though quite recently it was rumoured that some bones supposed to be Žižka's had been discovered at Časlav.

CHAPTER V

IT is impossible to overrate the influence of the sudden death of Žižka on the course of the events of the Hussite war. At no other moment had the Hussites been so strong and so united. At that moment only it was perhaps possible to establish in Bohemia a national Church and a national kingdom under a Slavic dynasty. After Žižka's death Prince Korybutovič assumed the command of the whole army, and after having rejoined Bořek of Miletinek obtained considerable successes, forcing the Austrians to evacuate almost the whole of Moravia. The Hussite armies, however, soon returned to Bohemia. It appears from the scanty records which we have that the plan of campaign was not methodically carried out and that discord soon again broke out among the Utraquist parties. Korybutovič, who, while under Žižka's influence, had acted strictly in accordance with him, now entered into direct negotiations with the Roman see. Though it appears that he always considered the acceptance of the articles of Prague as an absolute condition of an agreement, yet the more fanatical Táborites viewed these negotiations with suspicion. That party was also now, at least for a time, divided against itself. Only the more extreme levellers, who had often opposed Žižka, continued to adopt the name of Táborites. The moderate Táborites, among whom had been Žižka's intimate friends, considered that Sigismund had, through his treachery, forfeited his right to the Bohemian throne, but they were not on principle opposed to monarchy; as regards matters of religion they limited their demands to the recognition of the articles of Prague. These men now adopted the name of "Orphans," thus indicating that they considered no man

worthy to replace their lost leader. As in all the religious difference of this period, questions of ritual here also played a great part. The Orphans, like Žižka himself, did not approve of all the innovations introduced by the clergy of Tábor. The priests of the Orphans celebrated the holy mass according to the ancient rules and wore vestments. It is certain that with regard to other matters also their views were nearer to those of the Praguers than to those of the Táborites.¹

As had become customary during the Hussite wars, the partly religious, partly political differences were now again discussed at one of those meetings which were so frequent and generally almost resultless. As has already been mentioned, immediately before Žižka's death all the Utraquist parties had agreed henceforth to act in common, and they had concluded an armistice with the lords "sub una." The alliance between Prague and Tábor had placed the nobles who upheld King Sigismund in a very difficult position, and even their religious and dynastic zeal did not prevent them from making certain concessions for the purpose of preserving their estates.² It was settled that the Praguers and Táborites should first meet at Beroun and the lords "sub una" at Žebrák, and that after these preliminary conferences the members of all parties should meet together at Zdíc. The joint conferences at Zdíc began early in October, and were afterwards continued at Kouřim. Here also no permanent results were obtained. The members of the conference limited themselves to the expression of a general wish that peace should be restored in Bohemia, and to a protest against the false accusation of heresy which had been brought against the Bohemians.

¹ Professor Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 318.

² The dilemma which confronted these nobles appears very clearly in the correspondence between King Sigismund and Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, the leader of these nobles. (Published in the *Česky Archiv*, Vol. I.) Rosenberg informed the King that he was entering into negotiations with the Hussites. Sigismund in his answer blamed him, expressing his surprise that Rosenberg should allow "townsmen and common people to sit in judgment on him." Rosenberg in his answer pleaded the necessity of making concessions because of the superior strength of the enemies.

This was a point on which the Hussites of all parties laid great stress. It was also decided to prolong the truce with the nobles of Sigismund's party, who again promised to permit Communion in both kinds on their estates. The terms of the agreement referred only to the Bohemians, and the Utraquists were thus able to continue their warfare against Sigismund and his son-in-law without fear of intervention on the part of their internal opponents. The lords of the Roman party even agreed to allow their men-at-arms to enlist in the Utraquist armies during the time of the armistice. In contradiction to what occurred on similar occasions, no attempt was now made to establish a provisional government or elect regents. The Praguers, the Utraquist nobility and some of the moderate Táborites considered Prince Korybutovič as regent, and may have hoped that he would eventually be recognised by the Roman party also. The assemblies of Zdíc and Kouřim are notable also for the then exceptional circumstance that no theological disputations took place. The lords "sub una," who were constant, though not very self-sacrificing, adherents of King Sigismund, perhaps adopted his theory according to which laymen had no right to judge questions of ecclesiastical dogma and ritual.

It would, however, have been impossible to restrain even for a time the intense theological combativeness of the Bohemians of that age, which was equalled only in the Constantinople of the Eastern Empire and, perhaps, in the England and Scotland of the Commonwealth. It had, therefore, been settled, probably at the Treaty of Libeň, that representatives of the Utraquist or Calixtine Church should meet some of the priests of Tábor at the same time as that on which the conferences at Zdíc took place. It was hoped that the disputations begun at Konopišt would here be continued and satisfactorily ended. The meeting between the clergy of the town and university of Prague and the Táborite divines took place at the Hradčany castle of Prague on October 16, 1424. It is sufficient to state

that here, as at Konopišt, the divines found it impossible to agree. The division between the two great Hussite parties continued as before. According to the custom of the time the theologians of the university formulated their views in a certain number of "articles"; they referred principally to the seven sacraments, the ritual of the mass, purgatory, and the invocation of the saints. The leader of the Hussite High Church, Master John of Přeboram, to whose authority the articles were probably largely due, took a prominent part in the discussion which followed. He appears to have spoken with some violence. Nicholas of Pelhřimov, one of the representatives of Tábor, who, in his "*Chronicon Taboritarum*," has left us the only detailed account of the conference, but who, of course, cannot be considered as an impartial witness, attributes the failure of the negotiations entirely to Přeboram.¹ Both parties, however, in view of the ever-menacing attitude of Germany and Austria, were reluctant to accept the responsibility for a complete rupture between the Hussite parties. The assembly, therefore, before separating agreed to hold another meeting at Prague, which was to take place in the university college. This meeting was also resultless. The author of the "*Chronicon Taboritarum*," who, it must be remembered, was a vehement partisan of Tábor, again attributes the failure to John of Přeboram. The latter divine, he writes, stated that it was from the ranks of the Tábórites that had sprung the agitators who discredited the Hussite movement.² It must be admitted that Přeboram's assertion was not entirely devoid of truth. One of the other ever-recurring questions of theological controversy was then discussed. The Tábórite

¹ "Facta per magistrum Joannem Přeboram declaratione terminorum positorum in propositionibus in Konopišt per magistros sacerdotibus Thaboriensibus oblatis blasphemia et fratrum Thaboriensium multum et minus juste confusiva et detractoria omnes ad propria redierunt" (Nicholas of Pelhřimov, "*Chronicon Taboritarum*" in Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber der Hussitischen Bewegung*, Vol. II. p. 590).

² "Joannes Přeboram more suo in verba diffamatoria prorupit, dicens quod de numero sacerdotum Thaboriensium hic assidentium prodita pessima Picardica hæresis" (Pelhřimov in Höfler as above, p. 590).

clergyman, Marcold, declared that the Sacraments, when dispensed by an unworthy priest, were invalid. Marcold quoted many passages from Scripture and finally maintained that it was better for the Church to have no priests than unworthy ones.¹ The disputation thus ended, both parties continuing to hold their former views.²

The great historian Palacký has noted with his usual penetration that if the continuous internal strife in Bohemia—which sometimes took the form of actual civil war, sometimes that of lengthy and animated theological disputations—did not prove more disastrous to the country than was actually the case, this was the result of the reluctance of the German princes to act jointly against Bohemia. King Sigismund had invited the German princes and free imperial cities to a diet which was to have met at Vienna on September 29, 1424, but was afterwards postponed to November 25. The German princes, however, complained of the remoteness of Vienna and declared that the journey was a dangerous one. It appears that the fear of the Hussites, which afterwards became so great, here already manifested itself. Sigismund expressed great indignation at the attitude of the German princes, and even accused them of secret sympathy with the heretics. He thus brought against them the same accusation which they had levelled at him during the siege of Prague. It was only after the great defeat of the Germans at Ústí (Aussig) that they seriously began to plan a new crusade against Bohemia. One of the consequences of the failure of the attempts to organise a new crusade was the recall of Cardinal Branda by the papal see. Though he had been very active, he was thought not to

¹ [Marcold] "*dicebat quod utilius esset populo dum deficerent in bonis sacerdotibus, ut nullum habeant talem quia si fuit expediens ecclesiæ militantis quod careat corporali præsentia Jesu Christi, sicut contigit quando crevit ecclesia post ascensionem Domini; quanto magis prodesset militanti ecclesiæ quod careat talibus qui non æquiparantur Jesu nostro*" (Pelhřimov in Höfler as above, pp. 592-593).

² "*Et sic illa prædicta audientia eorum sine finali inter partes decisione est finita utrisque circa sua opinata remanentibus*" (Pelhřimov in Höfler as above, p. 593).

have shown the skill which at that period usually distinguished papal envoys.

It has already been mentioned that the Táborites, after the death of their great leader, divided into two parties, one of which continued to bear the name of Táborites, while those belonging to the other called themselves the Orphans. In consequence of this scission the two parties chose different leaders. Hvězda of Vicemilic became the first commander of the Táborites; while Kuneš of Bělovic; who belonged to the Orebite community; led the Orphans; whose strength was mainly in the north-eastern district, of which Králové Hradec is the centre. That religious differences largely contributed to this scission has already been stated. The contemporary chroniclers, however, also tell us that the division among the two parties of the many cities which had acknowledged Žižka's supremacy led to considerable troubles.¹ These dissensions appear to have been temporary and not of great importance. On the other hand desultory warfare between the united Táborites and Orphans and the Praguers continued almost uninterruptedly during the greater part of the year 1425. On this occasion; as on previous ones; the Táborites took up arms because they suspected Korybutovič and the men of Prague of negotiating secretly with the Pope. In September 1425 the Táborites besieged the castle of Vožic; which, though situated very near the town of Tábor, was still in the hands of Sigismund's partisans. The garrison; commanded by Materna of Ronov, defended itself bravely, even after the forces of the Orphans, under Kuneš of Bělovic; had joined the Táborites. The Utraquists here seem, according to the account of a contemporary chronicler,² to have made considerable use

¹ "In the year 1425 after Žižka's death there was great discord between the Táborites and the Orphans, and they seized the towns (that had been common property) and fortified them against one another" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 64).

² Bartošek of Drahonice. See my *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia*, pp. 47-48.

of their artillery; and to have subjected Vožic to a regular bombardment.¹ The united forces of the Táborites and Orphans appear to have been so considerable that they were able to detach a force under Bohuslav of Schwamberg in the direction of Prague. The little army arrived at Vršovice, then a village close to the capital of which it has now become a suburb. The Táborites were here met by representatives of the municipality of Prague, who wished to enter into negotiations. The *pourparler* was afterwards continued in the camp before Vožic, to which the Praguers sent their envoys. A treaty or armistice was here concluded, under conditions very similar to those of other truces that have been previously mentioned. It was decided to elect twenty men from all the different Utraquist parties, who were to act as judges in all moot cases of doctrine and ritual and to whose decision all were to conform. The document containing this agreement has not been preserved, but we are justified in conjecturing that a cessation of all hostilities between Utraquists was decreed, and that reciprocal forbearance and tolerance with regard to minor questions of ritual were enjoined. Experience having proved by now that the Hussites could only remain united when confronted by a foreign foe, it was probably also decided here to march again into Moravia, where Archduke Albert of Austria had just defeated the Utraquist party. The garrison of Vožic now, despairing of all hope of relief, capitulated immediately after the signature of the treaty. Towards the end of the siege the Táborite leader, Hvězda of Vicemilic, was killed by an arrow-shot. Bohuslav of Schwamberg, who had commanded the forces that had marched on Prague, succeeded him as commander of the Táborite army.

¹ [The Táborites] "processerunt hostiliter ad castrum Vožic et ibi cum machinis et pixidibus magnis per quinque septimanas facentes et tres dies ipsum castrum mediante tractatu sic quod tantum duo capitanei se in eorum militarem darent captivitatem, lucraverunt, alios liberos dimiserunt et ipsum castrum rupuerunt; et ibi fuit Bzdinka [a nickname of Hvězda of Vicemilic] letaliter sagittatus" (*Chronicon Bartošek de Drahonice*, p. 594 of Professor Goll's edition).

The united Hussite forces marched to Moravia immediately after the treaty of Vožic. They first undertook to relieve the city of Třebice, which was then besieged by King Sigismund and his son-in-law. On the news of the approach of the Hussites Sigismund, cautious as usual, retired from the camp before Třebice and was contented with burning down many villages belonging to Utraquist nobles in the vicinity of Brno. Somewhat later Sigismund's son-in-law, Albert of Austria, also retired in the direction of Hungary. Not heeding these enemies on their flank the Bohemians, under Prince Korybutovič and Bohuslav of Schwamberg, after occupying the city of Znoymo, crossed the Austrian frontier. The warfare in this borderland had a distinctly racial character. The inveterate antipathy between the Austrian and the Bohemian, which still exists, already prevailed in those remote days. The attack on Austria is noteworthy, as being one of the earliest instances of the system of offensive warfare which the Bohemians adopted during the last part of the Hussite wars. The Bohemians besieged the town and castle of Retz in Lower Austria. The city was obstinately defended by the Austrians, under John of Hardegg, Count of Retz, who, though of great age, displayed youthful energy, as the contemporary chroniclers tell us. The Hussite losses were very considerable, and Bohuslav of Schwamberg received a severe wound, in consequence of which he died shortly afterwards. The city at last capitulated on November 25. The Count of Retz was treated with the comparative leniency which usually distinguished the Utraquists from their Romanist antagonists. He was conducted to Prague, where he remained in honourable captivity. Many of the Austrian soldiers were, however, killed by the Hussites, who were exasperated by the loss of their leader, Bohuslav of Schwamberg. We have unfortunately but very scant information with regard to this important campaign.¹

¹ In *Paltrami Chronicon Austriacum* we only read: "Hussitæ congregaverunt fortem exercitum nimis in Bohemia et in Praga et venerunt in Austriam

After this success the Bohemians returned to their country, where they remained during the winter.

As successor of Bohuslav of Schwamberg the Táborites chose the priest Prokop, surnamed "the Great," who became the protagonist in the later part of the Hussite wars almost to as great an extent as Žižka had been during the earlier period. If even as regards Žižka the energy of the Bohemian scholars of the last and the present generation has not entirely succeeded in elucidating many moot points, the events of the life of Prokop were up to recently quite obscure.¹ Recent research, however, shows it to be nearly certain that Prokop was the son of a merchant of Prague, named Andrew, who probably died during Prokop's infancy. Andrew's wife, Anna, was the sister of a man of knightly birth, who is mentioned in contemporary documents as "Jan de Aquis" or "John Voda."² He appears to have owned the estate of Čelakovice, as we sometimes find him—according to the Bohemian custom of that period—described as Johannes de Čelakovice. John's sister Anna was probably the mother of Prokop, and after the early death of his father he was brought up under the direction of his uncle, John de Aquis. In his youth Prokop accompanied his uncle on extensive travels through France, Spain, and Italy, and even visited Jerusalem. On his return from these travels he took Orders; the Polish historian Długoš calls him "apostata ordinis Minorum," and we have evidence rendering it at least probable that he spent some time in a Minorite monastery at Králové Hradec. It is conjectured that Prokop was born between 1370 and 1379, but it is only after the year 1419 that

cum potentia magna et vallaverunt unam civitatem quæ dicitur Recz et debellaverunt eam et interfecerunt multos homines. Et in eadem civitate ceperunt Comitem qui dicitur de Hardegg et duxerunt eum at [*sic*] Pragm et devastarunt sibi omnes res circumquaque, quidquid habuit et ibi mortuus est in Praga" (Pez, "Scriptores rerum Austriacarum," Tom. I. p. 733).

¹ Dr. Alphons Neubauer has, in the *Český Časopis Historický* (*Bohemian Historical Journal*) for 1910, published a series of articles on Prokop the Great, which throw much light on the career of the great Hussite leader. I wish here to acknowledge my great indebtedness to these valuable articles.

² "Voda" signifies "water" (*aqua*) in Bohemian.

we have any reliable information concerning him. He was then one of that group of priests which included John of Zělivo, Venceslas Koranda, Marcold, and others, who most strenuously opposed the High Church Hussitism of the university of Prague. He was, however, by no means a visionary or a fanatic, as were some of these men, and it was principally his teaching with regard to the Sacrament and to the questions of ritual which rendered him obnoxious to the masters of the university. Both Dluhoš and Æneas Sylvius, contemporary writers, state that great friendship united Žižka and Prokop. We have now no contemporary Bohemian records vouching for this, but as most Bohemian historical documents, particularly those referring to the Hussite period, were destroyed after the battle of the White Mountain in 1620, Dr. Neubauer's conjecture that the writers mentioned above derived their information from some now unknown source appears very plausible. The writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries generally described Prokop as the immediate successor of Žižka. The study of the contemporary chroniclers who have now become accessible proves that this is untrue, as has already been mentioned. It is not easy to ascertain the exact position which Prokop at first occupied in the Hussite armies. From the beginning of the war Hussite priests—as has been noted in the case of John of Zělivo—accompanied the national armies. If we consider the intense religious fervour of the Utraquists, it is not surprising to read that during their campaigns their priests not only preached, but also celebrated mass in a wagon specially fitted out for that purpose,¹ which constituted what may be called a moveable chapel. In consequence of the state of intense religious excitement which then prevailed in Bohemia these army

¹ "Sciant omnes et singuli quod falsum nobis adscribitur; non enim in communibus lapidibus absque omni strato sacramenti cumulos conficimus ut experientia docet; scitur enim, quia in civitatibus in quibus missamus habemus utensilia specialiter distincta *et in exercitu campestri specialem currum distinctum in quo deducebantur*" (Pelhřimov in Höfler as above, p. 565).

chaplains soon obtained great influence. When this office was held by a man of great political insight and military talent such as was Prokop, he soon and surely obtained what was practically, though not theoretically, the rank of commander-in-chief. Some of the many disputations among the Utraquist priesthood had dealt with the question whether a priest could take an active part in warfare. Prokop, according to the most reliable accounts, took no active part in the battles at which he was present, differing in this respect from Žižka and all the generals of the period with the exception of King Sigismund. It is only on the day of the battle of Lipany, the last day of his life, that we find Prokop joining in the battle. He seems to have realised the difficulty of this ambiguous position, and the credentials which he took with him to Basel describe him as "*Procopius exercitum Taboritarum in spiritualibus rector.*"

The successes of the national armies at this period induced many Bohemian nobles to rejoin the Utraquist Church. Among them was Čeněk of Wartenberg, who now again received Communion in both kinds and recognised Prince Korybutovič as Regent. This was to be the last transition of the great waverer; he died shortly afterwards in the autumn of 1425. One of the motives which also induced many nobles to rejoin the Hussite ranks was the fact that Prince Korybutovič, as far as circumstances permitted, adopted a conservative policy. Thus it was through his influence that in the new and old towns of Prague, which had been united on the advice of the fanatical priest John of Zělivo, separate municipalities were again established. It was hoped that the more conservative old town would counterbalance the power of the new town, in whose counsels fanatics and demagogues played a considerable part. It appears certain that during the short rule of Korybutovič comparative order and tranquillity prevailed in Prague. Though the Lithuanian prince, as has already been noted, always remained firmly faithful to the articles of Prague,

he certainly favoured the more moderate party among the theologians of the university. This circumstance, as well as the fact that the nobles, whom they hated with the blind hatred of the leveller, now rejoined the Utraquist in great numbers, soon caused suspicion among the extreme Táborites. It seemed probable that new internal dissensions would break out in Bohemia, when the news that the Germans were again planning an invasion of their country caused all Utraquists to unite.

The papal see had replaced Cardinal Branda, whose recall has already been mentioned, by Cardinal Giordano Orsini. The new papal legate in Germany of course maintained the theory—which prevailed up to the convocation of the Council of Basel—according to which laymen could under no condition discuss laws laid down by the Church of Rome. He was really in this view entirely in accordance with King Sigismund, though this has escaped most writers on this period. If Sigismund and the lords “sub una” constantly entered into negotiations with the moderate party among the Hussites, their purpose was to cause these men to be suspected by the Táborites, and thus produce disunion in the ranks of the national party. In the summer of the year 1426 the new papal legate wrote to King Sigismund from Nürnberg, where the imperial diet had assembled: “I think the opportunity” (for attacking Bohemia) “is good; all here are willing, and necessity demands an immediate attack. All the princes are ready for the campaign; nothing now remains but to carry out the design.”¹ This, however, proved difficult, and the cardinal, who had just arrived from Italy, was obviously unaware of the political situation in Germany. King Sigismund had intended to preside at the diet of Nürnberg, and had actually started from Hungary on his way to Germany. He, however, as early as in May 1426, informed the princes

¹ “Reichstagsacten unter Kaiser Siegmund,” VIII, nr. 406 (quoted by Dr. Juritsch, *Der dritte Kreuzzug gegen die Hussiten*).

and free cities of Germany that the state of his health prevented his continuing his journey. Largely in consequence of the absence of Sigismund the results of the diet at Nürnberg were very slight. The ecclesiastical princes were naturally present at the diet in great numbers. We read that among those present were the Archbishops of Maintz and Trier, numerous bishops, Duke Frederick of Saxony, the Margrave of Meissen, and representatives of many free imperial cities. All present seem to have used the absence of King Sigismund as a pretext for limiting their armaments against the Hussites. The imperial cities declared that the forces they were asked to supply were proportionately greater than those which the other states had promised to provide. This caused much controversy and long discussions.¹ The German dukes and princes, occupied with intestine feuds, also mostly proved very unwilling to take part in a new invasion of Bohemia. War had broken out between the Duke of Holstein and the King of Denmark. That sovereign, therefore, refused to take part in the expedition, though the German princes appealed to him for aid. Almost at the same time a feud had begun between Duke Bernhard I of Brunswick and the Archbishop of Bremen. In Bavaria civil war had broken out between the princes of the house of Wittelsbach. The feeling in Germany, except in such lands as Saxony and Austria, which bordered on Bohemia, was, therefore, strongly in favour of non-intervention. Somewhat later, however, the news of the great victory which the Bohemians obtained at Ústi on June 16, 1426, somewhat impressed the Germans. Now believing their country to be really menaced, they in the following year attempted a new crusade.

It has already been mentioned that after their victorious campaign in Moravia and Austria the Bohemians returned to

¹ Dr. Juritsch calls them "höchst unerquickliche und langweilige Verhandlungen mit den Städteboten von Köln, Mainz, Strassburg, Constanz, Ulm und Nürnberg" (*Der dritte Kreuzzug*, p. 5).

their country in the autumn of 1425. Hostilities entirely ceased during the winter; but in the following spring the Bohemians were obliged to defend their frontiers against foreign enemies. The Bohemian city of Ústí nad Labem (Aussig an der Elbe) had, by King Sigismund, been pledged to Duke Frederick of Saxony. It is probable that the ever-impecunious King had thus obtained a loan, and it was certainly not displeasing to him that an important city situated on the banks of the Elbe should by a foreign occupation be secured against the Hussites. The Bohemians, equally aware of the importance of the town, began to besiege it in the spring of 1426. This caused great apprehension in Germany and particularly in Saxony. Duke Frederick was at that moment taking part in the deliberations of the diet of Nürnberg, but his energetic wife, the Duchess Catherine, succeeded in assembling in a very short time a large army that was to march to the aid of the menaced city. Catherine accompanied the German soldiers to the foot of the mountains which separate Bohemia from Saxony, and there took leave of them "with many tears." As soon as the report of the new invasion reached Prague the Bohemians—for once united—determined to march on Ústí with all the forces they could raise. The forces of the Praguers and of the Utraquist nobles; under Prince Korybutovič, marched immediately in the direction of Ústí, while Prokop's army of Táborites, probably to avoid the difficulty of victualling, marched by a less direct route, and on its way captured several towns that were held by the partisans of Sigismund. As soon as the national forces had united, an attack was made on Ústí on June 6, but was repulsed by the Germans. Prokop the Great with the tacit assent of all the troops, now assumed supreme command. Following the tactics of Žižka he placed his army on the slopes of a hill named Běhani, between the villages of Předlic and Hrbovic. He ordered his soldiers to await the attack of the enemies here under the shelter of the wagon-forts. The Hussites here, as

on almost all occasions, were opposed to vastly superior forces. The united Bohemian army, according to the most trustworthy sources, comprised only 25,000 men, while the German forces, commanded by Boso of Vitzthum, numbered 70,000 men. The Bohemians had, however, the advantage of better discipline. As was usually the case with them all dissensions among them ceased at the moment when they faced "the enemies of God and of the Bohemian nation." A contemporary chronicler writes:¹ "As soon as the Germans² arrived at Ústí, the Bohemians sent a gracious letter to them, saying: 'Should God favour you receive us as prisoners in mercy, and should God help us we will do the same unto you.' But the Germans answered: 'This is impossible; for we must, because of the papal ban, kill all, women, old men, girls, children.' Then the Bohemians decided that they would take no German prisoner, but all prayed to God, remembering their honour and their faith. Then Lord Vaněk Černohorský, a field-captain, said: 'He who would rightly fight God's fight must be reconciled with God. Then on Friday, early in the morning, the Bohemians heard a sermon and received the body and blood of God, that they might fight bravely for the law. Prince Sigismund (Korybutovič) also did this; with tears he prayed to God and exhorted the soldiers to fight bravely."

The Bohemians expected to be attacked on Friday, June 14, but no fighting took place on that day, and on the 15th only slight skirmishing began. The following day—the 16th—being Sunday³ the pious Bohemians hoped that no battle would take place on that day, but the Germans, sure of victory,

¹ The two principal contemporary sources are the "*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*," which I have so often quoted and the ballad entitled "*Bitva před Ustím*" ("The Battle before Ústí"), published in the *Výbor z Literatury české* (*Selections from Bohemian Literature*), Vol. II.

² i. e. the German army sent by Duchess Catherine to relieve the city.

³ The Catholic writer Bartošek of Drahonice shared his countrymen's dislike of engaging in battle on Sunday, and attributed the defeat of the Saxons to this circumstance. He writes: "*Hæc facta sunt ipso die dominico, quare nullus die dominico conflictum sapiens intret quia Misnenses inceperunt*" (p. 595 of Professor Goll's edition).

admitted no further delay, fearing that their enemies might escape them. The Germans bravely scaled the hill, on which the Bohemians awaited their attack. Their wagons were connected by chains, and a considerable number of guns which had been placed at short intervals immediately opened fire on the advancing Germans. Behind the guns some of the soldiers were placed, partly protected by large shields, whose pointed lower ends had been driven into the ground. In spite of the incessant fire of the guns and muskets of the Bohemians the Germans continued to advance, and reached the Bohemian encampment, though the great loss of life and the fatigue of the ascent had already weakened them. When the Germans, almost blinded by the smoke caused by the primitive fire-arms of those days, halted for a moment, the Bohemians, faithful to the teaching of their dead leader Žižka, immediately assumed the offensive. First the Táborites, then the Orphans, then the Utraquist nobles under Prince Korybutovič, then the Praguers and the townsmen allied with them, closed with the enemies. Employing a stratagem that was frequently used during the Hussites wars the Bohemians raised the cry, "The Germans fly, they fly!" Some of the German captains then turned their backs on the enemies, exclaiming that everything was lost. The mass of the infantry, hearing this, fled in great disorder, and many were killed while descending the hill. The slaughter was so great that, as we read, the stream that flows from the hill in the direction of Ústi and the fish-pond into which it falls were on that day coloured blood-red. The pond up to the present day bears the name of "Blut Teich" (the pond of blood). As is so frequently the case when an army has been unexpectedly and signally defeated, rumours of treachery were immediately rife.¹ The German nobles who had

¹ The "Chronicon Adami Ursini" (quoted by Toman, *Husitske Válečnictví*) states: "Als nun das deutsche Volk . . . kam, als was es durch Verrätherei mit etlichen Hauptleuten da bestellt, die sich da umkehrten und rannten diesem Volke alles unter Augen, und machten da eine Flucht mit wenig Behmen und schrien es wäre alles Leib und Gut verloren. Also war das Volk alles noch ungeschickt und ward flüchtig."

taken part in the campaign were by the traditions of their caste prevented from joining in a disgraceful rout, which began long before the result of the battle was certain. Deserted by their followers, they for a time attempted a hopeless resistance. They were soon forced to surrender, in consequence of the bravery of the Bohemians, upon which the chroniclers lay great stress on this occasion. Prince Korybutovič and his standard-bearer, the knight Vacha of Rican, fought in the front rank, and the other nobles gathered around the standard. Krušina of Lichtenburg and Victorin of Poděbrad are mentioned by the chroniclers as the bravest of the Utraquist nobles. The German nobles were obliged to surrender, and hoped to find greater mercy on the part of men of their own rank than on that of the ferocious Táborites. In the village of Hrbovic twenty-four counts of the empire and nobles of lower rank dismounted, struck their swords into the soil and kneeling begged for mercy. This was, however, impossible, as the Germans had previously declared with foolish arrogance that they would spare no heretic. The German lords were thus all mercilessly cut down. Lord Jakoubec of Bilina attempted to save the life of the German lord of Wolkenstein. He ordered him as his prisoner to mount on his horse behind him; the merciless Táborites, however, did not permit this. They fired at Wolkenstein from the back, and he dropped down dead from the horse; when falling he nearly dragged down Lord Jakoubec with him. This incident is interesting as showing more clearly than had been previously the case that disunion between the aristocratic and the democratic Utraquists was constantly increasing. This disunion culminated in the battle of Lipany and the subsequent downfall of Utraquism, for which the democratic party was as largely responsible as the aristocratic one. The clever tactics of the Hussites had left but one way of retreat open to the flying Germans; it lay through the village of Chabořice, and led to the mountains which form the frontier between Bohemia and

Saxony. Along this road the pursuit continued relentlessly, and the loss of life was even greater than during the battle. The Utraquists, however, always more humane than their antagonists, now became more merciful. A considerable number of Germans were taken prisoners and conveyed to Lipa and to Mladá Boleslav.¹ Though the figures vary greatly, it is certain that the battle of Ústi was the most sanguinary one of the Hussite wars. The Germans, according to the writers, who minimised their losses, lost 15,000 men. Other chroniclers state that 50,000 Germans were either killed or made prisoners. We are told that numerous members of the greatest families of the German nobility perished here. They had, as previously mentioned, continued to fight when the infantry had already fled. The Bohemian losses were very slight, though it is impossible to believe that they amounted to only thirty men, as the contemporary chroniclers write. The only man of importance whose death they record is the Utraquist knight Bradatý, who, since the beginning of the war, had been one of the bravest defenders of the chalice. The contemporary ballad to which I have already referred concludes its account of the battle with these words :

“ Now, all ye true Christians,
Lords, knights, Praguers and citizens,
Follow the faith of your ancestors,²
Show that you sprang from their blood.
Cling to God's truth;
Thus will you obtain praise from God,
Thus will your race be blessed by God,
Unto eternal life through all times.”

The first and inevitable result of the battle of Ústi was the capture of the town of that name. The German garrison

¹ Palacký, in his *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, publishes letters written by the municipalities of Nürnberg and Görlitz, which deal with the ransoming of prisoners who were detained as captives in Bohemia (Vol. I. pp. 466, 467, 476).

² These words are interesting as proving that the belief that Utraquism was the original form of Christianity in Bohemia was already general at that time. (See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, pp. 94-95 and my *Master John Hus*, pp. 10-11.)

attempted to leave the city immediately after the defeat and to join their flying comrades; but the Bohemians at the same moment entered the town walls, and burnt down the city so completely that, as we are told, the site remained entirely uninhabited for more than three years.

It may have been noticed that very little mention is made of Prokop in the accounts of the great victory of Ústi. This is no doubt largely due to the fact that the contemporary chroniclers delighted in recording the brave deeds of arms of the Utraquist lords and of Prince Korybutovič and his Polish followers. Prokop's reluctance to appear as a warrior and his wish to accentuate his priestly office may also be one of the reasons why his name is not more prominent in the accounts of the great battle. There is, however, no doubt that the Hussites attributed their great victory mainly to Prokop. It was he who, following Žižka's example, chose admirably the position which so largely contributed to the success, and Prokop and his Táborites were the first to assume the offensive when the Germans had reached the heights on which the national army was entrenched. Prokop's military genius was henceforth recognised not only by his Táborite followers, but by the members of all Utraquist parties. As Dr. Neubauer writes: "A new epoch of the Hussite wars begins with the victory of Ústi, the epoch of Prokop; it was the epoch of great victories over the crusaders and of the successful incursions into distant lands."

After the great victory of Ústi the soundest policy for the Bohemians would have been to assume the offensive and invade the neighbouring German lands. They could, indeed, only hope to secure peace if the Germans also endured the hardships and the horrors of incessant inexorable warfare from which Bohemia had now suffered for six years. The feeling in favour of an invasion of the neighbouring countries naturally became stronger after a course of almost uninterrupted victories. The soldiers, particularly the Táborites, became

more and more self-confident, and desirous to transfer the seat of war from their own exhausted country to other regions where provisions and rich booty could be obtained. This feeling was, however, much stronger among the Táborites than among the partisans of Prince Korybutovič, who wished to found an orderly government in Bohemia and to establish, if possible, friendly relations with the neighbouring countries.¹

It is certain that in Germany everyone believed in the danger of an imminent Bohemian invasion. The German townsmen in all parts of the country began to repair and strengthen the city walls, and many towns such as Jena, Halle, and Magdeburg erected new fortifications. Even in the distant regions near the Rhine it was thought necessary to arm against a probable invasion. The apathy of the Germans disappeared, at least for a time. The German princes were unable to ignore this popular movement, and agreed to attempt a new invasion of Bohemia in the following year.

Before referring to this new crusade it is necessary to consider the internal state of Bohemia at this moment, and to allude briefly to the domestic troubles which immediately followed the victory of Ústí. Shortly before the battle Victorin of Poděbrad, one of the greatest Utraquist nobles and a personal friend of Žižka, had abandoned the Táborites, joined the moderate Utraquists, and recognised Prince Korybutovič as his sovereign. It is evident that the Utraquist nobles had not the same confidence in Prokop which they had formerly had in Žižka, with whom many of them had been on terms of friendship. Victorin's step, which he no doubt considered as a defection, infuriated Prokop. He marched with his Táborites on Poděbrad and besieged this principal stronghold of the lords who took their name from it. Poděbrad was strongly fortified, and in one direction protected by the river Elbe. We have here, as so often in the annals of the Hussite wars, little authentic information; but it appears certain that

¹ See Grünhagen, *Hussitenkämpfe der Schlesier*, particularly pp. 104-105.

the attempt to capture the stronghold failed.¹ The abandonment of the siege may also have been caused by the news that the Archduke Albert of Austria, that inveterate enemy of the Utraquists, had again invaded Moravia. He laid siege to the important Moravian town of Brěclava (in German, Lundenburg), situated close to the Austrian frontier, which had been occupied by the Táborites. Prokop's victorious army easily defeated the Austrians and forced them to raise the siege.

These incidents of local warfare are of little interest in comparison with the new civic revolution that broke out in Prague about this time. The real plans and intentions of the Lithuanian Prince Korybutovič are one of the many enigmas which we encounter in Bohemian history. Korybutovič has almost always been judged severely, and, indeed, unfairly by Bohemian historians. He has very frequently been accused of treachery to the Bohemians during his second stay in their country. This accusation requires some definition. It is certain that shortly after the victory of Usti Korybutovič entered into negotiations with Pope Martin V. The pontiff had informed Ladislav King of Poland and the Grand Duke Vitold of Lithuania, both relations of Korybutovič, that "he was willing to grant a hearing to the heretics" if the princes consented to act as mediators.² In consequence of this a Polish ambassador started for Rome to open negotiations, and his mission only ended with the subsequent fall of Korybutovič. It is distinctly unfair to describe these negotiations as "an attempt to deliver up Bohemia to the Pope and deprive the people of all the results of their many victories." It is far more probable that Korybutovič wished to obtain certain concessions from Rome, similar to those afterwards granted

¹ Bartošek of Drahonice writes: "presbyter Procopius . . . cum sectis castrum Poděbrad . . . circumvallaverunt, et ipsum cum magnis pixidibus et machinis hostiliter conabantur expugnare ultra quinque septimanas et nequientes lucrare ob duram defensionem et audacem, abinde recesserunt" (p. 595 of Professor Goll's edition).

² Professor Goll, *Cechy a Prusy (Bohemia and Prussia)*, p. 190-193.

at the Council of Basel, on which occasion the Bohemian leaders, including Prokop the Great, did not hesitate to negotiate with the Roman Church. It is probable that Korybutovič, a man brought up in Lithuania, where the majority of the population belonged to the Eastern Church, cherished a very genuine reverence for the tenets of Utraquism. Even if we set aside these considerations and consider Korybutovič merely as an ambitious adventurer, as some German writers have done, there could have been no worse policy for him than unconditional surrender to Rome. Almost the only Bohemians who desired this submission were the lords "sub una," and these men were as entirely devoted to Sigismund, whom they considered their legitimate sovereign, as they were to the Church of Rome.¹ Even the statement that Korybutovič favoured, among the clergy of Prague, priests such as Christian of Prachatice² and Peter Mladenovic,³ who were known as men of moderate views, proves rather the contrary of what it intended to prove. These men had been the intimate friends of Hus and were better than others acquainted with his views, which, as I have written elsewhere, were far less antagonistic to the Church of Rome than is usually supposed. Christian of Prachatice and Mladenovič were accused of using vestments and of retaining part of the Catholic ritual. They were, however, known as fervent adherents of the articles of Prague. It is probable that the accusation of negotiating with Rome, which then had the same effect as the cry of "no popery" once had in England, was mainly raised by the city demagogues of Prague, with whose anarchical plans Korybutovič's endeavour to establish orderly government in

¹ Palacký, with his usual acumen, noted that neither Korybutovič nor any party then contemplated unconditional surrender to Rome. He writes: "Solch eine Unterhandlung und Versöhnung, wo die Sieger als büssende Sünder und verirrte sich freiwillig dem bisherigen Feinde auf Gnade ergeben sollten; lag keineswegs in der Absicht der Mehrzahl, selbst der gemässigten Kelchner" (*Geschichte von Böhmen*, Vol. III. ii. p. 425, German edition).

² See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 235 and 275.

³ See my *History of Bohemian Literature*, particularly p. 145, and *Master John Hus*, pp. 241-243, 283-285, etc.

Bohemia greatly interfered. It is certain that Korybutovič, in agreement with the Utraquist nobles, intended to maintain order in Bohemia with a strong hand and to suppress the seditions which, particularly in Prague, were constantly caused by fanatics. Though all Bohemians had hitherto rallied to the national standard whenever the country was attacked by foreigners, it was doubtful whether this would always be the case. It was, on the other hand, certain that the country, if divided against itself, would eventually succumb to its numerous and powerful enemies.

As was invariably the case during the Hussite wars, renewed dissensions among the clergy led to civic disturbances. The fact that John of Příbram,¹ the leader of the Hussite High Church, Peter Mladenovič and Christian of Prachatice enjoyed the full confidence of Korybutovič greatly incensed the more advanced Utraquists, whose leader was then the priest John of Rokycan, who afterwards became Utraquist Archbishop of Prague. Rokycan and his followers denounced the priests who used vestments and the ritual of the Roman Church as idolaters who were betraying the Bohemian Church to Rome. Popular excitement became very great, and according to the generally accepted account, Korybutovič conceived a plot—concerning which we are given no information—to arrest the hostile Utraquist priests. He is stated to have invited to a banquet one of his pages, Svojše of Zahradka, and his under-chamberlain, John Rozvoda of Stakov, and to have given them secret instructions, which are unknown to us. The two courtiers, we are told, were to leave Prague at night-time, and then to re-enter the city, and to leave open one of the gates. It is hardly necessary to point out the vagueness of these statements. Korybutovič is also said to have been mistaken in the choice of his confidants. The two courtiers immediately informed the enemies of Korybutovič of this plot, and though they left Prague they returned on the following day (April 17, 1427).

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 361-362.

Rozvoda, who appears to have acted as leader of the party opposed to the Lithuanian prince,¹ was accompanied by numerous partisans. One of the tumults so frequent in Prague at that period then took place, but it was this time unaccompanied by bloodshed. The bells of all the church towers were rung, and the people hurried to the market-place. John of Rokycan, followed by many priests of his faction and carrying the Sacrament, then left the neighbouring Týn church² and appeared on the market-place. He declared that a plot against him and his followers had been discovered, and called on the people to defend him. Jerome Šrol, formerly one of the adherents of John of Želivo, also called the people to arms. The citizens immediately began to attack the residence of Prince Korybutovič, who was greatly surprised at this sudden invasion and quite unprepared for resistance. He was, therefore, taken prisoner, without any struggle³ and conveyed in disguise to the Hradčany castle on the left bank of the Vltavo. From here his captors afterwards brought him to the castle of Valdštýn, where he remained a prisoner for some time. The *coup d'état* was carried out so suddenly and secretly that even his most intimate followers were for

¹ The author of the contemporary ballad "O zajeti Sigmunda Korybutoviče" ("On the Capture of Sigismund Korybutovič") writes: "First will I mention Rozvoda, who was the leader, and took the part of the deceased Judas" (*Výbor z Literatury české—Selections from Bohemian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 311).

² See my *Prague* ("Mediæval Towns" series), p. 155-156.

³ The ancient chroniclers thus describe this event: "On Thursday in Passion Week there were great disturbances in Prague because of a plot made against Sigismund of Lithuania, who was then in his princely residence, by Master John of Rokycan, then preacher at the church of the Mother of God at the Týn, together with some citizens of Prague and knights, particularly Svojše of Zahradka and Rozvoda, surnamed Rameš; they seized him [one of the MSS. here adds the untrue statement "because he would not receive Communion in the two kinds"] and brought him by night in disguise to the castle of Prague [Hradčany], and then conveyed him to the castle of Valdštýn, and [afterwards] drove him out of the country. Thus did the Praguers repay him [Korybutovič] for his services and his aid against their enemies. But the Lord God did not leave these traitors unpunished; for Rozvoda, surnamed Rameš, was shortly afterwards shot dead by one of his servants, and Svojše before his death became insane, and the others also ended their lives miserably" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. pp. 70-71).

some time unaware of the place to which he had been conveyed.

As Professor Tomek writes, our information concerning this civic revolution is very scant, and it is hardly necessary to point out how very improbable some parts of the generally accepted account appear. It is scarcely imaginable that Korybutovič, whom his enemies describe as a traitor and intriguer, and who had at any rate much experience of the political life in Bohemia and other Slavic countries, should have entrusted two members of his household with a weighty political mission without informing his numerous and powerful allies among the Utraquist nobility of his intentions. Yet none of these allies were ready to come to his aid, and Korybutovič himself was obviously taken by surprise when suddenly attacked in his dwelling. In the almost entire absence of trustworthy evidence, it may be at least conjectured that the *coup d'état* of April 17 was not a plot of Prince Korybutovič, but a plot against him. This view is confirmed by the fact that almost immediately after the imprisonment of Korybutovič Rozvoda and Svojše obtained important offices under the new municipality of Prague. As far as we are able to judge, public opinion disapproved of this sudden outrage inflicted on one who had proved himself a true friend of Bohemia. I have already quoted on this subject passages from the contemporary chroniclers and from a ballad of the period. The author of this ballad probably expressed the general opinion at the time when he wrote :

" Thus did they [the enemies of Korybutovič] act.
They set us at variance with the whole world.
We then lost [the help of] Poland,
Whence we formerly received aid.
They [the enemies of Korybutovič] did not heed this;
They took good care of themselves in Prague."

As the last lines of the ballad which I have quoted indicate, great changes took place in the distribution of the municipal dignities in Prague, and the principal offices were given to

those who had taken a prominent part in the revolution; among these were, as already mentioned, Svojše and Rozvoda. The imprisonment of Prince Korybutovič was immediately followed by that of the priests Christian of Prachatice, Peter Mladenovič, Master John of Příbram, and Master Prokop of Plzeň. They were conveyed to the prison in the town-hall, where they remained in safety, though the rabble demanded that they should be drowned.

Though the deposition of Prince Korybutovič is noted by the contemporary writers rather as an incident of civic strife than as the turning-point in the Hussite war, its great importance is very evident to the modern student. The rule of Korybutovič, though it had, except in Prague and in the cities allied or subject to the capital, been but a nominal one, had yet, to a certain extent, united the antagonistic Hussite parties. The powerful Utraquist nobility, which had played so great a part in the Hussite movement, now began to foresee that the fall of Korybutovič would slowly but surely undermine its influence in the country and transfer all power to the ultra-democratic party. If this evolution did not immediately take place, the reason is to be found in the fact that a new and—as was then believed—dangerous crusade at that moment menaced Bohemia. In September 1426 the Hussite general Přibík of Klenov had, almost without resistance, obtained possession of the important city of Střibo (in German, Miess), which is situated on the direct road between Plzeň and Cheb. The occupation of this town, in which the Utraquists immediately established a nationalist municipality, was considered as a permanent menace by the inhabitants of the neighbouring German districts, as well as by the Bohemian cities which had remained faithful to King Sigismund and the Roman Church. The spot most menaced by the Hussites was the town of Tachov, situated at a short distance from Střibro. The townsmen of Tachov were greatly alarmed, and wrote to the town-councillors of Cheb, begging them, “ for the love of

God and of His dear mother Mary, of all Saints, and the Christian faith and our beloved King (Sigismund), to come to their aid; they hoped with their aid and with that of the knights and nobles and other pious men to recapture the town and castle of Střibro.”¹ The Hussite occupation of Střibro certainly caused considerable anxiety in Germany, and it seemed probable for a time that the Germans would abandon their habitual apathy. The German electors met at Frankfort on November 27, 1426, for the purpose of planning a new crusade. They appear, however, to have arrived at no conclusion, and contented themselves with summoning all the German princes and free imperial cities to another meeting in February 1427, which was again to take place at Frankfort. This new meeting, however, proved a complete failure; not one of the German electors was present in person.

In the early spring of 1427 the Hussites again assumed the offensive and invaded Silesia and Austria, obtaining considerable successes in both countries. In the absence of King Sigismund, who, during the years 1427 and 1428, was entirely occupied in defending Hungary against the Turks, the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg summoned the German princes to another imperial diet, which was again to meet at Frankfort in April. This time the proceedings led to more serious results; the Germans were evidently impressed by the fact that the Bohemians now assumed the offensive and began to invade Germany. In a comparatively short time—the assembly broke up on May 4—it was resolved that a new crusade against Bohemia should be proclaimed, and that that country was to be simultaneously invaded by four armies, who were to start from Nürnberg, Saxony, Silesia, and Austria. The largest force was to assemble at Nürnberg, the usual residence of Margrave Frederick, who held the office of burgrave of that city. The diet also issued military regulations in view

¹ Letter printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkriegs*, Vol. I. p. 473.

of the new enterprise. Knowing how greatly the indiscriminate slaughter of the whole population had exasperated the Bohemians, the diet decreed that only those who were undoubtedly heretics should be killed; other enactments attempted to limit the indiscriminate plundering which had taken place during the former invasions of Bohemia by the Germans. It is certainly somewhat surprising that shortly before the day fixed for the meeting of the crusaders at Nürnberg, Frederick of Brandenburg, who was believed to be the intended leader of the crusaders, should have entered into negotiations with the Bohemians.¹ In a letter addressed to the citizens of Prague² on June 25, Frederick, after deploring the state of Bohemia caused by incessant internal and foreign warfare, formally offered his mediation. He told the Praguers that both he and his ancestors had received many favours and benefits from Bohemia, and that he was ready, as far as his God and his honour permitted, to prove his gratitude. He promised to do his utmost to obtain a peaceful settlement. The magistrates of Prague, in a letter dated July 5, thanked³ the elector warmly, and also expressed an ardent desire for peace. They declared, however, that only a general assembly of the nobles, knights, and townsmen of Bohemia was entitled to enter into definite negotiations in view of peace. The margrave's chancery sent a similar letter favouring a peaceful agreement to the citizens of Žatec. The answer of the citizens of Žatec was more explicit.⁴ They declared that they were not enemies of the holy primitive Church, and with God's grace never would be; they would, on the contrary, follow God,

¹ Though this fact was long known it is only recently that Dr. Juritsch, in his valuable monograph entitled *Der dritte Kreuzzug gegen die Hussiten*, has attributed the failure of that crusade to Margrave Frederick, and indeed directly accused him of treachery, in a similar fashion to that in which he accuses Prince Korybutovič of the same offence. It must be said that Dr. Juritsch—as was once said of Mommsen—invariably ascribes men's actions to the lowest motives.

² Printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I. p. 516.

³ Also printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I. p. 519.

⁴ Dr. Juritsch, *Der dritte Kreuzzug*, etc., p. 22.

as far as it was in their power, according to the laws of our Lord Jesus Christ, the dear holy apostles, the dear holy fathers, and the other saints.¹

These negotiations were certainly a strange prelude to the new crusade. The Elector of Brandenburg had for some time been on very bad terms with King Sigismund, and for reasons with which I have not to deal here, war between the two princes for a time appeared to be imminent. The elector, therefore, may not have considered so great a victory for the house of Luxemburg-Habsburg as the submission of Bohemia would have been favourable to his own far-reaching plans, and it is at least not impossible that the first Hohenzollern who became prominent in history may already have coveted the Bohemian crown.

By the end of June the main army of the crusaders had assembled at Nürnberg, though many cities had not yet sent their contingents, who started on their march slowly and reluctantly. There was no enthusiasm, and never perhaps has the term "crusade" been so grossly misused. On July 9,

¹ Dr. Juritsch, in his endeavour to prove the Hussite sympathies of the Elector Frederick, here quotes the well-known ballad of Lawrence of Březova on the battle of Domázlitz, to which I shall again refer later. In this ballad Frederick is made to say :

"Queratur certum medium
Per prudentum concilium
Quo queat ille populus [the Bohemian people]
Vobis reddi benevolus
Mihi videtur optimum
Tanto morbo remedium
Instemus omnes seduli
Ut ipsorum articuli [the articles of Prague]
Quos et scripturis comprobant
Pro quibus semper litigant
Serventur in ecclesia
Tota certe Katholica
Prout servarunt pariter
Primi fideles fortiter."

Březova's ballad can certainly claim little historical value, but it undoubtedly tends to prove that popular opinion at the time believed Margrave Frederick to be more favourable to the Hussite views than the other German princes.

after the arrival of the forces of the Archbishop of Mainz, the German army at last marched to the Bohemian frontier. It consisted of two divisions, one of which was commanded by the Archbishop Otho of Trier, while the other had as its leader the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg. No plan of campaign seems at first to have existed, and the two armies operated quite independently. Frederick began his campaign by occupying the frontier-town of Cheb. As he afterwards informed King Sigismund in his report,¹ he attempted here to obtain information concerning the movements of the other German princes who had crossed the Bohemian frontiers. Having heard that the army of the archbishop, after crossing the frontier, had marched directly on Tachov, Frederick decided to have an interview with Otho of Trier and agree on a plan of campaign. Though this does not appear very clearly from Frederick's report, Dr. Juritsch is probably right in conjecturing² that it was decided at this interview that the crusaders should continue to form two armies, which were to advance separately on Prague, the centre of the Hussite movement and unite before the city. The southern army, under the Archbishop of Trier, with whom were the Duke John of Bavaria and many temporal and spiritual German princes, was to march by way of Tachov, Střibro, and Plzeň, and then follow the course of the Vltava river in the direction of Prague. The northern army, under the Elector of Brandenburg, was to combine its movements with those of the Saxons, indefatigable enemies of the Hussites, against whom they were again preparing to march. The northern army and the Saxons—whom the crusaders wrongly believed to have already crossed the frontier—were to unite at Podersam to march to Slané (Schlan) and thence to menace the neighbouring capital of Bohemia. The plan was not unskilfully conceived, but was founded on entirely false premises. A diversion was expected on the

¹ Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I. pp. 539–542.

² *Der dritte Kreuzzug*, etc., p. 30.

Austrian frontier, but Archduke Albert, who had been signally defeated by Prokop in the spring, now considered himself unable to take part in the crusade. When Frederick entered into communication with the Elector of Saxony the information he received was also unsatisfactory. The elector declared that all his North-German allies who had promised him assistance had failed to send their contingents, and that he himself was prevented by illness from taking part in the coming campaign. He stated, however, that he entrusted his son, the Duke Frederick, with the command of his troops. It was then settled that the Saxon forces should join the Elector of Brandenburg at Maštov (in German, Maschau), a small town near Karlsbad. The young Saxon prince, however, after at last crossing the Bohemian frontier, halted at Kadaň. It is a proof of the great terror which the Hussites then inspired in all Germany that he should here have refused to continue his advance, probably fearing to be attacked by the Bohemians on his march. He begged the Elector of Brandenburg to join him at Kadaň, and Frederick, already somewhat disgusted with the campaign—as appears from his correspondence—reluctantly consented to do this. The united forces then marched to the small town of Žlutice (in German, Luditz), which they occupied without resistance, as the Bohemian commander, Jakoubec Bilinský, unable to resist the overwhelming forces of the enemy, hastily evacuated the city.

The southern army had meanwhile marched on Tachov, where the crusaders were enthusiastically received by the citizens, who welcomed them as their saviours. They then marched to Plan, no doubt to be in closer contact with the northern army. The Germans seem at this moment to have been very confident of victory. Duke John of Bavaria, in a letter dated from Plan on July 14, announced to the Bishop of Regensburg that the Archduke Albert of Austria, with the gracious aid of the King of the Romans (Sigismund), had already arrived at the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia with a large

army,¹ that the Silesians were besieging the town of Nachod on the Bohemian frontier, and that he hoped that with God's aid everything would be well. A letter of Hans Stallbogner, commander of the Nürnberg contingent,² is also written in a somewhat hopeful spirit, but he alludes to the dissensions among the crusaders. He writes that "the Duke of Saxony is at the head of a force of 20,000 men, and he should join us, but he wishes rather than we should join him; but this our Lord of Trier (the archbishop) and the princes will not do; they wish rather to march to the aid of castles (of the Roman Catholic nobles) in the district of Plzeň."

The discord among the Germans to which Stallbogner alluded soon became very serious. Some of the crusaders; among others the Bishop of Augsburg and the commander of the forces of the Suabian league, were already preparing to return to Germany. Wishing to act in agreement with the elector of Brandenburg, the Archbishop of Trier invited him to a conference, and suggested the former monastery of Tepl, situated between Žlutice and Plan, as a meeting place. When, however, the Archbishop of Trier, who was accompanied by Duke Otho of Brunswick, reached Tepl it was ascertained that the Elector of Brandenburg had not arrived there. This news seems to have caused great depression in the ranks of the crusaders. One of the captains of the Suabian troops wrote: "It would have been better if we had never come here." Those who were not absorbed by the thought of the dangers which menaced the army seem to have been in a state of complete indifference.³ The crusaders had also greatly over-rated the value of the aid which they hoped to obtain from the owners of the neighbouring Bohemian castles who were

¹ The chronicler Andrew of Regensburg, who publishes this letter, adds the characteristic remark: "Hic [Albert of Austria] isto tempore nunquam venit in campum. Vide hic quomodo etiam principes falluntur."

² Palacký *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, Vol. I. pp. 527-528.

³ Dr. Juritsch writes: "Es herrschte bei den Herrn in Plan eine grenzenlose Sorglosigkeit; sie scheinen sich hinter dem Bierkrüge ausserordentlich wohl zu befinden und ganz vergessen zu haben was der Krieg erheischt."

Catholics. These lords "sub una" were often closely connected with the Utraquist nobles, and knew that the religious views of the latter did not differ widely from the Church of Rome. Many of the lords "sub una" were also nationalists in their views, and did not wish to help the Germans to subdue their country.

It was not, therefore, under very favourable auspices that the crusaders marched to Střibro on July 22. The army was not complete even then, and troops of crusaders were still crossing the passes from Bavaria to Bohemia. Much disappointment was caused by the delay of the arrival of Cardinal Henry Beaufort, Bishop of Winchester, who had now been appointed papal legate, and who was to proceed to the site of war accompanied by 1000 English archers, then famed in all parts of the continent. Cardinal Beaufort arrived at Nürnberg on July 13, and remained there up to the 28th of that month. He then proceeded to Tachov, but travelling leisurely only arrived there on August 4. On July 23 the siege of Střibro began. The city was bravely defended by Přibík of Klenov, who was aided by the strong natural position of the town. In one direction the Misa river and in another a stream that runs into that river rendered it almost impregnable to the armies of the fifteenth century. The bombardment appears to have been carried out with little energy, and to have been directed almost exclusively against the town walls. It is at any rate certain that the city, though garrisoned by only 200 men, remained in the hands of the Hussites. On the last days of July the crusaders were joined by the troops of the Elector of Brandenburg, and by those of the Saxon prince. Almost immediately after his arrival in the camp before Střibro the Elector Frederick was suddenly seized with illness.¹ According to his report to King Sigismund, "he was suddenly attacked by so great a bodily weakness that the Archbishop of Trier, who was also there (in the camp), and

¹ Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. I. p. 539-542.

other friends counselled and advised him to go to Tachov, and to remain there for some days, according to the advice of the doctors." The Bohemians were meanwhile actively occupied in preparing the defence of their country. On July 11, the first division of the Táborites marched through Prague to the neighbouring White Mountain. Prokop the Great joined them on the 15th of that month, and somewhat later the forces of the town of Prague and of the Utraquist nobles also met there. The united Hussite army then marched on Plzeň.¹ They were joined on their march by the troops of one of the Utraquist nobles, Lord Beneš of Kolowrat, and this is said to have caused some delay. It was only on August 2 that the vanguard of the Bohemians arrived in view of the city of Střibro. Henry of Plauen was sent by the Germans with a small troop of cavalry to reconnoitre, and the leaders of the German army immediately held a council of war. Though one of the German princes suggested that they should adopt the Bohemian tactics and await the attack of the enemies under the protection of their armoured wagons, this proposal was rejected, as the Germans had not—as the Bohemians generally had—a sufficient number of these wagons. It was finally decided to abandon the siege of Střibro and to march with the whole army in the direction in which the Bohemians were expected. Though we have fuller information concerning the third crusade against the Bohemians than on other events of the Hussite wars, it is not very clear what now occurred. It is certain that as soon as the news of the approach of the Bohemians became known among the crusaders great con-

¹ Bartošek of Drahonice writes (p. 596 of Professor Goll's edition): "*Pragenses vero cum presbytero Procopio et aliis sectis Taboriensium et Orphanorum cum aliis eorum capitaneis et eorum complicitibus inter quos nullus notabilis dominus erat, congregantes de civitatibus et villis ad xv centena equitum et xvi peditum cum curribus et pixidibus eorum versus prædictos principes, qui ut dicebant plus quam Lxxx milia equitum et tantum vel plus peditum processerunt.*" The statement that no territorial nobles took part in this campaign is of course incorrect. Palacký conjectures that Bartošek, a bitter enemy of the Hussites, insinuated that the Utraquist nobles followed Prokop reluctantly.

fusion, almost a panic, broke out among them. On the evening of August 2 Henry of Plauen returned to the German camp with the news that Prokop and the whole Hussite army were advancing on Střibro by the Plzeň road. The German generals ordered their troops to advance on the following morning, and also gave the order that all the tents in the camps should be burnt. This caused a panic—as incomprehensible as such panics often are; it began among the wagoners, but soon spread among the soldiers also, and the whole army fled in disorder in the direction of Tachov before even a single shot had been fired.¹ The panic was so great that many of the fliers did not halt even at Tachov, but continued their hurried and inglorious retreat till they reached the frontiers of Germany. Abandoned by most of their men the German princes, with the cavalry and a few guns which they had retained, retreated to Tachov on the evening of August 3. The flight of the crusaders was all the more dishonourable because the Hussites, exhausted by long marches, had no intention of attacking immediately. The crusaders, therefore, fled on that day without being pursued, as the chronicler whom I have just quoted wrote.²

On the evening of August 3 the German princes held another council, at which Cardinal Henry of Winchester presided. This gave great offence to the Germans, as the previous papal legates who had accompanied their armies had never claimed such a right. The Germans may not have known that Henry of Beaufort was far more a warrior than a dignitary of the Church. The Elector of Brandenburg was specially offended, as he was considered the commander-in-chief, and as he had,

¹ The chronicler Andrew of Regensburg writes: "In hac vero tertia expeditione [the third crusade] quod dolenter scribo nemine persequente de Bohemia sic festinarunt ut ad literam videretur adimpletum illud Isaie prophetæ: 'Cuncti principes fugerunt.'" (Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. II. pp. 452-453.)

² Ebendorfer of Haselbach writes: "Dum Misam [Střibro] . . . Principes Electores cum ceteris obsedisent *Capitaneo Exercitus Burgravio Nurimbergensi ipsi quoque fugam iniissent nemine persequente*" (*Chronicon Austriacum* Pez Tom. I. p. 852). It will be noted that Ebendorfer describes the retreat to Tachov in the same words as Andrew of Regensburg.

as already mentioned, negotiated with the Hussites in the name of the German princes. The council of war decided to oppose the advance of the Bohemians, and made a last attempt to raise the spirits of the despondent crusaders. It was, however, fruitless. While the heralds proclaimed in the streets of Tachov that the army would attack the Bohemians on the following morning, an incessant stream of fugitives, with many provision- and ammunition-carts, was pouring through the town, intent on reaching the Bavarian frontier as quickly as possible. When, therefore, Cardinal Beaufort on the following morning appeared on a hill near Tachov bearing the banner of the Church and exhorting the soldiers to defend their faith, he must have known that this step would prove resultless, and Dr. Juritsch is hardly too severe when he describes the cardinal's attempt as an act of theatrical display. According to a German contemporary ballad, the young Duke of Saxony offered to lead his troops against the Hussites, while Frederick of Brandenburg rightly foresaw that under the circumstances any attempt to encounter the Hussites would result in a disaster worse than that at Ústi had been. It is probable that a very angry dispute between the two princes arose, and the English cardinal, perhaps to prove his impartiality, entrusted the papal standard to neither of them, but to the Count Palatine John of Neumarkt, requesting him to lead the army against the Hussites. This caused further trouble, as the German princes disputed the right of an English ecclesiastic to appoint the leader of their armies. This new quarrel, almost in view of the enemy, seems not unjustifiably to have irritated the cardinal. He threw the banner to the ground before the German, and expressed himself in very strong language.¹ This dispute seems to have continued up to the moment when the Bohemian cavalry was approaching. The Hussites marched with their usual rapidity, and rested for a

¹ "Cardinalis . . . vexilla distraxit et in terram ante ipsos Teutonicos projecit et ipsos non modice maledixit" (*Bartosek of Drahonice*, p. 596).

short time near Střibro in the quarters where the crusaders had encamped on the previous night. The result of the approach of the enemies was immediate, and a general stampede began, in which the cardinal was obliged to join. The Elector of Brandenburg only halted when he had reached the little town of Wunsiedel in Bavaria. The Hussites on this occasion followed in hot pursuit and massacred a very large number of the Germans during their flight through the mountain-passes which here divide Bavaria from Bohemia. If we include the wagoners, camp-followers, and others who followed the mediæval armies in large crowds, it can be stated that the Germans killed during this flight numbered about 100,000 men; this—the figure given by the contemporary chroniclers—is probably but slightly, if at all, exaggerated. A certain number of Germans and some Bohemian Catholics, who had found the roads blocked by the enormous crowds of fugitives who were hurrying in the direction of the mountain-passes, took refuge in the city of Tachov, which was strongly fortified according to the ideas of that time. With their usual rapidity the Bohemians began immediately to bombard the city. The siege began on August 5, was carried out with great energy, and within a week the Bohemian artillery had set fire to considerable parts of the town, and the Hussites had also succeeded in undermining the city walls. Prolonged street-fighting took place after they penetrated within the city walls on August 11. Some of the defenders finally took refuge in the castle, but they were also obliged to surrender on the 14th from want of provisions. The Bohemians here also showed that comparative humanity which distinguished them from their German antagonists. The garrisons of the town and castle were led off as prisoners, and the woman and children—according to the usual custom of the Hussites—remained unharmed.¹ In less than a month after their

¹ "Mulieribus tamen et parvulis, qui primos impetus evaserant parcentes, eos autem qui de exercitu Catholicorum ibi manserant, ex quibus quamplures

departure from Prague Prokop the Great and his victorious army returned to the capital of Bohemia. By no means intoxicated by their brilliant successes, the Bohemians proposed to their enemies to enter into fresh negotiations, which were to take the customary but generally ineffectual form of a religious disputation. I shall again refer to these deliberations in the next chapter.

It will, I think, appear clearly from this account that the third crusade, as indeed all the crusades against Bohemia, was doomed to failure from its beginning. It is evident that the German princes, with the exception of those of Austria and Saxony, countries which always had much intercourse with Bohemia, were far more absorbed in their own quarrels and rivalries than in the affairs of Bohemia. The Germans were at first inclined to underrate the importance of the Hussite movement. When bitter experience taught them that this supposition was erroneous they, with the superstition so characteristic of that age, took refuge in the idea that the Hussites were superhuman beings sent by a demoniacal power to chastise mankind, and that it was therefore hopeless to attempt to resist them. Another circumstance which contributed largely to the failure of these expeditions was the incapacity and mutual distrust of the generals. King Sigismund was above all things desirous to be recognised by the Bohemians as their King, and then to obtain their aid in his incessant wars against the Turks. He was in some respects no very strict upholder of the claims of the Church of Rome, and it is noteworthy that while bitterly opposing the articles of Prague, which demanded the poverty of the clergy, he himself acted in accordance with these articles by largely distributing Church lands among those members of the

ad custodiam civitatis positi erant et alios qui ad conservandum se ad castrum ibidem confugerant numero plus quam MCCCC, viros exulis omnibus quae habebant in captivitatem ducunt" ("Andrew of Regensburg," Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, Vol. II. p. 454).

Bohemian nobility who had remained faithful to his cause. The fact that on many other occasions Sigismund appeared as very subservient to the Church of Rome may be attributed to conscientious remorse for his scandalous private life, the record of which it is well to leave to those who wrote in Latin. With regard to the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, the official leader of the third crusade, it is very difficult to express a positive opinion. Dr. Juritsch recently, in his study which I have frequently quoted, practically accuses the Elector of Brandenburg of treachery. It has already been mentioned that the elector had for some time been on bad terms with King Sigismund. He had entered into an alliance with Poland at a moment when the rulers of that country were greatly exasperated against Sigismund because of the judgment, favourable to the Teutonic order, which he pronounced at the meeting of the imperial diet at Breslau in 1420. Frederick himself had on several occasions been involved in quarrels with that order, and it appears clear from his letters that his policy had what would now be called an "anti-clerical character." It should also be mentioned here that in 1430 Margrave Frederick made an agreement with Prokop the Great according to which papal and Utraquist divines were to meet at Nürnberg and discuss the question whether the articles of Prague could be accepted by the Catholic Church. It is therefore certain that the Elector Frederick maintained a conciliatory attitude and favoured a peaceful agreement with the national Church of Bohemia; this feeling naturally became stronger when the elector observed the incapacity of the German leaders, the discord among the princes and the complete absence of all discipline among the soldiers. German writers have, however, gone much further, and have accused Frederick of having treacherously attempted to obtain the Bohemian crown. I have already alluded to this conjecture, which is at least very improbable. In distinction from most of the other German princes, Frederick was at that period

well informed with regard to the state of affairs in Bohemia. He employed secret agents in Prague, from whom he received lengthy reports.¹ He must have known through these men how large a part of the Bohemian people was then opposed to all monarchical rule, and what great difficulties even Korybutovič, a Slavic prince who had accepted the articles of Prague, encountered when he attempted to obtain the Bohemian crown. Frederick must also have known through his agents how strong the anti-German feeling then was in Bohemia; nor could he be ignorant of the fact that no assistance could be expected from the nobles "sub una," whose dynastic affection for Sigismund was as great as their devotion to Rome. It should also be noted that the extreme adherents, both of the Roman Church and of Hussitism, have in their writings a tendency to accuse of treachery all moderate men who desired a peaceful agreement and were not carried away by unreasoning fanaticism.

About this time the career of Prince Korybutovič came to an end in Bohemia—at least for a time. It is evident that the Lithuanian prince, who had certainly succeeded in re-establishing order in Bohemia to a certain extent, and who had been imprisoned on the strength of very doubtful accusations, still had many adherents in Bohemia, not only among the Utraquist nobles, but also among the citizens of Prague. One of the most prominent adherents of Korybutovič, Lord Hynek of Kolštýn, planned an attack on Prague. He hoped in this fashion to force the city magistrates to reveal the spot in which they had imprisoned the Lithuanian prince, and to liberate him. The Utraquist nobles, no doubt, intended also to expel the magistrates and to appoint new ones who were favourable to Korybutovič. Kolin, a city which, after the imprisonment of Korybutovič, had thrown off its allegiance to Prague, became the centre of the Utraquist nobles who had

¹ Some of these reports are printed in Bezold, *König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten*.

entered into this plan. They had numerous partisans in Prague, among whom were John Rak, chief judge of the old town, and several councillors, both of the old and new towns. The accounts of this attempt to liberate Korybutovič are very contradictory, but it seems probable that the plan was betrayed to the town-councillors by Lord William Kostka, one of the Utraquist nobles; finding less support among the Hussites than they had hoped the Utraquist nobles had confided their plan to some of the lords "sub una." The latter then proposed that as soon as Prague had been captured Sigismund of Hungary should be proclaimed king. This was, of course, opposed by the Utraquist nobles, who were faithful to the articles of Prague. When the nobles arrived at the city gates on September 6 they found them open, but as soon as they reached the market-place they were attacked by large numbers of townsmen. As their force consisted only of 600 horsemen resistance was hopeless, and they could only attempt to escape. Some succeeded in doing this, but many were made prisoners, and some of them were afterwards decapitated.

Though this attempt had completely failed it resulted in the liberation of Prince Korybutovič. The leaders of the advanced party in Prague, thinking his presence in Bohemia more dangerous to them than his absence, caused him to be liberated on September 9 and conducted under escort across the Bohemian frontier.

CHAPTER VI

It is a strong proof how great the desire for peace had already become in Bohemia, that during the last days of the eventful year 1427 a religious disputation should have taken place, as had been settled earlier in the year. The divines of both Churches met at Žebrak on December 29. Though Pope Martin, maintaining his unvaried standpoint, had forbidden this disputation, the Cardinal of Winchester had, before he had received notice of the papal prohibition, appointed as representatives of the Church of Rome two Catholic priests who had been recommended to him by the lords "sub una." These men, Simon of Tišnov and Prokop¹ of Kladrub, had for a time belonged to the Utraquist Church, and had lectured at the university of Prague. The choice was undoubtedly a good one; these priests were acquainted with the teaching of the university of Prague and were not inclined to confuse it with the ravings of fanatics and visionaries, as former representatives of Rome had done on previous occasions, either from ignorance or from ill will. Unfortunately the disputation remained resultless. A very futile discussion arose as to which party should open the debate. The English Hussite, Peter Payne, was one of the representatives of Tábor, and we may conjecture that he here also displayed that rancour which we so often find in exiles. The discussion appears not to have got beyond the preliminary question mentioned above, and the conference broke up without any result. The truce previously concluded was, however, confirmed, and the Bohemians were thus enabled to devote their attention to

¹ He must, of course, not be confounded with Prokop the Great, or Prokop the Lesser.

their foreign enemies exclusively. Prokop now extensively adopted that system of assuming the offensive which characterised the Bohemians during the last years of the war. Probably at the beginning of the year 1428 the united armies of the Praguers under John Tovačovský, the Táborites under Prokop the Great, and the Orphans under Prokupek (Prokop the Lesser), who now first became widely known, entered Moravia and then marched to Hungary. The Bohemians evidently followed the example of Žižka, who some time previously had attempted to subdue Sigismund by invading his own kingdom. We have very little information concerning this new Bohemian invasion of Hungary. Some writers, indeed, state that no battles or sieges occurred, and that Prokop's principal purpose was to devastate Hungary, thus rendering an invasion of Bohemia from that direction more difficult. Marching by way of Skalice and Senice the Hussites reached the Danube at Pressburg; they occupied, the suburbs, but were unable to obtain possession of the strongly fortified town and citadel. For reasons not known to us they then retired to Moravia by way of Trnova (Tyrnau),¹ after having burnt down the suburbs of Pressburg. They reached the Moravian frontier at Uherský Brod, from where they had started on their not very successful expedition into Hungary.

After a short respite the Bohemians determined to invade Silesia. That country had from the beginning of the war been intensely hostile to the Bohemian national cause, and the incessant raids of the Silesians, which generally took place at the moment when the Bohemians were occupied in opposing the main armies of the Germans, greatly incensed the people. Prokop the Great again assumed command of the united

¹ Bartošek of Drahonice writes (p. 598 of Professor Goll's edition: "[The Hussites] civitatem Prespurk suburbium excremaverunt, deinde ante Wiennam processerunt, sed illuc per Danubium venire non valentes ex ista parte in Austria per voraginem ignis magnum monumentum fecerunt." It may be considered as certain that this statement, corroborated by no other contemporary writer, is untrue.

Utraquist armies, and it is interesting to note that among those who joined his standards were the Polish¹ prince, Frederick of Ostroh, who had been chamberlain of Prince Korybutovič during his residence in Prague, and the Polish nobleman Dobeslav Puchala. The Bohemians arrived at the frontier of the Silesian duchy of Troppau² probably at the end of February 1428. It has already been noted that the longer the Hussite wars continued the greater the terror became which their approach caused in the neighbouring German lands. This again proved true on the occasion of this invasion of Silesia. As soon as the Bohemians had crossed the frontier Venceslas, eldest son of the Duke of Troppau, appeared in their camp. He came there to conclude an agreement with the Bohemians, according to which several towns in the duchy of Troppau, which had been entrusted to him by his father, should, on payment of a sum of money, remain unmolested. The prince himself proclaimed his neutrality. His father, the old duke, sought refuge in the city of Troppau, which successfully repulsed the attacks of the Hussites. It was their custom during their offensive campaigns not to allow themselves to be delayed by lengthy sieges, and they therefore soon abandoned their attempt to obtain possession of the capital of the duchy of Troppau. They continued their advance through Silesia, and after plundering several small cities arrived before the city of Ober-Glogau in the duchy of Oppeln. This was the first Silesian town which the Bohemians took by storm, but the resistance does not appear to have been very determined. This can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the town of Ober-Glogau had been made over by the duke to his son Bolko. This prince is stated to have been educated at the Utraquist university of Prague, and it

¹ Or rather Ruthenian; the chroniclers of the fifteenth century took little notice of these distinctions that have become so important in the present day.

² Very valuable information concerning this invasion of Silesia is contained in the so-called "Strehlemer Fragment" (published in Grünhagen's *Geschichtsquellen*, etc., pp. 155-158).

is certain that his sympathies were on the side of the Hussites. Immediately after the surrender of Ober-Glogau he proceeded to the Bohemian camp and concluded a separate treaty of peace with them. Though Bolko was the only Silesian prince who openly sided with the Hussites, whose armies he joined during the last campaigns of the war, it is certain that sympathy with the Hussites was widespread in Silesia. German writers have even attributed the fact that Martin Luther's Reformation found early adherents in Silesia to the Utraquist traditions that still lingered among the people.

The Bohemians were, however, also to meet with bitter enemies in Silesia. They now invaded the lands of Bishop Conrad of Breslau, one of the most determined opponents of the heretics. It was mainly through his influence that the Silesians had undertaken their frequent incursions into the Bohemian district of Králové Hradec. They had on these occasions given proof of cruelty and ferocity which far surpassed that of the Bohemians, who were now seeking revenge. The nationalists, indeed, now plundered Silesia mercilessly, and destroyed many towns and villages in a fashion which the modern humanitarian would severely condemn. They, however, except on rare occasions, spared the lives of the women and children, and indeed often received soldiers as prisoners. The Silesian Romanists, on the other hand, deliberately massacred, and, as far as it was in their power, exterminated the whole Slavic population of the Bohemian frontier districts which they invaded. The Bishop of Breslau had proceeded to Neisse, one of the principal cities in his dominions, where he was joined by a large part of the Silesian nobility and by some of the dukes who ruled over the many duchies into which Silesia was then divided. The Silesians chose as their leader the Bohemian lord "sub una" Puta of Častolovice, captain of the county of Glatz,¹ who, as an old antagonist of

¹ Up to the time of Frederick the Great the county of Glatz formed an immediate part of the kingdom of Bohemia, and did not form part of Silesia.

the Hussites, was supposed to have become acquainted with their new system of warfare. The Bishop of Breslau and his allies had assembled a vast force, and had pressed into their service a large number of peasants from the surrounding country. The extraordinary rapidity of the movements of the Bohemians here again assured their success. They arrived before Neisse quite unexpectedly, and immediately attacked the Germans, whose resistance was very slight. The peasants, who had been hurriedly armed, immediately fled, and the bishop only with difficulty found a refuge within the fortifications of Neisse. Following the Germans rapidly, the Bohemians penetrated into the suburbs of the city, which they burned down. Though the Germans had offered but little resistance, their loss in this battle amounted to about 2000 men. Neisse itself was not taken, in consequence of its brave defence by Puta of Častolovice, and, it may be added, because it was the habit of the Hussites not to delay their advance by prolonged sieges of fortified towns. From Neisse the Bohemians immediately marched on Brieg, after receiving the submission of several Silesian princes and cities. The town of Brieg, situated on the banks of the Oder, was then one of the most important cities of Silesia. It belonged to Duke Louis of Liegnitz-Brieg, who at first decided to resist the advance of the Bohemians, and assembled a large number of troops. When, however, the news of the defeat at Neisse reached Brieg, the duke, changing his plans, hastily crossed the Oder and with his knights retired to his other duchy of Liegnitz. The town of Brieg was then immediately occupied by the Bohemians, who met with no resistance. The spiritless abandonment of Brieg—then one of the strongest fortified cities in Silesia, and the largest which the Hussites captured in that country—caused great sensation, not only in Silesia, but also in the neighbouring countries. One of the first to receive the news was Ladislav, King of Poland. As has already been mentioned, his policy during the Hussite wars was a very

inconstant one. The Germans had, indeed, on several occasions accused him of secretly favouring the projects of his nephew, Prince Korybutovič, who was a staunch Utraquist. The King of Poland was therefore doubtlessly not reluctant to address severe and well-deserved reproaches to the Germans. In a letter to one of the Silesian princes, Duke Henry Kantner of Oels, he expressed his surprise that the Silesians, though they had ample means of defence, should have offered so slight a resistance, and that they should have abandoned cities such as Ober-Glogau, flying from them without necessity.¹

From Brieg the Bohemian armies, following the course of the Oder, marched in the direction of Breslau. The rulers of the different small duchies into which Silesia was then divided attempted no resistance, but concluded treaties with the Bohemians according to which they agreed to pay subsidies to them and to observe in future strict neutrality between the contending parties. These treaties were naturally kept very secret, and, as Dr. Grunhagen writes,² no copy of any one of them has been preserved. Though the Bohemian horsemen arrived within the distance of a mile from Breslau they made no attempt to attack the city, and shortly afterwards retired to the county of Glatz. It was not their wish

¹ " Porro vero admiramur vehementer de hominibus vestris et presertim nobilibus quos fama bellicos et ad bella doctos et audaces ubique in orbe terrarum perstrepuunt, qualiter circa defensionem dominorum suorum et fame sue dilatationem ampliorem tam desides et leves se ostenderunt et ubi resistere potuerunt, cur fuerunt negligentes? Habentes enim loca, castra et civitates tam munita et fortia, potuerunt hostes a se repellere, sed in ipsis nec minima resistentia est reperta. Ecce quomodo Glogoviam [Ober-Glogau] quomodo Bregam civitates ubi populum habuerunt numerosum se juvantem absque necessitate et gravi offensa hostibus reliquerunt et soli se in fugam converterunt. Adhuc muri et castrorum presidia construuntur ut hostibus resistatur ex eisdem et periculis et incommodis non parcat. Nam bona et virilis nobilium conditio sub sepibus defendere se consuevit et castra sepe mulierum vetularum fragilitate defensa audivimus. Si enim cum ipsis campum belli portare grave fuisset saltem furit circa flumina et castra resistendum. Re vera qua talis concussit pusillanimitas ut suorum dominorum et principum defensionem non intenderunt et tot dampna fieri permiserunt non absque pudore reputemus." (This interesting letter is published by Grünhagen, *Geschichtsquellen der Hussitenkriege*, pp. 60-61.)

² *Die Hussitenkämpfe der Schlesier*, p. 140.

to obtain permanent possession of foreign countries, as they well knew that such an attempt would weaken them when they were called on to repel the ever-recurring German invasions of Bohemia. They determined, however, to retain in their possession certain strongholds which would be useful to them for the purpose of securing their communications, should they again be obliged to invade Silesia. They therefore besieged the castle of Landfried, or, as it was called in Bohemia, Homola, which overlooks the small town of Reinerz.¹ The castle was captured after a somewhat prolonged siege. It is, however, certain that in July it was already in the hands of the Bohemians, who left here a garrison under Peter Polák of Volfina. Part of the nationalist army then returned from Reinerz to their country by way of the neighbouring pass of Nachod, while other detachments continued to ravage Silesia. They failed in their attempt to obtain possession of the town of Glatz, which has a naturally strong position and was strongly fortified in accordance with the then general custom. They then marched to Reichenbach, and without meeting with any resistance occupied the neighbouring castle of Zobten, situated on a height and overlooking a vast expanse of country. The Bohemians here also left a garrison, which was commanded by Lord Kolda of Žampach. The castle was, however, retaken by the Germans later in the year, but Žampach and his soldiers were allowed to return to Bohemia.

It is beyond the purpose of this work to give a detailed account of the various marches and counter-marches of the Hussite armies in Silesia during the latter part of the year 1428 and during the following year. As the Silesians had, in the early part of the war, annually raided the border districts of Bohemia, so the Hussites now constantly invaded Silesia and obtained there ammunition, provisions, and other necessary articles. The frontiers of the neighbouring lands had so long

¹ Reinerz has now become a small but fashionable watering-place.

been closed to the Bohemians—all intercourse with the Hussites had been forbidden under penalty of excommunication—that the country would have been thoroughly exhausted had it not obtained supplies from Silesia. That country also now became a great recruiting-ground for the Hussite armies. In consequence of the necessities of agriculture it was impossible to keep the whole peasantry constantly under arms. Their places were gradually taken by other, not always desirable, recruits. Many Poles and Lithuanians, attracted by the example of Prince Korybutovič, as well as Ruthenians, now began to flock to the Bohemian standards. Many of these men—particularly the Ruthenians, who belonged themselves to a Utraquist Church—were genuinely zealous for the cause of Utraquism, and most of them, no doubt, possessed the innate Slavic hatred of the Teuton. Yet many of the new recruits were influenced by other motives. In consequence of the almost incessant warfare on the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and the dominions of the Teutonic order, these lands swarmed with mercenaries, always ready to take part in any warlike enterprise. Such men were mainly attracted by the democratic character of the Hussite armies, in which the rich spoils were distributed with the strictest impartiality. It is certain that in consequence of the admission of these new elements the Bohemian armies deteriorated towards the end of the war.

When the advanced party among the Hussites determined to drive Prince Korybutovič from Bohemia they were certainly unaware of the fact that they were rendering the greatest service to King Sigismund. Korybutovič had undoubtedly been a very dangerous rival to the claimant to the Bohemian throne; he had accepted the articles of Prague, and he belonged to the Slavic race. After his departure some of those who were strongly attached to the monarchical principle began again to turn their attention to Sigismund. Fourteen years had elapsed

since the tragedy of Constance. Žižka and many others who considered that Sigismund's participation in the execution of Hus excluded him for ever from the Bohemian throne were dead. Though Sigismund was at heart a fervent and even bigoted adherent of the Roman Church his innate falseness made it easy for him to express occasionally opinions which could be interpreted in a very different sense. Even at the time of the Council of Basel he stated that he was strongly opposed to the celibacy of the clergy, and it will be remembered that during the siege of Prague the Germans suspected Sigismund of secretly favouring their enemies.

It was one of the greatest of the Bohemian territorial nobles, Lord Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec (in German, Neuhaus), who undertook the difficult task of mediating between King Sigismund and the Utraquists. Menhard's career had been a somewhat chequered one. He was the son of John of Jindřichův Hradec, who had been one of the first Bohemian nobles to adopt the Utraquist teaching, but who had died in 1417, before the beginning of the war. Menhard had in 1421 taken up arms against Žižka, by whom he was made prisoner and detained for some time at the castle of Přibenic. After his liberation he again opposed the national party, but was defeated at Kamenic in 1425. Henceforth he joined the Utraquists, as whose ally he took part in the campaigns of Stříbro and Tachov. He now appears for a time as a genuine defender of the articles of Prague, but he continued to be a strong monarchist, and also endeavoured to restore the power of the Bohemian nobility, which had greatly declined since the departure of Korybutovič. His well-known prudence and caution caused him to become the recognised leader of the Utraquist nobility.¹ Menhard found a favourable occasion for his attempted mediation when Prokop the Great, leaving the castle of Bechin, undertook a new invasion of Austria. Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec, accompanied by other nobles

¹ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, Vol. II. ii. p. 473 of German edition.

of Bohemia and Moravia, met him on his march¹ and suggested to him that he should, for the purpose of a general pacification, have an interview with King Sigismund, who was then residing at Pressburg in Hungary, not far from the frontiers of Moravia. It appears probable that peace negotiations had already begun some time previously, but we have little information on this subject.

It is certain that Prokop did not hesitate to accept the invitation as soon as his safety and that of his companions had been assured by means of hostages; for the treachery once committed against Hus was still in the minds of many. With him Menhard, several Bohemian nobles and knights, representatives of the cities of Prague, and a few divines—among whom was the English Hussite, Peter Payne—rode to Pressburg. They arrived there on April 4, 1429. Perhaps to overawe the Bohemian envoys, Sigismund had invited many German princes to Pressburg at this moment. Among those present were Sigismund's son-in-law, Albrecht of Austria, William, Duke of Bavaria, several Silesian princes, and the principal nobles "sub una," among whom it is sufficient to mention Ulrich of Rosenberg, Puta of Častolovice, and Hanuš of Kolowrat. A large number of ecclesiastical dignitaries had also been summoned to Pressburg. Bishop Conrad of Breslau, the "iron" Bishop John, formerly of Litomyšle, now of Olomouc, Hus's bitterest enemy, and the Archbishop of Gran in Hungary were present. Representatives of several universities had also arrived at Pressburg—among them four theologians of the university of Paris. These had no doubt arrived on a special mission. During the whole period between the meeting of the Council of Constance to the dissolution of that of Basel

¹ "Anno eodem videlicet mccccxxix presbyter Procopius et secta Taboriensium commisso castro Bechina Johanni dicto Bleh se cum comitatu suo versus et in Austriam transsumpsit et equitavit, ibique Dominus Menhart de Nova domo [Neuhaus, Jindřichuv Hradec] cum aliis baronibus Boemiæ et Moraviæ se interposuerunt et ipsum presbyterum Procopium cum serenissimo domino Sigismundo . . . ad terminum et tractatus conduxit, qui in civitatem Pressburg . . . convenerunt" (*Bartošek of Drahonice*, p. 599).

the university of Paris had always insisted on the necessity of strengthening the authority of the ecumenical councils of the Church. The council held in Siena in 1424 had already determined that a new council should be held at Basel after the lapse of seven years. The university of Paris, however, in view of the disturbed condition of the Christian world, wished to advance the date of the new assembly. It was hoped that a general council of the Church would more easily come to terms with the Utraquists than the Pope. The Bohemian envoys were received by King Sigismund on the day of their arrival, but the first meeting had an entirely ceremonial character. On the following day the King assembled the princes, Bohemian nobles, and theologians, and consulted them as to the best manner in which negotiations with the Utraquists could be opened. They advised him to tell the Hussites in a conciliatory fashion that they had strayed from the path of true Christianity and that they had abandoned the doctrines in which their forefathers had believed, and which they themselves had formerly accepted. According to the contemporary chroniclers, Sigismund then transmitted these remarks to the Hussite delegates "with wise and kindly words." It is a proof of Sigismund's intense vanity that he believed that his conciliatory words—which contained no concession whatever—would induce the Hussites to abandon doctrines which they had successfully upheld against all Europe for nearly ten years. The Hussites answered that they wished to be granted a hearing by a general meeting of the Christian people, at which laymen also were to be present. According to Dr. Neubauer's skilful conjecture, the Hussites had remarked that among the lower nobility and the townsmen beyond the borders of Bohemia their views had already found many friends. The germs of the ideas which brought out the German Reformation in the following century perhaps already existed in the borderlands of Bohemia. The brief exchange of views at Pressburg soon proved that the antagonistical parties were at least for

the moment irreconcilable. On the advice of his councillors Sigismund replied that the Catholic Church had been founded by Jesus Christ, and that the teaching of the Hussites had already been condemned at Constance by the Pope and Council, and that discussions on a matter which had already been decided were useless; the Hussites could only expect a hearing and such instruction as was befitting for those who had erred; this, however, could be better given privately by ecclesiastical or temporal princes and by scholars than before a large assembly comprising many plain men who knew nothing of these matters. This categorical statement did not, as might have been expected, lead to an immediate conclusion of the negotiations. Sigismund again consulted his advisers. They declared that heresy in Bohemia could only be exterminated by the sword, but that it would be well, that being for the moment impossible, to propose an armistice which was to last up to the moment of the meeting of the new Council. The condition of the armistice was to be that the Hussites should attend the Council and submit to its decisions. This advice was undoubtedly astute if we consider the constitution of the Hussite armies. It was certain that during a prolonged truce the Utraquist nobles would retire to their estates with their followers; the peasants, freed from imminent peril, would return to their country homes, from which they had so long been absent; the mercenaries, whose number in the Hussite armies was increasing, accustomed to constant warfare, would, deprived of any immediate hope of obtaining booty, have sought service elsewhere. It can be considered as probable that the acceptance of Sigismund's proposal would have deprived the national party of the powerful weapon which the Hussite army had now become, and would have left the country at the mercy of Sigismund and his allies. It need hardly be said that Prokop, whose military talent had kept the Hussite armies at that very high standard of efficiency to which Žižka had brought them, did not for a moment

contemplate such a surrender. The Hussite envoys had received from the estates of Bohemia instructions according to which they were under no condition to accept a general armistice, but were to consent to a truce with Sigismund and his son-in-law, Albert of Austria, on condition that both these princes should surrender to the Utraquist party all the castles in Bohemia and Moravia which were still held by them.¹ It seems probable that these propositions had been brought to the notice of Sigismund at the beginning of the negotiations at Pressburg, and that they had then already been rejected by him; the answer of the Hussites to Sigismund's new proposal, therefore, entirely ignored the question of the proposed armistice. It was, however, on the whole more conciliatory than their first message had been. The belief in the authority of councils was then at its apogee, and even the Utraquists were not uninfluenced by it. It appeared to them a very different thing to obtain a hearing before the whole Christian Church than to receive an admonition from a number of priests chosen by their enemies. They therefore declared that they were ready to appear before a council of the universal Church, but that they would continue to uphold their views till a general Church reformation had been carried out. Seeing that the reply of the Hussites was evasive rather than negative, Sigismund now thought that he could obtain an armistice. This, indeed, appears to have been his principal reason for entering into these negotiations.

On April 8 the Hussites made a somewhat unexpected move. They informed the King that if he would consent to accept their creed they would gladly receive him as their sovereign—rather than any one else. Should he, however, decline their proposal they could only repeat what they had

¹ "Quod Gratia Vestra una cum filio Vestro, duce Austrie disposeret quod castra que in Bohemia et Moravia tenetis, se nobiscum unirent et ad veritates Dei accederent et quod super illo vellemus nos cum Gratia Vestra et filio Vestro pacificare ad certum tempus." (*Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. V. p. 370, quoted by Dr. Neubauer.)

said before, that they had drawn their swords and would not sheath them till they had converted all men to their faith. On receiving this message Sigismund was seized by one of those attacks of semi-insane fury which sometimes overtook him. He beseeched all the princes who were at his court to assist him in exterminating heresy and in obtaining possession of the lands which he had inherited. He added that he would immediately organise a new military expedition against Bohemia. The German princes, whose previous experiences had not been satisfactory, received this statement silently and without enthusiasm. On April 8 Prokop and his companions again approached the King and inquired where the proposed Council was to meet. They also wished to know whether it was to be entirely under the direction of the Pope and the cardinals, or whether Sigismund and the other princes were also to exercise a certain control over it. In his reply Sigismund stated that he would have the same authority over the Council which the Roman emperors and kings had possessed on similar previous occasions. On the following day the Bohemian envoys left Pressburg and rejoined the Hussite army, which was encamped six (German) miles from the city. The Hussite envoys, whose instructions did not allow them to express an opinion on such vital questions as the conclusion of an armistice and the promise of attending the future council, declared, before leaving Pressburg, that a general meeting of the estates of Bohemia would give a definite reply. This assembly began its sittings on May 23, and continued them for a week. The representatives of King Sigismund, who had on this occasion appeared in Prague, demanded that the Bohemians should submit to the verdict of the Council of Constance, and agree to a truce for two years, or up to the beginning of the council, not only with the King and his Bohemian adherents, but also with the foreign princes who were allied with him. The diet in Prague, on the advice of some theologians and priests who were consulted, agreed to

accept Sigismund's proposals, but only under certain conditions. The diet demanded firstly that this assembly of the whole Christian world should include the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Patriarch of Constantinople, who all, like the Bohemians, received Communion in the two kinds; secondly, that the council should be held according to the law of God, and not according to rules established by the Pope, and that not only the Pope, but all Christianity should be permitted to express its views freely. Should such a council assemble, the Bohemians were ready to send to it wise, prudent and pious men, both priests and laymen, and to grant them full powers. The Bohemians added several other conditions of minor importance. They declared that those who had acceded to the law of God (*i. e.* the Utraquist Church) and then treacherously abandoned it, and those who had bound themselves by writing to accept the law of God and then failed to do so, should be excluded from the truce. In view of the vacillating attitude of some of the Bohemian nobles this affected some men of considerable importance in the country. The Bohemians further declared that they were ready to conclude a truce with King Sigismund and his son-in-law, but not with Meissen (Saxony) or Bavaria. Archduke Albert was to promise to preserve the rights and privileges of Moravia, and the King was to entrust the government of that land provisionally to one who belonged to the Bohemian or Slavic nation.¹ The Bohemians finally made stipulations in favour of the Utraquist peasants who lived on estates of the lords "sub una," and demanded guarantees for the safety of the Utraquist priests who resided in districts occupied by partisans of Sigismund. The Bohemians were naturally elated by their constant victories, and, having been so long isolated from other countries, they were imperfectly informed as to the public opinion in the rest of Europe. They seem to have considered it probable that Sigismund would accept their proposals, and indeed already began to discuss

¹ Or language. The word "jazyk" has both significations in Bohemian.

the possibility of his accession to the Bohemian throne.¹ It has already been noted that some of the new leaders of the Utraquists no longer entertained the intense personal resentment against Sigismund which Žižka had felt, and which the Orphans—who all cherished memories of their dead leader—still preserved. Prokop was not disinclined to recognise Sigismund as king should he accept the articles of Prague.² It was, however—as stated by the chronicler quoted below—decided that, in consequence of the resistance of the Orphans and the new town of Prague, the attempt to confer the Bohemian crown on Sigismund should be deferred to a later period. At the same time the diet decided to inform Sigismund of the conditions under which it would consent to a truce. For this purpose a new Bohemian embassy, again headed by Prokop the Great, started for Pressburg. The delegates arrived there probably at the end of June. Prokop informed Sigismund of the decision of the diet and questioned him as to the composition of the proposed council, at which, he said, the Hussites could only appear as one of the contending parties, not as contrite penitents. Sigismund had at the time of Prokop's first visit already come to the conclusion that the negotiation would at that moment inevitably be resultless; he was, indeed, then already busily engaged in organising a new crusade against Bohemia. Yet both parties wished to avoid the odium of renewing the hostilities, and no immediate rupture

¹ The ancient chroniclers write: "This year [1429] there was a great assembly of the Bohemian nation in Prague (of) lords, knights, gentry ["ze-mane"], Taborites, Orphans, and citizens. They met in the house of the masters of the great college [the Carolinum] and debated as to how they could come to an agreement with King Sigismund of Hungary, and receive him as their Lord and the hereditary sovereign of the land. All agreed to this except Valek Koudelnik, captain of the Orphans. He and the citizens of the New Town [of Prague] would not consent to it, and opposed it" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 76).

² Professor Goll writes: "Prokop had no objection to the accession of Sigismund, should he conform to the teaching of the Hussite Church. . . . It appeared clearly that he had not preserved that implacable hatred of Sigismund which we find in Žižka, and which the Orphans preserved as his inheritance." *Cěchy a Prusy (Bohemia and Prussia)*, p. 179.

took place. When King Sigismund demanded that the Hussites should abandon all sieges of castles belonging to nobles "sub una," and that the truce should include all his subjects—an expression which could be applied to all German states, even those with whom the Bohemians had already refused to negotiate—the envoys stated that they had no instructions to discuss these matters, but would inform their countrymen of the King's demands. They then left Pressburg and the negotiations were interrupted for a considerable period.

The so-called crusade of 1429 requires but very slight mention. Cardinal Beaufort was again to command it. He landed on the continent in July with an English army of 5,000 men. While marching through Belgium he was ordered to proceed to France because of the victories of Joan of Arc. The German princes considered this a sufficient reason for abandoning the proposed campaign. Some time previously—in March 1429—Joan of Arc addressed a menacing letter¹ to the Bohemians, threatening to invade their country.

On his return from Pressburg to Bohemia Prokop had, at the castle of Sovinec, near Olomouc, an interview with Prince Korybutovič, who had again appeared in the lands of the Bohemian crown. The Lithuanian prince had, on his return from Bohemia, been treated with great severity by the King of Poland, and even imprisoned for a short time. Ladislas maintained that Korybutovič had undertaken his second expedition to Bohemia against the King's order. In view of the profound duplicity of the King of Poland it is perhaps impossible to judge how far this was true. While the failure was blamed, a success would probably have met with approval. Korybutovič very soon regained the King's favour, and now made his third appearance on the turbulent Bohemian stage. He probably hoped that Prokop would act as a mediator

¹ I have printed part of this letter in my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 152 n. 1.

between him and the citizens of Prague. From Olomouc, Prokop proceeded to Ústí nad Orlicí (in German, Wildenschwert), where the Hussite army was occupied in besieging the neighbouring castle of Lanšberk.

The question of the recognition of Sigismund as King of Bohemia, which had been discussed at the diet of Prague, had caused new troubles in that city. It has already been mentioned that, roughly speaking, the old town contained the more conservative, and the new one the more radical, citizens. The Utraquist nobles, who had always demanded the establishment of a monarchical and orderly government, endeavoured to secure the recognition of Sigismund as King, and the Táborites were not opposed to this on condition that the new King accepted the articles of Prague. On the other hand the Orphans and the citizens of the New Town of Prague were bitterly opposed to this plan. It is one of the strange vicissitudes which we meet so frequently during the Bohemian civil wars that the citizens of the Old Town of Prague—the stronghold of the Hussite High Church—should now have requested the aid of the leader of the Táborites. Though so strongly antagonistic as regards matters of theology, both parties at that moment seem to have contemplated a monarchical restoration. Prokop, who was still directing the siege of Lanšberk, hurried to Prague, but found there that the two cities had already concluded peace or rather a truce. We have little information about the causes of this sudden agreement, but it is probable that both parties had become aware of the fact that Sigismund would not accept the Bohemian crown on the conditions under which it had been offered to him.

The castle of Lanšberk capitulated shortly after Prokop's departure, and though during the summer small detachments of Hussites raided parts of Silesia, it was only for the following winter that Prokop had planned an invasion of Germany on a large scale. It was not only to provision Bohemia—as has been stated by many popular German writers—that these

expeditions were undertaken. Prokop believed that by frequent attacks on the border-lands he could employ sufficient pressure against them to force them to grant freedom to the Bohemian Church, and perhaps even—so his sanguine temperament led him sometimes to believe—to induce them to accept the articles of Prague. In the meantime Prokop, whose matchless energy at this moment it is impossible not to admire, devoted his attention to the never-ending theological controversies in Prague. The good sense of the townsmen had, indeed, for the moment averted an armed conflict, but the odium theologicum of the rival divines continued unabated. The priest John of Přebor, one of the protagonists of the Hussite High Church, had in his sermons strongly attacked some of Wycliffe's views concerning the Sacrament of Communion. This should not have been considered as an attack on Hussitism, as Hus himself had often stated that he did not accept unconditionally all Wycliffe's views.¹ In this controversy Peter Payne, surnamed Engliš, strongly upheld the opinions of his master. Payne as well as Master Nicholas of Pelhřimov and the majority of the Tábórite divines maintained that Christ was not present in the Sacrament essentially, but that in the Sacrament the bread and wine signified the body and blood of Christ, who had suffered for us on the cross. This theory, which Dr. Krummel calls the "Wycliffite-symbolic" interpretation,² was not quite in accordance with

¹ I may perhaps be allowed to quote here my own words—contained in *Master John Hus*, p. 21—"Hus himself frequently protested against the suggestion that he was responsible for all the statements made by Wycliffe, and shortly after the death of the Bohemian Church-reformer, a controversy on this subject arose. . . . John of Přebor, an intimate friend of Hus, wrote: 'It is well known to many that when preaching Master John Hus said that he would not defend any error of Wycliffe, or of anyone else. He also preached: "If Wycliffe is in heaven, may he pray to God for us; if he is in purgatory, may God help him; if he is in hell the Lord be blessed." Also in Constance before his death Hus said openly before all: "Why do you blame me because of Wycliffe? What concern is it of mine? For neither was Wycliffe a Bohemian, nor was he my father; he was an Englishman; therefore if he wrote errors, let the English answer for them."'"

"Die Wycliffitisch-symbolische Auffassung" (*Hussiten und Taboriten*, p. 85).

the theories of Prokop, who now, in view of the ever-recurring foreign peril, attempted to mediate between the contending parties. Prokop on this question did not agree with Payne and Pelhřimov and the majority of the Taborite divines. He believed that Christ was really present in the Sacrament of Communion, and he held that Christians should kneel before it, a custom which some of the advanced Taborites abhorred. On the other hand Prokop's views also differed widely from those of magister Přebíram. Prokop believed in the remanence of the substance of bread, that is to say he believed that after the consecration, besides the body of Christ, the substance of bread also continued to exist. When at a meeting of theologians Přebíram attempting to refute the theories of Prokop, quoted the father of the Church, Prokop was somewhat irritated, and in a letter written to Přebíram shortly afterwards, advised him to cling to the words of Christ and His Apostles,¹ and to ignore the words of the "doctores," the fathers of the Church. It was probably the conciliatory attitude of Prokop, as well as the news that the German princes had now finally decided to engage in a new crusade, which induced the controversialists to discontinue their deputations, at least for a time.

In the autumn of 1429 Prokop left Prague and first proceeded to Kutna Hora, a city which he appears often to have visited when he was able to absent himself from the Utraquist armies. These armies were at that moment scattered over different parts of Bohemia, but were already preparing for the new

¹ This letter is so characteristic of Prokop that I will quote part of it. He wrote: "Mane in sententia Salvatoris et ejus Apostoli (scilicet panem materiale remanere asseverantium) et statim erit pax inter nos et te, et alias non. Et noli attendere verba vel sensus eorum de quibus propheta loquitur: Narraverunt iniqui fabulationes, sed non ut lex tua. Sin autem illud nolueris facere, scito quod contra te intendo pro posse clamare et omnibus modis licitis insurgere. Et videbis quod veritas Domini vincet te una cum doctoribus. Jam enim eos judicat in illis quæ pertinaciter contra ipsam dixerunt vel scripserunt. Et vae illis si non pœnituerint. Et ideo doctores nolo habere pro (ut tu scribis) Dei legis judices, sed opto ut lex judicet doctores" (Cochlæus, *Hist. Hussit.* p. 226).

campaign. It was decided that the troops should assemble at different points along the Saxon frontier. On December 3 Prokop returned to Prague at the request of the magistrates of that city. He was to assume command over the vast army, which, according to the most trustworthy authorities,¹ consisted of 4,000 cavalry, 40,000 infantry, and 2,500 armoured wagons. Besides the Orphans and Táborites, the men both of the Old and New Towns of Prague, and the levies of many Bohemian cities, started for the frontier on December 4. The burgomaster and councillors entertained the generals at a banquet at the town-hall before their departure, "drinking to their health as they were taking leave." On its march the army was joined by the troops of several Bohemian and Moravian nobles, and on the frontier by the Bohemian forces that were already encamped there. The whole large army then, after crossing the frontier, followed the course of the Elbe as far as Pirna and Dresden. They encamped for some time before the latter city, but faithful to the system they had adopted during their former invasions of Germany, they did not attempt the siege of the fortified town. Small detachments of Hussites raided some of the open Saxon towns, but the Germans remained behind their fortifications, not daring to meet the Bohemians in the open field. On the appeal of Frederick, Elector of Saxony, some of the German princes promised to march to his aid and to arrest the triumphant progress of the heretics. The ecclesiastical princes were naturally among the most zealous. The Archbishop of Magdeburg, the Bishops of Naumberg, Halberstadt, Merseburg, and Hildesheim with their troops joined the Saxon army, which, under the command of the Elector Frederick, had assembled at Leipzig. The Duke of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Thuringia also marched to the aid of the menaced elector. The German army, according to the most trustworthy

¹ *Bartošek of Drahonice*, p. 600, and "*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*," Vol. III. p. 79.

accounts, numbering about 100,000 men, was now vastly superior in strength to the Bohemian forces. On hearing of the approach of the Germans the Hussites marched in a north-western direction, burning the towns of Oschatz and Wurzen on their way. They then determined to cross the Mulda stream. Believing that the German army was concentrated on the other bank of that stream they kept their forces closely, and overcrowded the wagons to such an extent that some of them were overturned and some men were drowned. When about half the force had crossed the stream the cry was raised that the Germans were attacking. Those warriors who had already reached the bank immediately formed in battle array, but it was soon found that the alarm was unfounded. A body of Thuringian nobles with their followers had indeed ridden to the ford where the Bohemians were crossing. Their attack was, however, speedily repulsed by the Hussites, and the knights retired with heavy losses; of their small force of 800 horsemen half were killed or made prisoners. On the day following the skirmish the Bohemians, who had now all crossed the stream, expected to be attacked by the entire German army. They received a menacing letter from the German commanders, telling them that they would on the following day all be killed as being heretics. No attack, however, took place. The Elector of Saxony appears to have been greatly impressed by the sudden flight of the Germans at Tachov and to have feared the renewal of such a catastrophe. He therefore suddenly changed his plans, ordered the tents of his troops to be burnt, and dismissed the troops of his allies, who returned to their homes. The elector himself first retreated to Leipzig, sharply pursued by the Hussite soldiers. He then continued his flight to Thuringia, after having ordered the suburbs of Leipzig to be burnt down to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemies. The Bohemians, now unopposed, divided their forces into different detachments, which ravaged a large part of Northern Germany. The inhabitants, terrified

by the mere approach of the Hussites, forsook their dwellings and fled into the woods, where many perished of cold and privation. The Germans, whose practice it had been when they occupied Bohemian towns or villages to murder the whole population, were surprised that the Bohemians always spared the lives of women and children. The German chronicler Windecke writes that "wherever the Bohemians arrived the citizens and peasants fled into the woods, leaving their wives and children behind them"; they evidently soon knew that the Bohemians did not war against women and children.

It is beyond the purpose of this work to give an account of the different raids which the Bohemians undertook during this winter. Their principal army marched into Franconia. That part of Germany, comparatively distant from Bohemia, had hitherto taken little interest in the affairs of that country. The Bohemian invasion came as a complete surprise. The Hussites attacked the town of Hof, of which they easily obtained possession, but the castle was bravely defended by Kaspar of Waldenfels. That general appears, however, to have been one of the first Germans who realised the necessity of terminating the war with Bohemia. Through his mediation the Bohemian leaders entered into negotiations with the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, who was also Burgrave of Nürnberg. I have already referred to the elector's conciliatory tendencies, and he again gave proof of them on this occasion. He had just returned to Germany from Pressburg, where he had taken part in the fruitless negotiations which have already been mentioned. It is not likely that the elector returned from Sigismund's court in a hopeful frame of mind, and seeing that his country was at that moment quite unable to resist the Bohemians he determined to negotiate with them. His foremost purpose was to free Germany from the presence of unwelcome visitors, but he may have also hoped to reconcile the Utraquists with the Roman Church, and thus to

effectuate a general pacification. After having received letters from the Hussite leaders inviting him to their camp and letters of safe conduct, the Elector crossed the Bohemian lines accompanied by ten Hussite horsemen as his bodyguard. An interview took place between him and the Hussite commanders at the castle of Zwernitz, not far from Bayreuth, on February 6, 1430. It was here agreed that on condition of the payment of a considerable sum by the Bishop of Bamberg and by the municipalities of Bamberg and Forchheim, the Hussites should undertake not to attack the territory of Bamberg. It is, however, certain that larger and more weighty questions were also discussed at Zwernitz. The Elector then proceeded to Nürnberg, no doubt to consult his allies with regard to the continuation of the negotiations. Having obtained their consent Frederick again met the Hussite generals at the castle of Böheimstein, near Nürnberg. It was here agreed that the Elector of Brandenburg, Duke John of Bavaria, and the city of Nürnberg should pay large sums to the Bohemians on condition that the latter should evacuate Germany. Prokop was not, however, satisfied by receiving ransom, rightly thinking that his victorious campaign would thus appear as a mere razzia. He again brought forward the question of the reconciliation of the Utraquists with the universal Church. On this point the elector made very considerable concessions, for which he was much blamed by the extreme partisans of the Church of Rome. For reasons which it is not difficult to understand the documents concerning the agreements of Zwernitz and Böheimstein were destroyed, but it has been possible to ascertain some facts from other sources, particularly from the drafts of some letters of the Elector Frederick, which have been published by Dr. V. Bezold. It was agreed between the elector and the Bohemians that on April 23 both Catholics and Hussites should send to Nürnberg "doctors and men of learning," not for the purpose of religious disputations, but only to attempt a

friendly understanding in view of a future pacification.¹ The draft of the letter of safe conduct which the elector intended to give the Bohemian envoys proves that he was ready to permit a discussion on the four articles of Prague.² There is no doubt that the Elector of Brandenburg's attitude was to a certain extent favourable to the Bohemians. It had been hitherto thought necessary to start from the standpoint that heretics should submit unconditionally. An astute statesman such as was Frederick, however, well knew that such a submission was out of the question. He was, therefore, already prepared to accept the articles of Prague as the basis of the future negotiations. Frederick accompanied the Bohemian armies to the frontier of their country and acquired great popularity among the soldiers. He was at that time on very bad terms with the Emperor Sigismund. The first Elector of the house of Hohenzollern and the real founder of the greatness of Prussia, he seems almost to have foreseen the long antagonism of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, who were to succeed Sigismund—an antagonism that only ended on the battlefield of Sadova.

On February 21 the victorious Hussite armies re-entered Prague, where they were, of course, received with the greatest enthusiasm. A contemporary chronicler writes:³ "The Bohemians had never before carried out so brilliant a campaign

¹ "Wir haben auch unter einander [the Elector and the Hussites] Rede gehabt von eines gütlichen unverbundenen Tages wegen gegen Nürnberg zu kommen auf St. Georgs Tag [April 23], dazu man aus den sechs [Church] Provinzen dieser Lande doctores und gelehrte Leute bringen soll, nicht von dem Glauben zu disputiren, sondern unverbindlich und gütlich mit davon zu reden . . . möchte aber dass nicht sein dass man gedächte nach Rathe etlich andere Wege zu erdenken und fürzunehmen, damit solche Sachen zu ganzem Ende kämen." (Letter of Frederick to the other Electors. Bezold, *König Sigismund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten*, Vol. III. pp. 169-171). I have somewhat modernised the difficult German of the original.

² . . . Treugamus et assecuramus . . . ut possitis libere et secure ad nos versus Nurburgensem civitatem venire et in eadem demorari, ibique in concilio articulos quatuor, per quorum claritate instatis oretenus aut in scriptis offere aut propallare, scripturis sacris beatorumque doctorum verbis et sententiis eos declarare, astruere et persuadere" (Bézdold, as above, Vol. III. pp. 171-174).

³ "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III p. 79.

in Meissen (Saxony); nor is there any man who remembers anything similar before, neither is anything such recorded in the chronicles. They numbered, as was commonly said, 40,000 men. Had they striven for glory like their ancestors they could have marched as far as the Rhine and have subdued many countries; but having obtained rich spoils they returned to Bohemia." This day marks the climax of the glory of the Táborite arms. The decline followed it very closely; the former rigid discipline gradually disappeared; greed for plunder took the place of the former religious fervour and enthusiasm.

The Elector of Brandenburg soon found it difficult, or rather impossible, to obtain the Pope's sanction for the negotiations with the Utraquists which he had planned. It was only the great defeat at Domázlitz in the following year which at last induced Pope Martin to abandon his previous point of view, according to which discussions of Hus' tenets were inadmissible, as they had already been condemned by the Council of Constance. The German princes also declined to take any part in the negotiations suggested by the Elector of Brandenburg, and Sigismund again protested against all conferences with heretics, now that it seemed improbable that they would turn to his personal advantage. The Elector reluctantly broke off all negotiations with the Bohemians, but before doing so he sent to Domázlitz the sums of money which he and his allies had promised to the Bohemians on condition of their evacuating Germany. Prokop's great winter campaign of 1429-1430 did not, however, prove entirely fruitless. Though the conferences at Böheimstein had led to no immediate result, yet the foundation of a future agreement had been laid there. There is little doubt that the Council of Basel in some respects considered the deliberations at Böheimstein as a precedent.

The brilliant campaign of the Bohemians in 1430 again attracted the attention of all Europe to their country. The

Bohemian question then for the first time became a European one. The panic caused by the exploits of Prokop and his followers continued in Germany, where a new Hussite invasion was constantly dreaded. As has been frequently stated, the annals of Bohemia during this short but glorious period of its history are very scanty. It seems, however, certain that Prokop the Great returned to his country greatly exhausted by the fatigues of a long and arduous campaign, and that he rested for a short period. On April 4 we read of his presence in Prague, and it is known that shortly afterwards he proceeded with some of his followers to Domázlitz to take over the indemnity which the German princes had agreed to pay to Bohemia. As comparative internal quiet then prevailed, and as the preparations for a new crusade—which, as the Bohemians knew, was being planned—proceeded but slowly, Prokop employed this period of respite for the purpose of defending his faith with his pen. It had not escaped him that the Bohemians were tired of incessant warfare and ready for peace if their enemies would accept the articles of Prague. On the other hand, he knew that the blind hatred of the Bohemians as “heretics” was not as general as it had been at the beginning of the war. The comparative moderation of the Hussites during their raids, when they indeed levied heavy contributions, but spared the lives of women and children, and often even received warriors as prisoners, had greatly impressed the minds of the people. The democratic spirit of the Hussites was also beginning to attract attention. Men could not but wonder that a citizen of Prague of modest birth and fortune should negotiate with princes and great territorial nobles. The German rulers began to fear that even ancient racial hatred might not be sufficient to prevent the Germans from joining the Bohemian fighters for freedom. Great agitation spread among the people. They said that they had been misled by the priests and abandoned by the princes and nobles, who had been unable to oppose the Slavic enthusiasts. This

movement was not limited to the parts of Germany that are nearest to Bohemia. In the districts near the Rhine the peasants formed armed bands, which carried before them a banner with the portrait of Our Saviour, and raided the neighbouring country in every direction. It appeared as if an appeal of the Hussites would be sufficient to induce the whole German people to rise in arms against their princes.¹

Though this is a matter on which it is impossible to express a positive opinion, it appears that at this moment the religious views of the Hussites, and particularly of the Taborites, were beginning to find favour even in countries very distant from Bohemia. Some traces of this popular current appear even at the beginning of the Hussite wars. Monstrelet states² that at a village near Douay some persons suspected of Hussite heresy were arrested and burnt. It was stated that some villages in the Dauphiné had sent subsidies to the Bohemians, and that revolutionary bands who were supposed to have some connection with the Hussites had appeared in the county of Forez, and had been exterminated by the Bailiff of Macon.³ The longer the war lasted the more the danger increased, particularly as in consequence of the slowness of the communications the news of the great Hussite victories only

¹ Professor Droysen has very eloquently described the condition of Germany at this period; the passage is unfortunately too long to be quoted in its entirety: "Schon begann," he writes, "die wilde Gährung die die Massen in so vielen Städten ergriffen auch beim Landvolk einzureissen: sie seien von den Pfaffen betrogen, von ihren Herrschaften preisgegeben. Und nicht bloss in den zunächst an Böhmen gelegenen Gegenden; am Rheine traten die armen Leute zu 'Bauernschaften' zusammen unter gewählten Hauptleuten, und eigenem Banner mit dem Bilde des gekreuzigten Heilandes, begannen nach Hussitenart umherzuziehen, wagten sich selbst an Worms, forderten die Auslieferung der Pfaffen und Juden. . . . War es noch möglich sich über die unermessliche Gefahr in der Deutschland stand zu täuschen? Nur eines Aufrufes daherziehender Hussitenhaufen schien es zu bedürfen um die Masse des deutschen Volkes zu entfesseln" (*Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, Vol. I. p. 382. Leipzig, 1868).

² "Et d'austre part furent trouvez en l'an dessudit [1420] plusieurs hommes et femmes tenans ladictie hérésie [Hussitism] et faisant leur concile ensemble, en un village près Douay nommé Sains, dedans lequel ilz furent trouvez et menez prisonniers à la court de l'evesque d'Arras" (Monstrelet, Vol. IV. chap. cclix).

³ Noël Valois, *Le Pape et le concile (1418-1450)*, Vol. I. p. 154.

spread gradually in Western Europe. In a letter addressed to the Council of Basel by the Bishop of Arras on March 30, 1432, he writes that Bohemian heresies were spreading rapidly in his diocese.¹ The penalties of heresy were then so terrible, and even the suspicion of not being a firm Roman Catholic so greatly endangered the life of him on whom such a suspicion fell, that we have naturally but very scanty information concerning the spreading of the Hussite doctrine in Western Europe. It is, however, probable that the cases mentioned above were by no means isolated.

These considerations undoubtedly influenced Prokop when he published in his own name and in that of some of his companions a manifesto addressed to the whole Christian world. This document, entitled "*Epistola Procopii et aliorum Hussitarum honorabilibus, providis, honestis dominis, consulibus et toti communitati, divitibus et pauperibus,*" attempts to justify the Hussites and very skilfully strives to create distrust of the Catholic clergy, whom the Hussites considered their most dangerous enemies. This manifesto was first published in 1430—Martène and Durand's version has no date—and again in 1431. The two documents are, however, nearly identical. Prokop began by stating that there had for a long time been discord between the Bohemians and the Church of Rome, and that the Bohemians had been frequently attacked by the Roman Catholics. Yet, he continued, the partisans of Rome had never granted them a hearing nor heard from the mouths of the Bohemians what their doctrine was. This Prokop attributed to the influence of the clergy, who, by granting indulgences, excited the people to exterminate the Hussites.²

¹ "Pullulant in dies in dyocesi ista hæreses et zizania Bohemorum, quibus nisi viriliter restitisssem cum coadjutoribus, et modo jugiter vigilas gregis custodirem, in agro Domini non frumentum veritatis, sed infelix lolium doctrine erronee germinasset" (Quoted by Noël Valois, as above, Vol. I. p. 158).

² "De hoc miramur valde quod vos papæ et omni suo sacerdotio tantum confiditis et creditis qui vobis dant venenosum cœtum, alias dant intelligibile consulamen in eo, quod episcopi vobis dicunt, remissionem omnium vestrorum

Prokop then referred to the executions of Hus and Jerome, the authors and advisers of which await God's punishment. He then again complains that the Hussites were not allowed to expound their views, while Jesus Christ had even allowed the devil to address Him.¹ The letter then formulates in sixteen "articles" the grievances of the Utraquists against the Church of Rome. Many grievances are here alluded to which have already been frequently mentioned in these pages. Great stress is laid on the poverty of the clergy—a point on which even moderate Utraquists agreed with the Taborites. The writer then affirms that many priests enter the Church without vocation and from lower motives.² He then treats of the prayers for the dead. It is here interesting to note that these prayers are not absolutely condemned, a circumstance which proves that even the Taborist, the most advanced party in the Bohemian Church, approached far less closely to modern Protestantism than has often been stated. It is, however, also maintained that no payment should be taken for such services.³ The letter next deals with the vexed question of vestments and the dress of priests generally. Prokop himself, differing in this respect from the priests of the Hussite High Church, who dressed like other Catholic priests, officiated in the clothes which he habitually wore, "a coat of coarse thick cloth." He accused the Catholic priests of vanity, and wrote with disapproval of their "long tabards and other garments." The letter then referred to the well-worn subject of the immorality of the clergy, a matter constantly discussed by

peccatorum. Contribuunt propter hoc ut vos debellare debeatis contra nos et nos depopulare" (Martène et Durand, "Veterum Scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima," Coll. VIII. p. 19.)

¹ "Christus tamen audivit diabolum ut habetur Matth. cap. 10. Et ipsi [the Roman Catholic priests] non sunt meliores Christo, nec nos pejores diabolo" (Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. pp. 19-20).

² "Propter vitam otiosam et bene comedere et bibere et ut honorentur et venerentur super terram" (Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. p. 20).

³ "Quia si vellent orare pro mortuis et animarum missas legere . . . tamen nullum munus propter hoc capere debent, neque magnum, neque parvum" (Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. p. 20.)

mediæval writers—even by those who were firm adherents of the Church of Rome. On this subject Prokop wrote with a strong bias; like many priests of the Utraquist Church, he was a married man. It was further stated that the priests, to ingratiate themselves with the people, told them many tales (*i. e.* legends) which are not contained in Holy Scripture. The letter finally demanded the recognition of the articles of Prague.

The universal desire for peace, which was constantly growing stronger both in Bohemia and in Germany, manifested itself in a somewhat striking fashion towards the end of the year 1430. All parties believed that the only means of obtaining peace could be found in the convocation of a ecumenical council, though there were differences of opinion with regard to its constitution. The principal obstacle was Pope Martin V, to whom even the word "council" was obnoxious. Some German princes imagined a somewhat singular way of intimating to the Pope that the Christian world demanded that the Council, which it was proposed to hold at Basel, should meet as soon as possible. On November 8, 1430, the surprised Romans found that a somewhat lengthy document had—according to the custom of the time—been affixed to the gates of the papal palace. The authors, who stated that they were two illustrious princes, declared that, considering that innumerable persons had since the Council of Constance seceded from the militant Church, they forwarded the following statements to the Christian princes, as all Christian laymen as well as priests had the duty to defend the Christian faith. The conclusions or "articles," to use the language of the period, declared that the Hussite heresy should be eradicated by a Council, as had been done on several occasions in the early Church. It was, therefore, necessary that the Pope should convoke a general Council not later than in March of the following year. Should the Pope without valid reason refuse to attend the Council, the Council might, in accordance with the powers given it by

God, depose the Pope.¹ It is impossible to state what princes were the authors of this strange manifesto, which largely influenced the convocation of the Council of Basel, and therefore indirectly the termination of the Hussite wars. Some writers have ascribed this document to the Archduke Albert of Austria. His lands had suffered severely through the Hussite incursions, and he also had a future claim to the Bohemian crown, as heir of his father-in-law Sigismund. Yet this conjecture appears very improbable, for the Archduke Albert fully shared that feeling of intense devotion to the papal see, which, with few exceptions, has influenced all the princes of his house from the time of Rudolph of Habsburg. The manifesto, on the other hand, though it strongly condemns the Hussites, is obviously the work of a member of the moderate, not of the intransigent party within the Church of Rome. Some Romans at the time believed the manifesto to have been drawn up by the Elector Frederick of Brandenburg and by his

¹ The contents of this strange proclamation are contained in a letter addressed to the chancellor of the Duke of Burgundy by a Roman correspondent. It is entitled "*Conclusiones positæ in valvis palatii principis apostolorum Mercurii, VIII Novembris MCCCCXXX.*"

I. Prima conclusio. Fides catholica adeo est privilegiata quod est omni homini præferenda . . .

II. Secunda conclusio. Nedom ecclesiastici verum et sæculares, et maxime principes . . . adstricti sunt fidem Christianam defensare, aliter alieni a fide censendi sunt.

III. Tertia conclusio. Sicut hæreses Novatiani, Arii, Sabelli, Macedonii, Nestorii et aliorum hæreticorum per generalia concilia exsufflatæ fuerunt: ita necesse est pro eradicatione hæresis Hussitarum concilium de mense proximo Martii inevitabiliter celebrare.

IV. Quarta conclusio. Cum celebratio concilii generalis sit medium necessarium extirpandi dictam hæresin quisquis Christianus. . . obnoxius est promovere . . . celebrationem concilii generalis fiendam dicto tempore.

V. Ubi papa vel cardinales desistant promovere aut velint impedire celebrationem concilii generalis dicto tempore fautores hæresis sunt censendi.

VI. Sexta conclusio. Ubi papa in proximo mense Martii concilium generale . . . non incipiat quod præsentas tunc in concilio jure divino sicut sunt obnoxii ei primo obedientiam nomine totius Christianitatis subtrahere, et omnes Christicolæ tenentur præsentibus in concilio generali parere.

VII. Si appareat papam et cardinales nolle promovere concilium . . . ex potestate concilio data a Deo, concilium contra non promoventes tenebitur procedere ad illius vel illorum privationem et depositionem . . . et alias penas a jure statutas contra fautores hæresis.—Martène et Durand, as above, VIII. pp. 48-49.

son-in-law, Duke Louis of Brieg, and most modern writers agree with this supposition. It has been pointed out¹ that the wording of the manifesto recalls the statements contained in the documents drawn up by the Elector during the negotiations at Böhmeinstein. The Elector Frederick of Brandenburg has already been frequently mentioned in these pages. Of Duke Louis of Brieg, a Silesian prince, little is known. During the great invasion of Silesia he was said to have been somewhat half-hearted when opposing the Hussite attacks.² It is, however, impossible to state with certainty who were the authors of the document.

This manifesto greatly impressed Pope Martin V. He at last consented to the meeting of a ecumenical council, whose members were to assemble at Basel in March 1431. Still, however, preferring to subdue the Hussites by the strength of the sword, he endeavoured by all means to accelerate the new crusade against Bohemia. To accentuate his point of view the Pope, on January 1, 1431, appointed Cardinal Julian Cesarini³ papal legate for Germany and entrusted him with the negotiations to expedite the crusade. Only on February 12, when he had already left Rome, the cardinal was also appointed president of the future Council. Though the Pope had reluctantly consented to the meeting of the Council, it is not likely that his life-long aversion to these assemblies—founded on the proceedings of the Council of Constance, which in his

¹ By Dr. v. Bezold, *König Sigmund und die Reichskriege*, etc., Vol. III. p. 86.

² He was accused of having surrendered the town of Brieg to the Hussites without resistance, and even of having a secret agreement with them (*Grünhagen, Hussitenkämpfe*, etc., pp. 137-139).

³ At a period when accusations against unworthy priests play so large a part in history, it is well to note the truly saintly nature of Cesarini. Dr. Pastor (*Geschichte der Päpste*, Vol. I. pp. 203-204) writes: "Von seiner [Cesarini's] Sittenreinheit und Frömmigkeit kann Vespasiano da Bisticci kaum genug Lobenswerthes erzählen. Der Cardinal . . . schlief stets in einem härenen Busshemde, fastete jeden Freitag bei Wasser und Brod. . . . Nie kam mehr als ein Gericht auf seinen Tisch, der Wein den er trank war gefärbtes Wasser. . . . 'Ich habe sehr viele heiligmässige Männer kennen gelernt,' ruft der ehrliche Vespasiano da Bisticci aus, 'aber unter ihnen keinen der dem Cardinal Cesarini gleiche; seit fünfhundert Jahren hat die Kirche keinen solchen Mann gesehen.'"

opinion had greatly limited the papal power—had suddenly disappeared. It was specially displeasing to him that a Council should negotiate with heretics. A victory in the coming campaign would, therefore, appear to him as a victory not only over the Hussites, but also over the Council. Had the Hussites been subdued by the strength of the sword it would become unnecessary to negotiate with them, and it was only to obtain peace that the German princes demanded the convocation of a Council. If this necessity disappeared it would be easy to dissolve the Council.

Before referring to this, the last, crusade against the Bohemians, it is necessary to consider the internal condition of Bohemia at this moment, and also to refer to the renewed negotiations between Bohemia and Poland. The intense dislike and distrust of ecumenical councils which Pope Martin entertained inspired him—as he now no longer expected much help from Sigismund and Germany—with the idea of seeking aid against Hussitism from the Polish nation. He had, therefore, before consenting to the convocation of the Council of Basel, entered into negotiations with Ladislas, King of Poland, and his cousin Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania. In a letter addressed to them on October 1, 1430, he begged the princes to undertake the task of either converting the heretics or destroying them. He gave them permission to negotiate with those who had deserted the Church and to grant them pardon, and he was even ready to consent to any concessions the princes might make, unless they were contrary to the faith and the regulations of the Church; should the Hussites, however, refuse to be converted, the princes were to destroy them in any manner possible, and they were not to consider themselves as bound by any previous promise, even if it had been confirmed by oath; for it was within the power of the Church to annul all promises; and every one could neglect his natural duties, to his father, son, brother, or other relation, and even commit parricide if this was to the advantage of the Catholic

Church.¹ This message, which must of course be judged according to the spirit of that time, was given to a special envoy, Brother Andrew of the Dominican Order.

When the papal envoy arrived at the end of his long journey, Vitold was already dead, but King Ladislas for a time earnestly attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the Hussites and the Church of Rome. His now well-known duplicity, however, caused him to be distrusted by all parties. It is probable that Prince Korybutovič—whose personality contrasts somewhat favourably with those of the other Polish and Lithuanian dignitaries of his time—suggested that some Bohemian generals and divines should be invited to Poland and should there hold a disputation with some Roman Catholic theologians. When Prokop, who was then engaged in warfare in Silesia, was informed of this proposal he avoided giving a definite answer, but deferred the matter to the Bohemian estates. They met at Kutna Hora on February 11, 1431. A new attempt to establish a provisional government was now made. Prince Korybutovič had been obliged to leave Bohemia, and though he had begun to take part in the border warfare, which continued on the frontiers of Bohemia, Silesia and Poland during the whole period of the Hussite wars, his partisans in Bohemia were not numerous. The notorious duplicity of his uncle, King Ladislas, who had expressed sympathy with Bohemia at a moment when he was plotting the ruin of that country in league with King Sigismund and Pope Martin, had naturally, though unjustly, caused the Bohemians to distrust Korybutovič. King Sigismund, whom many Bohemians, even Utraquists, would now have been ready to recognise as King, still persisted in demanding an unconditional surrender to Rome. Even the most moderate Utraquist noble could not accept this as a possible result of ten years of victorious warfare. Under these circumstances the only alternative to complete anarchy appeared to be the

¹ Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 476.

establishment of another provisional government. It was, therefore, decided to appoint twenty regents, chosen among the nobles, knights, squires ("zemane"), Praguers, Táborites, and Orphans. Immediately afterwards it was agreed to send representatives to Poland, who were to take part in the disputations which had been proposed. The leader of this embassy was Prokop the Great, who, since his victories of Ústi and Tachov and his triumphant campaign in Germany, had for a time become practically, though not formally, Dictator of Bohemia. Other priests who formed part of the mission were Frederick of Strašnice and Peter Payne. Among the lay members of the embassy the chroniclers mention Lord Kostka of Postupie and several town-councillors of Prague. The delegates first proceeded to the castle of Sleiwitz in Silesia, where Prince Korybutovič was then residing. From there they sent messengers to King Ladislav to inquire when and where the proposed disputation should take place. The message found the King at Cracow, and he immediately decided that the deliberations should begin there on March 18. The Bohemians immediately started for Cracow, accompanied by Prince Korybutovič and the Polish nobleman, Dobeslav Puchala, who had lately been fighting in Silesia on the side of the Hussites. Contrary to the then general custom on the occasion of theological disputations, only the Bohemian and the Polish languages were used during the discussions which now began. The Bohemians, as on previous occasions, wished to discuss and defend the articles of Prague. King Ladislav and the Polish Church dignitaries, however, declared that the Bohemians should obey the orders of the Pope. The discussion, as was inevitable, therefore remained resultless. The priests Prokop, Frederick, and Peter entirely refused to recognise the papal decrees as absolutely decisive, and Prokop maintained that the Utraquists formed part of the universal Church. King Ladislav himself addressed the Bohemian envoys in a courteous fashion, and reminded them of the great

misfortunes which had befallen their country because of heresy. He specially admonished the Bohemian nobles to return to the fold of the Church of Rome, and endeavoured to persuade them to act independently of the other national parties. On April 4 King Ladislas, on the advice of his councillors, suggested to the Bohemians that they should sign a document stating that they would attend a ecumenical council of the Holy Roman Church, whether held at Basel or elsewhere. The document also contained the promise that the Bohemians would accept and observe indissolubly all the decisions of the Council. The Bohemians immediately declined to sign this document, whose contents, indeed, amounted to an unconditional surrender. The Hussites had demanded to appear on terms of equality at a council in which the whole Christian world was to be represented, and hoped that, should they be able to prove the truth of their tenets, the Council would accept them. The King of Poland now suggested a Council of the Roman Church, which was to be entirely under the direction of the Pope, and he demanded that they should, as erring sons, submit themselves unconditionally to this papal assembly—as the Hussites considered it. The desire for peace was, however, at that moment already so strong that the refusal was couched in very courteous language. The Bohemians begged the King of Poland to intercede in their favour, that they might obtain letters of safe conduct which would enable them to attend the Council; they also suggested that the negotiations begun at Cracow might be continued in Prague at the coming meeting of the estates, to which they begged the King of Poland to send representatives.

Though the Bohemians showed great moderation on this occasion there is no doubt that they left Cracow greatly disappointed and somewhat indignant. It was not the first, nor by any means the last, time that the Bohemians wrongly placed their trust in the kindred Polish nation. An incident which occurred during the stay of the Bohemians in Cracow

also caused great irritation among them. The very zealous, but somewhat tactless, Bishop Zbynev of Cracow had decreed that all religious services in the town were to cease during the presence of the Hussite heretics. When during Easter week the Polish royal family wished to assist at the religious functions, the Bohemian envoys were requested to take up their residence in the suburb of Kaziměř, situated outside the city boundaries.¹ The bishop obstinately insisted on this measure, though many of the King of Poland's councillors disapproved of it. The chivalrous Prince Korybutovič declared that the Bohemians, whom he considered his guests, had been insulted, and sent to the bishop a letter "declaring his enmity to him."²

During the period which begins with the return of the Bohemian armies from Germany in the spring of 1430 and ends with the march of these armies to the frontier to oppose the crusade of 1431, the warfare on the frontiers never entirely ceased, but it had little influence on the general course of events. Probably as early as in March 1430, a large Bohemian force, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 1,200 horsemen, again invaded Silesia. Prokop himself, who was retained at Prague by deliberations that were then taking place there, took no part in this raid, of which it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. The Bohemians were joined by Prince Korybutovič, and with their help he obtained possession of the small Silesian principality of Sleiwitz, which has already been mentioned. In April of the same year another Bohemian army invaded Hungary. This army consisted of the soldiers of the Orphans and the levies of the New Town of Prague. Commanded by Velek Koudelnik and the priest Prokupek (Prokop the Lesser), they marched on the city of Tyrnau, where Sigismund was then residing. He was on the point of starting for Germany, intent on holding another of his numerous imperial

¹ See Professor Goll, *Čechy a Prusy (Bohemia and Prussia)*, p. 220.

² This in the language of chivalry signified a challenge to single combat; there was nothing unusual in such a challenge at a period when bishops were warriors as well as dignitaries of the Church.

diets. The King was obliged to send a messenger to Nürnberg, where the German princes were to meet, informing them that he was detained in Hungary by the attack of the Orphans. It was necessary to meet the enemies in the open field; but Sigismund, never a keen soldier, entrusted the command of the Hungarian army to Stibor, Duke of Transylvania, and John Matik of Telovec, a Hungarian magnate. The first attack of Stibor was so spirited that his horsemen penetrated into the wagon-entrenchment of the Hussites. Velek Koudelnik fell while endeavouring to defend his camp. The arrival of Bohemian reinforcements, however, obliged the Hungarians to retreat, particularly as their second army, under Matik, wrongly believing that their comrades had been defeated, had already begun to retire. The battle was, considering the small number of soldiers who were engaged, very bloody. The Bohemians lost 2,000 men, and the losses of the Hungarians amounted to 6,000 dead and wounded. The Hussites, as was their custom when waging offensive warfare, did not attempt to retain permanent possessions in foreign lands. Shortly after their victory at Tyrnau they returned to Moravia. These raids of smaller or larger Hussite bands into the neighbouring country continued during the summer and autumn of the year 1430. On December 21 the Orphans started on another foreign expedition, invading Lusatia, which had hitherto suffered less than the other neighbouring countries.

Immediately after the departure of the Bohemian envoys King Ladislas, on April 7, 1431, addressed a letter to King Sigismund informing him of the results of the disputation at Cracow and of his intention to be represented at the diet of Prague. He also begged him to consult the German princes as to the best way in which he could obtain letters of safe conduct for the Hussite leaders who wished to attend the Council. Before this letter reached Sigismund, who had now arrived at Nürnberg, he had already received secret com-

munications from some Bohemian nobles favourable to his cause. They had advised him also to send representatives to the diet of Prague. The King readily consented. He was above all things anxious to terminate the struggle with the Hussites. The Hussite wars have so great an importance in the world's history that it is difficult to realise how largely Sigismund was, during this period, occupied with other matters, which even to the historian now appear unimportant. At this moment the King of Hungary was principally interested in the expedition to Italy which he had planned. He hoped to be there crowned as Emperor by the Pope, and he had already sent in advance some of his soldiers to Southern Germany along the road by which he intended to enter Italy. The fact that the Germans had recently frequently fled at the mere approach of the Hussites—and this applies not only to some of the larger battles, but also to many smaller engagements which it has not been possible to mention here—naturally rendered Sigismund reluctant to attempt a new crusade. He therefore gladly agreed to the suggestion of his adherents and appointed the Burgrave of the Karlštýn Zdislav of Buřenic and Nicholas Lobkowitz of Hasištýn his representatives at Prague. The regents chosen in the previous year had decreed that the diet should meet at Prague on May 1, 1431. They had also wisely settled that some time previously the Táborite divines and those representing the moderate Utraquists should meet for the purpose of exchanging their views, and if possible arriving at an understanding. The regents thoroughly understood that it would be necessary that all members of the Bohemian Church should formulate their tenets in an identical manner. They thought—rightly, as events proved—that any appearance of disunion among the Hussites would be very advantageous to their antagonists. Somewhat later than had been intended, on April 30, the Bohemian divines, representatives of the moderate Utraquists (the so-called "Praguers"), the Táborites, and Orphans met at the university college

known as the Carolinum. Master John of Rokycan spoke first, in the name of the Praguers. Most of Rokycan's grievances referred to matters which had already been frequently discussed. He said that the Taborites, who did not recognise the validity of some of the sacraments, reviled those who used them, that they did not pray for the souls of the dead and dissuaded others from doing so. He maintained that they did not sufficiently honour the holy hierarchy, the angels and saints, and the Virgin Mary, that they did not observe the fast-days which had been established at an early period of Christianity, and that they did not prevent the faithful from engaging in warfare not waged in defence of the law of God. Some of the Taborite priests, Rokycan continued, had exercised functions of secular government ("secularis dominii"), and the Taborites had entirely abandoned the use of vestments when celebrating mass; they had omitted to make the sign of the cross during mass, as well as to add water to the wine during mass, and they had been guilty of other irregularities.

Judging of Rokycan's own views by the objections he raised to the teaching of the Taborites, it appears clear that these views were in many respects closely connected with the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet it must be remembered that Rokycan cannot be rightly considered a thorough member of the Hussite High Church. At the moment of the rising of the people of Prague against Korybutovič he had even been one of those who demanded the expulsion of Přebem, Mladenovič, and other High-Churchmen.

The Taborites immediately replied on all the points raised by Rokycan. They said that they recognised six sacraments.¹ They denied that the sacrament of extreme unction had been established by Jesus Christ, but they raised no objection to the practice of administering extreme unction to sick or dying men if they desired it. As to the prayers for the dead the

¹ This is noteworthy, as many German Lutheran writers have stated that the Taborites recognised only two sacraments.

Táborites objected to them, as they found in Scripture no positive statement affirming the existence of purgatory nor any injunction to pray for the dead; they also stated that these prayers often caused simony to be committed. They disapproved of prayers to the saints, but declared that their memory should be honoured and respected. The Táborites did not disapprove of fasting, but said that every Christian should himself determine when to do so; he should, however, when doing this take into consideration the times mentioned in the Old and New Testaments as specially suitable for fasting. The answer of the Táborites to Rokycan's rather unfair accusation of favouring bloodshed and warfare was appropriate and dignified. They declared that originally none of those whom the teaching of Master John Hus had converted had any intention to fight. "But," they continued, "when our opponents began to use violent means against us, then our whole nation, which did not wish to abandon the good cause and turn away from the Catholic Church,¹ out of necessity began to go to war, and all the priests and masters of Prague unanimously agreed to this." The Táborites further stated that they could not condemn wars forced on them by necessity, and that such a necessity still existed. They were ready immediately to abandon warfare if the enemies would tread the path of truth and justice, and they had always preferred to employ spiritual warfare, that is, prayer and mild persuasion, for the purpose of leading the enemy to concord and agreement. They could not prevent many who had evil intentions from joining their armies, but they deeply regretted it, and had issued severe regulations to maintain order in their camps. With regard to Rokycan's statement that Táborite priests had assumed the duties of secular government, the Táborites declared that they had decreed at their convocations that no priest or person who had received the higher orders should

¹ This is, of course, to be understood in the Hussite sense of the word; they always maintained that they belonged to the Catholic Church.

engage in temporal affairs; yet as there were improvident and careless laymen, they would not judge or condemn a priest who, inspired by the Divine Spirit, established peace and order among secular men, thus assuming functions which laymen had proved incapable of exercising. They were also sure that there were no priests among them who would not gladly renounce such functions if it were possible for them to do so. With regard to the use of vestments, the last point which Rokycan had raised, the Taborites maintained the views which they had previously held. They said that concerning mass and Communion, certain matters were essential, these were the necessary materials, bread and wine, the ritual words at the moment of consecration, and the presence of a lawfully ordained priest, who had the intention of celebrating mass; other matters—and this referred specially to the vestments of the priests—could be observed or neglected without incurring sin in either case.¹ The priests of the Orphans then expounded their views, which were intermediate between those of the Praguers and those of the Taborites.² Their statements, however, appear to have been considered unimportant, and are hardly mentioned by the contemporary writers. When reading the authentic statements expounding the views of the different Hussite parties, it is impossible not to be struck by the comparative moderation of the opinions expressed. It is certain that the Hussite parties, intending to appear jointly before the universal council of the Church, endeavoured to attenuate the differences which existed between them as to matters of ritual and doctrine. It is also certain that during the whole period of the Hussite wars there were many fanatics holding views that differed widely from those recorded above. Yet every Bohemian, to whatever branch of Christianity he

¹ I have founded my account of these discussions on the "Chronicon Taboritarum" (Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber*, etc., Vol. II. pp. 475-480).

² "The Orphans on some points agreed with the masters of Prague, on others opposed them in union with the Taborites" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 80).

may belong, is justified in objecting to the statements of those writers who—from political rather than from religious motives—describe lengthily the deeds and words of sometimes crazy fanatics, but ignore the teaching of what was for a long time the dominant Church in Bohemia.

The meeting of the Bohemian diet took place immediately after the disputations in the Carolinum. The King of Poland and King Sigismund had both sent representatives. The proceedings were of short duration, and turned principally on the question whether the Bohemians should accept the invitation of Sigismund, who had asked them to send representatives to Cheb, where the conditions of the coming Council were to be again discussed. The Bohemians were at this moment better disposed to Sigismund than to the King of Poland. The conflict between Pope Eugenius IV—Pope Martin had died on February 20—and the Council, which began to assemble at Basel in the spring of 1431, had an indirect but not inconsiderable influence on the course of events in Bohemia. Sigismund was at that moment considered an upholder of the authority of ecumenical councils, which moderate men even in Bohemia were inclined to recognise. The King of Poland then was, or pretended to be, an unconditional supporter of Pope Eugenius. Though there was some opposition on the part of the Orphans, who cherished their hatred of Sigismund as a legacy of their dead leader, the Bohemians decided to send representatives to Cheb. As had become customary, Utraquist nobles with representatives of the communities of Tábor and of the Orphans and delegates of the cities of Prague composed the new embassy. Prokop did not form part of it. He joined the Hussite army, that was then carrying on guerilla warfare in Silesia, and undoubtedly wished at this important moment to bring pressure on the enemies and convey to them that the negotiations had not yet advanced sufficiently to render the conclusion of an armistice possible.

The negotiations which began at Cheb on May 24 were

similar in character to those at Pressburg and Cracow and equally resultless. The principal speaker on the national side was Lord Kostka of Postupic, who had already taken part in several similar discussions. The Bohemians again demanded that the Council in which they were to take part should be a truly ecumenical one, to which members of the Greek and the Oriental Churches should be admitted. Sigismund, who was present at Cheb accompanied by many German princes, rejected this proposal, which, indeed, he considered ridiculous.¹ The King then suggested that the Hussites should leave to the Council the final decision as to what was true Scriptural doctrine. The Hussites replied that they would die rather than submit unconditionally to the Council, and they also rejected Sigismund's proposal that an armistice should be concluded which was to last during the time in which the Council continued its deliberations. This concluded the negotiations, and the Bohemian envoys hurriedly returned to Prague, where they called on their countrymen to be ready to resist an immediate German invasion.

Sigismund had in August 1430 returned to Germany after an absence of nearly eight years. It was now his duty to superintend the organisation of a new crusade. He did this reluctantly, remembering the failure of previous expeditions, yet it appears that from the time when he had received Prokop at Pressburg he had been planning a new invasion of Bohemia. In February 1431 the German princes began to assemble at Nürnberg, where the long-deferred imperial diet was to meet. The festivities on this occasion were very brilliant, and the German princes attended in large numbers. As soon, however, as the serious deliberation began great difficulties arose. The free so-called "imperial" cities possessed great

¹ "Subjunxerunt etiam [the Hussites] quod in hujusmodi concilio totius Christianitatis etiam Indi, Græci, Armeni, schismatici et breviter omnes Christum confitentes interesse deberent et plura alia quæ ad scribendum magis ridiculosa quam utilia forent" (Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, Vol. II. pp. 209-214.)

privileges, and had formerly been favoured by Sigismund. Influenced probably by the Suabian nobles the King now took up an attitude very hostile to these miniature republics. When the question of the levies and financial grants which were required for the new crusade arose, these cities, therefore, proved more reluctant than on any previous occasion.¹ While these discussions affecting the private interests of various German princes and cities were being carried on with great acrimony the papal legate, Cardinal Cesarini, arrived at Nürnberg on March 4. His religious enthusiasm greatly contrasted with the indifference and egoism of the German princes. He appeared before the diet and stated that he had been sent by the Pope to further the coming crusade by word and by deed. When shortly afterwards the proceedings at Nürnberg terminated and Sigismund proceeded to Cheb, as already mentioned, Cardinal Cesarini repaired to Germany and the Netherlands, calling on all faithful Christians to take part in the holy war. It is evident that at this moment the papal see was more intent on the result of the coming crusade than on the meeting of the Council. Though Cesarini had been appointed papal representative at the Council he avoided visiting Basel, skilfully explaining his absence by the fact that he had not yet received instructions from the new Pope, Eugenius IV. The papal see no doubt thought that should the new warlike enterprise prove successful Hussitism could be exterminated, and negotiations with the Hussites would become unnecessary; in that case it would be well to close the Council as soon as possible. The cardinal first visited Würzburg and Frankfort, and then visited several princes in the lands situated near the Rhine. He received promises of aid from the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Burgundy, the town of Köln, and the Bishop of Lièges, and then returned to Nürnberg, greatly pleased with the results of his mission. He was here, however, to meet with

¹ The lengthy deliberations of the diet of Nürnberg are well described in Dr. v. Bezold's *König Sigmund und die Reichskriege*, etc., Vol. III.

a great disappointment. The incessant bitter feuds among the German princes and free cities continued as usual during the year 1431, and even the princes who had just promised their aid to Cardinal Julian forgot Bohemia as soon as he had left them and again engaged in civil warfare. Thus the Duke of Burgundy took part in the contest for the succession to the duchy of Lorraine, and several other German princes aided each of the two rival claimants to the succession to the duchy. Internal warfare also began between two rival candidates to the archbishopric of Trier, and a feud broke out between the Archbishop of Magdeburg and the citizens of that town. These were the principal, though not the only, feuds raging in Germany during the year 1431. Though the diet had decreed that the crusaders should start on their march in spring, it was only on June 26 that King Sigismund appointed Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, commander-in-chief. On July 1 Cardinal Cesarini issued a proclamation in which he called on all Germans to start immediately on the crusade. About this time numerous German soldiers began to march through Nürnberg on their way to the Bohemian frontier. Cesarini, who had no knowledge of military matters, believed them to be far more numerous than was actually the case. Feeling, therefore, very confident, he addressed a proclamation to the people of Bohemia and Moravia, calling on them to submit at last to the papal authority, and promising them peace and quiet should they do so. The cardinal then, as was so often done during the Hussite wars, appealed to the Bohemian nobles, calling on them not to submit to the arrogance of heretical townsmen and peasants. At the same time King Sigismund also published a proclamation throwing on the Hussites the full responsibility for the rupture of the recent negotiations at Cheb, and protesting against the accusation that he was invading Bohemia to burn the cities, ravage the country, and murder women and children. In answer to these proclamations the united Utraquists on July 21 pub-

lished a manifesto addressed to the whole Christian world. It began by again enumerating the articles of Prague, and strongly maintained that the Utraquists had always been favourable to a peaceful agreement and had proved this by taking part in the negotiations at Pressburg, Cracow, and Cheb. They, however, strongly protested against the attempt of the Roman Church to assume in the place of Jesus Christ the position of supreme arbitrator on the question of true Christianity. They then drew a contrast, worded in very bitter words, between the life of the Apostles and that of the pontiffs of the period.¹ The bitter hatred of the Roman priesthood and the striving for a return to the primitive Church, so characteristic of the Hussite movement, appear very clearly in this interesting document.

On July 7 Cardinal Cesarini left Nürnberg and proceeded as far as the town of Weiden, where part of the army had already assembled. The crusaders, from motives which it is difficult to fathom, remained near this town up to the end of July. New levies gradually joined them, but by no means to as great an extent as had been hoped. The long delay at Weiden, as was inevitable, slackened the discipline in the German army, and the usual discord arose among the princes. Some princes began to suggest that the campaign should be abandoned and that the Council, which had already begun its sittings at Basel, should be called on to negotiate a pacific agreement with the Bohemians. The enthusiastic Cardinal Cesarini violently opposed these proposals, and urgently demanded an immediate advance. Some German writers

¹ " . . . sensate, attendite, obsecramus universi et singuli Christifideles, si isti episcopi sedes Apostolorum juste ac digne occupant, qui illis vita et moribus totaliter adversantur. Illi quippe per orbem terrarum pannosi et contempti a populo migrantes, veritates dominicas cunctis populis tribubus et linguis fideliter nunciarunt, easdem propria morte firmantes; isti purpura vestiti ac bisso, gloriosi in populo, canes muti effecti in castris et urbibus tranquille resident et easdem veritates eciam aspernantur audire, ac propter earum observanciam fidelem fideles spoliant fama, vita et rebus non per se quia cubant cum scortis, sed per cruenta crucis erectionem, seculare brachium in occisionem fidelium fallaciter concitantes " (Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. II. pp. 228-231).

have recently, not quite unjustly, accused the cardinal of being the cause of one of the most disgraceful defeats which any German army ever suffered.

It has already been stated that the Bohemian envoys, on returning from their fruitless mission to Cheb, had informed their countrymen that they must expect an immediate new attack of the Germans. With a rapidity and energy that contrast strangely with the attitude of the Germans, who had for two years been deliberating on the plan of this campaign, Prokop immediately gave the necessary orders to concentrate his troops and move them in the direction of the menaced frontier. All the troops in Silesia marched to Prague, leaving only small garrisons in some Silesian cities. In a letter addressed to the nobles of Moravia, Prokop and the other Táborite captains called on them to march to the district of Plzeň with as large force as they could muster, "as the King of Hungary had assembled many foreigners to fight against God's truth and for the destruction of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia who believed in God's truth."¹ The Moravians readily responded to the call; we find among those who hurriedly marched into Bohemia the names of two of the greatest Moravian nobles, Lord John of Tovačovský and Lord Lacek of Sternberg. The Utraquist nobles of Bohemia did not at this moment show as great a zeal for the Utraquist cause as on former occasions. The strong distrust, soon amounting to hatred, of the advanced parties which the Bohemian nobles felt, and which finally caused the downfall of Bohemia, was already very evident.² Though a considerable number of Bohemian nobles sent their retainers to join the Táborite

¹ Letter published by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge*, etc., Vol. II. p. 215.

² It is interesting to note that Bishop Stubbs, though he did not devote much study to Bohemian history, saw this point more clearly than most historians have done. "It may be questioned," he writes, "whether in the long run Bohemia could not have rejected the yoke of Rome and the rule of the Luxemburg family, had not the national party itself been divided and the Hussites—the Táborites are meant—as the weaker gone to the wall" (*Germany in the later Middle Ages*, p. 173).

forces, only Lord Hanuš of Kolowrat is mentioned as having, somewhat reluctantly, taken a personal part in this campaign. The Táborite army was, however, joined by large forces sent by the cities of Prague and many other Bohemian towns, and a large Polish contingent led by Prince Korybutovič also came to the aid of the Bohemians in this moment of peril. The forces of the Hussites in this their last battle against a foreign foe were greater than on any previous occasion. The Bohemian army first marched to Plzeň, and after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain possession of that stronghold continued its march to the Bavarian frontier ready to give battle immediately. The crusaders, however, remained at Weiden on the Bavarian frontier without attempting to cross the hills of the Šumava (Bohemian forest). The districts of Western Bohemia had during the last ten years been the scene of almost incessant warfare, and had been thoroughly devastated. The Hussites soon found it impossible to provision a large army in these regions. Prokop the Great, anxious to prove the conciliatory attitude of his party, made another attempt to negotiate with the King of Hungary, which, however, again failed. The Hussite leaders then immediately decided to evacuate for the moment this exhausted district and to retire into the interior of their country. The crusaders, as usually, entirely uninformed of the doings in the enemies' camp, concluded that the Bohemians had given up all hope of offering resistance in the open field. On August 1 they at last crossed the Bohemian frontier and marched on the small town of Tachov, which had played a considerable part in a previous campaign. The Elector of Brandenburg, who was commander-in-chief, was accompanied by Cardinal Cesarini, the Archbishop of Köln, the Duke of Bavaria, and the Count Palatine Stephen. Though some of the promised reinforcements were not forthcoming a considerable number of new crusaders joined the invading army about the time at which it crossed the frontier. According to the most reliable calculations the whole

force—including the numerous camp-followers—amounted to about 100,000 men. Instead of advancing immediately the vast army remained for some time close to the Bavarian frontier. The terror then inspired by the Bohemian name was so great that the crusaders probably thought it more prudent to await the results of the movements of the Archduke of Austria and the Silesian princes, who were to create diversions by attacking Bohemia from their territories. Contrary to the judicious advice of Cardinal Julian, a week was spent in besieging the town of Tachov. The attempt to capture Tachov failed, and on August 8 the army continued its march, following at first the direct road to Plzeň, and then turning southward in the direction of Domázlíce. Both on this march and during the siege of Tachov the crusaders plundered and devastated the surrounding country to an extent unrivalled even in the bloody annals of the Hussite wars. The entire population was murdered, irrespective of their religious creed. The crusaders were undoubtedly determined to extirpate entirely the Slavic-Bohemian race.¹

The Hussites, who had only retired from the frontier because of the difficulty of provisioning their large army in an exhausted country, had meanwhile rallied their forces near the Karlštýn fortress, and, probably well aware of the indiscipline and licence which prevailed among the crusaders, now immediately marched on Domázlíce. When the Elector Frederick was, on the morning of August 14, informed of the approach of the Bohemian armies, he immediately determined to await their attack in a defensive position and also to prepare for a retreat which, he thought, might possibly be necessary. He therefore gave orders that all the transport-wagons and impedimenta generally should be immediately conveyed to the rear. This measure, though undoubtedly justified by the circumstances,

¹ Even Æneas Sylvius writes: "Cardinalis numerosum exercitum ductans multas hæreticorum villas incendit, oppidaque diripuit, in quibus non avaritia tantum, verum crudelitas etiam militum grassata est qui mares cum fœminis obvios senes puerosque passim necavere (*Historia Bohemica*, chap. xlviii).

yet caused great alarm among the Germans, who had on previous occasions distrusted the Elector's conduct. He had issued this order without informing either the cardinal or the German princes of it. When, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, the cardinal, accompanied by the Elector of Saxony and several other German princes, rode up to the summit of a hill which overlooked the road by which the Bohemians were advancing, he was naturally astounded at seeing the long columns of provision-wagons that were being hurriedly driven off in the opposite direction, that of the German frontier. Though the Hussites were not yet even in sight, many wagons had already thrown off their loads to hasten their retreat. Matters, of course, became much worse when the advancing Bohemian columns were seen and the war-song "All ye warriors of God,"¹ which the nationalists intoned, reached the ears of the crusaders. No resistance was even attempted, and before a single shot had been fired the whole German army, seized by a sudden panic, fled in the greatest disorder in the direction of the mountain passes which divide Bohemia from Bavaria. All discipline soon ceased, and in the narrow roads that lead to the frontier fierce struggles took place among the crusaders and particularly the wagon-drivers, each of whom tried to outstrip the others. A small number of crusaders, among whom were some Italian troopers who formed the body-guard of the cardinal, attempted to arrest the advance of the Bohemians, who, this time well provided with cavalry, sharply pursued the flying Germans. Cardinal Cesarini, who at first attempted to remonstrate with the flyers, was soon obliged to take part in the general flight. The German soldiers, most of whom had very reluctantly taken part in the campaign, were infuriated against the foreign priest as the cause of this disaster, and they threatened his life. He was at last obliged to fly in disguise, not from the Hussites, but from the crusaders. During the retreat through the mountain-passes the losses of

the Germans were enormous, and almost all their artillery and baggage were captured by the Hussites.¹

¹ Lawrence of Březova, author of a history of the early part of the Hussite wars which has often been quoted in these pages, wrote a quaint and very interesting Latin ballad on the rout at Domálice. It is here only possible to quote a few lines. Březova writes of the flight—

“ O quam turpe diffugium
 Tam strenuarum gencium :
 Non viso hoste fugere
 Totque cara relinquere
 Suis in fructum hostibus
 Duris atque crudelibus.”

Somewhat later Cardinal Cesarini thus addresses the Pope—

“ Tandem illi scismatici
 Gentis Boemie rustici
 Congesserunt exercitum
 Paucum inermem frivolum.
 Mira tunc res peragitur
 Nec ei par conspicitur
 In tota sacra pagina.
 Cum nobis appropinquaret
 Ille malignus populus
 Spes fugit et consilium.
 Terra tremante tremimus,
 Nil nisi fugam querimus,
 Agente hoc dyabolo
 Certe ipsorum domino.”

(Published in “ Fontes rerum Bohemicarum,” Vol. V, pp. 545-563.)

CHAPTER VII

THE effect of the victory of Domázlíce can hardly be exaggerated. Had the Bohemians now abandoned their system of only raiding the neighbouring lands and not establishing themselves permanently in foreign countries nothing would at that moment have prevented them from founding a Slavic state in Central Europe, though it is doubtful whether such an enterprise would have met with permanent success.

It is at any rate certain that none of the Bohemian leaders, not even Prokop, whose Táborites had contributed so largely to the crowning victory of Domázlíce, entertained such plans. Their claims were, as before, limited to the recognition of the independence of their country and to the demands contained in the articles of Prague. Even the Táborites energetically protested against the accusation of heresy, and maintained that the Bohemians formed part of the universal Church. Still greater was the desire for peace among the Utraquist nobles and the more conservative citizens of Prague. The Utraquist nobility, which had played so brilliant a part during the earlier period of the Hussite wars, had, since the departure of Prince Korybutovič, almost entirely lost its predominant position. These men had always demanded the establishment of a Bohemian national Church, which was to form part of the universal Church. Within this national Church Communion was to be dispensed in the two kinds, the national language was to be used in the religious functions, and very severe regulations were to reform the clergy, whose worldliness and viciousness at that period scandalised even the most fervent adherents of the Church of Rome. With regard to temporal matters, however, these nobles held views not dissimilar from those of the nobility

of other countries. As did the men of their rank in Germany and France, they also considered themselves the born leaders of their nation. They were not uninfluenced by the taunts of the German nobles who—now that Prokop had become practically dictator—described them as “priest-ridden.”¹

Among those who had been defeated the desire for peace was also almost universal. King Sigismund, with the attitude of foolish bravado which was habitual with him, affected to consider the disaster of Domázlíce as a matter of slight importance. He had recourse to his usual universal remedy. He convoked the princes and free cities to an imperial diet, which was to meet at Frankfort on October 16, 1431, and promised to be present there. This promise he, however, as usual, failed to keep. He was now almost exclusively intent on his expedition to Italy, where, according to his wishes, he hoped at last to be crowned as emperor by the Pope.

The German princes were not inclined to view the perilous position of their country with the same indifference as the King of Hungary. A strong democratic wave at this moment menaced the rulers of Germany. This danger, which had existed before the disaster of Domázlíce, now became more serious. In the cities of Constance, Stettin, Bremen, and others democratic movements broke out, and it was feared that they might extend to the neighbouring country districts. In Passau, Bamberg, and Würzburg the citizens rose in arms against their bishops, and a feeling hostile to the clergy spread over all Germany. The most energetic friend of peace was now the formerly war-like cardinal, Julian Cesarini. His short sojourn in the German camp had convinced him that the Germans were at that moment incapable of resisting the Bohemian armies. He therefore undertook and carried out with great skill the difficult task of bringing about a reconciliation between the Roman Church and the Utraquists. On his return from

¹ This motive, to which the contemporary German chroniclers frequently allude, has remained unnoticed by many writers on Bohemian history.

Bohemia the cardinal first visited King Sigismund at Nürnberg. The King, as already mentioned, made light of the recent disaster and declared that he was sure of final victory. He did not, therefore, express a favourable opinion of Cesarini's conciliatory plans. He was on the point of starting for Italy, where his coronation depended on the favour of the Pope. He knew that Pope Eugenius was—like his predecessor—strongly opposed to general Councils of the Church, and that he was at that moment contemplating the dissolution of the Assembly at Basel. The cardinal, however, proceeded to that town and now at last assumed the presidency of the Council, which had been conferred on him by Pope Martin and confirmed by his successor. Since the spring of the year 1431 ecclesiastics from various countries had begun to arrive at Basel, though the scarcely veiled hostility of Pope Eugenius deterred many. Shortly after the arrival of Cardinal Cesarini the Council took the important step of inviting the Utraquists to appear before the assembly. On October 10 the Council addressed a letter to the clergy, nobility, and the whole Bohemian nation,¹ in which it expressed the sincere wish that peace and unity be re-established in the Church, and it invited

¹ This letter is published in John of Ragusa's "Tractatus quomodo Bohemi reducti sunt ad Unitatem Ecclesiæ" (*Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium Seculi Decimi Quinti*, Tom. I. pp. 135-137). It states: "Sacrosancta Basiliensis Synodus . . . : universis viris ecclesiasticis, nobilibus et toti populo regni Bohemiæ unitatem et pacem in Christo domino nostro. Compulit nos caritas Christi egredi de terra nostra . . . et venire ad locum, quem ostendit nobis Dominus pro pace ecclesiæ et salute populi Christiani. Et quid mirum si pro Christo in terra aliena peregrinari decrevimus, cum ipse Deus noster pro nobis durissimam usque ad mortem crucis peregrinationem pati dignatus sit? Si Deus ita dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret: et nos merito ipsum diligere debemus ut pro ovis suis, si oporteat animas nostras libenter exponamus. . . . Si sciretis quanto affectu salutem et pacem vestram optamus . . . obmissis omnibus sine mora huc properantes projiceretis vos in ulnas nostras confidentes quod a nobis, qui vos propter Christum ut nos ipsos amamus requiem animabus vestris invenire possetis. . . . Licebit omnibus libere exponere quicquid Christianæ religioni expedire judicaverint. . . . Rogamus autem ut viros tales mittatis super quos spiritus domini requiescere speratur; mites videlicet humiles corde pacem optantes et non quæ sua sunt quærentes, sed quæ Jesu Christi; qui nobis et vobis et toti populo Christiano hic pacem et in futuro seculo vitam æternam donare dignetur qui vivit benedictus in secula. Amen."

the Bohemians to attend the Council, where they would have complete liberty of freely expounding their religious views. They were also assured that they would be allowed to proceed to Basel freely and safely. The Council finally begged them to choose pious and conciliatory men as their representatives.

The embitterment of the Roman Church against the Utraquists was at that moment so great that even the question how this message was to be transmitted to Bohemia caused some difficulty. Papal decrees had, under penalty of excommunication, forbidden all intercourse with Bohemia. It was, therefore, decided to send off three copies of this invitation, one to King Sigismund, who was then at Feldkirch on his way to Milan, another to the municipality of Nürnberg, and a third to the city of Cheb, requesting that this communication be forwarded to the authorities in Bohemia.

This undoubtedly wise step immediately met with strong disapproval on the part of Pope Eugenius. He considered the mere fact that the Council had proposed to enter into negotiations with heretics whose teaching had already been condemned by the Roman Church a sufficient reason for decreeing the dissolution of the Council. This seemed particularly unjustifiable to the members of that assembly at a moment when the negotiations for the purpose of reuniting the Eastern Church to that of Rome had been resumed. On November 12 Pope Eugenius forwarded to the Cardinal Cesarini a bull declaring the Council of Basel to be dissolved, and requesting the cardinal to leave that city immediately. A later bull dated December 18 repeated the same orders in stronger language. One of the grievances now alleged against the Council was that it had invited to its sittings representatives of the Bohemian heretics, whose teaching had been condemned by two Councils—those of Constance and Siena—and that it had thus seriously impaired the dignity of the Church. Cardinal Cesarini in this difficult position maintained his conciliatory attitude, and firmly, though courteously, declined to abandon

the peace conference. He refused to leave Basel, and in a lengthy document attempted to justify the proceedings of the Council. He pointed out that negotiations with other heretics formed a precedent for the negotiations with the Utraquists,¹ and declared that in view of the increasing opposition to the Roman Church in Germany pacification was an absolute necessity.

The Bohemians had meanwhile received the conciliatory message of the Council. The citizens of Cheb forwarded it to Prague by a special envoy, and Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg also transmitted to the Bohemians the copy of the letter which King Sigismund had entrusted to him. The town council of Prague received this communication with great joy. The letter was first read out privately to the members of the Council, and then brought to the knowledge of the whole community by the eloquent priest John of Rokycan, who read out its contents from the pulpit of the Týn church. He then preached a sermon on peace which, as the chroniclers write, was so touching that all present burst into tears of joy. The municipality of Prague, however, found it difficult to give a definite reply. The hegemony over a large part of Bohemia once possessed by Prague, particularly after the victory of the Vyšehrad, had almost entirely disappeared. The Utraquist lords were, indeed, still in alliance with the conservative Old Town, but the lords "sub una," whose influence had greatly increased in consequence of Prokop's radicalism, now demanded the unconditional surrender to King Sigismund and absolute submission to the authority of Rome. On the other hand, the practical dictatorship of Prokop the Great, which had been confirmed by his brilliant victory at Domázlitz, rendered it impossible to enter into negotiations except in

¹ M. Noël Valois in his *Le Pape et le concile*, quotes a document entitled "De Justificatione vocationis Bohemorum" (Paris, Bib. nat. MS. lat. 1548), which justifies the action of the Council. The author writes: "Et pro illis jam inveteratis hereticis [the Greeks] novum indicitur concilium; cur pro istis novellis, ex quibus majus timetur periculum non permittitur manere concilium ceptum et longe ante indictum."

agreement with the Táborites. The Praguers in their reply, therefore, limited themselves to stating that they were unable to treat alone on such weighty matters, but that a general diet of the Bohemian kingdom would shortly assemble in their city and would be able to give a definite answer. The university of Prague and the moderate Utraquists generally sympathised with Rokycan's praise of peace. The demands of these men, as has been repeatedly noted, were limited. Opposition was, however, to be expected on the part of the Táborites, who had just published a manifesto violently attacking the entire ecclesiastical institutions of the Catholic Church. All Bohemian parties, however, agreed that it was necessary that the estates should meet as soon as possible. It had at first been settled that the diet should begin its sittings on December 6, but some delay occurred, as the army of the Orphans had not at that date returned from a raid in Hungary; though negotiations in view of peace had begun, the Bohemians still continued these incursions into the neighbouring lands; they had, indeed, become necessary to provision the exhausted country. The new invasion of Hungary had, however, proved very disastrous; and the Orphans returned to Bohemia in very reduced numbers. Even after their return many died from exhaustion and exposure to the cold. The Orphans openly accused Prokop ¹ of

¹ In a letter sent by John Nider, prior of the Dominicans, one of the peace negotiators to John of Ragusa, on January 5, 1532, he notes the report of an envoy of the Town of Cheb who was at Prague when the Orphans returned there. "Dixit [the envoy] quod XIII Decembris fuit Pragæ per VIII circiter dies; vidit eadem die i. e. in crastino S. Lucie redire de Hungaria Hussitas et intrare Pragam non ut antea viderat aliquando cum spoliis, lætitia et fistulationibus, sed cum magna tristitia et irrisionibus. Sunt enim in Praga, præsertim Veteri, quæ in triplo validior est in omnibus Nova qui corde fideles sunt et cum summo gaudio perceperunt stragem Orphanorum, optantes ut malis Bohemiæ finis detur. Fuerunt autem præfati Hussitæ qui Pragam intraverunt hi quos hæretici percipientes eorum confratres circumdatos in Ungaria direxerunt eisdem fratribus in adiutorium. Sed mentita est iniquitas sibi. Ungariæ enim appropinquantes, perceperunt, prout alias audisti, nedum multitudinem Orphanorum fame et gladio occisas, verum etiam plures ignobiles, nobiles et capitaneos Taboritarum peremptos. Siquidem postquam Procopius cum suis et Orphanorum exercitus Ungariam intrasset et spolia multa collegisset captam prædam cum dissidio et seditione dividere cœperunt. Ex quo in iram motus Procopius cum paucis, quibus

not having sent sufficient reinforcements to their army in Hungary. A very bitter controversy broke out, and Prokop, offended by these accusations, retired to Kutna Hora, refusing to take part in the proceedings of the diet. That assembly met at last on New Year's Day 1432. A few days previously Archbishop Conrad had died, and this event greatly increased the wish of the Hussite High Church to re-establish its connection with the universal Church, for thus only could the Apostolic Succession of the Bohemian clergy be assured. The assembly met at the town-hall of the New Town, probably in accordance with the wishes of the Orphans, who were close allies of the citizens of that community. Following the precedent of other previous meetings the diet constituted two committees—if we may thus describe them—one of which was to discuss the religious controversies, while the other was to devote its attention to the general political situation in the country. Among those who were to apply their attention to religious matters, John of Rokycan again played a predominant part. Here, as previously, he eloquently advocated a peaceful agreement, though he continued to maintain the demands of the Bohemian Church as they had been formulated in the articles of Prague. The priests of Prague and of those cities which were still allied with the capital, the community of the Orphans, and the Utraquist nobles all agreed to uphold the cherished teaching of the university, for which they had fought so long and so bravely. They recognised the seven sacraments and admitted the existence of purgatory; they admitted the right of praying for the dead and declared that the priests should, when celebrating mass, officiate in vestments which were in accordance with the rites of the universal Church.

vitam optavit caute fugiendo, reliquit post se multitudinem gladiis statim præstandam Ungarorum. Est autem prope Montem Cauthnis [Kutna Hora] in castro sine omni campestri exercitu infamis fere apud omnes hæreticos qui eum proclamant fratres seduxisse" (Monumenta Conciliorum, as above, Tom. I., p. 140). It must not be overlooked that the citizens of Cheb were strong adherents of the Church of Rome.

In view of the vacancy of the archiepiscopal see they then elected Rokycan administrator of the Utraquist Church ("director cleri"), and conferred on him the full powers which had been exercised by the Archbishops of Prague.

The committee, which had to deal with the political situation, began its activity by sanctioning all the resolutions made by the ecclesiastics. The members then devoted their attention to the necessity of putting a stop to the indiscipline of the soldiery, which had recently greatly increased, and to their depredations, from which the townsmen and peasants suffered severely. It was decided to appoint captains of the people, who were to exercise extensive powers in the districts of Bohemia and Moravia that were entrusted to them. They were in time of war to protect the Utraquist people from undue commandeering and plundering, and were, in accordance with the local authorities and the nobles and knights, to determine what supplies and provisions were required for the continuation of the war. The stress laid on this matter proves to how great an extent the new Táborite levies, very different from Žižka's "warriors of God," had already become a burden even to the Utraquist population of Bohemia. As to the all-important question whether the Utraquists should attend the Council the diet declared that, as the Bohemians had always desired peace, they were ready to take part in a ecumenical council if they were given the necessary guarantees for the safety of their envoys during their stay in Germany; they could not, however, give a positive answer before the leaders of the Táborite party, who had not taken part in the proceedings of the diet, had expressed their opinion. As under the existing circumstances a decision of the diet which had not been sanctioned by the Táborites would have had little value and could not have influenced the resolutions of the Council, the diet adjourned, after having only sat for a week.

It has, of course, been impossible to notice even slightly the innumerable feuds and minor intestine conflicts which con-

tinued in Bohemia uninterruptedly from the year 1420 to 1434. It, however, deserves mention that the diet, which met in Prague in January 1432, decided that an attempt should be made to obtain possession of the towns of Budějovice and Plzeň, that were still held by the adherents of Rome and of King Sigismund. It was evident to the Utraquists that they could not ask the Council to recognise the Bohemian Church as the national one as long as two important Bohemian cities refused their allegiance to that Church. Unfortunately for the Utraquists the execution of this plan was deferred, and when a new attack of Plzeň was attempted two years later it caused a complete rupture between the national parties. The Bohemians hoped that a new diet would be able to transmit to Basel an answer which would be in accordance with the views of all the national parties. The estates, therefore, met again at Prague on February 10, and all the parties, including the Táborites, were this time represented. Among those present were Prokop the Great, Prokop the Lesser, and the principal leaders of all the Utraquist parties. We have unfortunately but very scanty information concerning the deliberations of this diet, but it appears certain that they were very stormy. The Orphans, joining the moderate parties; not only proposed that envoys should be sent to the Council of Basel, but also spoke in favour of drawing up "articles," which were to be presented to the members of the Council. In this document the principal points on which the Utraquist teaching differed from the doctrine of the Church of Rome were to be enumerated. The Táborites energetically opposed this suggestion, as they held many opinions which were distasteful to the Hussite High Church. The dispute became so bitter that some of the Utraquist lords already began to meditate a reconciliation with the lords "sub una" for the purpose of opposing the fanatical democracy of Tábor. Though secret negotiations to this purpose probably now took place, a complete scission was avoided at least for a time, and the

Utraquists appeared as a united body at the Council of Basel. The proposals to establish severer discipline in the Hussite armies, first discussed at the previous meeting of the diet, were again a subject of debate. The Táborites energetically opposed all such regulations. Though this is scarcely mentioned by the chroniclers, it appears certain that the Táborite generals already knew that they were powerless to enforce rigid discipline among their followers, whose conduct was becoming more and more seditious.

In spite of these troubles and difficulties the deliberations of the diet were on the whole successful. It was decided, with the consent of the Táborites, that Bohemia should be represented at the Council, and also that Bohemian envoys should meet at Cheb delegates of the Council, where the necessary steps should be taken to assure the safety of the Bohemians during their stay in Germany. On February 27 the municipalities of Prague, in their own name and in that of the Bohemian nobles and knights and in that of the commanders of the armies in Bohemia and Moravia, addressed a letter to the delegates of the Council, who were then staying at Nürnberg, begging them to proceed to Cheb together with the German princes whose lands were near the Bohemian territory. In consequence of delayed communications this letter only reached Nürnberg on March 12. The delegates of the Council, John Nider, prior of the Dominican monastery of Basel, who has already been mentioned, and the Cistercian monk John of Maulbronn, immediately forwarded this letter to Basel, and they also wrote to Prague stating that they had entered into communications with Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg and Burgrave of Nürnberg, Duke John of Bavaria, and some of the Saxon princes, begging them to accompany them to Cheb, where they were to meet the Bohemian delegates. The Council then appointed other delegates, who were to accompany Nider and Maulbronn on their journey. There was considerable delay, caused no doubt by mutual distrust, but the conferences at

last began there on May 9, shortly after the arrival of the Bohemian envoys. The Bohemian embassy on this occasion was very numerous. It included Prokop the Great, John of Rokycan, Peter Payne—surnamed Engliš—the Táborite Bishop Nicholas of Pelhřimov, the nobles John of Uršovec and Beneš of Mokrovous, and several prominent citizens of Prague. Including guards and followers the embassy consisted of seventy persons. The negotiations that ensued were necessarily difficult and delicate. As was inevitable, when the question of the journey of the Bohemian envoys to Basel and the safe conduct necessary for that purpose was raised, the Bohemians—Prokop the Great acting as spokesman—recalled the treachery that had been committed against Hus. It seemed for a moment probable that the negotiations would end with a failure. The general political situation, however, forced both parties to avoid a rupture. Among the Bohemian envoys those who belonged to the conservative party—if we may thus describe the Utraquist nobles, the theologians of the university of Prague, and the conservative citizens of the capital—were becoming certain that their alliance with the democracy of Tábor could no longer endure. On the other hand, the Council was constantly receiving messages from the clergy of Western Europe begging that the Hussite schisma might be ended as soon as possible. References was made to the fact, to which I have already drawn attention, that Hussite sympathies had become evident even in countries far distant from Bohemia.¹

¹ John of Segovia writes (*Monumenta Conciliorum*, as above, Tom. II. pp. 5-6): "Accidit rursus his diebus publicatas fuisse eciam ad Hyspaniam plurimas copias diversarum et diffusarum epistolarum Bohemorum ex parte ad honorabiles, providos, honestos dominos in tota communitate, divites et pauperes. Que salutacionis loco premittebant se desiderare, ut illis opperiret intellectum Deus illuminans corda eorum narrantes quomodo iam a pluribus annis inter se et illos magna fuisset discordia et utrimque nobiles et ignobiles multi fatui sua corpora perdisissent; nunquam tamen audivissent de ore eorum fidem suam an possent vel non ex scriptura sacra probare eam et nichilominus reges et principes, domini et communitates magna interim ab eis percepissent damna ideoque admirarentur . . . quod pape et omni sacerdocii suo tantum confiderent tantibus . . . remissionem peccatorum . . . ut contra eos bellare deberent."

It is undoubtedly mainly due to Cardinal Cesarini that it was after great difficulties at last arranged that the Bohemians should appear at the Council of Basel. The delegates of the Council, who arrived at Cheb somewhat earlier than those of Bohemia, were very numerous. Among them were John Nider and John of Maulbronn, who have already been mentioned; Henry Toke Canon of Magdeburg, Albert parish priest of St. Sebaldus at Nürnberg, Frederick of Parsberg, Dean of Regensburg, and other ecclesiastics. Elector Frederick of Brandenburg, Duke John of Bavaria, and other secular princes also joined the embassy, which, including the suites, numbered 250 men. The deliberations were opened on May 9 by a very conciliatory speech of Canon Toke, in which he welcomed the Bohemians and strongly advised a peaceful agreement. Rokycan, answering in the name of his countrymen, also spoke warmly in favour of peace, but added that the responsibility for the long and sanguinary war could not be attributed to the Bohemians, who had only repulsed unjustifiable and unwarranted attacks. The discussion was then continued with great bitterness on both sides, and on several occasions a rupture appeared inevitable. As previously mentioned the question concerning the safety of the envoys whom the Hussites were to send to Germany always envenomed the debates, as the Bohemian objection, founded on the fate of Hus, was almost unanswerable. Mainly through the influence of the Elector of Brandenburg, who personally guaranteed the safety of the envoys during their stay in Germany, an agreement was finally drawn up. The representatives of the kingdom of Bohemia and of the margraviate of Moravia were to proceed to Basel safely and unhindered, and were there to express their views freely, and in particular to defend the articles of Prague. They were to be given seats in the council-chamber that were appropriate to their rank. All the previous decrees, papal bulls, anathemas, and excommunications pronounced against the Bohemians, particularly

at the Councils of Constance and Siena, were to be considered invalid during the stay of the Bohemian envoys at Basel. On the occasion of the discussion of the four articles (of Prague) only God's law, the practice of Christ and the teaching of the primitive Church and the early councils should be considered as authoritative. Measures were to be taken to allow the Bohemians freely to celebrate their religious functions according to their own rites, both on their journey and during their stay in Basel. After these stipulations and others of minor importance had been accepted by both parties, the proceedings ended on May 18, when Canon Toke again addressed the assembly in so touching a manner that many were moved to tears. On his return to Prague Prokop the Great immediately sent a letter to King Sigismund in which he informed him of the results of the negotiations at Cheb, and urgently begged him to proceed to Basel and assist at the deliberations of the Council.¹ King Sigismund had in the autumn of the previous year proceeded to Milan, where he had been crowned with the iron crown of the Lombard Kings, and had then continued his journey in the direction of Rome. His progress through Italy was very slow, and he became involved in the internal struggles of that country. Venice had long been at war with Hungary; on the other hand, Sigismund was supported by the powerful Duke of Milan. The King of Hungary had arrived at Lucca; and was preparing to march from there to Siena, when John of Maulbronn, sent by the Council of Basel, appeared before him and informed him of the successful result of the

¹ In this letter, dated May 21, 1432, Prokop wrote: "Notifico Vobis ex parte mei et aliorum nunciorum nostrorum regni Bohemiæ et marchionatus Moraviæ qualiter nunc in Egra cum nunciis Vestris et cum illustribus principibus Frederico marchione Brandeburgensi et Johanne duce Baviaræ et doctoribus de concilio ad hanc congregationem ad Basileam pro conductibus ac modis sub quibus in Basilea ad concilium stare debemus, jam concordavimus. Ideo studiose optamus quatenus etiam in hoc concilio personaliter esse dignemini et hoc non negligere quia de hoc nobiscum sæpius loquebamini quod utique huic concilio vultis interesse." The letter is signed "Procopius presbyter, director communis Taboritarum in campo laborantis" (Martène et Durand, *Veterum scriptorum amplissima coll.*, Vol. VIII. p. 133).

negotiations at Cheb. Sigismund had received Prokop's letter some time previously, and he now determined to send his reply through Maulbronn. He expressed his pleasure at hearing that a peaceful settlement of the Bohemian question appeared to be probable, and promised to do everything in his power to facilitate the solution of the difficult question of granting a safe conduct, and also to prevent the adherents of the Church of Rome from impeding the journey of the Bohemian embassy to Basel. This was a point to which Prokop had referred in his letter.¹

The members of the Council of Basel welcomed with great joy the news of the agreement concluded at Cheb. In a letter to Pope Eugenius² Cardinal Julian Cesarini wrote: "The gate through which the lost sheep will return to the fold has now been opened. The envoys who have returned from Egra [Cheb] report with joy and jubilation that through the grace of the Holy Ghost they have come to an agreement with the representatives of the Bohemians, namely the Praguers, the Orphans, and the Táborites, among whom were also the generals, especially Prokop. According to this agreement a solemn embassy of all the estates of the kingdom will attend the

¹ Sigismund wrote: "Procopi quemadmodum nobis ad præsens scripsisti parte tua et aliorum nunciorum vestrorum qualiter cum principibus cumque doctoribus per sacrum concilium ad Egram missis, concordēs sitis super adventu vestro ad Basileam prosalvis conductibus et modis ibidem tenendis, et ita tibi notificamus quod memoratum sacrum concilium super rebus illis etiam ad nos misit religiosum fratrem Jo. de Maulbrunno ordinis Cisterciensis qui etiam illi diætæ Egrenci interfuit informando nos de omnibus modis conclusis, quos bene intelleximus ac libenter ac multum lætāter audivimus sperantes in Deo omnipotente quod res illæ cadent ad laudem suæ divinitatis et ad profectum Christianismi, et pacem et tranquillitatem coronæ Bohemiæ. Et quicquid sacrum concilium de salvis conductibus et aliis rebus necessariis requisivit a nobis, mox expēdivimus, et omnia vobis mittentur. Etiam scripsimus Bohemis de parte nostra, ut vos per regnum Bohemiæ conducant. Super illo autem ubi desideratis in sacro concilio personalem præsentiam nostram, etiam clare præfato Jo. mentem nostram deteximus, qui eam vobis latius notificabit quam possumus describere. Nam in omnibus quæ tendunt ad bonum et pacificum statum regni præfati nunquam deficiemus; sed ita nos exhibebimus, sicut rex grātiosus et dominus" (Martène et Durand, as above, Vol. VIII, p. 134).

² Letter printed by Palecký (Vol. III, iii. p. 5 of German edition), from MS. in the Imperial Library in Vienna.

Council of Basel as soon as the necessary letters of safe conduct have been received, which will be the case immediately. The holy assembly [the Council] received this news with unprecedented joy and with hands raised unto Heaven; for our ambassadors assured us that the deliberations at Cheb had been carried on with such complete sincerity, and the Bohemians had shown so conciliatory a spirit, that there was every reason to hope for their conversion. They [the envoys] had finally been begged by the Bohemians with cordial embraces and tears to do all that was in their power to settle matters peacefully. They added that such great kindness had been shown them during the negotiations that he who, hearing of this, did not burst into tears, would show but little love of Christ." It is of course necessary to receive the cardinal's statements with some reserve. He had to overcome the Pope's strong objection to the Council of Basel and to all negotiations with so-called heretics. Having spent some time in Germany and taken part in the recent disastrous campaign, he well knew how strong and indeed invincible the Hussites were as long as they remained united. He also knew better than the Pope and the cardinals in Rome how strongly the democratic character which the Hussite movement had assumed appealed to the German townsmen and peasants. He was also well aware of the fact that the anti-clerical movement, caused by the evil life of many German priests, had recently become much stronger, particularly since the defeat of Domázlitz, which many Germans believed to be a token of God's wrath.

It was according to the then existing constitutional organisation of Bohemia necessary that the agreement of Cheb should be sanctioned by a general meeting of the estates of the country. The diet therefore assembled at Kutna Hora about August 30 and approved of the decision that the Bohemians should take part in the ecumenical council. It also elected a large number of delegates who were to proceed to Basel. Among them were

several nobles, William Kostka of Postupic, Beneš of Mokrovous, and George of Rečič. The Prague citizen John Velvar, the Táborite, Matthew Louda, and George of Dvůr, who represented the Orphans, also formed part of the embassy. Among the very numerous ecclesiastics who were to proceed to Basel were John of Rokycan, who specially represented the town and university of Prague, Peter Payne, surnamed "Engliš," the Táborite Bishop, Nicholas of Pelhřimov, Prokop the Great, described on this occasion as "*exercitus Taboritarum in spiritualibus rector*," Ulrich, parish priest of Znoymo, and many others.

As Palacký has very truly stated, the negotiations with the Council of Basel are at this moment so vastly superior in interest to all other occurrences in Bohemia that these scarcely deserve notice. It must, however, be mentioned that the diet at Kutna Hora also deliberated on the conditions under which an armistice should be granted to the princes of Silesia and Lusatia. Prokop the Great immediately after the victory of Domázlitz had considered it advisable again to invade the neighbouring countries, spreading widely the terror of the Hussite name. These raids, the character of which was similar to that of those previously mentioned, had induced several German princes to sue for peace. In consequence of the great prestige which the Bohemians had obtained through their great victories, they had also again been drawn into the conflict which then occupied the attention of Northern Europe. Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, who for a moment had played so great a part in the politics of Northern Europe and appeared as the protagonist of the Slavic world, died on October 31, 1431, and the Russo-Lithuanian nobility chose as his successor the Grand Duke Svidrigal, brother of King Ladislas of Poland. The state of suzerainty under Poland which had existed during the reign of Vitold was to continue. The Polish nobility and clergy, however, wished to establish their rule over Lithuania more firmly, and the clerical influence aimed specially at the

Eastern Church, to which the larger part of the population of Lithuania belonged. Svidrigal energetically resisted the encroachments of the Polish ecclesiastics, and even contracted an alliance with the Teutonic order, long the bitter enemy of Lithuania as well as of Poland. In this difficult position King Ladislav attempted to renew the former amicable relations with Bohemia which he had abandoned under the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy. The deep-rooted antagonism between the Bohemians and the Poles, which, like the better known hostility between Poland and Russia, has so greatly impeded the advance of the Slavic race, rendered such an attempt difficult, and the Bohemians could not forget the fierce denunciations of their national Church which the King of Poland had formerly sent to Rome. It is, however, certain that negotiations between the two countries took place, and that Prince Korybutovič, an old and trusty friend of Bohemia, acted as mediator. The Bohemian parties did not entirely reject the proposals of King Ladislav. The large Táborite armies, now consisting to a great extent of foreign mercenaries, needed constant employment, and had no objection to joining even the Roman Catholic Poles in an attack on the knights of the Teutonic order, the sworn enemies of the Slavic race. The conservative Utraquists and the nobles of that creed, who had long been on friendly terms with Prince Korybutovič, were not averse to re-establishing friendly relations with Poland. Some of the most prominent Utraquist nobles, such as Bořek of Miletinek and Kostka of Postupic, who had been chamberlain of Prince Korybutovič during his short rule over Bohemia, took the principal part in these negotiations, and a meeting between King Ladislav and the Bohemian leaders was planned. It never took place, for reasons which the contemporary writers do not state. There is, however, little doubt that here, as on so many other occasions, the traditional subserviency of the Poles to the Roman see influenced the councillors of the King of Poland. It should, however, be mentioned that, though

no alliance was concluded, we shortly afterwards find a Bohemian army fighting as allies of Poland against the Teutonic order in the lands near the Baltic Sea.

The envoys of the Council of Basel who had taken part in the negotiations at Cheb wrote to the citizens of Prague and to Rokycan on August 13 informing them that they had already received from King Sigismund letters of safe conduct for the Bohemians, and that they hoped shortly to obtain similar letters from the Elector of Brandenburg. That prince, for reasons which it is difficult to understand, raised objections at the last moment, and it was only somewhat later that he forwarded the papers desired by the Bohemians. The latter also appear to have continued distrustful for some time. Before consenting to the departure of their embassy for Basel they thought it advisable to send there two envoys, Nicholas Humpolecký, notary of the Old Town of Prague, and John Žatecký, a member of the community of Tábor. These men were to report on the political situation of Germany and to inform the Bohemians whether their embassy could start safely for Basel. After receiving the necessary letters of accreditation Humpolecký and Žatecký proceeded to Germany in the month of September. They were met at the German frontier by the Bishop of Regensburg and several other German prelates. During their journey through Germany they were everywhere treated with respect and courtesy, and when in the small town of Biberach a townsman called Žatecký "a damned Bohemian heretic" he was immediately arrested, and would have been punished had not the Bohemians themselves interceded for him. In Basel also the envoys were most cordially received. They appeared before the Council on October 10, presented their credentials and then stated that ambassadors representing the whole kingdom of Bohemia and the margraviate of Moravia would shortly proceed to Basel to confer with the Council on the re-establishment of peace and the reunion of the Christian Church. They also demanded further information concerning

the letters of safe conduct which their ambassadors to Basel were to receive. The ever-recurring insistence on this point must, of course, be attributed to the treachery once committed against Hus, the memory of which still rankled in the minds of his countrymen. The envoys also begged the Council to use its influence to persuade King Sigismund to take part in person in the deliberations at Basel, and they also, in the name of the Bohemian nation, expressed the wish that the members of the Eastern Church should take part in the deliberations of the Council. The answer of the Council was distinctly conciliatory, and appeared satisfactory to the envoys. The assembly again assured the Bohemians that their embassy would be perfectly safe in Germany and that the whole Council fully sanctioned the promises relating to this matter which its representatives had made at Cheb. The Council further promised the Bohemians that it would endeavour to persuade King Sigismund to proceed to Basel as soon as the state of affairs in Italy, which detained him there, rendered this possible. It also stated that representatives of the Eastern Church would be invited to take part in its deliberations. The Council, however, added that it appeared probable that King Sigismund would be detained in Italy for a considerable time, and that it would, in consequence of the distance of Constantinople and the difficulty of communications, not be possible to receive an early answer from the dignitaries of the Eastern Church. The Council therefore begged the Bohemians to send their embassy to Basel as soon as possible, irrespective of such possible delays. The Bohemian envoys were on the whole satisfied with their reception at Basel, and on their return to their country they spoke warmly in favour of sending representatives to the Council at Basel. It was now finally settled to do so. The different members of the embassy were to meet at Domázlíce on the day of St. Nicholas (December 6), and then travel together to Basel. On November 5 the municipalities of Prague wrote to the town council of Cheb and also to the

Elector of Brandenburg informing them that the Bohemian embassy would shortly start for Basel, and begging them to send an escort to Cham in Bavaria, on the Bohemian frontier, which was to conduct the members of the embassy to Basel. I have already stated that the embassy was very numerous, and I have mentioned the names of the most prominent men among those whom the diet had chosen. Some delay in the departure of the embassy took place, and its members only left Prague on December 6. They were accompanied by an escort provided by the commander of the Karlštýn fortress, which was in the power of Sigismund's adherents. The embassy proceeded by way of Domázlitz to the German frontier, where they were met by a larger German escort. The journey through Germany was undisturbed. When the embassy was nearing Nürnberg Matthew Louda displayed a Táborite battle-flag showing on one side the portrait of Christ and on the other a representation of the chalice, bearing the inscription, "Veritas omnia vincit." This caused great displeasure among the Germans, but Louda, when informed of this by the escort, acted in a very conciliatory fashion and removed the banner; other members of the embassy, fearing to give offence, followed his example. From Nürnberg the Bohemians proceeded to Schaffhausen by way of Nördlingen and Ulm.

The members of the Council of Basel anxiously awaited the arrival of the Bohemian plenipotentiaries. Cardinal Cesarini, to whose ability and foresight the favourable result of the negotiations was almost entirely due, had persuaded the magistrates of Basel, in consideration of the puritanic character of the Hussite movement, to issue regulations prohibiting all doings that might shock the Bohemian guests. It was decreed that all ill-famed women should be forbidden to appear in the streets during their stay, that all gamesters should be expelled from the city, and that all music and dancing in the inns should for a time be prohibited. The citizens were also instructed to treat the strangers with great courtesy, but to avoid all intimate

intercourse with them; for the Council feared that their teaching might spread among the citizens.

Cardinal Cesarini, with his usual prudence, succeeded in persuading the Hussites to make their entry into Basel in as quiet a manner as possible, thus avoiding the danger of both hostile and friendly demonstrations. The Bohemians, who sincerely wished to avoid further difficulties, gladly acquiesced. On arriving at Schaffhausen they decided to avoid publicity by continuing their journey in a ship on the Rhine. They thus arrived at Basel somewhat unexpectedly on January 4, 1433. As soon as their arrival became known it caused great excitement and curiosity among the people of the town of Basel. Many, not knowing that they would arrive by water, hurried into the country beyond the city walls anxious to see them. Crowds of people from the roofs of their houses watched the arrival of the formidable warriors. Prokop in particular was pointed out by many.¹ Immediately after the arrival of the embassy Cardinal Cesarini sent John of Palomar and John Stojkovič of Ragusa, the well-known chronicler of the Council of Basel, to welcome the Bohemians in the name of the Council, and to express the joy of the members of the Council that the Bohemians should have arrived safely at Basel, and also their regret that the Bohemians had not arrived by land, as it would then have been possible to receive them in a more ceremonious fashion. On Thursday, January 8, eight members of the embassy—four laymen and four priests—called on Cardinal

¹ The passage in Æneas Sylvius describing the arrival of the Bohemians at Basel has often been quoted, but well deserves to be quoted again; he writes: "Effusus extra mœnia urbanus populus, ex synodo quoque complures adventum fortissime gentis pro portis expectavere. Alii frequentes in plateas qua transitus esset convenire; matrone, pueri puelle fenestras atque tecta complere. Alii hunc, alii illum digito designare, peregrinos habitus, non visa prius vestimenta mirari horribiles hominum facies, truces notare oculos, non esse alienum dicere ab ea hominum specie facta que fama prodiderat. In unum tamen cuncti Procopium defigere lumina, illum esse qui totiens fidelium fudisset exercitus, qui tot oppida subvertisset, tot hominum milia neci dedisset, quem sui pariter atque hostes metuerunt, invictum ducem, audacem intrepidum neque labore neque timore superandum" (*Historia Bohemica*, cap. xlix).

Cesarini and thanked him for his kindness, and also inquired when the delegates would be received by the Council. It was decided that the reception should take place on the 10th. On the previous day the Archbishop of Lyons, with two theologians of the university of Paris, visited the Bohemians, reminded them of the ancient friendship between Bohemia and France, and assured them of the good will of the King of France.¹ Before the Bohemians appeared at the Council they had already discussed with its members the rank and position which they would hold there. Firmly maintaining their standpoint that they formed part of the universal Church, they abhorred every attempt to brand them as "heretics." Here also the prudence and tact of Cesarini removed all difficulties. In the hall of the Dominican monastery, where the sittings of the Council were then held, seats were assigned to the Bohemians immediately opposite those of Cesarini and the three other cardinals who were present. Though Pope Eugenius' antagonism to the Council continued, the assembly had now become very numerous, as all believed that only through an ecumenical Council the much-desired reconciliation with the Hussites could be obtained. As soon as the Bohemian envoys appeared in the hall Cardinal Julian addressed the assembly in very eloquent language. He laid great stress on the authority of the universal Church and on the infallibility of ecumenical councils. The Cardinal's speech was very impressive, and many were moved to tears. The assembly strongly approved of the desire for peace which he expressed. John of Rokycan, who replied in the name of the Bohemians,

¹ "Eodem die [January 9] hora vesperorum . . . archiepiscopus Lugdunensis cum duobus doctoribus Parisiensibus in medium Bohemorum venit, qui honorifice susceptus, legationem quam a rege christianissimo suo Francorum habuit, sibi sub fide et honore et quasi juramento astrictus, inter cetera retulit, quod memor beneficiorum per regem Bohemiæ Johannem cæcum, et filiam cujusdam regis Bohemiæ in matrimonium Francorum cuidam datam, a qua ipse processit seu natus est; ob hoc commissit suis legatis, Bohemis famulari et complacere quantum possent. Cui pro tunc responsum non dabant, sed differebant inde post" ("Petri Zatecensis Liber," in *Monumenta Conciliorum*, etc., Tom. I. p. 290).

regretted the wrong that had been done to the Bohemians for so long a time by calling them heretics. He described the condition of the primitive Church and regretted that men should have turned away from it at the present time. He then thanked the Council for the great efforts it had made to reconcile the Bohemians with the universal Church, and finally begged that the embassy be granted a public hearing, as had been agreed at Cheb. The first reception of the envoys being a purely formal one, it was necessary to enter into detailed discussions. In his answer Cardinal Cesarini, ignoring the other points in Rokycan's speech, said that the Council was ready at any time to grant the Bohemians a hearing, and that he begged them to settle themselves the day when this should take place.

As was natural, both parties agreed that the principal subject of the discussions should be the famed articles of Prague. The Bohemians, on the request of Cardinal Cesarini, chose Friday, January 16, as the day on which the disputations should begin. On that day John of Maulbronn and several other ecclesiastics conducted the Bohemian embassy to the Dominican monastery, where the members of the Council had already assembled. Matthew Louda, in the name of the Bohemians, first addressed the assembly. He informed the Council that the Bohemians had long desired to be reconciled with the universal Church through the mediation of King Sigismund, but that their endeavours had always been fruitless. He then thanked the members of the Council for allowing him and his countrymen to appear before their august assembly. Immediately afterwards John of Rokycan opened his defence of the first article of Prague, concerning the necessity of Communion in the two kinds. In his lengthy dissertation, which was continued on the 17th and 19th, he referred to the customs and traditions of the primitive Church and maintained the necessity of Communion in the form in which the Sacrament had been instituted by Jesus Christ. Though not able to agree

with all his statements, the members of the Council were favourably impressed by Rokycan's speech and the moderation which he showed. After Rokycan's speech Prokop the Great briefly addressed the assembly. His tone was somewhat menacing, and he begged his hearers to accept God's truth while it was yet time. His speech was received by the Council with marked displeasure. Finally Cardinal Cesarini suggested that, before the members of the Council replied to the speeches of the Bohemians, the latter should be allowed to expound their views on the other three articles. The representatives of the Church of Rome could then reply consecutively to all the arguments of the Bohemians. This very fair proposal was accepted by all parties.

Before leaving their country the Bohemians had already, at the diet of Kutna Hora, deliberated on the choice of their spokesmen at the Council. It had been agreed that the four Utraquist parties, the Praguers, the nobles sub utraque, the Táborites, and the Orphans, should each appoint one orator. The choice both of the Praguers and the Utraquist nobles having fallen on Rokycan, it was agreed that he should act as defender both of the first and the third articles, though the attitude of the advanced parties afterwards prevented this plan from being carried out. On January 20 the Táborite bishop, Nicholas of Pelhřimov, defended the second article. His speech was not as conciliatory as that of Rokycan had been; he not only spoke very strongly on the treacherous execution of Hus, but he also laid great stress on the simony and depravation which, as he said, were then prevalent among the Roman Catholic clergy. Some of the prelates who were present loudly expressed their displeasure. Nicholas, referring to the stipulations made at Cheb, which promised the Bohemians full liberty of speech, protested against what he considered an attempt to intimidate him. It was here again due to the wisdom and conciliatory attitude of Cardinal Cesarini that this somewhat stormy sitting ended without a rupture.

The members of the Council were not alone in blaming the conduct of the Bishop of Pelhřimov. When, after the sitting of the Council, the Bohemian delegates met at the house of Prokop the Great, John of Rokycan strongly expressed his disapproval of the personal attacks which the Táborite bishop had made against the Roman Catholic priests. At this meeting the Bohemians also discussed the question who was, as their spokesman, to defend the third article of Prague. According to the wishes of Utraquist nobles and of the Praguers this duty was to devolve on Rokycan. The Táborites, however, raised strong objections to this plan, and violently attacked the Utraquist nobles, whom they accused of no longer being faithful to the Hussite cause. The Utraquist nobles, always readier to make sacrifices for the common cause than were the Táborites, gave way, and thus for a time avoided a complete scission among the Bohemian parties. The priest Ulrich of Znoymo was chosen to defend the third article in the place of Rokycan. Ulrich spoke with great moderation, and his dissertation, which he only concluded on January 24, gave rise to no disturbing incidents. John Payne—known as Magister Engliš—was, according to the agreement, to speak on the fourth article. He had been chosen by the Orphans, the party to which he then belonged, though he afterwards joined the Táborites. Payne's vehement speech, in which he highly praised Wycliffe and lengthily referred to the controversies in which he had been involved at Oxford because of his partisanship for that English divine, caused great irritation. Some of the English prelates who were present strongly protested against his account of the long-past-over struggles in England in which he had taken part. The oration of Payne, who evidently spoke with that acrimony so frequent among exiles, began on the 26th and ended on the 28th of January. Immediately afterwards Rokycan, in a very conciliatory speech, gave a summary of all the arguments which had been brought out by the Bohemian orators. He again thanked the members of the Council for

their cordial reception, and hoped that they would grant forgiveness should any of the Bohemian speakers in the heat of argument have offended some member of the Council. Cardinal Cesarini replied to Rokycan's speech. He had obviously thoroughly studied the situation in Bohemia, and the increasing antagonism which divided the moderate from the advanced party among the Bohemians had not escaped him. He therefore, speaking with his accustomed courtesy, declared that though the Bohemians had only enumerated four articles, it was rumoured in the assembly that some of them differed from the Church of Rome in their doctrine on other points also. He then read out twenty-eight so-called "articles," the contents of which were to a considerable extent derived from the speeches of Nicholas of Pelhřimov and Peter Payne, as well as from the writings of Wycliffe, and statements which were attributed to the English divine. He then put several questions to the Bohemians, demanding an answer to them. Some of these questions were distinctly invidious. The cardinal wished to know what words the Bohemians used on the occasion of the consecration of the holy bread and wine, whether they accepted the regulations of the Church with regard to the marriage of consanguineous persons, whether they recognised the authority of the ecumenical councils, and specially whether they considered as heretics those who opposed the decrees of the Councils of Nicea, Constantinople, and those of the first Council of Chalcedon. The cardinal finally wished to know whether the Bohemians recognised the Pope as the true successor of Christ, and whether they accepted the doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and the Son.

Nobody knew better than Cardinal Cesarini that the opinions of the Bohemians differed with regard to some of the points which he had enumerated. They were, however, at that moment still conscious of the necessity of presenting a united front to their antagonists, if they hoped to obtain some of the reforms which they desired. Rokycan, therefore, in the name

of his colleagues, declared that the Bohemian envoys would require some time to deliberate on the cardinal's questions, of which they begged to be given a written copy. The Bohemians obviously wished to gain time, and hoped that the members of the Council would meanwhile reply to the statements concerning the articles of Prague which their spokesmen had made. The members of the Council had, like their Bohemian antagonists, entered into previous discussions with regard to the choice of their spokesmen. The first orator for the Council was John Stojkovič, Bishop of Ragusa, whose lengthy speech occupied several sittings of the Council. He spoke with great vehemence and animosity, and not only Prokop, but also Rokycan, on several occasions protested against his attacks on the Bohemian national Church. Conciliatory as ever, Cesarini suggested that these grievances should be examined by a committee chosen from the members of the Council and the Bohemian delegates. The cardinal was again successful in preventing a rupture of the negotiations. From February 13 to 17 the Dean of Cambrai, Giles Carlier, professor at the Sorbonne, spoke on the second article of Prague, and was then followed by the Dominican friar, Henry Kalteisen. Cardinal Cesarini then again addressed the assembly, again referring to the twenty-eight articles which he had placed before them. Answering in the name of his colleagues, Peter Payne declared that they were not all present at this sitting of the Council, and that it would be necessary that they should consider these matters more fully before giving a definite answer. It was, therefore, thought advisable to continue the discussion of the articles of Prague. On February 23 John of Palomar, Archdeacon of Barcelona, began to speak on the fourth article of Prague, and his elaborate oration only ended on the 28th of that month.

The Bohemians had now spent nearly two months at Basel, and yet the negotiations cannot be said to have made any real progress. It is, however, noteworthy that amicable private

relations had been established between some of the Bohemian delegates and some of the members of the Council. This circumstance, which is surprising if we consider the intense hatred of so-called heretics which was general at that time, was undoubtedly the result of the conciliatory policy of Cesarini. It is indeed in consequence of these private relations that the first visit of the Bohemians to Basel did not prove entirely fruitless, in spite of the failure of the public negotiations which will be mentioned presently. The cardinal himself seems to have felt great interest in the strong and strange personality of Prokop the Great. A first private interview between them took place on January 14. Of a later interview, that probably occurred towards the end of the stay of the Bohemians at Basel, we have some information. Prokop confidentially referred to the corrupt state of the Church, and declared it to be a grave error that those whose conduct diverged so widely from the Holy Ghost should believe that whatever they did was in accordance with the Holy Ghost. A man of spotless character, such as was Cesarini, could find no offence in these words, and he certainly agreed with Prokop in believing that a reform of the clergy was necessary. He therefore only said : " The more I converse with you, Sir Prokop, the more my heart clings to you ; therefore stay very long with us that we may at last agree together." Prokop then pointed out how great were the expenses of their prolonged stay at Basel. The cardinal, no doubt rightly, believed that this was only a pretext.

It is obvious that the Bohemians had by this time come to the conclusion that an agreement was at that moment very improbable. During the month of March members of the Bohemian delegation, as was customary at the theological disputations of that period, again replied to the four speeches of the members of the Council. The first Bohemian speaker was again John of Rokycan. On March 5 the disputation was interrupted for a short time, as the Council wished to receive

the envoys of Pope Eugenius. They brought the Pope's proposal that the Council should transfer its deliberations to Bologna. This suggestion was rejected by the Council. There is no doubt that its acceptance would have immediately brought the negotiations with the Bohemians to an end, as it would have been impossible to induce them to journey to Italy. Rokycan then resumed his oration, and, at its conclusion on March 10, expressed his views with regard to the universal Church and to Councils. He endeavoured to prove that neither part of the Church nor the whole Church could abrogate God's commands, and he maintained that not all the ecumenical Councils had been inspired by the Holy Ghost. John of Ragusa then demanded to be heard immediately, and a somewhat animated discussion began. Cardinal Cesarini, however, here, as before, acted as peacemaker, and it was agreed that Nicholas of Pelhřimov, one of the Bohemian spokesmen, should next be heard. The monotonous and resultless debate on the correct interpretation of the four articles was then continued. Both the members of the Council and the Bohemian delegates listened with ever-increasing distaste, and the discussions were no longer carried on in an orderly fashion, as had at first been the case; noisy exclamations and interruptions frequently interfered with the debates.

On March 13 Cardinal Cesarini declared that the Council could not express a definite opinion on the four articles till its representatives had again spoken on the subject. Rokycan replied, in the name of his countrymen, that an agreement would only have been possible if the four articles had been favourably received by the Council; otherwise all negotiations were vain. He said that his countrymen had come to Basel in the hope that an agreement would be speedily concluded; but it was now clear that no progress whatever had been made. He therefore declared in his own name and in that of his colleagues that they wished to return to their own country, and begged that the necessary letters of safe conduct be given

to them. The members of the Council received this statement with surprise and not without indignation. Cardinal Cesarini pointed out with undeniable fairness that as all the spokesmen of the Bohemians had been allowed to address the Council twice, they were bound to recognise the right of the representatives of the Council to do the same. It must, of course, be considered that the articles of Prague had been the result of a compromise, and that even the most conservative Utraquists were not, after long and victorious warfare, prepared to accept lesser concessions than those demanded in the articles, and afterwards, with slight modifications, granted by the compacts. Cesarini's intervention was again successful, and the members of the Bohemian embassy consented to defer their departure.

Though the cardinal had again prevented a complete rupture between the antagonists, no one knew better than he that the continuation of the plenary sittings of the Council could at that moment but little further an agreement. During the prolonged sittings of the Council the debates became more and more embittered. The more extreme Roman divines continued to impress on the Bohemians the duty of accepting unconditionally all decrees of the Roman Church—a standpoint which obviously rendered all negotiations superfluous. The Bohemians, particularly the Táborites, more and more energetically protested against the designation of "heretics" which was applied to them by some members of the Council, and bitterly reproached their opponents with the treachery committed against Hus, whom they revered as a saint. Cesarini, who, as already mentioned, had established amicable relations with some of the Bohemian delegates, came to the conclusion that private meetings between members of the Council and representatives of Bohemia might draw the opponents closer together. In this plan the cardinal was assisted by Duke William of Bavaria, whom King Sigismund, who was still detained in Italy, had appointed "protector" of the Council. Through the duke's influence four prominent

members of the Council met four of the leading Bohemian delegates at the house of Cardinal Cesarini. The discussion was entirely private, and the accounts of it which have been preserved can lay no claim to authenticity. It, however, appears certain that this exchange of views had a moderating influence on the men of both parties. Some Bohemians of the advanced party, and Prokop in particular, relying on the phenomenal military successes of their countrymen, had genuinely believed that Bohemia was strong enough to impose on Europe a reformed Church similar to that of the early Christian period. The more intimate intercourse with men of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and other countries, who all unreservedly recognised the authority of the Church of Rome, necessarily convinced the Bohemians that their plans were impracticable and utopian. The fact that sporadic manifestations in favour of Hussitism took place in some parts of Europe could not alter this conviction. They therefore concluded that it would be impossible to obtain more than the recognition of certain special rights and privileges of the Bohemian Church. On the other hand, the divines of the Council perceived that an unconditional surrender of the Bohemians was not within the range of possibility. Even the Utraquist nobles and the conservative citizens of Prague, they now knew, would never return unconditionally to the Roman Church. It was, therefore, inevitable that concessions would have to be made, and the purpose of the Council was henceforth to limit these concessions as far as was possible. Though the elaborate orations pronounced at the public meetings of the diet continued for some time longer, it was now already practically settled that the Bohemians should return to their country. It had, however, also been agreed—probably at the meeting at the house of Cesarini—that they should on their return journey be accompanied by representatives of the Council. This appeared all the more plausible as the Bohemians had previously declared that any permanent agreement would only be binding

when it had been ratified by a general meeting of the diet of Bohemia.

It is probable that this decision did not immediately become public, for before the departure of the Bohemians several foreign ambassadors attempted, in a not always tactful manner, to interfere in these negotiations. Thus on April 3 Duke William of Bavaria arranged a meeting between the Bohemian delegates and the envoys whom the Duke of Burgundy had sent to the Council. The Burgundian ambassador expressed the hope that the Bohemians would conform to the decrees of the Council; for, he added, his master would otherwise be obliged to draw his sword in defence of the Council. Rokycan, who always studiously maintained the attitude of a prelate, answered in a conciliatory manner, but Lord Kostka of Postupic, a Utraquist noble and famed Hussite general, not unnaturally considered the threats of the Burgundian as an insult. He replied: "As to your threats, let your duke come to Bohemia; we will not fly from him, but will, with God's grace, resist him, as we resisted our other invaders." An interview which the Bohemians had shortly afterwards with the members of the embassy sent by the Duke of Savoy to the Council had a more cordial character. The leader of the embassy declared to the Bohemians, in the name of his duke, that that prince was ready to assist the glorious Bohemian kingdom both by sending armed forces and by financial aid, even at the price of his life, and that he was sending an embassy to Prague. In the name of the Bohemian delegates, Lord Kostka of Postupic warmly thanked the duke.

It had by this time been settled that the Bohemian envoys should leave Basel on April 14, and it was now the duty of the Council to choose representatives who were to accompany them. Among those chosen were Philibert, Bishop of Coutance in Normandy, Peter, Bishop of Augsburg, Doctor Eberdorfer of Haselbach, Canon of Vienna, now best remembered through his historical writings, which have several times been

quoted here, Giles Carlier and John of Palomar, who have already been mentioned, and the monk John of Maulbronn, who had been the first to negotiate with the Bohemians. Immediately before the departure of the envoys King Sigismund, who, in the course of the year 1433, was crowned as Roman Emperor, announced to the Council that he would shortly proceed to Basel. Cardinal Cesarini informed the Bohemians of this, and expressed the hope that they would await Sigismund's arrival. The Bohemians declined this proposition. They said that the King was in the habit of constantly changing his plans, on which it was, therefore, impossible to rely; they added that they had already announced their return to their countrymen, and that their presence would be necessary in Prague, where the diet was to meet on the day after Trinity Sunday. The Bohemian envoys there left Basel on April 14, as had been settled. The leave-taking was very cordial on both sides. Cardinal Julian blessed the delegates, raising his cross and saying: "I commend you to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." On leaving the city gates Rokycan said: "May the Lord preserve this spot in peace and tranquillity." Before leaving Basel several of the delegates—among whom Rokycan and Lord Kostka of Postupic are mentioned—visited some members of the Council and assured them that they would, on their return to their country, do everything that was in their power to further a peaceful agreement.

The Bohemian delegates and the members of the Council who accompanied them arrived at Schaffhausen on April 16. Here a somewhat unpleasant incident occurred, which for a moment endangered the concord that had lately prevailed. Giles Carlier or Carlerus, as he was often called, tells us that the members of the Council noticed that some of the wagons which the Táborites had left at Schaffhausen bore emblems and devices professing the Hussite creed. They begged the Bohemians to remove them, but met with a refusal. The

matter was finally compromised. The Táborites retained the devices on their wagons, but promised not to display their flags during their journey through Germany.¹ The envoys then continued their journey, and, after a short stay at Nürnberg, reached the Bohemian frontier at Cheb on April 30. They were here met by a Bohemian escort, and arrived in Prague on May 8. During their progress through Bohemia they were everywhere joyfully received by the people, who regarded them as messengers of peace. In Prague also crowds of people welcomed them when they entered the city gates. They proceeded through the Malá Strana over the bridge to the Old Town, where lodgings had been prepared for them; and, as was customary at that time, various gifts were sent to the representatives of the Council by the citizens.

The envoys of the Council, whose leader was Bishop Philip of Coutance, immediately visited the councillors of the Old Town and informed them that they had brought credentials for the municipal authority of the three towns of Prague, and asked permission to deliver them. The antagonism between the Old and the New Towns of Prague, which continued during the whole period of the Hussite wars, became evident on this occasion also. The councillors of the Old Town expressed their willingness to receive the deputation that was to present

¹ "Feria 4^a venimus in Scafusam, ubi altera die quievimus propter Bohemos, ut suos possent adaptare currus, quos ibi derelinquerant. Vidimus tunc in hospicio Mathei de Louda pendere arma in quibus stetit: 'Veritas vincit' et superius 'Jhesus Nazarenus, rex Judæorum' et ad latera 'Matthias de Louda.' Ivimus in principio ad Procopium et suos, petentes ut illa et eciam que in curribus habebat, deponantur. Respondit quod vellent secum loqui. Ivimus similiter ad Pragenses et ipsum Matthiam petentes idem, quia non deceret illa vice signa ostendi diversitatis, et alia multo pro illo suadentes. Qui post deliberacionem dixerunt, quod de hopicio vellet remove, sed non de curribus; promisserunt tamen simul convenire et super isto nobis requisiti respondere. Post dies forte sex requisiti promisserunt se sequenti die responsuros; et ita scilicet fecerunt mittentes quatuor . . . et dixerunt 'Petimus quod non desideretis a nobis que sunt contra honorem nostrum,' etc. Fuit responsum quod putemus hoc esse pro honore eorum, ut signa caritatis ostenderent non divisionis" ("Ægidii Carlerii Decani Cameracensis Liber de legationibus Concilii Basiliensis," in *Monumenta Conciliorum, etc.*, Tom. I. p. 361).

the credentials, but the magistrates of the New Town raised some objections. It was, however, finally agreed that a meeting between the magistrates of the three cities and the delegates of the Council should take place in the town-hall of the Old Town.¹ An occurrence here again caused considerable irritation and bitterness. After Canon Toke of Magdeburg had saluted the municipal authorities, Bishop Philibert was obliged to inform them that the embassy had lost its credentials.² Rokycan, as usual acting as peacemaker, replied in a courteous manner, and the envoys received the customary gifts on leaving the town-hall. Only after their departure the men of the New Town blamed the envoys for having lost the credentials, to receive which their councillors had been invited. It may, indeed, be stated generally that in the New Town, where the Orphans held a predominant position, a spirit hostile to the envoys of Basel was gradually gaining strength. The fanatical priest, Jacob Vlk, preacher at St. Mary-of-the-Snow, inveighed against the representatives of the Council in very bitter language. He declared that the Council consisted only of heretics, and that Basel (Basilea) was a venomous basilisk. The envoys of the Council were obliged to complain of the fanatical preacher, and Rokycan promised to advise him to moderate his language.

The day when the estates of Bohemia were to meet for grave and weighty deliberation had now drawn near. The diet was to have met on the Monday after Trinity (June 8), but various circumstances caused a slight delay, and it was only on June 12 that the assembly began its sittings in the hall of the Carolinum. Besides the Bohemian estates, who were present in larger numbers than on any previous occasion, many representatives of Moravia and Silesia assisted at the diet, and the Archduke of Austria and several German princes had sent envoys. John of Rokycan, in a lengthy speech, gave a detailed

¹ The present town-hall of Prague.

² Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 517.

account of the negotiations of the Bohemian delegates at Basel. It was then decided that a deputation consisting of three nobles, seven knights, and some other men of distinction should call on the envoys of the Council and invite them to take part in the deliberations of the diet. The envoys consented, and shortly afterwards appeared in the university. Rokycan then, as president, took his place at the lecturing desk of the hall. Near him were seated Bishop Nicholas of Pelhřimov and Master Peter Payne. Rokycan thus prudently attempted to maintain the appearance of unity among the Utraquists; for Peter Payne was then one of the leaders of the Orphans, while Nicholas of Pelhřimov, Bishop of the Táborites, was the natural spokesman of that community. The whole assembly opened its proceedings by intoning the hymn "Veni creator spiritus." In his opening speech, which immediately followed, Rokycan warmly praised the articles of Prague, and recommended their acceptance to the assembly. This step was both judicious and opportune. As has been stated, both parties had perceived during the negotiations at Basel that neither could maintain an intransigent standpoint. Though some representatives of the Council, such as Palomar, still demanded unconditional surrender, the discussion was now really restricted to the question in what sense the articles were to be interpreted, and to what districts the privileges contained in them were to be granted. After a short speech of Philibert, Bishop of Coutance, Archdeacon Palomar addressed the assembly. He praised the blessings of peace, and declared that it was only by submission to Rome that the Hussites could obtain its benefits. Palomar's lengthy dissertation was continued at the next sitting of the diet on June 15. At the following sittings and also at several private meetings the signification of the four articles was thoroughly discussed. In these debates the envoys of the Council had a great advantage over their opponents. Though we have no positive evidence on this point, it may be considered as certain that these envoys had,

before leaving Basel, come to an agreement with the other members of the Council as to the limit of the concession which could, if necessary, be made to the Utraquists. It is certain that among these concessions was the permission to receive Communion in the two kinds. This practice has frequently obtained in countries professing the Roman Catholic creed, and is at the present time tolerated by the Church among the uniates in Galicia and other parts of Poland. The Bohemians were in a more difficult position. They were, of course, unaware of the fact that the Council had roughly settled to what extent it was prepared to make concessions; they therefore endeavoured to enforce their demands as far as was possible without risking a renewal of hostilities; for, with the exception of a few fanatics, all the inhabitants of Bohemia, which was exhausted by long and uninterrupted warfare, longed for peace. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the prolonged debates which turned on the interpretation of the articles of Prague. The proceedings of the diet were not always carried on in a courteous fashion, as had been the case at the first sittings. When Archdeacon Palomar held the Hussites responsible for the terrible bloodshed of the recent years, Rokycan replied that the Bohemians had always desired peace, and that not they, but the prelates at Constance, had caused the war; for they had granted the Bohemians no hearing at Constance, declared heretics those who received Communion in the two kinds, burnt their dear master (Hus) and encouraged King Sigismund to devastate their country. While these vehement debates, which for a moment seemed to render an agreement doubtful, continued the Bohemian divines drew up the first draft of those stipulations which afterwards became famous under the name of the compacts, but which were only brought before the Council of Basel somewhat later.

Far more important than these public debates were the private negotiations which were now carried on between the

representatives of the Council and the members of the Utraquist nobility. These noblemen have shared the fate of almost all men who, in a stormy and revolutionary period, attempt to maintain the principle of compromise. Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec acted as mediator, and we read of frequent banquets, to which he invited both the Utraquist nobles and the representatives of the Council. On other occasions also the envoys of the Council reproached the Bohemian nobles with their alliance with men of mean birth, and reminded them of the loss of their feudal rights and supremacy.¹ It is certain that these arguments were not without influence on the Utraquist nobility. They remained, however, as is proved by the document just quoted, faithful to the demand that Communion in the two kinds should be granted. They stated that "they would in no case renounce Utraquism, rather would they all die." Their demands had never gone beyond those formulated by the articles of Prague. The attacks made on these noblemen by German writers, who state that they were intimidated by the peasantry or influenced merely by the wish to acquire Church lands, are therefore unfair and unjustifiable.

Though, as stated, it again for a moment appeared probable that the negotiations would be broken off, the universal desire for peace prevented this. An immediate agreement, however,

¹ The arguments of the envoys of the Council are very clearly explained in a letter sent to the abbot of Tegernsee by one of his monks, brother Ulrick Stockel (printed by Palacký, *Urkunden, etc.*, Vol. II. pp. 376-379). Stockel writes: "Die Landschaft [the estates] hat gar einen grossen Verdruss und sprachen alle gemeinschaftlich, sie wollten, noch möchten nicht, länger bleiben, sie verzehrten viel Gutes umsonst und sie wollten doch den Artikel de communione sub utraque specie durch keinerlei Sache wegen fallen lassen, eher wollten sie alle sterben. . . . Die [ambasioteres concilii] nahmen die Ritterschaft auf einen Ort [25 Jun.] und . . . redeten sie also an: 'Ihr edelen Herren und Ritter und Knechte, denket daran dass Ihr die Vordersten seit in dem Königreiche zu Böhmen, und es Euch billig zugehört dass Ihr das Königreich erhaltet. Seht an wie gross das Königreich vor Zeiten gewesen ist und dass Ihr nun darum gekommen seit. Denn die Euere Vorfahren als Diener verschmäht hätten die sind jetzt Euer Herren geworden.' Darauf antwortete die Ritterschaft: möchten sie einen Weg erdenken dadurch in Concilio communionem sub utraque erlaubet, so hofften sie es werde Einigkeit." This valuable letter is unfortunately too long to be quoted in its entirety. I have somewhat modernised the very difficult German of brother Ulrick.

appeared impossible, and it was settled that the envoys should return to Basel and confer there with the other members of the Council; representatives of the Bohemian estates would, however, accompany them to Basel, and it was thus to be clearly proved that the negotiations were not broken off. Before leaving Prague the envoys of the Council suggested that a truce should be concluded which was to continue up to the time of the general pacification. This proposal, which was undoubtedly very disadvantageous to Bohemia at a moment when a renewal of hostilities was still by no means improbable, was rejected by the Utraquists.

It was then settled that the envoys of the Council, with the Bohemian representatives, should leave Prague on July 3. The diet met early on that day, and Rokycan then announced the names of the three Bohemian representatives who were to accompany the envoys of the Council to Basel. Prokop the Great then declared that though the Bohemians were, in the present situation, unable to accept an armistice, the Táborites were prepared to live in friendship and peace with all men, if the four articles, of course as interpreted by Prokop—were accepted by all. Bishop Philibert replied in the name of the envoys of the Council, in a very friendly and courteous fashion. He thanked the Bohemians for their kindness and hospitality, and expressed the hope that peace would soon be concluded. Though it had been settled that the envoys of the Council should start on July 3, they were delayed by the preparations for their long journey, and only left Prague on the 11th. During these last days the envoys had further meetings with the Utraquist nobles, and they also conferred with the Roman Catholic nobles and the municipal authorities of Plzeň, who also belonged to that Church. After leaving Prague and crossing the Bohemian frontier the envoys first interrupted their journey at Nürnberg, where they stayed three days. In view of the importance which the city of Plzeň acquired during the events that occurred shortly afterwards, it is

interesting to note that the envoys, during their stay at Nürnberg, obtained from the municipality a loan of 1000 florins for the city of Plzeň. During the stay of the envoys in Prague the hostilities between the Utraquists and the city of Plzeň had been temporarily suspended, but they broke out again immediately after their departure, as will be mentioned presently.

Before arriving at Basel the representatives of the Council had sent on in advance one of their colleagues, Martin Berruer, Dean of Tours. On his arrival he immediately informed the Council of the results of the mission in which he had taken part. He stated that the Bohemians were divided among themselves, and that the moderate Utraquists greatly desired peace. He seriously warned the members of the Council against interrupting the speeches of the Bohemian delegates by opprobrious exclamations or cries of derision, as had frequently happened during the first visit of the Bohemians to Basel. He also praised the dignified manner in which the proceedings of the diet had been carried on, and laid great stress on the courtesy with which the members of the Council had been received in Prague. On August 2 the whole embassy reached Basel, and shortly afterwards Palomar expounded his view of the situation in Bohemia. He stated that he and other envoys, who had been on intimate terms with the Bohemians, had been surprised by the great diversity of opinions which they had found among the Utraquists. Palomar appears to have thought that the Utraquist nobles were prepared to submit unconditionally to Rome, but were intimidated by the Táborites. What I have previously written is, I hope, sufficient to prove that this supposition was absolutely erroneous. On August 11 the representatives of Bohemia appeared before the Council, and, after presenting their credentials, the three envoys, Master Prokop of Plzeň, Matthew Louda, and Martin Lupač, addressed the assembly. They then laid before the Council the draft of an agreement in which the demands of the Bohemians

were formulated; should these demands be granted the Bohemians were ready to conclude a permanent treaty of peace. The draft differed slightly from the one drawn up by the Hussite divines in Prague, and the compacts—as this agreement soon began to be called—were slightly modified before their acceptance at Jihlava in 1436; yet it is well to give here the wording of these famed stipulations, which ended the Hussite wars. They ran thus :

I. The Holy Sacrament is to be given freely in both kinds to all Christians in Bohemia and Moravia, and to those elsewhere who adhere to the faith of those countries.

II. All mortal sins shall be punished and extirpated by those whose office it is to do so.

III. The Word of the Lord is to be freely and truthfully preached by the priests of the Lord and by worthy deacons.

IV. The priests in the time of the law of grace shall claim ownership of no worldly possessions.

The compacts were declared invalid in 1462 by Pope Pius II (Æneas Sylvius), and in 1567 the Bohemian diet, then consisting mainly of Protestants, thinking that they formed an obstacle to their larger demands, decreed that the compacts should no longer form part of the fundamental laws of the kingdom of Bohemia.¹ Most historians have, therefore, considered the compacts as an attempt at compromise which was bound to fail. The writer of the present day who judges the events of the fifteenth century with greater impartiality than was perhaps possible at an earlier period will probably hold a different opinion. It is certain that the compacts were entirely adapted to the wishes of the nobles *sub utraque*, of the citizens of the Old Town of Prague and generally of the conservative townsmen of Bohemia, who at that time almost all belonged to the Utraquist Church. It is certain that later and more advanced Church reformers, such as the German Protestants, have greatly underrated the value of the compacts.

¹ See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, pp. 213-214.

They satisfied almost all the claims raised in the articles of Prague, and if the Bohemian people had consistently defended them they could have formed the foundation of a Bohemian national Church; they guaranteed Communion in the two kinds, a reformation, and stricter control of the clergy and the use of the national language in the religious services.

When this document was presented to the Council the divines assembled at Basel decided, on August 13, to elect a committee which was to deliberate on the proposals made by the Bohemians. A slight examination of the compacts shows that they could be interpreted in various fashions, and the deliberations were, therefore prolonged. Some members of the committee were entirely opposed to the granting of any concessions to the Bohemians, while others, laying great stress on the necessity of terminating the war, spoke in favour of granting the Bohemians such concessions as were necessary for that purpose. The committee finally declined the responsibility of a decision, and the question was brought before a larger meeting, consisting of about 160 of the foremost members of the Council. They all bound themselves to absolute secrecy. Palomar, addressing this assembly, declared an agreement with the advanced Hussites to be impossible, but thought that slight concessions would satisfy the moderate Utraquists. He therefore proposed that they should be granted permission to receive Communion in the two kinds. This concession had been, though reluctantly, previously granted by the Council. Palomar, however, advised that this decision should be kept secret for the present, and only announced to the diet at Prague by the envoys, who, as was now settled, would be again sent there by the Council. These proposals were accepted by all present, and Cardinal Cesarini then announced to the Council that a new embassy would be sent to Prague, that its mission was for a time to remain secret, but that everything that had been resolved was in conformity with the Catholic religion. A similar declaration was made

by Duke William of Bavaria, who, in King Sigismund's absence, acted as "protector" of the Council. The Bohemian representatives were entirely excluded from these deliberations, but they were, in accordance with Berruer's advice, treated with great kindness and hospitably entertained.

The Council had this time chosen only four plenipotentiaries who were to represent it at Basel; they were Philibert, Bishop of Coutance, John Palomar, Henry Toke, and Martin Berruer, who had all taken part in former missions. Leaving Basel on September 11, together with the Bohemian representatives, they arrived, on the 20th of that month, at Nürnberg, where a short halt was made. They were here informed of the important military events that had occurred in Bohemia since the first embassy of the Council had left that country. They heard that—as will be mentioned later—a Táborite force had entered Bavaria, but had been defeated, with great losses, at the village of Hilkersreuth. Civil war had again broken out in Bohemia, and the envoys would, on their way to Prague, have to pass near the camp of the Táborite army, that was then besieging Plzeň. In view of the fanatical hatred of the Roman Church which characterised the Táborites it appeared somewhat perilous to continue the journey. It was at Nürnberg also that the Bohemian delegates received letters from the estates of their country, announcing that the diet would meet in October to discuss the possibility of a general pacification, but that this meeting could not take place unless the estates were assured that the Council would accept the compacts in the wording in which they had been presented to it. The Bohemian envoys, as already mentioned, had at Basel been kept entirely ignorant of the deliberations of the Council. They therefore consulted their fellow-travellers, the representatives of the Council, who, pledged as they were to secrecy, gave an evasive answer. They, however, determined to continue their journey to Prague, and begged the town council of Nürnberg to allow one of the citizens, Sigmund

Stromayer, who had been their guide during their first visit to Prague, again to accompany them as far as Cheb. The town council granted their demand, and with Stromayer sent also "a servant who knew Bohemian and Latin fairly well, so that he could act as their interpreter." On September 27 the representatives of the Council and those of the Bohemian nation arrived at the Bohemian frontier. The envoys of the Council here again hesitated to proceed further. They, however, begged their Bohemian colleagues to obtain for them fresh letters of safe conduct, and, after having received them, continued their journey to Prague, where they arrived on October 22. November 11 was finally fixed on as the date on which the estates were to meet.

When the estates met the very grave political situation of Bohemia had first to be taken into consideration. It has already been noted that the rigid discipline maintained by Žižka in the Táborite armies had gradually declined. In consequence of the prolonged war it had become necessary to strengthen these armies by mercenaries, who, for the sake of plunder, flocked to the Hussite standards from all Slavic countries and even from Germany. During the first visit of the envoys of the Council to Bohemia comparative peace had reigned in the country, and even the continuous feud with Plzeň had been suspended. About that time a large army of the Orphans had entered the service of the King of Poland, who was then at war with the Knights of the Teutonic Order. The Bohemians here certainly fought as allies of a kindred Slavic country; yet as the Poles, with the exception of Prince Korybutovič and his followers, always upheld the cause of Rome, this campaign was by no means advantageous to Utraquism. The great military successes of the Hussites naturally increased their pride, and it is even now a subject of pride to Bohemians that the Hussite armies once carried the Bohemian standards as far as the Baltic Sea. In the autumn of 1433 the victorious Bohemians returned to their country.

Their brilliant victories in distant lands had not rendered them more amenable to discipline; they consented, however, to assist the Táborite forces, which had for some time been besieging the city of Plzeň. Exhausted as Bohemia already was it became impossible to provision these large forces. Insubordination became general, and both Táborites and Orphans indiscriminately pillaged the districts in which they were quartered.¹

Under these circumstances it was natural that the estates almost unanimously determined to take the necessary steps to prevent their country from drifting into anarchy or the despotic rule of a pretorian force. On this point veteran enemies of Church reform, such as Ulrich of Rosenberg, adherents of Sigismund, such as Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec—then still a Utraquist, though he afterwards joined the Roman Church—the Utraquist nobles, the citizens of the Old Town of Prague, and those of other cities which adhered to the moderate Utraquist party and the leaders of the Orphans, such as Lord Aleš of Riesenbourg, were entirely in agreement. Even Prokop the Great, who had left the camp before Plzeň to take part in the debates of the diet, was at that moment in favour of attempting to re-establish order in the land. As a first step to further this purpose it was decided to elect a regent, who was to be the head of the government up to the moment when it would be possible to elect a king, according to the ancient constitution of the land. That this decision by no means signified an unconditional surrender to Rome, as the advanced Táborites believed, or pretended to believe, is sufficiently proved by the personality of the regent who was elected. The choice of the diet fell on Lord Aleš of Riesenbourg, a member

¹ A contemporary chronicler writes: [the soldiers] "devastated the Bohemian land and caused a great famine in the country; for they took possession of all the churches and dwellings and robbed the people of all that they had, and carried it off, each one to his own home, and then sold it. And therefore did the Lord permit that, wherever they went, they were defeated" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 88).

of one of the oldest Bohemian families, but a man of small fortune. He had, since the beginning of the war, fought on the Utraquist side, and was at that moment one of the foremost leaders of the Orphans. The powers granted him by the estates were very considerable. He was empowered to take all lawful steps to re-establish peace in the kingdom. He was given power to convoke the estates, receive representatives of foreign countries, conclude treaties, and take all military measures necessary for the defence of the country. This decision of the diet was closely followed by important events which will be mentioned presently.

It was only after the choice of a regent that the estates were able to devote their attention to the negotiations with the envoys of the Council. On November 17 some of the members of the diet visited the envoys, and Rokycan, in a conciliatory speech, invited them to be present at the meeting of the diet which was to take place on the following day. On that day the envoys appeared in the great hall of the Carolinum, where the diet again held its sittings. Bishop Philibert and Palomar first addressed the assembly, and a prolonged debate on the interpretation of the compacts began. It continued for several days, first at the Carolinum and later at the dwelling-place of the envoys, where they were visited by Rokycan, Prokop the Great, Master Přibram, Ambrose of Králové Hradec, and other Utraquist divines. In these discussions the question of Communion in the two kinds naturally played a great part. The envoys of the Council continued their system of limiting all concessions, as far as this could be done safely. Lengthy discussions began as to the districts in which Utraquist Communion should be permissible, and as to the right of children to receive Communion. Other questions of minor importance were raised. The Utraquists wished it to be stated in the proceedings that Communion in the two kinds was "useful and salutary." The envoys, who always gave only a reluctant consent to all stipulations which sanctioned Communion in the

two kinds, at first opposed this proposal, but afterwards, declaring this to be "a matter of minor importance," accepted it. The knights and nobles who took part in the deliberations of the diet had now become somewhat impatient of the slowness of the negotiations. Through their influence the Bohemian delegates consented to accept the compacts in the form in which they had been presented to the Council of Basel, on condition that they should not be interpreted in a sense disadvantageous to the Bohemians. The representatives of the Council agreed to this, and members of both parties gave their hands to one another to confirm the agreement. This ceremony can by no means be considered as a formal treaty, as it was not performed in the presence of the diet, nor with its consent.¹ It indeed only requires mention because the adherents of Sigismund afterwards, when the Bohemians made demands on behalf of the national Church, declared that they had already agreed to a final settlement. The difficult situation caused by the renewal of the siege of Plzeň would, indeed, at that moment have rendered an agreement impossible, and it is obvious that neither party was prepared to bind itself till it was acquainted with the result of the now inevitable new civil war.

It was one of the principal demands of the Utraquists that Communion in the two kinds should be obligatory in the whole kingdom of Bohemia; they stated that if two different rites of Communion were admitted in the country this would lead to constant friction and strife. It was an obvious answer to this demand that the important city of Plzeň and many neighbouring castles were in the hands of the Roman party, and that it was impossible for the representatives of the Council to advise their co-religionists to abandon rites to which they had continued faithful during the whole war. The delegates of the Council were, on the other hand, anxious to save the city of Plzeň, which the Utraquists had begun to besiege immedi-

¹ Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 616.

ately after the first envoys had left Bohemia on their return to Basel. They therefore demanded that the Utraquists should consent to a truce with Plzeň. The representatives of the Council, who were in secret communication with the city, had received intelligence that it was then on the point of capitulating. All Utraquist parties agreed in rejecting this proposal. The regent, Aleš of Riesenburg, demanded that the citizens of Plzeň should recognise his provisional government and pledge themselves to accept the agreement which the diet would conclude with the Council. The advanced parties, of course, even more energetically expressed the same opinion. Čapek of San, one of the best generals of the Orphans, who had commanded their recent expedition to Prussia, spoke strongly in the diet against the armistice. The representatives of the Council left Prague on January 14, 1434. The negotiations were not, however, entirely broken off, and the envoys of the Council were on their return journey accompanied by a Bohemian envoy, Martin Lupač, parish priest of Chrudim.

It has already been mentioned that, during the first visit of the envoys of the Council to Bohemia, hostilities had temporarily ceased in the country. Very soon after their departure, however, the Utraquists, as already mentioned, began again to besiege Plzeň, long the principal stronghold of the Roman Catholic party in Bohemia. Since its abandonment by Žižka at the beginning of the war the city had always continued to be in the hands of the Roman party, and its immediate neighbourhood contained some of the principal castles of the nobles "sub una," who, though not numerous, were very powerful. The citizens of Plzeň found in them staunch allies and talented leaders, and, in consequence of the permanent danger to which the attacks of the Utraquists exposed them, they had become thoroughly accustomed to warfare. On July 14, 1433, the new siege of Plzeň began. The first troops to arrive there were the Táborite forces, under Frederick of Stránc and John Pardus

Shortly afterwards the levies of the Old and New Towns of Prague, and those of several cities allied with Tábor, arrived before Plzeň, and they were followed at a short interval by the army of the Orphans, under Čapek, which had just returned from Prussia. It is probable that some of the soldiers of the lords "sub utraque" also took part in this, the last joint enterprise of the Utraquists. At the beginning of August Prokop the Great also arrived before Plzeň and took the command of the besieging army. This army was concentrated in five separate camps, each of which contained the levies of one of the Utraquist parties who had jointly undertaken the siege. It was not attempted to starve the city, as the defenders had employed the respite which they had obtained in consequence of the negotiations of the Council for the purpose of strengthening the fortifications of the city. The Hussites therefore determined to invest the city thoroughly, and shortly afterwards opened a bombardment from all their positions. Many incidents prove that indiscipline had spread among the Hussite soldiers, and though their artillery had been brilliant during the earlier part of the war, it now seems to have failed entirely. Though Catholic chroniclers probably exaggerate when they write that no one was killed or wounded during the bombardment, it certainly caused scarcely any damage in the city. It is, at any rate, certain that the bombardment by no means discouraged the defenders. On September 1 they made a vigorous sortie at night-time, and occupied and destroyed one of the camps; the losses of the Hussites were considerable. To avoid similar occurrences Prokop decided to join his troops more closely together. The original plan of isolating the camps had, no doubt, been adopted to prevent conflicts between the different forces. The relations between the Utraquist nobles and Prokop the Great were already strained to the utmost, and the citizens of the Old and New Towns of Prague, who were to meet in armed conflict only a few months later, were already on very bad terms. At the

same time it was also decided to move the now united camps somewhat further from Plzeň.

The purpose of the close investment had been to force the city to capitulate by starvation, but this became more and more difficult, as the neighbouring German princes—to whom the Council had appealed on behalf of the citizens—constantly attempted to provision Plzeň, and, in consequence of treachery, which had now become frequent, succeeded in doing so on several occasions. On the other hand, it was becoming increasingly difficult to provision the Hussite armies. As discipline among the soldiers had gradually become very lax, the Táborite soldiers pillaged the neighbouring country and soon incurred the hatred even of the peasantry, who had hitherto always been faithful to the Hussite cause. We therefore find in contemporary documents much evidence of the execration which the people of Bohemia and other lands then felt for the Táborites, and Prokop the Great in particular.¹ A diligent study of the contemporary documents undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that Prokop's brilliant victories and the prominent position which he was able to assume, even in his

¹ It is curious to note that even at this moment, when the power of Prokop was more than vacillating, a letter should have been sent to him entreating him to mend his evil ways. I refer to the anonymous letter sent "sub nomine ecclesie Anno 1434 ante 30 Maii," and addressed: "Infideli Procopio contra Christum in campis degenti, et hunc crucifixum pro salute." The anonymous author writes: "Quid gloriaris quod in virtute sanguinis Christi frequens tibi arridet victoria bellorum? O stulta æstimatio! O superba jactatio! Nonne Alexander magnus cui deus Jupiter fuit totum mundum sibi subjugavit? Nonne Romani omnium idolorum cultores totum mundum superarunt? . . . Dicis enim sacerdotes in ecclesiis student avaritiis et vacant simonie in sacramentorum collatione; quod tu asseris absque veritate. Si tamen sic esset, quod alsit, ob hoc domus Dei non debet tradi incendiis, et Jesus Christus cum invenit in templo vendentes et ementes non templum incendebat; sed facto flagello de funiculis ejos ejecit et pie correxit. . . . Noram certe ex relatu te esse virum magni concilii, utinam in bono. Sed proh dolor talentum tibi creditum non posuisti ad negationem. . . . Totam enim intentionem ostendis ad nova peccata mortalia perpetranda, in novis homicidiis, rapinis, incendiis, pauperum oppressionibus. . . . Obsecro te igitur per viscera misericordie Dei nostri et per effusionem sui sanguinis pretiosi, obtestor ac per suum tremendum judicium ut ab ista vita damnabili resiliās." The length of this very interesting letter (printed by Martène et Durand, as above, Vol. VIII. pp. 709-714) unfortunately renders it impossible to quote it in its entirety.

dealings with the sovereigns of foreign countries, had had an unfavourable influence on the equilibrium of his mind. At the time when he was attacking the Church of Rome in the most virulent manner he, on several occasions, entered into negotiations with the Emperor Sigismund. After having agreed with the moderate Utraquists, who, at the Diet of Prague in the winter of 1433, had declared that the suppression of the turbulent and anarchical bands of the Orphans and Táborites was necessary, Prokop almost immediately afterwards rejoined the Táborite camp before Plzeň.¹

Though the Táborite and Orphan armies continued to pillage ruthlessly the country districts of Bohemia, it soon became impossible to provision a large army in the now totally devastated land. Prokop therefore determined to send a detachment of his troops across the Bavarian frontier to obtain provisions. A small force, commanded by John Pardus, at that moment one of the most prominent Táborite generals, entered Bavaria by way of Domážlice, and, according to the custom of the period, began to pillage the country mercilessly. The Bavarian Duke of Sulzbach, whose territory the Táborites had invaded, hastily assembled troops, and he received some aid from the neighbouring Burgrave of Nürnberg, Elector Frederick. After successfully concluding their raid the Bohemians were returning to their country when they were attacked by the troops of the two princes at the village of Hilkersreuth, near Waldmünchen, close to the Bohemian frontier. The peasantry, exasperated by the depredations of the Táborites, rose in arms against them, and in large numbers joined the forces of the two princes. The Bohemians, as usual, retired to their wagon-forts to defend themselves, but they

¹ Dr. Neubauer, in his interesting studies on Prokop, to which I have already referred, notes a great deterioration in the character of Prokop, and quotes several of his denunciations of the Church of Rome couched in most coarse and crude language. Dr. Neubauer adds the very penetrating remark that a long period of brutalising warfare affects the speech and writings of the people; he alludes to the similar effect which the thirty years' war had on the German language.

were this time unsuccessful. The wagons were stormed, and, according to the most trustworthy account,¹ of the 1800 Bohemian warriors only 130 men with their commanders, Pardus and John Ritka, Captain of Domázlíce, escaped and reached the camp before Plzeň.

This defeat at a moment when discipline was continuously becoming slacker in the Táborite camp, and when by no means groundless rumours of treachery were rife there, would in any case have had serious consequences, but the riot which broke out when Pardus returned to the camp made the situation even more dangerous. A mutiny broke out among the soldiers, who accused Pardus of treachery. The defeated general was attacked, fettered, and imprisoned, and when Prokop attempted to protect his comrade, who appears to have been perfectly innocent, he was himself insulted by the soldiers, wounded by a stool that was thrown at him, and confined in a prison.² Prokop was released almost immediately, and it appears that he then proceeded to Prague, where his presence in the autumn is, at any rate, certain. We have, however, very scant information concerning his movements at that moment, and this is generally perhaps the most obscure period of the Hussite wars. We have also only varying and, indeed, contradictory statements concerning the doings in the camp of Plzeň after Prokop's departure.

The proceedings at the Diet of Prague after the arrival of the second embassy of the Council have already been noted. Prokop the Great, who took part in these deliberations, spoke strongly in favour of re-establishing order in the country. As it could not be denied that the principal disturbers of peace were then the Táborites, Prokop thus broke openly with his party. It is likely that the opprobrious manner in which he

¹ *Bartošek of Drahonice*, p. 611.

² "Pardus reversus ante Plznam eadem septimana est a suis complicitibus captus et vinctus et dominus et presbyter Procopius tunc a quodam ribaldo dicto Twaroh fuit ad caput cum sede seu scabello graviter vulneratus et captus sed [post] paucas dies liberatus" (*Bartošek of Drahonice*, p. 611).

had been treated by those whom he had so often led to victory rankled in his mind. Later writers, whose authority is, however, slight, even state that Prokop now entered into negotiations with Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec and other Bohemian nobles, and only rejoined the Táborites when they begged him to do so.¹

It is, at any rate, certain that about the middle of December, 1433, Prokop returned to the Táborite camp before Plzeň. The deliberations of the diet continued up to the following month, but he had probably ascertained that the concessions which the Council was prepared to make would appear insufficient even to the most moderate members of the community of Tábor. He therefore, forgetting former grievances, returned to the army which he had so long commanded. It must here again be stated that the proceedings in the Táborite camp during the last months before the great defeat at Lipany are shrouded in deep obscurity; the contemporary accounts are few and contradictory. It appears certain that Prokop the Great soon regained the confidence of the army. He again proceeded to Prague in January 1434 as representative of the army and bearer of what may be called an ultimatum. He declared that the Táborites could accept no agreement with the Council which did not declare that Communion in the two kinds should be obligatory in the whole kingdom of Bohemia. There is no doubt that among the Táborite warriors there were many fervent Utraquists who considered it their duty to insist on this point. The Táborite armies, however, at this period included many German, Polish and Lithuanian mercenaries who knew no other craft except warfare. These men were certainly not anxious that a treaty of peace should be concluded. It is certain that the envoys of the Council, who had

¹ Professor Tomek, in his *History of the Town of Prague* (Vol. IV. p. 601, n. 34), quotes the words of these writers. The statement, to which the learned professor himself does not appear to attach much importance, appears to me very improbable. It is, however, characteristic of the atmosphere of mutual distrust and treachery which marks the last months of the Hussite wars.

secretly aided the defenders of Plzeň, could not accept this proposal, and they, as already mentioned, immediately left Prague. The Roman Catholic party attributed the failure of the negotiations to Prokop.¹

The political complications in Bohemia now began to overshadow the religious controversies with which they were so closely connected. The anarchical condition of the Táborite and Orphan armies became an ever-increasing danger. Irritated by their continued failure to obtain possession of Plzeň and by the famine which had broken out in the camp, the soldiers, now entirely beyond control, harassed and raided the country near Plzeň, robbing and murdering the peasantry. Prokop the Great, who would, perhaps, have succeeded in maintaining a certain amount of discipline, had not returned to the camp. The depredations caused by the soldiers had so greatly irritated the population that the people on several occasions rose in arms against them. At Horaždovic the pillagers were attacked by the soldiers of Lord Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec and defeated with great loss, and at Benešov the Knight John Malovec of Pacov surprised another band of Táborites at night-time and dispersed them. When the news of these defeats spread in the camp violent riots broke out, similar to those that had occurred on the occasion of the return of Pardus. The siege of Plzeň still continued meanwhile, but all hopes of starving out the fortress, which was considered too strong to be stormed, gradually disappeared. In the absence of all discipline the investment was not carried out thoroughly, and on several occasions the Catholic allies of Plzeň found means to bring provisions into the city. The citizens also received financial aid from various quarters. The members of the Council of Basel made a collection of money for the

¹ Brother Ulrick, already quoted, wrote, on February 19, 1434, to the abbot of Tegernsee: "Tunc isti de prædicta obsidione [of Plzeň] miserunt Procopium inimicum pacis cum aliis suis ad civitatem Pragensem qui impedi-verunt hoc sanctum opus unitatis et pacis quod prius acceptatum erat" (Palacký, *Urkunden*, etc., Vol. II. pp. 402-405).

defenders of Plzeň. A large sum of money was collected and safely remitted to the citizens. The depredations of the soldiery and their anarchical behaviour necessarily caused many defections from the Tábórite ranks. Thus one of their generals, Přibík of Klenov, secretly assisted the Catholics in sending provisions to Plzeň. Many Utraquists, who did not wish to aid the enemies of their creed, but strongly disapproved of the anarchical conduct of the mercenary troops, left the camp and returned to their homes.

Under these circumstances it was natural that the plan of ending the depredations of the Tábórite and Orphan bands, which had hitherto only been occasionally mooted, should now have been generally accepted. The regent Aleš of Riesenburg, whose election Prokop had approved of, and who had been entrusted with unlimited authority over the armed forces of the country, was justly indignant that the armed bands entirely ignored his commands. The Utraquist lords, among whom Borěk of Miletinek and Kostka of Postupic acted as leaders, first met secretly—the locality has remained unknown—and decided to force the Tábórites to desist from further warfare. The citizens of the Old Town of Prague immediately joined the confederacy of the nobles. The many victories of the Taborites had, however, rendered them so formidable that the nobles did not venture openly to oppose them, aided only by the conservative townsmen of Prague. They therefore—some of them somewhat reluctantly—decided to form a coalition with the lords “*sub una*.” It will be remembered that a similar coalition had once been founded previously, during the last year of the life of Žižka. These negotiations were mainly conducted by Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec, through whose influence Ulrich of Rosenberg, leader of the lords “*sub una*,” joined the confederacy with the consent of the Emperor Sigismund. John Palomar, whom the Council had sent to the Bohemian frontier to watch the events and to assist the citizens of Plzeň, took a large part in these negotiations, which were

carried on with great secrecy. It was also through Palomar's influence that Pribik of Klenov abandoned the Tábórite cause.

Events now proceeded rapidly, but before referring to the downfall of Tábóř it is necessary to allude briefly to an attempt made by Sigismund to enter into direct negotiations with the Tábórites. Sigismund, who was at that moment at Basel, sent a Bohemian nobleman, Habart of Adlar, to the camp before Plzeň, and proposed that the Tábórites and Orphans should negotiate directly with the King. The propositions made by Adlar are not known to us, but they appear to have been very favourable, for they were accepted not only by the Tábórites, but also by the Orphans, by whom hatred of Sigismund had always been preserved as a legacy of their dead leader Žižka. It is also probable that the Tábórite leaders, who had knowledge of the formidable league which was being formed against them, welcomed this opportunity of negotiating directly with the King. Sigismund, in whom duplicity was innate, undoubtedly entered into these negotiations without the knowledge of the Council. The Tábórites and Orphans then chose envoys who were to meet Sigismund either at Basel or at Nürnberg. We are expressly told that Prokop the Great was not one of the delegates chosen, as he was then in Prague; but it is probable that he was in favour of these negotiations, as he always preferred to come to terms with Sigismund rather than with the Bohemian nobility. While negotiations concerning the time and place where Sigismund should receive the envoys were still continuing, hostilities between the Tábórites and the Bohemian nobles began, and the negotiations were necessarily broken off.

Once formed, the league of the Bohemian nobles immediately took very energetic steps. To obtain the aid of the lords "sub una" the Utraquist nobles had been obliged to admit that the raising of the siege of Plzeň should be one of the demands which the league was to address to the Tábórites. They certainly thus renounced the claim of the advanced

Utraquists that Communion in the two kinds should be declared obligatory in the whole kingdom of Bohemia. Under the given circumstances the concession was an inconsiderable and inevitable one. The siege of Plzeň had proved a complete failure. Treason and anarchy were rife in the Táborite camp. The moderate Utraquists, particularly the nobles, desired to come to an agreement with the Council of Basel, as representing the universal Church. It was, however, certain that the Council would never admit that a small minority of the Bohemian people should be coerced into abandoning the practice of the Roman Church and into accepting the Utraquist teaching, to which the Church could at best only give a reluctant consent. At a meeting of the members of the league in March 1434 it was decided that all the confederates should pledge their faith to uphold the authority of the regent, and that they should summon the Táborites to disarm and cease to plunder the country. If they consented to do this, a free pardon for all past offences was to be granted to them. In case of a refusal they were to be treated as enemies of their country. All mercenaries who wished to continue their military career would, if they wished it, be enrolled in the army of the league. The Táborite movement has, like the French Revolution, found some unconditional defenders, who attempt to palliate even its worst features. These writers have declared that the moderate Utraquists were traitors to their cause because they opposed the continuation of the siege of Plzeň. The same writers also blame the members of the league for strongly denouncing the depredations of the Táborite bands; these accusations were, however, but too well founded; the Táborite bands at the end of the war were very dissimilar to the "warriors of God," whom Žižka had once led to victory. The impartial historian, though admiring the religious enthusiasm and heroic bravery of the Hussites, is yet obliged to condemn many deeds of the Táborites during the last and least glorious months of the war.

As an unconditional surrender of the Táborites was rightly

considered improbable, no immediate attempt to negotiate was made, and the summons of the league was by all considered a declaration of war. The league called on all its members to march with their levies to the Kačín hill, near Kutna Hora, which was chosen as rallying-point. The troops of all the Utraquist nobles rapidly assembled there. Among those present were the regent, Aleš of Riesenburg, Bořek of Mile-tinek, formerly one of Žižka's best generals, Henry of Wartenberg, son of Čeněk of Wartenberg, who had played so great a part at the beginning of the war, Kostka of Postupic, George of Poděbrad, a youth who was once to become King of Bohemia, and many others. The troops of Ulrich of Rosenberg and of other Catholic nobles of Southern Bohemia had not yet arrived, and the men of Plzeň, who afterwards played a considerable part in the battle of Lipany, were then still occupied in defending their town against the Táborites. The commanders of the league decided to make an immediate attempt to obtain possession of Prague. They may have thought that the New Town would more readily admit a Utraquist army than the Roman Catholic soldiers of Rosenberg. The Old Town, as already mentioned, had immediately joined the league. The nobles now summoned the New Town to do the same, but, largely through the influence of the fanatical preacher, Jacob Vlk, the citizens refused to enter into negotiations, and remained faithful to the party of the Orphans. The Táborites, informed of the plans of the league, hurriedly sent one of their generals, Andrew of Kerský, to organise the defence of the New Town, in which Prokop the Great, who appears to have remained in Prague since the beginning of the year 1434, also took part. The citizens of the New Town began the hostilities. They took possession of the Horská and Pořice gates of the Old Town and occupied several church towers, from which they opened fire on the Old Town. The citizens of that town immediately sent messengers to the army at the Kačín hill requesting aid. This was immediately

granted, as the generals of the league had already decided to force the citizens of the New Town to join the confederacy. The army of the league arrived before Prague on May 5, and, after marching through the Malá Strana, crossed by the bridge of Prague into the Old Town. They called on the citizens of the New Town to demolish the fortifications which they had constructed, to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Old Town, and to cease troubling the public peace. It appears likely that no answer was given to this summons, and none was probably expected. On the day of the arrival of the troops of the league an artillery duel began, and on the following day they, with their allies of the Old Town, took possession of the New Town without much bloodshed.¹

Though the capture of the New Town was no great military exploit it must be considered as a great success for the league of the nobles. They had thus deprived the Táborites of the powerful aid of the New Town of Prague, and had forced them to abandon the siege of Plzeň without any further effort. Prokop the Great left the New Town immediately after its capture.² He proceeded hurriedly to Tábor, the centre of his community, where he hoped to organise a new army in view of the decisive conflict which was evidently impending. On his way he sent a letter to the priest Prokop the Lesser, who was then commanding the troops before Plzeň. The letter³ is interesting, as throwing some light on the enigmatical character of Prokop the Great. He wrote: "Our Lord is omnipotent, He who after a storm grants calm and consoles His faithful after affliction. My most beloved brother in Christ! I wish

¹ A contemporary chronicler writes: "By God's dispensation few were killed on this occasion, sixteen or twenty at most, and only one house, that of Kučka, was burnt down" ("Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum," Vol. III. p. 88).

² According to the "Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum" Prokop the Great and Andrew of Kerský were expelled from the New Town of Prague after its capture by the army of the league.

³ The Latin original of this letter is printed by Palacký, *Urkunden*, etc., Vol. II. p. 411. Its fate is very curious; it never reached Prokop the Lesser; it was intercepted by the troopers of the Catholic Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg. The original is now preserved at Wittingau (Třeboň), in the archives of the princes of Schwarzenberg, who are descendants of the Lords of Rosenberg.

it to be known to you that, by God's will, the false nobles, with the Praguers of the Old Town, attacked our very dear brethren the citizens of the New Town; they killed some and, as we have seen, took possession of the city. It therefore seems well to us that you should, abandoning everything, move from the city of Plzeň in the direction of Sedlčany; for Čapek is assembling large forces, and we of Tábor will, we hope, do the same; for it is better for us to die than to leave unavenged the innocent blood of our dearest brethren, which was fraudulently shed. Farewell in the name of the Lord, who after our trials will console us." As mentioned in the letter, Čapek of San, the best cavalry general of the Orphans and Táborites, was rapidly raising troops in the district of Králové Hradec, where the Orphans had their most numerous and staunch adherents. Prokop himself still succeeded in obtaining a considerable number of recruits in the town of Tábor and its vicinity.

Though the contemporary records are silent on this subject, it yet appears that the exhausted population of Bohemia did not receive this new call to arms with great enthusiasm. This is proved by the fact that a comparatively small army of Táborites encountered the enemies at the decisive battle of Lipany. The first result of the capture of the New Town was the final raising of the siege of Plzeň. It was probably rather an excuse for this decision than its actual cause that about this time the Catholics again succeeded in provisioning the city.¹ On May 9 the besieging army retired from Plzeň, after having burnt their tents and destroyed the earthworks which they had erected. Besides the permanent armies of the Táborites and Orphans, the levies of the New Town of Prague, of Beroun, and of Žatec took part in the march. The few soldiers of the Old Town of Prague who were still in the camp were taken prisoners. For reasons that are not known to us the armies divided after a short time; the Táborites marched

¹ Some contemporary writers state that this provisioning was again the work of Přibík of Klenov. This is certainly untrue.

on Tábor while the Orphans, after crossing the Vltava, proceeded in the direction of Králové Hradec, the great stronghold of their community. We are not well informed as to the very rapid movements¹ of the two contending armies during the month of May. Prokop the Great's plan, that the whole army which had besieged Plzeň should march together to Sedlčany, was not carried out—no doubt because his letter was intercepted. Both the Orphans and the Táborites, however, appear to have agreed to attempt to regain possession of Prague. The Orphans, under Čapek of San, were the first to appear in the neighbourhood of the capital. The Utraquist nobles who occupied Prague, still hoping for a reconciliation, entered into negotiations with Čapek. The leader of the Orphans, however, made the surrender of the New Town a condition of peace, and an accord was thus impossible. Almost immediately afterwards—on May 17—the Táborite forces, under Prokop the Great, also arrived in the vicinity of Prague. The re-united Táborite and Orphan armies appear to have desired to give battle to the lords of the league under the walls of the capital. The lords, however, who expected large reinforcements, cautiously remained within the city walls. These reinforcements soon arrived. The powerful Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg, the faithful friend of King Sigismund and leader of the Roman party in Bohemia, sent a large force. The citizens of Plzeň and the nobles allied with them joined the army of the league, as did also the garrison of the Karlštýn, who, during the whole course of the war, had held that stronghold for King Sigismund. The new army which joined the Utraquist lords consisted of 10,000 infantry and 500 horsemen.²

¹ The Lords of the league occupied the New Town of Prague on May 6, the siege of Plzeň was raised on the 9th, and the decisive battle of Lipany was fought on the 30th of that month.

² " Ipso die sancti Urbani gentes dominorum Ulrici de Rosenberg, Johannis de Rabie et domini Menhard de Nova Domo . . . ante Pragam erant et dominus Johannes de Svamberk, Zdenko Drstka, dominus Aliso de Zylberg et de districtu Plzensi habentes sexingentos equites et decem millia vel circa peditum in adiutorium Antiquae civitatis Pragensis contra Taborenses et Orfanorum sectam venerunt " (*Bartošek of Drahonice*, p. 613).

On receiving the news that their opponents had received such strong reinforcements the Orphans and Táborites left the neighbourhood of Prague and marched on Kolin, to be nearer to the district of Králové Hradec, where they still had many adherents. Immediately afterwards the Utraquist nobles also left Prague and, following their enemies, first marched to Zaběhlíc, where, on May 26, their complete junction with the Roman Catholic allies took place, though the troops had already previously been in connection. The joint armies then marched on Český Brod and laid siege to that city, which still sided with the Táborites. Up to the day of the great battle both parties continued to receive reinforcements. At Kolin the Táborites were met by a few new recruits from the district of Králové Hradec, while several knights and nobles, who had hitherto wavered, at the last moment joined the army of the nobles. Finding more resistance at Německý Brod than they had expected the nobles, now vastly superior in number to their antagonists, determined to attack them as soon as possible. They divided their forces into four army corps; the first comprised the Utraquist nobles and their followers, the second consisted of the citizens of Plzeň, and the third of the troops of Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg. The fourth corps was composed of the levies of the three towns of Prague—the men of the New Town only reluctantly followed the standards of their enemies—and of those of the city of Mělník. Our information concerning the events that immediately preceded the battle is very insufficient and contradictory.¹ On the advance of the army

¹ The three most valuable contemporary accounts of the great battle are that of Bartošek of Drahonice, whom I have frequently quoted, and those contained in two letters, one written by Martin Husník, a soldier who, like Bartošek, took part in the battle, the other by the citizens of Plzeň, announcing the victory to some Minorite friars. Both these letters are printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, Vol. II. pp. 414–416. The best modern accounts are those of Professor Tomek, in his *History of the Town of Prague*, and of General Köhler, in his *Entwicklung der Kriegskunst in der Ritterzeit*. Dr. Toman, *Hussite Warfare*, is also interesting. Lately articles on some controversial matters connected with the battle have appeared in the *Časopis Musea Království Českého* (*Journal of the Museum of the Kingdom of Bohemia*) for 1898 and 1900, in the *Vešník České společnosti nauk* (*Proceedings of the Bohemian Society for Sciences*) for 1903, and elsewhere.

of the league the Táborites and their allies retreated from the neighbourhood of Kolin and took up a strong position between the villages of Lipany and Hrib, on the slopes of a hill known as Lipské, which is, in the southern direction, connected with a line of other hills. By this apparently retrograde movement the Táborite army had come somewhat nearer to Prague. According to a probably truthful tradition Prokop still hoped that the citizens of the New Town, who had submitted so easily, might rise in arms against the league. Well aware of the superiority of the forces of the enemy he determined to remain in this defensive position. Probably on the 29th his army came in touch with the troops of the league, who occupied a position the centre of which was the village of Hrib. The Utraquist nobles, who here again played the thankless though meritorious part of mediators, even at this last moment attempted to obtain a peaceful agreement. They alone understood that the victory of either party would be fatal to the principles which were dear to them, and which they had so long defended. The obstinacy of the Táborites, who opposed all compromises, caused the immediate failure of the negotiations. The Táborites broke them off, saying: "Then we will settle this matter with our fists."

The battle began immediately afterwards. The army of the league consisted of about 25,000¹ men on the morning of the battle (May 30). The whole army was under the command of Bořek of Miletinek, an experienced general who had fought under Žižka. With him were Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec, the regent, Aleš of Riesenburg, Nicholas Krchlebec, Burgrave of Zvikov, who commanded the troops of the Lord of Rosenberg, John Malovec of Pacov, and many other nobles whose names have frequently appeared in these pages.² We have less

¹ I have adopted this figure from Professor Tomek's work. According to Bartošek the Catholic forces amounted to 10,600 men. If we consider that the vast majority of the nobility of Bohemia was then Utraquist, their forces certainly amounted to 15,000 or 16,000 men.

² The contemporary chroniclers and, following them, the Bohemian historians give a long list of the nobles who were present. This list, though valuable for the records of the Bohemian nobility, has little interest for English readers, and I have therefore omitted it.

information concerning the organisation of the Orphans and Táborites at the beginning of this their last battle. It seems certain that the supreme command was now again assumed by Prokop the Great; under him Andrew of Kerský commanded the Táborites. The leader of the Orphans was Čapek of San, with whom was the priest Prokupek (Prokop the Lesser). Besides the permanent mercenary soldiers of the Orphans and Táborites the army comprised the levies of thirty-three Bohemian cities, Tábor, Králové Hradec, Domázlíce, Písek, Beroun and many others. A few nobles, among whom were Lord Rohač of Duba, Lord Kolda of Žampach, and the Moravian lord, Sezima of Kunštat, still remained faithful to the cause of Tábor. The united forces of the Orphans and Táborites amounted to about 18,000 men. On this occasion, as on many others during the Hussite wars, the artillery played a great part. As soon as the army of the nobles was within range of the Táborite artillery the wagon-forts, which had been formed in six columns,¹ opened a murderous fire on the enemy. Their losses were considerable, and the infantry loudly demanded to be allowed to attack the strong position of the enemy; this would probably have been unsuccessful, and it would at any rate have caused an enormous loss of life. Nicholas of Krchlebec, commander of the forces of the Lord of Rosenberg, however, by a skilful stratagem, succeeded in enticing the Táborites to leave their almost impregnable position. He placed four field-pieces in front of the vanguard which he commanded, placing the rest of his guns on his flanks, so that they could continue to fire while he advanced. After they had been fired once and the enemy had replied, he immediately advanced at full speed in the direction of the lager, before the enemy could fire again. It need hardly be mentioned that the slowness of the fire of the primitive cannons of that day rendered this possible. It was not, however, the intention

¹ "Die Hussen haben ihr Wagen zugerüstet mit 6 Zeilen." (Letter of Husník.)

of Krchlebec to storm the wagon-forts. When he had come near to them he suddenly retreated. The Táborites and Orphans raised the cry, "The enemies fly," left their wagons and rushed in pursuit of the troops of Krchlebec. Meanwhile the principal forces of the league had outflanked the Táborite lager on both flanks, broken down or climbed the chains that secured it, and attacked the Táborites in the rear. It is evident that the Táborites no longer had preserved the discipline which had formerly distinguished them. Though some of their leaders—according to tradition, also Prokop the Great—attempted to restrain them, they pursued the troops of Krchlebec till the general of the league ceased to retreat and turned on the pursuers. The Táborites now attempted to return to their camp, which had already been invaded by the main body of the army of the league. The battle now became a massacre. As soon as the defeat appeared certain Čapek of San, with his cavalry, and the Táborite captain, Andrew of Kerský, fled in the direction of Kolin. Čapek, whose cavalry might at least have attempted to cover the retreat, thus rendered the defeat even more disastrous. Almost the whole army of the Orphans and Táborites, except those who had fled with Čapek and Kerský, perished. The dead numbered 13,000 men or more. Both Prokop the Great and Prokupek fell in this battle. We have many accounts of the death of Prokop the Great. Though, in consequence of his priestly dignity, he generally took no active part in battle, he is said here to have rushed among the thickest foes and perished fighting desperately.¹ It appears more probable that Prokop perished with

¹ Æneas Sylvius writes: "Procopius ubi suos retinere non potest . . . inter confertissimos hostes dilapsus . . . aliquamdiu hostis impetum detinet multisque cæsis victoriam pæne hostibus eripuit: Sed non tam victus quam vincendo fessus telo in incertum misso transfoditur (*Historia Bohemica*, cap. li.). I have, in my *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia*, noted the similarity of this passage to the description of the death of Catilina in Sallust, who writes: "Postquam fusas copias seque cum paucis relictum videt Catilina memor generis atque pristinæ suæ dignitatis in confertissimos hostes incurrit, ibique pugnans confoditur." The *Historia Bohemica*, though a fine specimen of Renaissance Latinity, is historically almost valueless.

many other priests of his community, and that his body was only recognised on the following day.

Dr. Toman has written very judiciously that the battle had been very skilfully planned by the leaders of the army of the league. It is probable that the victory was mainly due to Bořek of Miletinek. His subsequent political career is probably the reason why most writers, particularly Roman Catholic ones, attribute the victory principally to Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec and to the leader of the troops of the Lord of Rosenberg. Bořek of Miletinek always remained a staunch Utraquist, and protected Rokycan when he was menaced during the short reign of Sigismund.¹

It will be my duty in the next chapter to study the momentous consequences of the battle of Lipany. The Bohemians had totally vanquished their countrymen, who had been victorious over all foreign enemies. As a Bohemian historian of the eighteenth century writes: "Thus the Bohemians could only be vanquished by other Bohemians, they who had proved invincible to all Germans, and had terribly spread their heroic glory through the whole world."²

¹ See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, p. 175.

² "Solcher Gestalten konnten die Böhmen nur durch Böhmen bezwungen werden, die bevor allen Deutschen unüberwindlich waren und ihren Heldenruhm fürchterlich durch die Welt verbreiteten" (Bienenberg, *Geschichte der Stadt Königgrätz*).

CHAPTER VIII

THE battle of Lipany was primarily a victory for the Emperor Sigismund. All men who now played a part in the political life of Bohemia agreed, some perhaps reluctantly, that their country must accept Sigismund as king. The King, on the other hand, seems with increasing age to have become more and more eager to enter into possession of his Bohemian kingdom. This is proved by the interview which he granted to Prokop the Great at Pressburg, and by his negotiations with the Orphans and Taborites during the weeks that preceded the battle of Lipany. The theological discussions at Basel, turning mainly on the interpretation of the compacts, continued uninterruptedly, though their interest was for a time eclipsed by that of the civil war. In matters of theology Sigismund now displayed a conciliatory spirit, and appeared ready to use his influence to obtain large concessions for the Bohemians, if they consented to recognise him as their sovereign. It is, however, more than doubtful whether these offers were sincere.

The members of the Council of Basel considered, or affected to consider, the battle of Lipany as a great victory of the Roman Catholic Church. A *Te Deum* was sung in the cathedral of Basel as soon as the news of the battle arrived there. Their judgment was somewhat erroneous. The Utraquist nobles, no longer fearing that their country might become the prey of anarchists, began again to devote their attention to the religious controversy. They were determined to uphold the articles of Prague and to enforce the recognition of the compacts in a shape as near as possible to the articles from

which they had been derived. It also appears probable that after the battle of Lipany a secret agreement between the Utraquist lords and the nobles "sub una" was concluded, according to which the former consented to accept Sigismund as king, while the latter agreed to support to a certain extent the religious demands of the Utraquists. A modern German Protestant writer,¹ therefore, correctly states that from the religious standpoint, not the Church of Rome, but Rokycan and the Hussite High Church were victorious at Lipany. The greater part of the life of Rokycan, who was elected Archbishop of Prague, belongs to a later period, but it may be stated here that if any man could have established a Bohemian national Church forming part of the universal Church it was Archbishop Rokycan.

It was mentioned in the last chapter that when the envoys of the Council left Prague in January 1434 Martin Lupač, parish priest of Chrudian, accompanied them as representative of the Bohemian diet. The envoys of the Council at the moment when they left Bohemia probably already foresaw the downfall of the advanced party in the country. They therefore assumed a somewhat intransigent attitude. When Lupač, who had left Prague somewhat later than the envoys, joined them at Cheb they informed him that, if was he proceeding to Basel to demand further concessions, it would be as well if he did not undertake the journey. Lupač, none the less, proceeded to Basel. Some time before the envoys of the Council left Prague they had sent one of their number, Martin Berruer, Dean of Tours, to the Council to report on the state of the negotiations. He stated that the Bohemian Diet had accepted the compacts in the amended form in which the ambassadors of the Council had presented them to that assembly. This was undoubtedly untrue, though such a statement may have been made to Berruer by some of the envoys. He also appears, no doubt impressed by the general

¹ Dr. Krummel, *Utraquisten und Taboriten*.

indignation against the Táborites which he had observed in Prague, to have believed that the disposition of the Utraquists was far more conciliatory than was actually the case. On the February 16 Martin Lupač was received by the Council. He expounded the claims of the Bohemians, which at that moment centred in the demand that Communion in the two kinds should be obligatory in the whole kingdom of Bohemia and in the margraviate of Moravia. This was the point on which, for reasons that I have previously mentioned, the Council was determined to make no concessions. The arguments of Lupač, who maintained the necessity of uniformity in Bohemia in this matter, were strongly opposed by Archdeacon Palomar. He laid great stress on the fact that, as previously mentioned, the negotiators of both parties had in Prague given the hand to one another. He maintained that this signified that an agreement had been concluded, though the diet had passed no act to that purpose, and no agreement could otherwise be considered as valid. After Palomar, the Bishop of Coire, John Naž, spoke in the same sense. Naž, who was a Bohemian by birth, untruthfully stated that King Venceslas had never permitted Utraquist services in three churches in Prague. It was afterwards ascertained that the bishop had left Bohemia some time before King Venceslas had—as previously mentioned—granted that permission. The Council finally decided to accept the view of Palomar, who still maintained that the Bohemians had promised to recognise the Council's interpretation of the compacts. They then determined to write to the regent, Lord Aleš of Riesenburg. Their letter stated that the Council had learnt with great pleasure from Dean Berruer that the Bohemians had pledged their word to accept the compacts in the form in which they had been sanctioned by the Council of Basel. As to further demands of the Bohemians, no discussion was possible till they showed sincere desire for peace and abandoned all hostilities against the city of Plzeň. It is interesting to note that when this

message was shown to King Sigismund he strongly urged the Council to use more menacing language. The Council declined to accept this suggestion. On February 26 Cardinal Cesarini delivered this message for the regent to Martin Lupač at a plenary assembly of the Council. The Bohemian envoy, after protesting against the accusation of double-dealing levelled against his countrymen, maintained that no definite agreement had been made in Prague. He then thanked the Council for its hospitality, and shortly afterwards returned to Prague.

King—now Emperor—Sigismund who had long been expected at Basel, at last arrived there on October 11, 1433. According to the contemporary writers he was during his stay principally occupied with the dissensions that had broken out between the Council and Pope Eugenius, in which he attempted to act as mediator. It is, however, certain that he continued to devote great attention to the affairs of Bohemia. His conduct was marked by his habitual duplicity. It has just been mentioned that when the Council transmitted a message to the estates of Bohemia Sigismund wished to render its wording more menacing. Yet he was almost up to the day of the battle of Lipany attempting to come to a secret understanding with the Táborites; these negotiations were, of course, concealed from the Council. Sigismund's intervention in the dispute between the Pope and the Council does not, of course, require mention in this work. It is sufficient to state that the Emperor departed from Basel on May 19, 1434, somewhat dissatisfied with the results of his visit. Early in June he arrived at Ulm, where he stayed nearly three months, and where he received the news of the battle of Lipany. He had called the German princes to an imperial diet at Ulm, but as the attendance was very small it was decided to defer the assembly to a later period of the year, and to invite the princes to meet at Regensburg. The Emperor himself proceeded to that city on August 21.

Immediately after the victory of Lipany the Bohemian estates determined to take the necessary steps to re-establish order and tranquillity in their country. This had been the principal inducement for men whose views differed widely on many matters to act in common. Only a few days after the battle of Lipany the Táborite general, Andrew Kerský and Čapek of San, the most talented of the commanders of the Orphans, who had retired to Kolin, though refusing to surrender unconditionally, agreed to take part in the deliberations of the diet, which was to meet at Prague on the day of St. John (June 24). Several prominent nobles and the municipalities of some towns concluded similar treaties with the victorious party. The diet met on the appointed day, and though it only lasted for a fortnight its proceedings have considerable importance. The assembly was very numerous. All the prominent Utraquist nobles, as well as those "sub una," were present, and many Moravian nobles, knights, and representatives of the Bohemian towns. Čapek of San and Nicholas of Padařov represented respectively the Orphans and Táborites. It was here decided to establish a regular provisional government, which was to remain in office up to the moment when Sigismund would be recognised as king; that this would now happen very shortly was already considered certain by all. Lord Aleš of Riesenburg was now formally re-elected as regent. All present, including the representatives of the Orphans and Táborites, agreed to this. They also, together with the towns and communities who were still in alliance with them, concluded an armistice of a year with the members of the league, and it was hoped that during this period the numerous local contentions would be settled by the regent, to whom full powers were granted with the consent of all.

All contending parties further promised to liberate the prisoners of war whom they had made. The diet limited itself entirely to the discussion of political matters, but as religious questions still largely absorbed the attention of the

people, it was decided to convoke an assembly of the clergy of all denominations, which was to begin its sittings on July 25.

Envoys of the Emperor Sigismund were present at the diet, and on their invitation the Bohemians decided to send an embassy to Regensburg, where the Emperor was then expected.¹ The members of the diet then separated with strong assurances of mutual good will. As settled by the diet the divines met on July 25. If we consider the strength of the odium theologicum of those days we are not surprised to read that the proceedings at this assembly were not as harmonious as those of the diet had been. Rokycan read to the assembly a lengthy statement² consisting of nineteen "articles," which, he stated, contained the true doctrine of the Bohemian Church. This extensive document declared that the writings of the Old and New Testaments were to be honoured by all, and that all should in their actions be guided by its teaching. The Bohemian Church accepted the Apostolic, Athanasian and Nicean Creeds and all the teaching of the primitive Church. The third article, confirming the first of the compacts, sanctioned Communion in the two kinds and maintained the true presence of Christ in the Sacrament. The fourth, fifth, and sixth articles were a

¹ Bartošek of Drahonice writes (p. 616): "Item eodem anno videlicet xxxiv . . . fuit magnus concursus baronum, dominorum, terrigenarum Prage, ubi etiam pars domini imperatoris suprascripti [Sigismund] affuit, videlicet dominus Ulricus de Rosenberg, dominus Puota de Czastolowicz . . . et alii quam plures servitores domini imperatoris, ubi conclusum est ex parte Wikkelfistarum, ut ad dominum imperatorem equitarent dominus Menhardus de Nova Domo, dominus Ptaczko de Rataj et dominus Czenko juvenis de Wartemberg, militares vero Benessius de Mokrowous, Czapko de Ssan, capitaneus Orphanorum . . . feria iii ipso die sancti Laurencii suprascripti et dominus Wilhelmus Kostka, Johannes de Smirzicz, magister Johannes de Rokycan et dominus Martinus Lupacz et magister Marcus ad dominum imperatorem Ratisponam transiverunt equites." Thomas Ebendorfer of Haselbach writes in his "Diarium gestorum per Legatos concilii Basiliensis" (*Monumenta conciliorum*, etc., Tom. I. pp. 736 ff.): "Ambasiata tertia ad Boemos [Jun. 24, 1434] anno quo supra . . . facta est generalis congregatio regni in Praga, ibique decreverunt solemnem mittere ambasiatam ad civitatem Ratisponensem ad habendum dyetam cum invictissimo Romanorum imperatore, desiderantes suam pariter et ambasiatorum sacri concilii presenciam at diem assumptionis gloriose semper virginis Marie [Aug. 15] quod et factum est."

² It is printed in full in Mansi Concil., XXXI. 279.

repetition of the other stipulations contained in the compacts. The seventh and eighth articles declared that the Bohemian Church recognised the seven sacraments, and declared that the holy mass should be celebrated in the form accepted by the Catholic Church. Articles nine, ten, and eleven sanctioned fasting according to the regulations of the Catholic Church, declared that priests should be tonsured and should wear a distinctive clothing, and forbade priests to receive remuneration for the exercise of religious functions. Further articles maintained the existence of purgatory, as taught by the Catholic Church, exhorted the priests to read Scripture diligently and to use the national language in the religious services as far as possible. The eighteenth article sanctioned the veneration of the saints and prayers to them for their intercession, but severely forbade the rendering to them of that worship which is due to God alone. The last article declared that the Bohemian Church, conforming to Scripture, would render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and formulated theories that appear very advanced for that period. The reader would almost think that the theory of a "free Church in a free state" was advocated, did he not also read that "the transgressors against God's law must be punished more severely than those who transgress the laws of men." Rokycan's theories, of which it has here been only possible to give a mere outline, are of great interest, as they to a great extent indicate the views which the Bohemian Church adopted up to its final destruction in 1620. It is true that in the last years previous to that date German Lutheranism had a considerable influence on the Bohemian Utraquists. It is not surprising that the extreme moderation of Rokycan's view displeased the Táborite divines, but it is less easily explicable that the faction of the Utraquists led by Magister Přebem, which was nearest to Rome in its teaching, also raised objections. Both the Táborites and the doctors of the university, who followed Přebem, formulated their objections in written statements. The assembly then separated

without having arrived at an agreement. It was, however, settled that the disputations should be continued on the occasion of the next meeting of the diet in Prague.

On August 10 the Bohemian embassy started for Regensburg. It was very numerous, and included members of the nobility and knighthood and representatives of most of the important Bohemian towns.¹ Including the armed escort, the whole expedition numbered about 400 men. Sigismund, desirous of at last obtaining the Bohemian crown and also of ending the religious controversies, which were now the only obstacle to his accession to the throne, begged the Council also to send representatives to Regensburg. The Council acceded to this demand and sent a very numerous delegation to Regensburg. Among its members were Bishop Philibert of Coutance and two other bishops, Thomas Ebendorfer of Haselbach, Martin Berruer, Henry Toke, Giles Carler, and others whose names have been frequently mentioned. The delegates of the Council arrived at Regensburg on August 16, an hour before the arrival of the Bohemian envoys. The Bohemians, who considered themselves as sent only to negotiate with the Emperor Sigismund, were reluctant to confer with the delegates of the Council, which had so often disappointed them. Several minor incidents contributed to render the relations between the antagonists more strained. Palomar visited the Bohemian envoys and begged them not to assist at the religious services in the churches of Regensburg, as this might cause scandal. Rokycan, as usual acting as spokesmen, said that the Bohemians had endured much blame and suffering because they had upheld the truth, and that they were prepared to suffer yet more, but that his colleagues of the embassy said that it would be better to drive out of the churches degenerate priests rather than pious laymen. Palomar replied that such evil priests must be tolerated till the Church had passed judgment on them. He added that the

¹ The names of the most prominent members of this embassy are given by Bartošek of Drahonice.

Council was considering a system of Church reform, but that this matter must be dealt with cautiously. John Velvar, a citizen of Prague and member of the embassy, then said that the Council of Constance had already talked of Church reform, but that nothing had been done. In reply Palomar stated that that Council had re-established unity in the Church, and that everything could not be done at the same time.¹

On August 21 Sigismund arrived at Regensburg, and on the following day he received first the representatives of Bohemia, then those of the Council. Rokycan as usual spoke in the name of the Bohemians. Sigismund replied very graciously, reminding them that he was their countryman, and that he was the descendant of him whom they had once called from the plough to their throne.² The Emperor then received the envoys of the Council. He again declared to them that he did not wish to interfere in questions of doctrine, but would in such matters be guided by their advice; on political matters, however, he would consult his Bohemian councillors. Such a distinction after a prolonged, mainly religious, war and at a time when religious controversies occupied the attention of all was, of course, inadmissible, and in suggesting it Sigismund cannot be acquitted of duplicity. Long discussions on subjects on which so many previous debates had taken place followed. The principal orators were Rokycan and Palomar. The Bohemians still upheld their demand that Communion in the two kinds should be declared obligatory in the kingdom of Bohemia and in the margraviate of Moravia, while Palomar and

¹ Tomek, *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 652.

² Přemysl. See my *Bohemia, a Historical Sketch*, pp. 10-11. Ebendorfer in his "Diarium gestorum, etc." (*Monumenta conciliorum, etc.*, Tom. I. p. 37) thus describes the interview: "Item die 22, qui erat octava assumptionis, die dominica mane, vocati ambasiatores concilii et Boemi per dominum imperatorem . . . Expectantes paululum, venerunt ambasiatores Boemorum pro quibus Johannes de Rokyczano in Bohemico assumens thema de evangelio 'Vade et fac similiter' deduxit quomodo dominus imperator a deo dodatus prudenter deberet facere justitiam et misericordiam ad instar Samaritani, precipue cum regno Boemie. Respondit dominus imperator in Bohemico se natum in regno et in Praga; si de popularibus agitur ipse ex istis est; succedit enim ei qui de aratro in villa quadam in Bohemia ad ducatum electus est, si de majoribus scitur quia de Luczelburg ad regnum illud vocati sunt sui progenitores."

the other representatives of the Council continued to maintain that at the diet of Prague the Bohemians had already accepted the compacts in the form which had been sanctioned by the Church of Rome. A further difficulty arose with regard to the choice of a new Archbishop of Prague. Since the death of Conrad of Vechta, whom the Utraquists had only recognised as archbishop after he had accepted the articles of Prague, that high office had fallen into abeyance. As the archdiocese would now comprise an almost entirely Utraquist population, the Utraquists proposed that in accordance with the traditions of the primitive Church the new archbishop should be chosen jointly by the clergy and the people (represented by the estates), and that the choice should then be confirmed by the King. There was some justification for this demand; for at that moment a Roman Catholic archbishop would have had no authority over the vast majority of his diocesans; many of them would have become the prey of the anarchical and socialist sects that were numerous at that time. Though Palomar promised some minor concessions, his answer on this important question was evasive. Several minor incidents, such as the one mentioned above, caused the Bohemians to wish to return to their own country and to leave Regensburg, where their reception had been by no means as friendly as formerly at Basel. As on previous occasions private conversations took place between the members of the antagonistic parties before they separated. The Utraquist lords attempted to persuade Ulrich of Rosenberg and the other lords "sub una" to accept Communion in the two kinds, rightly thinking that they would by conforming to the then universal custom of their country facilitate a general pacification. The Utraquists, however, met with a decided refusal. When at the end of August the Bohemian delegates returned to their country Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec and Ulrich of Rosenberg remained at Regensburg to confer with the Emperor Sigismund. It is probable that they advised him to grant, at least momentarily,

large concessions to the Utraquists. They may have suggested to him that his position in Bohemia would become much stronger as soon as he became its acknowledged sovereign. His advisers well knew that Sigismund was not very scrupulous as to keeping promises made under different circumstances.

Though the conferences at Regensburg had led to no immediate result, it was probably at this moment that the Utraquist nobles determined to abandon their demand that Communion in the two kinds should be made obligatory in the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. Though the destruction of the Táborite bands had principally been their work, they began to feel that they had lost a powerful ally should it be necessary again to take up arms. In their own ranks defections were becoming frequent. Through the influence of Menhard and Rosenberg some nobles had already abandoned Utraquism, and the bribes of Sigismund, which were as considerable as his chronic impecuniosity permitted, had caused some men to submit unconditionally to the Church of Rome.

The new Bohemian diet met on October 23, shortly after the return of the envoys from Regensburg. Its most important resolution was to send a deputation to Hungary, where Sigismund was then residing, to confer with him on the conditions under which the Bohemians would receive him as king. The diet also decided to enter into renewed negotiations with the Council concerning the all-important question of the re-establishment of the Bohemian hierarchy. This was an absolute necessity if order was to be permanently re-established. Though the battle of Lipany had been fought but a short time previously bands of Táborites had again risen in arms, and in Silesia there had been conflicts between Utraquists and Roman Catholics. It was thought that only priests belonging to the Utraquist Church would have authority over the people. The diet therefore demanded that the new archbishop and his two suffragan bishops should be elected by the estates and should belong to the Bohemian nation. One of the most important

results of this diet was the complete reconciliation between the theologians of the university, who represented the Hussite High Church, and the Orphans.¹ The latter now ceased to form a separate community. Some members of that community who held advanced opinions declined to accept this agreement, and preferred to join the ranks of the Taborites. Mainly through the energy of Rokycan the diet, however, succeeded in concluding a truce even with the Taborites. The moderate Utraquists—whom contemporary writers generally call the “Praguers,” as their leaders were the theologians of that university—and the Orphans, who had now joined them, came to an agreement with the Taborites according to which Magister Peter Payne, who, formerly a member of the Orphan community, had now joined the Taborites, was to act as mediator.² Both parties bound themselves to accept his decision with regard to the seven sacraments, purgatory, the veneration of the saints, and the form in which mass was to be celebrated. He was to base his decisions on the writings of Master John Hus, Master John Wycliffe, and his own, as well as on the stipulations of the agreement of Cheb. This referred to the decision of that conference that in judging the articles of Prague only God’s law, the practice of Christ, and the teaching of the primitive Church and the early councils should be considered as authoritative. It was specially stipulated that the question of transubstantiation, which the magisters of the university upheld as an indisputable truth, should not be submitted to the arbitration of Magister Payne. In spite of this clause the

¹ The chronicler in the “*Scriptores rerum Bohemicarum*” (Vol. III. p. 90–91) writes: “at this diet the priests of the Praguers and the Orphans like good Christians came to an agreement with regard to the Christian faith but . . . the Taborites would not agree to this.”

² *Volumus et promittimus stare scriptis magistri Joannus Hus, magistri Joannis Wicleff et scriptis magistri Petri Anglici in controversiis habitis inter nos Pragenses ex una et Thaborienses parte ex altera in materiis sacramentorum septem ecclesiæ, suffragii, invocationis sanctorum, rituum missæ, et purgatorii, sic quod magister Petrus omnia secundum scripta præmissorum et indicem pactorum in Egra [Cheb] faciat.* (“*Nicholai de Pelhřimov Chronicon Taboritarum*” in Höfler, *Geschichtsschreiber, etc.*, Vol. II. p. 704).

agreement must be considered as an important concession to the advanced party. The stipulation, obviously originating from Payne himself, that he should base his decision on the writings of Wycliffe was necessarily displeasing to the Hussite High Church. Hus himself had refused to be rendered responsible for all the statements of Wycliffe,¹ and the moderate Utraquists always resented the name of "Wycliffites," which the lords "sub una" applied to them. Rokycan now suffered the fate of most peacemakers. He had at Regensburg been accused of showing too great subserviency, not only to Sigismund, but also to the representatives of the Council; he was now denounced as having shown too much favour to the extreme Táborites. It is certain that at that moment the citizens of some of the towns who still sided with the Táborites were seriously meditating a renewal of hostilities. Rokycan and the theologians of the university rightly thought that all Utraquists should appear as a united body during the final discussions on the constitution of the Bohemian Church. Peter Payne did not immediately exercise his office of arbitrator. His decision was only made public two years later, after the termination of the Hussite wars and Sigismund's entry into Prague. As Palacký suggests, he probably wished thus to obtain for the Táborites at least a short period of respite and toleration.

The envoys of the Bohemian diet to King Sigismund arrived at Pressburg in November. The King at that moment laid great stress on the cession of certain Hungarian towns on the Moravian frontier which, contrary to their usual practice, the Bohemians had continued to occupy since their invasions of Hungary. This matter was settled amicably, but the negotiations for the purpose of a general pacification appear to have made little progress. These negotiations, which turned mainly on the fashion in which the compacts were to be interpreted, and now also on the establishment of a national Church in Bohemia, were carried on by means of the repetition of

¹ See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 18-22.

arguments that had already done duty on many previous occasions. They are, therefore, excessively wearisome, and it is here sufficient to note the principal occurrences.¹ At Pressburg, however, Sigismund declared that he could only act in unison with the Council, and he requested the Bohemians to meet him again at Brno, where he had begged the Council also to send its representatives. It must be admitted that during these lengthy deliberations, which continued from 1431 to 1436, the attitude of the Council was franker and more honourable than that of Sigismund. The Council had, though reluctantly, consented to permit Communion in the two kinds in the Utraquist parts of Bohemia and Moravia, and it had openly declared that it could make no further concessions. Sigismund, on the other hand, was above all things intent on rapidly obtaining possession of Bohemia, and did not hesitate to make promises which he had no intention to fulfil.² At this moment (about the end of the year 1434) Sigismund was again secretly negotiating with the Táborites. It is certain that he received envoys representing that community and told them that he had always been well-disposed to their party; he then spoke much of the avarice and malice of the priests, which, as he said, he had himself observed at the Council of Constance, at his coronation in Rome, and recently at Basel. The Táborites appear to have distrusted the King's overtures.

The only positive result of the visit of the Bohemians to Pressburg was the decision that Sigismund should proceed to Brno in Moravia, and that he should there again meet the envoys of Bohemia, who would now recognise him as their sovereign. The Bohemians would there also confer with the representatives of the Council. Before the Bohemians could

¹ Even the indefatigable Palacký mentions on one occasion the "Vielen Schwierigkeiten über die wir uns hier nicht ausführlich verbreiten können." *Geschichte*, Vol. III. p. 201.

² Æneas Sylvius writes: "Liquet imperatorem quum fœdera cum hæreticis paciscit, necessitate magis admississe quam voluntate: voluisse illum paternam hæreditatem quoquo modo intrare, sensimque regni possessione accepta more majorum subter veram Christi religionem provinciam reducere" (*Historia Bohemica*, cap. lii).

send their representatives to Brno it was, however, necessary that the Bohemian estates should meet in Prague to deliberate on the conditions under which Sigismund would be received as king. It had been agreed that the estates should meet on the day of St. Valentine (February 14), but, in consequence of the exceptionally cold winter, the deliberations of the diet only began on March 2, 1435. The regent, Aleš of Riesenburg, had some time previously received a short communication from Bishop Philibert of Coutance and other members of the Council¹ which proffered excuses for their delay in answering the letter concerning the Bohemian hierarchy which the estates had sent in the autumn of the previous year. The reply avoided answering the questions contained in the letter of the diet, and limited itself to stating that the Council would send a numerous and important embassy to Brno, which would take part in the deliberations during the stay of the Emperor in that city.

The resolutions of the "Diet of St. Valentine," as it was called, though its sittings began somewhat later than the day of that saint, are very important. The estates here formulated the conditions under which they were prepared to recognise Sigismund as their king. Their demands were certainly extensive, and it is obvious that the constant delays and what they considered the double dealing had irritated many. The somewhat reviving strength of the Táborites was probably also taken into account by the assembly. The document² which contained these demands consisted of twenty-seven articles. The most important stipulations were "that no man, and especially no German, should be received as a citizen by any town unless he communicated in the two kinds, that no one should hold office unless he communicated in the two kinds, that the Emperor should have no chaplain who did not communicate in the two kinds, that the Emperor himself with his court

¹ Printed by Palacký, *Urkundliche Beiträge, etc.*, Vol. II. pp. 435-436.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 440-441.

should communicate in the two kinds, that monks should not be again admitted into Bohemia, and that all those whose lands had been confiscated by Sigismund and his brother Venceslas should recover possession of them.

In other articles the diet again demanded that the Bishops of Bohemia and Moravia should be elected by the estates and referred to some minor grievances that do not require mention here. Though the estates well knew that their demands would meet with opposition at Brno, they yet determined to send delegates to that city, where they were to meet Sigismund and the ambassadors of the Council. Renewed feuds between the Táborites and Lord Ulrich of Rosenberg caused some delay, and it was only on June 19 that the Bohemians started for Brno. At the head of the embassy was the regent, Aleš of Riesenbourg, and among the nobles and knights who accompanied him were Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec, Ptáčěk of Pirkštýn, Bořek of Miletinek, Kostka of Postupic, John of Černín, Matthew Louda of Chlumčany. Numerous ecclesiastics accompanied the mission; among them were John of Rokycan and Martin Lupáč. Besides the towns of Prague the cities of Žatec, Loun and Slané had sent representatives to Brno. The prolonged resultless negotiations had somewhat embittered the Bohemians, and it was with regret rather than with surprise that they heard on their arrival at Brno that the delegates of the Council of Basel, who had arrived there some time previously, now maintained an entirely intransigent attitude. They attempted by repetition of previous arguments to limit the purport of the compacts as far as possible, and they also opposed a stern negative to the other most important Bohemian demand, the foundation of a national hierarchy. They declared that it was impossible for them to accept a Utraquist archbishop, and as it was probable that an archbishop elected by the chapter according to the regulations would displease the people, they suggested that the Council itself should name a distinguished ecclesiastic who belonged to no Bohemian party.

The Utraquists interpreted this as signifying that the new archbishop was to be a foreigner.

On July 1 the Emperor Sigismund arrived at Brno, and immediately devoted his energy to removing the obstacles which still stood in the way of his entering into possession of his Bohemian kingdom. On the following day Rokycan, in the name of the Utraquists, and Palomar as representative of the Council, expounded their views in the presence of the Emperor. Rokycan, who—contrarily to the wishes of the envoys of the Council, but by desire of Sigismund—opened the proceedings, stated that the Utraquists made three demands, namely, that the four articles of Prague should be recognised in the whole kingdom of Bohemia and the margraviate of Moravia, that Bohemia and Moravia should be freed from the accusation of heresy which had been brought against those countries because of the articles, and that the general reform of the Church should be carried out. In his reply, Palomar maintained his usual intransigent attitude. Very badly informed as to the political situation of Bohemia, he thought that after the battle of Lipany the Bohemians could easily be induced to submit unconditionally to the Church of Rome. A complete rupture seemed inevitable, and when the envoys met again on July 4 Rokycan asked the envoys of the Council if they considered their previous statements as final. If this was the case he feared that they (the envoys of the Council) could not say "God with us"; but "with us," he continued, "He always has been and, we hope, always will be." Palomar gave an evasive answer, and the negotiations continued for some weeks in a desultory fashion. The representatives of the Council now admitted that the Bohemians should, at least provisionally, be granted in a limited form the privileges contained in the compacts. The envoys of the Council, however, absolutely and consistently opposed the demand of the Utraquists that the Archbishop of Prague and two suffragan bishops should be elected by the

estates of Bohemia. Towards the end of July the Bohemians began to leave Brno, and it became obvious that the negotiations would here again be resultless. Those Bohemian delegates who had not already left Brno did so on August 3, after having declared that they would again defer the questions concerning the recognition of Sigismund as king and the solution of the religious controversies to the Bohemian diet.

Though the religious disputations at Brno had again ended in failure, the question of the recognition of Sigismund as king had made considerable progress. The negotiations between Sigismund and the Bohemians, in which Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec again acted as mediator, are very obscure. It, however, appears certain that on July 6 Sigismund, when conversing with some of the Bohemian envoys, assured them of his friendship and his conciliatory spirit and of his intention never again to war against their country. The Bohemians, whom prolonged experience had not unnaturally rendered suspicious, demanded that some written statement should be given them bearing witness to the King's conciliatory intentions. The King shortly afterwards, probably on July 25, acceded to their demand, and signed a document¹ which certainly granted the Bohemians considerable concessions. It was kept secret for some time, and for that reason the ordinary writers of the King were not employed, but the document was transcribed privately by one of the Bohemian envoys. It was only made public by Sigismund when at Stuhlweissenburg in Hungary on January 6, 1436. In this important document Sigismund declared that no benefices in Bohemia or Moravia should be conferred on foreigners, and that the King reserved to himself the right of conferring such benefices. No Bohemian or Moravian was to be summoned to appear before any foreign law-court or to be judged by it. The most important part of the document was, however,

¹ This document, entitled "*Proscriptio Imperatoris Sigismundi Brunnæ factæ nuntiis a Bohemis ad eum missis pro aliquibus articulis ultra compactata*," is published by Palacký, *Unkünden, etc.*, Vol. II. pp. 445-448.

the one containing the formal sanction of the election of the Archbishop of Prague and his suffragans by the Bohemians.¹ The King further declared that all parish priests in Bohemia and in Moravia should dispense the Sacrament in the two kinds to those laymen who claimed that privilege; if they refused to do so they were to be removed.² The document also contained regulations and promises concerning matters of minor importance, but it is the imperial consent given in it to the foundation of a Bohemian national hierarchy which renders it important. It is unfortunately almost certain that Sigismund never intended to fulfil his promises. The dispute on this matter continued beyond the period with which I am now dealing, and as Professor Tomek rightly remarks: "Sigismund publicly wrote to the Council recommending it to confirm Rokycan's election as archbishop; secretly he advised the contrary."

As had been settled at Brno the Bohemian estates again met in Prague in the autumn of 1435. The most important act of this diet was the election of the heads of the Bohemian hierarchy. The assembly chose sixteen of its members—of whom eight were ecclesiastics and eight laymen—as electors. They unanimously chose John of Rokycan as archbishop and Martin Lupáč, who has often been mentioned in these pages, and Venceslas of Mýto as suffragan bishops. The diet also settled to send a new embassy to Sigismund, who was expected at Stuhlweissenburg (Bělehrad) in Hungary. The envoys arrived there early in December and were soon joined by the representatives of the Council, who had also proceeded to Hungary. The Emperor was then hunting in the neighbourhood of Stuhlweissenburg, but he arrived in that city immediately before Christmas. As on previous occasions, dissensions immediately arose on the question whether the Utraquist

¹ Sed et hoc volumus, ut per dominos Boemos generosos, nobiles, strenuos, famosos, Pragam et civitates alias una cum clero archiepiscopus Pragensis cum aliis episcopis titularibus alias suffraganeis eligantur " (Palacký, as above).

² "Quod si non fecerint, non sunt tolerandi" (Palacký, as above).

Bohemians should be allowed to be present at the Church services. When Sigismund insisted on their admission the delegates of the Council absented themselves from those religious functions at which the Bohemians were present. They were, indeed, now less conciliatory than on any previous occasion. Though this is but slightly indicated by the contemporary writers, it is probable that the election of Rokycan and his suffragans had caused much displeasure at Basel. That these elections had been sanctioned by Sigismund was probably already known to the delegates of the Council, and they devised a very astute counter-move. In the name of his colleagues Palomar presented to the King for signature a document in which he engaged himself to prevent that any of his subjects should be forced to communicate in the two kinds by direct or indirect threats that he might lose rights or privileges. Another stipulation bound the Emperor not to interfere in any way in matters that concerned the doctrine or the power of the Church of Rome, nor to confer any dignities which the Roman Church had alone the right to grant; should he have secretly done so, such an act was to be considered as invalid. It need hardly be pointed out that by signing this document Sigismund would have immediately invalidated the promises he had made to the Bohemians, particularly with regard to the establishment of a national episcopacy. This document was presented to the Emperor on December 28, and some of the representatives of the Council immediately afterwards consulted Menhard of Jindřichův Hradec on this matter. Menhard had about this time—the exact date is uncertain—joined the Roman Catholic Church, and he was known to be Sigismund's most trusted councillor on Bohemian affairs. When consulted as to the promises which the Emperor was rumoured to have made to the Bohemians Menhard confirmed the truth of these rumours, adding that he could not advise the sovereign to break his word. As to the promise that Sigismund should not interfere in matters concerning the

doctrine and the authority of the Church of Rome, Menhard said that if such a promise were now made publicly the Bohemians would immediately break off the negotiations, if it were made secretly the King, after his arrival in Bohemia, would be in great danger, if it then became known that he had made such a promise. During the following days the negotiations continued uninterruptedly, the King almost daily receiving either the Bohemian delegates or the envoys of the Council, and sometimes both bodies jointly. Sigismund, who wished above all things to hasten his recognition as King of Bohemia, and who was in his heart a fervent adherent of the Church of Rome, considered these lengthy theological discussions both tedious and superfluous. He did not always conceal his irritation. During one of the audiences which he granted the Bohemians he declared that he wished to abandon his claim to the Bohemian throne, and advised them to seek for another king. On another occasion he rebuked the representatives of the Council for attaching too much importance to the choice of a new archbishop. He said that, as far as he was concerned, he did not care whom the Bohemians elected, even if they elected a donkey; it was not he who would have to ordain him.

On January 4, 1436, Sigismund presented to the envoys of the Council a new draft of a letter in which he, acceding to their demand, declared that he approved of the suggestions of Palomar. Though some stipulations had been modified, the new draft again contained the promise that Sigismund would not interfere in matters that concerned the doctrine and authority of the Roman Church. The Bohemians rightly thought that this was by far the most weighty point. When they were admitted to the presence of the Emperor immediately afterwards and the draft was read out to them, John Velvar, a citizen of Prague and a member of the Bohemian embassy, immediately protested, and in the name of his colleagues begged the Emperor's permission to return to Bohemia.

Matters once again appeared to have arrived at a standstill, but Sigismund, not usually much troubled by conscientious scruples, devised a scheme by which a rupture was avoided. The assurances demanded by the Council were now formulated in a revised draft, in which the passage containing the Emperor's promise not to interfere in matters concerning the doctrine and authority of the Church of Rome was omitted. On the suggestion of Archduke Albert, Sigismund's son-in-law, it was, however, agreed that the Emperor should privately and secretly pledge his word to fulfil the promises contained in the passage which it had been thought necessary to suppress. The envoys of the Council reluctantly consented to this proposal, and on January 5 the Emperor, in the presence of his chancellor, Count Šlik, and of his son-in-law, Albert of Austria, swore not to interfere in any way in matters that concerned the doctrine or authority of the Church of Rome. It is, of course, impossible to state what took place at these strictly confidential conferences, but it is probable that Sigismund begged the envoys of the Council not to delay his accession to the Bohemian throne, and that he at the same time promised them that he would, as ruler of Bohemia, further the interests of the Church of Rome. The events of the short reign of Sigismund in Bohemia—with which I have not to deal in this work—certainly render this conjecture very probable. It is a proof of the King's truly cynical duplicity that on the following day (January 6) he at last made public the document drafted at Brno in the previous year, which granted the Utraquists very considerable rights. It appears inexplicable that it should under these circumstances have been possible to come to an agreement. The delegates of the Council probably relied on Sigismund's secret promises, while the Bohemians were anxious to be reunited to the universal Church. The more advanced Utraquists may also, in view of Sigismund's advanced age and failing health, have thought that his reign would be a short one, and that it would

afterwards be possible to elect a king belonging to their own Church. As a token of reconciliation both the Bohemian delegates and those of the Council presented letters to the Emperor in which they declared that they accepted the compacts. It was then decided that the Emperor should again meet the delegates of the Council and those of the Bohemian estates at Jihlava in Moravia, near the Bohemian frontier. After all moot points had been settled there Sigismund was to proceed to Prague, accompanied by the representatives of the diet, and to take possession of his Bohemian kingdom. The Bohemian envoys then returned to Prague, and on February 29 the estates again met there. The elections of Rokycan as archbishop and of his two suffragan bishops were now made public, for it had previously been attempted, though somewhat unsuccessfully, to keep this decision secret. The estates then decided to send delegates to meet King Sigismund at Jihlava. They were, however, only to recognise him as their king and accept the compacts after they had received an assurance that the election of Rokycan and of his suffragans would be sanctioned.

I have already quoted Sigismund's own words concerning the importance which he attached to the choice of an Archbishop of Prague. He was, however, sufficiently astute to perceive the importance which the Bohemians attached to this matter. Unscrupulous as he always was he determined, in view of the opposition of the Council, to enter into communications with Pope Eugenius IV, who for a considerable time had been engaged in a bitter conflict with the Council of Basel. The Pope seems to have responded to Sigismund's overtures. Early in the year 1436 he sent a very courteous letter addressed to the "Lords, knights, Praguers, and citizens of the other Bohemian towns," in which he stated that the Emperor had requested him to grant certain concessions which were favourable to the tranquillity and glory of the Bohemians and their kingdom. He added that he was ready to grant these de-

mands. Though this letter only reached Prague after the sittings of the diet had ended, its effect was considerable. It strengthened the hand of those who, though faithful to the articles of Prague, longed for a reunion with the universal Church. It was thought that it would be possible that the Bohemian Church, should the Council continue intransigent, might come to an agreement with Pope Eugenius.

It had been originally settled that the meeting at Jihlava should take place early in spring, but a Turkish invasion of Hungary delayed Sigismund's arrival for a considerable time. He, however, arrived at Jihlava on June 5, on the same day as the Bohemian delegates. The envoys of the Council had arrived in the Moravian town some time previously. Negotiations began immediately, as all parties were anxious to secure the long-desired pacification. The Bohemians, according to their instructions, demanded that Rokycan and his suffragans should be recognised by the Council as holding the episcopal dignitaries which the diet had conferred on them. On the absolute refusal of the delegates of the Council to consent to this, some of the representatives of the Bohemian towns declared that they must consult their fellow-citizens. They could not—before doing this—accede to the compacts or accept Sigismund as king, without having received any assurance that the Council would recognise Rokycan and his suffragans. They soon returned, having apparently obtained the consent of their fellow-citizens.

It was only on July 5 that the compacts were accepted by all parties. This was done with great solemnity on the market-place of Jihlava. The Emperor appeared there in his imperial robes. He was preceded by Albert of Austria, who carried the imperial globe, the Count of Cilli—Sigismund's brother-in-law—carrying the sceptre, and the Count of Schaumburg, who carried the sword of state. When he was seated the delegates of the Council sat down on his right side. On his left side were seated the regent, Aleš of Riesenbourg, Menhard of Jindřichův

Hradec, Archbishop Rokycan and his two suffragan bishops. John Velvar then read out the compacts¹ and presented a document in which the Bohemians declared that they accepted the compacts and wished henceforth to live in peace with the whole Christian world. A similar document was then read out by one of the delegates of the Council. Immediately after this reconciliation Bishop Philibert of Coutance intoned the *Te Deum*, in which all present, Bohemians, delegates of the Council and members of the imperial court, enthusiastically joined. The whole city of Jihlava and the surrounding country rejoiced that the long religious war was at last ended. It remained to settle the differences between Sigismund and his subjects. It was hoped that these matters would be settled speedily, as religious questions had been the principal cause of the war. Though dissensions concerning the ever-recurring question of the admission of Utraquists to the religious services of the Roman Church still caused some delay, the Emperor on July 20 granted the estates of Bohemia a so-called "letter of majesty." In this document he conferred on his Bohemian subjects considerable rights and privileges, besides those already promised at Stuhlweissenburg. He undertook to maintain all the privileges granted to the Bohemians by the compacts, to have only chaplains belonging to the Utraquist Church, to force no one to rebuild the churches and monasteries that had been destroyed during the war, to preserve and guard the privileges of the university of Prague and to restore to it the lands of which it had been deprived. The King further declared that he had forgotten all that had been done against him during the recent troubles, promised to maintain all the ancient rights and privileges of Bohemia, and, according to the ancient custom; to employ no foreign officials in the lands of the Bohemian crown. He also promised to return to the

¹ The wording of the compacts, as finally accepted, differed so slightly from the former one, that it is sufficient to refer here to their contents as given on p. 311.

country the venerated Bohemian crown, and to retain at his court a certain number of councillors, who were to be appointed by the estates of Bohemia. The letter contained some other stipulations of minor importance to which it is unnecessary to refer here. On July 22 Sigismund published another decree, which granted certain privileges to the cities of Prague. On July 25 the nobles, knights, and townsmen of Bohemia again appeared before the Emperor, and John Velvar, again acting as spokesman, informed him that the Bohemians were prepared to receive him as their sovereign.

All difficulties were now removed, and though a short delay was still caused by the necessity of bringing the Bohemian crown to Jihlava, Sigismund started from that city for Prague on August 18. He arrived in the capital on the 25th of that month, and was received with great enthusiasm by the population.¹ He first entered the Týn church, where he was warmly welcomed by Archbishop Rokycan, and then proceeded to his temporary residence, near the present Celetná Ulice, as the royal residence on the Hradčany had become uninhabitable in consequence of the long war.

The entry of King Sigismund into Prague marks the end of the Hussite war. The long and bitter struggle had proved to be a drawn battle. Internal discord had prevented the Bohemians from obtaining a complete victory. Yet it is certain that by securing the recognition of the compacts the Utraquists had obtained a not inconsiderable success. If the privileges which Bohemia then acquired were always disputed and the compacts were successively repudiated by the Roman and the Bohemian Church, this is due to events which occurred

¹ Palomar, the delegate of the Council, thus describes Sigismund's entry into Prague: "*Tota civitas est plena populo, tanquam ad spectaculum magnum, et vere magnum et, non diu est, vix credibile: in quo agnoscendum est et cum laudibus et gratiarum actionibus memorandum, quoniam in manu domini potestas terræ; ipsius est regnum, et cui vult et quomodo vult concedit illud. Quod olim cum octuaginta millibus armatorum non potuit obtinere, nunc sine gladio, arcu et lancea pacifice est obtentum. Ipsi gloria, benedictio et claritas in secula sempiterna, amen.*" (Letter to Council of Basel, Palacký, *Urkunden*, etc., pp. 466-468.)

at a period subsequent to that of which I am now writing. The modern historian of Bohemia, Professor Tomek, who, though he was a fervent Roman Catholic, always wrote with absolute impartiality, very truly says:¹ "The Bohemian religious movement stirred up by Hus and his successors, who were able to carry away the majority of the nation, in its essence strove to reform the organisation of the Church, to encourage a more fervent interest in the doctrine of Christianity, and greater zeal for the fulfilment of the religious enactments. It therefore endeavoured to weed out the vices that had sprung up among a clergy that had become worldly. The minds of the people were also dominated by a particular devotion to Communion in the two kinds, overrating the importance of this practice, which had prevailed in the primitive Church." It is, indeed, impossible to understand the importance which the Bohemians of all classes at that period attached to Utraquism if we do not realise that to the Bohemians, great readers of Scripture, only Communion as they believed it to have been instituted appeared as a true sacrament. Every other form was "incomplete."²

It is certain that the originators of the Hussite movement were guided by very noble motives. The degeneracy of the Roman Catholic clergy at this period cannot be exaggerated. The study of Scripture, which, through the influence not only of Hus, but also of his predecessors, Milič and Stitný,³ had become general, prevented the Bohemians from tolerating these abuses with the same indifference as other countries then did.

In spite of the bitter invectives of the enemies of Bohemia, and in spite also of the perhaps more harmful writings of indiscriminate praisers of Hussitism, the period of the Hussite war will always appear to a Bohemian as the most glorious epoch in the annals of his country.

¹ *History of the Town of Prague*, Vol. IV. p. 664.

² See my *Master John Hus*, pp. 232-233.

³ See my *History of Bohemian Literature*.

APPENDIX I

JOHN ŽIŽKA

BY LENA U

TROCN OV's forest peaceful lay,
Bathed in fading sunset's glow ;
E'en the treetops lay as still
As their roots deep down below.

Lost in thought a horseman neared,
On his arm reins loosely wound,
Pacing slowly, dreamily
Sinks his steed's head t'ward the ground.

Suddenly the rider halts ;
As from dreamland he awoke,
Leapt his blade from out its sheath,
Haileth thus an ancient oak :

Here at this oak's gnarled trunk,
On a stormy thunder night,
By sharp birth-pains overta'en
Mother brought me forth to light.

Heard alone the wood her groans,
Midwife was the bitter blast,
That as blessings on the child
Lightning flashes round it cast.

'Gainst all dangers meant to brace me
For a warrior's hardy doom;
Merciless the cold hail beat on
Moaning mother's pain-torn womb.

Storm the first breath that I drew,
Thunderclap first caught my ear;
Hence a storm-bred suckling, I
Plunge now on my wild career.

Hus! beneath this oak I swear
Vengeance on thy death, for lo,
Hus, the earth soon crimson-red
With thy torturers' blood shall flow.

Hus, so freely from their wounds
Shall their blood stream forth therewhile,
That it could a hundredfold
Quench at once thy blazing pile.

Hus, the soil shall turn as black
As their smouldering forts, and I,
Wheresoe'er a priest be found
I will slay him, he shall die!

From the dense smoke-laden clouds
Shall the eye of God grow dim,
That they could commit such crime
In the very sight of Him!

Quenchless, Hus; within my breast
Burns a spark from thy death-pyre;
As their crime, so my revenge—
They shall dread my righteous ire.

O Bohemia ! Wilt thou list
To the oath I swear thee now?
Will my greenwood birthplace hear
This my solemn, sacred vow?

Soul and body here I tend
Freely for thy cause, until
Death o'ertakes me, list, Bohemia !
Stand thou still, my steed, stand still.

APPENDIX II

ŽIŽKA'S REGULATIONS OF WAR, 1423

WE, brother John Žižka of the Chalice, John Roháč of Duba, Alěš of Riesenbourg and Vřestov, John Potštain of Žampach, Bocěk of Kunštat and Jevišovic, Bartholomew and Bernard, brothers of Valečov Bartholomew, John and Martin, brothers of Vysoká, we, the burgomasters, aldermen, and citizens of the towns of Králové Hradec and Časlav, we, Benedict of Mokrovous, Jaroslav of the Chalice,¹ Venceslas Horina of Honbic, Christian of Žernosek, Francis of Litožnic, George of Rěčič, John of Studená, we, burgomasters, aldermen, and citizens of the town of Jaroměř; we, Zdislav Zeman, Lawrence Polák of Paňov, Blasius of Kralupy, Jacob of Březová, Peter Kralovec of Příbram, John of Domázlíce, John of Techov, Martin of Borovnice, Gallus Orebský,² and we, burgomaster, aldermen and all the citizens of the town of Dvůr; and we, Chůstník of Košov, Andrew of Studená, Šarka of Slavné, Křiž the captain, Beneš the captain, Michael Breda Odraný, Aleš of Hostačov, Polévka of Hoštka, Michael Orebský,³ Veta of Chlumčany, Litobor of Trubeč, Linhart of Sleza, Beneš of Hořovic, John Baštin, Mařík Velek Šeňk, George Roh, Nicholas Brada, the captains, lords, knights, squires and citizens without exception, and no one being excluded: We all, whose names are written above, rightly request, order and demand of you that there should be orderly obedience; for

¹ Žižka's brother.

² That is of the Orebite community.

³ See n. 2.

through disobedience and riotous disturbances we have suffered great losses, both as regards our brethren and our estates, and we have been shamed before the enemies of God. Now, however, with the help of God and of all the faithful, we hope to avoid this, and therefore lay down these regulations :

I. When we march out of some place and move to new quarters, no one shall ride or walk or drive in advance of the army to secure quarters or lodgings for himself ; neither shall any one encamp without the permission or order of the older captains or before the said older captains appointed for this purpose have assigned him a place ; and should any man encamp or march or place himself anywhere without order from these elders we wish to have revenge on him and punish him in goods and person, whoever he be, and of whatever rank, without exception in favour of any man.

II. When they¹ move on from the place where they have encamped with permission and by order of the appointed elders, they shall march to an appropriate spot and wait there till the whole army has moved from its encampment.

III. No one shall on the march or when we encamp light a fire or burn anything ; only those [shall do so] who are ordered to do so and appointed for this purpose, and this under severe penalty that no others may do so afterwards.

IV. Before we leave a town or begin a march or orders are given, all shall first pray to the Lord God, and falling on their knees before the Sacrament shall pray that the Almighty God God may deign to grant us His aid, that we may carry on His holy fight to His holy glory, for the increase of all that is good, for the salvation and aid of the faithful.

V. Then, when the men have formed in order, each troop under its standard, then the watchword shall be given and then all shall proceed on the march in that order that whichever troop is on that day ordered to march on first, shall start first ; and others shall not mingle with them nor impede

¹ *I. e.* the first detachments of the Army.

their march; all shall, when they have been placed in a troop and under a standard, march together in that troop in an orderly fashion, no troop mingling with another; all shall march carefully, guarding the van, the rear and the flanks of the army according to the orders they will receive from the elders.

VI. And should God ordain that we incur losses through some incautiousness or neglect on the part of the captains, either in the field or at the outposts or at the entrenchments, or at any other post that may have been entrusted to them by the elders or by the community, then [the captains] shall without exception be punished by death and loss of their goods, be he [the guilty person] a prince, a lord or any one else, without excepting or excluding any one.

VII. But if the Lord God grants to us to overcome and defeat the enemies, to capture towns, strongholds, or castles, and, either on the march or while encamped, to obtain booty, then shall these spoils and this booty be collected and brought together to a spot appointed and chosen by the elders, be it much or little; and for this purpose elders shall be chosen among all communities, the lords, knights, townsmen, and peasants, who will faithfully see that these things are justly distributed and divided among the rich and the poor as is befitting, so that no one may himself carry anything away or keep it. But if some one carries away anything or keeps it and he is conscientiously ¹ convicted of this, then such a man shall be executed, and lose his life and goods, as one who has robbed God and the commonwealth, whoever he may be, without exception in favour of any one; for thus was treated Achan ² because of the cap and the cloak of the king's daughter, or [such a man] shall die by some other death, be he a prince, noble, knight, squire, citizen, craftsman or peasant, without exception for any man or regard to his person; thus with God's help will we take vengeance on such a man.

¹ *I. e.* justly.

² Joshua, Chap. VII. vv. 19-26.

VIII. There shall be in our armies and amidst ourselves no quarrels, riots, or noisy disputes.

IX. If some man should strike, wound, maim or kill another, he shall be punished according to God's law and as God permits, without exception of any man and regard for any person.

X. Be it further known to you that, should any one steal away, walk, ride, or drive away from the army while we are on the march or encamped, without the knowledge of the elders who are mentioned above and without having the right watchword, then he, whether he be a prince, or a noble, or knight, or squire, or citizen, or craftsman, or peasant, or of whatever other condition, shall, when arrested, be, as a faithless thief who slinks away from God's battle and the army of the faithful, punished publicly by loss of his life and goods.

XI. Also will we not suffer among us infidels, disobedient men, liars, thieves, gamblers, robbers, plunderers, drunkards, revilers, lewd men, adulterers, prostitutes, adulteresses, or any other sinners, male or female; all these will we banish and drive away, or execute them with the help of the Holy Trinity and in accordance with God's law.

XII. Brother Žižka and the other nobles, captains, knights, squires, citizens, craftsmen, and peasants named above, and all the communities will, with the help of God and of the commonwealth, punish all disorders by banishment, by flogging, slaying, decapitating, hanging, whipping, burning, drowning and by all other punishments which are befitting according to God's law, with exceptions of no one, whether of male or female sex. And if we observe and fulfill the salutiferous articles written above¹ the Lord God will be with us with His holy grace and help; for it befits the warriors of God to live in a truly Christian fashion, loving discipline and fearing God, and to place all wishes, desires and hopes in the hand of

¹ The articles of Prague, which were published with Žižka's Regulations as a sort of Preface.

the Lord God without hesitation, expecting from Him eternal reward. And we beg you, dear comrades, of all districts, princes, lords, knights, squires, townsmen, craftsmen, peasants, villeins, men of all estates and generally all faithful Bohemians to agree to this good work and be skilful and helpful for this purpose. And we again will keep, fulfil and maintain [our promises] because of our dear Lord God and His holy martyrdom, for the sake of the freedom of the truth of God's law, for the glory of the saints, for the help of those who are faithful to the holy Church, and particularly for those of the Bohemian and Slavic race¹ ["jazyk"] and all Christianity, that the faithful may be glorified and all open or secret heretics and miscreants be shamed. Thus may Almighty God deign to grant us and you His aid and lead us to victory against His enemies and ours, and fight for us and with you with His might, and not withdraw from us His holy grace. Amen.

May the Lord God be with us and with you wherever you are and wherever it pleases the Holy Trinity (that you should be). And for better knowledge, confirmation, and certainty we who are named above, together with the clergy, have deliberately given our consent to this writing or letter,² and we agree to hold, preserve, and defend it with the help of the uncreated and eternally blessed Holy Trinity. Amen. May God grant this.

¹ Or language; the Bohemian word "jazyk" has both significations.

² *I. e.* the Regulations of War.


GERMAN NAMES OF BOHEMIAN TOWNS

As the German names of many Bohemian towns are more familiar to English readers than the Bohemian ones, it may be useful to give here a short list of some of these names with their Bohemian equivalents :

Alt Bunzlau	=	Stará Boleslav.
Ausschwitz	=	Osvěti.
Aussig	=	Ústí nad Labem.
Brünn	=	Brno.
Budweis	=	Budějovice.
Brüx	=	Most.
Caslau	=	Čáslav.
Eger	=	Čeb.
Iglau	=	Jihlava.
Komotau	=	Chomoutov.
Königgrätz	=	Králové Hradec.
Kuttenberg	=	Kutná Hora.
Lundenburg	=	Brěclava.
Miess	=	Stříbro.
Neuhaus	=	Jindřichův Hradec.
Saaz	=	Zátec.
Seelau	=	Zélivo.
Tauss	=	Domálice.
Wildenschwert	=	Ústí nad Orlicí.

It has not been considered necessary to include in this list towns whose German name is nearly, though not quite, identical with the Bohemian one, for instance, Lipan (Boh., Lipany), Pardubitz (Boh., Pardubice), Pilsen (Boh., Plzeň), etc.





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